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THE FRENCH PEOPLE 



/ BY 



ARTHUR HASSALL, M.A. 

STUDENT OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD 
AUTHOR OF THE BALANCE OF POWER, ETC. 






TFITH INDEX 



NEW YORK 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 

1901 



THE I. 19RARY OF 

ocwcness 

Two CociK3 KEoeiueo 

NOV. 29 IPOJ 

OOPVWOMT eioTKv 

CLASS Cl xXc. n,>. 

copy a , 



Copyright, 1901, 
By D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. 



a 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

I. — The arrival of the Franks ii 

The first period in the history of France — Gaul at the time of 
the Roman Conquest — Gallia Narbonensis — Roman Gaul — 
Lugdunum or Lyons — Teutonic invasions — The Visigoths — The 
Burgundians — The Franks — The accession of Clovis — His con- 
version — Brittany — Burgundy, Aquitaine — Kingdom of the 
Merovingians — The Frankish settlement — France Christian — 
Continuity with the Roman Empire. 

II, — The alliance with the Church .... 19 

Significance of the conversion of Clovis — He becomes sole sov- 
ereign of the Franks — A blow to Arianism — Religious unity — 
Stability and activity of the Christian Church — Its progress — 
Its influence — Its alliance with the Frankish kings — Authority 
of the bishops — The monasteries homes of piety and learning 
— The Church injured by the alliance — Ecclesiastical and lay 
aristocracy — Pepin d'Heristal and Caroling supremacy — Reor- 
ganization of the Church — Charles Martel — Pepin le Bref — 
His compact with the Papacy — His grant to the Holy See — 
Services of Charles the Great to the Church. 

III. — Charles the Great and his laws .... 34 
The Holy Roman Empire — The strife of ideas — Reorganiza- 
tion of states — Vassal kingdoms — The counts — The clergy — 
— The missi dominici — Feudalization of society — The scabini 
— The centenarii — The emperor's assemblies — The capitu- 
laries — The three great political events of Charles's reign — The 
revival of learning — Frankish power at its zenith — Division of 
the empire — Influence of the life and death of Charles on the 
history of Europe. ^ 



vi The French People 

CHAPTER PAGE 

IV. — Hugh Capet and Paris 47 

Decline and fall of the Carolingian dynasty — Service rendered 
by feudalism — Invasions of the Northmen — Their settlements 
— Carloman — Charles the Fat — Siege of Paris — Odo or Eudes 
— He is chosen kmg — Rollo or Hrolf — Charles the Simple — 
Robert, Count of Paris — Louis d'Outremer — Hugh the Great — 
— Hugh Capet — He is made king — Meaning of his election — It 
is the starting-point of all later French history — A triumph of 
feudalism — The Church and Hugh Capet— France in 987 — Be- 
ginning of the development of French nationality. 



V. — France and the East 64 

The crusades and French monarchy — Extension of royal power 
— Rise of communes — Weakening of feudalism and growth of 
a national sentiment — The crusades a Frankish movement — 
Jerusalem — Urban II urges a holy war — The state of religion 
in France — The Hildebrandine revival — The first crusade — 
The kingdom of Jerusalem — The contest with Saladin — French 
nobles in the fourth crusade — Capture of Constantinople — Louis 
IX leads two crusades — French energy and capacity revealed in 
the crusades — Their results to Europe and to France — Their 
effect upon the position of the French feudal nobility — Louis 
VI — Louis VII and the second crusade — National unity fos- 
tered — Prominence of French influence in Europe — Impetus to 
commerce on the Mediterranean — Additions to historical and 
practical literature. 

VI. — The annexation of Toulouse 78 

The noble spirit of the cnisades — Contrast with the intolerant 
motives of the Albigensian crusade — Value of the latter to the 
French monarchy — The county and city of Toulouse — The 
heresy of the Albigenses — Efforts to convert them — Forcible 
measures— The beginning of a fierce struggle — It takes a polit- 
ical character — Simon de Montfort — A second crusade — The 
north against the south — The Treaty of Meaux — Independence 
of the south destroyed, and the royal domain touches the Med- 
iterranean — Treaty of Lorris — Alfonse of Poitiers — Union of 
northern and southern France — Fate of the southern civiliza- 
tion — France becomes a great state and nation. 



Contents vii 

CHAPTER PAGE 

VII. — The administrative and intellectual progress 

OF France in the thirteenth century . . 89 

Difficulties of the French monarchy and its sources of strength 
in the thirteenth century — Feudalism destroyed as a basis of 
government — Baillis, seneschals, and prdvdts — Administrative 
organization in Paris — Concentration of authority — Connection 
of local and central organization — Enquesteurs — Louis IX's 
reforms — The Cour du Roi — The Parlement — The Conseil du 
Roi — The Chambre des Comptes — The States-General — Intel- 
lectual progress — Paris an intellectual centre — The University 
of Paris — Its relations to the Church — The mendicant orders — 
Robert of Sorbonne — The study of law and history — Villehar- 
douin and Joinville — Poetry in the twelfth century — Literature 
and architecture in the thirteenth century — The Roman de la 
Rose. 

VIII.— The Hundred Years' War and its result . . 104 

France at the beginning of the fourteenth century — Causes of 
the war — The Appanages — Rivalry of the Burgundians and Ar- 
magnacs — The mistakes of Philip IV and his successors — The 
English in Aquitaine — Attempts to expel them — Attacks upon 
them by Philip Valois — The Bordeaux merchants and the pro- 
vincials prefer the English — Philip forms an alliance with Scot- 
land — Magnitude of the struggle — Etienne Marcel and his 
democratic movement — Charles V — Defeat of the English — Gui- 
enne and Gascony pass into the hands of the French — Ability 
of Charles V — Incapacity of Charles VI — Henry V of England 
attacks France — French disasters and losses — Joan of Arc turns 
the tide — The end of the war — Recovery of territory by the 
French — The royal power again strengthened — The period a 
critical one for I' ranee — Lack of patriotism — Distress under 
Charles VI. 

IX. — The rebuilding of the monarchy . . . .117 

The Praguerie — A conspiracy of nobles — The houses of Or- 
leans, Anjou, Alen9on, Bourbon, Foix, Armagnac, Albret, and 
Brittany — The house of Burgundy — Philip the Bold — Philip the 
Good — Recoveiy of its strength by the Crown — Charles VII — 
The pragmatic sanction of Bourges — A standing army and a 
pernnanent tax granted — Louis XI — Po.ver of the Duke of Bur- 



viii The French People 



gundy — The League of Public Weal — Treaty of Conflans — 
Declaration of the States-General in 1468 — The middle king- 
dom — Philip de Commines — Fall of Charles the Bold — Success 
and achievements of Louis XI — Charles VIII — Annexation of 
Brittany — Charles ready for war. 

X. — France and the Italian wars . . . .131 

Beginning of modern European politics — The principle of the 
balance of power — The invasion of Italy — Duration and events 
of the Italian wars — Their results — An important epoch in Eu- 
ropean history — Rivalry of Francis I and Charles V — The inde- 
pendence of France preserved— Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis — 
Gains and losses of France — Gains of Europe — Protestantism — 
The Renaissance and the Reformation — The Anabaptists — Loy- 
ola, Rabelais, Calvin — Persecution of Protestants by Francis 
I — Bureaucracy — Financial disorders — Complaint of the peas- 
ants — Concordat of Francis I with the Pope — Civil war immi- 
nent. 



143 



XI. — The religious wars , 

Growth and aggressiveness of Protestantism — The Genevan sys- 
tem and Calvin's theology — The Counter-Reformation — Influ- 
ence of Calvinism — Religious divisions — The religious question 
predominant — Aim of the Huguenots — Policy of Catherine de' 
Medici and Charles IX — Massacre of St. Bartholomew — The 
League of Paris— A movement against the crown — Capitula- 
tion of Henry III to it — Unpatriotic attitude of Paris — A reac- 
tion — Failure of the League — The Huguenots support Henry 
of Navarre — He accepts the Mass, and gains Paris and France 
— Attitude of Henry IV toward the Church and the Huguenots 
— The monarchy triumphant. 

XII.— The triumph of centralization under Riche- 
lieu AND Mazarin 156 

The centralizing process under the Capetian and Valois kings — 
Checks to it — Policy of Henry IV — His death — Its effect — The 
monarchy weakened — Rise and work of Richelieu — The Riche- 
lieu tradition — The Thirty Years' War — A final effort of the 
Counter-Reformation — Danger from the triumphs of the Austro- 
Spanish House — Richelieu's measures to hamper the Haps- 



Contents ix 

CHAPTER PACK 

burgs — His foreign, colonial, and domestic policy — A religious 
revival — Richelieu's Church policy national — The nobles — The 
appointment of intendants a blow to their political power — De- 
struction of feudal castles — Administrative measures — The pays 
d'dtats — Death of Richelieu — Mazarin — Attempts against the 
office of first minister — The Frondes — Mazarin's triumph, 

XIII. — France and a world empire 170 

Prominence and enterprise of France — Ambitions of Louis XIV 
— The French nobles — Lack of unity and homogeneity among 
the provinces — The king concentrates all authority in himself — 
The nobles attracted to Versailles and pensioned — A bureau- 
cratic system organized — Supremacy in letters — " The Augustan 
age of French literature " — Control of the Church assumed — 
Colonial schemes developed — Plans to secure supremacy in 
Europe and displace the Hapsburgs — Alliances with Sweden, 
Poland, and Turkey — Colonization in North America — Pre- 
vious expedition thither under Francis I — Jacques Cartier in 
the St. Lawrence — The Huguenot colony in Florida — Cham- 
plain makes the French claim on Acadia effective — " New 
France " — The French West India and East India trading 
Companies — French settlements in India — The religious idea 
in the policy of Louis — His failures. 

XIV. — Failure in North America and India . . . 185 
Rivalry of French and English in North America — Defects in 
French colonial policy — French and English methods contrasted 
— Advantages of the English system — The feudal regime fails 
in the contact with freedom — Loss of her American colonies by 
France — Failure in India — French entanglements in Europe — 
The rise of Russia — The Austrian Succession War — French 
blunders — Establishment of Prussia as a first-class power — The 
Seven Years' War — Naval inferiority of France — The Peace of 
Paris — The idea of a world-wide empire and transmarine con- 
quest — England's rivals crippled — Her final success — End of 
the French colonial experiment. 

XV. — The shadow of the Revolution . . . . 194 
The Seven Years' War and the military reputation of France — 
Grounds for opposing the colonial policy - Ecclesiastical influ- 
ence in it — Choiseul endeavours to remedy the disasters of the 



The French People 



CHAPTER PAGE 

nation — Vergennes — Reforms needed — Anti-Christian character 
of the Revolution — Inefficiency of Louis XV — Weakness of the 
monarchy — Financial irresponsibility— Power of the courtiers — 
Pensions — Necker's compte r endue — Court intrigues — The bur- 
den of feudal dues — Unpopularity of the clergy — Voltaire, the 
encyclopedists, and Rousseau — The philosophers — The anti- 
religious movement and an anti-social crusade — Diderot — 
D'Alembert — The Encyclopedia — The Nouvelle Heloise — The 
social contract — Disorder and discontent — The States-General 
summoned. 

XVI. — The Revolution of 1789 212 

Three phases of the Revolution — The meeting of the States- 
General — Cleavage between the classes — The noblesse oppose 
the people — Social reforms instituted — Hopes for a constitu- 
tional monarchy disappointed — The constitution of 1791 — The 
Constituent Assembly — Its work good — The constitution of 
1791 — The Legislative Assembly — Labours of the Constituent 
Assembly nullified — The National Convention of 1792 — ^Jacobin 
rule — The Committee of Public Safety — The Reign of Terror — 
Robespierre — Saint-Just — Deputies to the provinces — The laws 
of suspects and of maximum — The war in La Vendee — Quarrels 
of the Jacobins — The Directory — The coup d'dtat of Fructidor 
— The Revolution of Brumaire. 

XVII. — The great Napoleon 231 

Napoleon's aim — His task — An organizer and a conqueror — 
Siey^s and his constitution — The consulate — Reforms by the 
first consul — The concordat — The University of France — The 
Code Napoleon — The Bank of France — The Legion of Honour 
— An equitable system of taxation — A despotism the price of 
this reorganization of administration — Napoleon's ambition — 
The passion for military glory — The Peace of Tilsit — The fail- 
ure in Spain — Spanish resistance — The Treaty of Erfurt — Na- 
poleon supi-eme, 1810 — The continental system — The War of 
Liberation — Waterloo — The fall of Napoleon — France in 1815. 

XVIII. — The romantic school and the Revolution of 

1830 250 

The Restoration — The reign of Louis XVIII — An outburst of 
literature — Two classes of men of letters — The aristocratic or 



Contents xi 



religious, and the liberal or patriotic parties — Independence of 
the Church restored — The Revolution of 1830 — The Doctri- 
naire Liberals — Louis Philippe — A brilliant literary epoch — 
Thierry and his histories — Thiers and Guizot — De Tocqueville 
and Michelet — Chateaubriand — Madame de Stael — George 
Sand — Balzac — Hugo and Beranger — Lamartine — Romanticism 
— Criticism and art — Incompetence of Louis Philippe's govern- 
ment — Guizot's optimism — Revolution. 

XIX. — The Revolution of 1848 266 

Causes of the Revolution — Weakness of the July monarchy — 
The doctrinaires — The provisional government — Lamartine — 
Proudhon's prophecy — The national workshops — Attempts to 
coerce the Government — The elections of 1848 — Insurrection 
of June 23d — General Cavaignac — Louis Bonaparte — He is 
elected president of the republic — The peasantry friends of 
order — The second empire. 

XX. — The Napoleonic legend and the second em- 
pire 278 

The coup d'dtatoi 1852 — The plebiscites — Napoleon Ill's suc- 
cess — Thiers and modern French policy — The " Idees Napo- 
leoniennes " — The memory of Napoleon I — The emperor's 
speech of October 2, 1852 — Character of Napoleon III — Theory 
of a democratic dictatorship — Fear of socialism — Napoleon III 
supported by the Church — The empire before i860— Subsequent 
decline — Napoleon's Italian policy — The commercial treaty 
with England — Failure to develop a constitutional monarchy — 
The socialist propaganda— Rouher— Weakness of the empire 
—Liberal reforms approved— War with Prussia— Fall of Napo- 
leon III. 

XXI. — The Commune and after 295 

Sedan — The Assembly overthrown by a mob— Government of 
National Defence— The siege of Paris— The armistice and elec- 
tions — The new Assembly and a new government — The Inter- 
national Association— The turbulent action of Paris — Two ideas 
of democracy — The communist revolution — Paris and France 
— Fall of the commune— The third republic— Thiers president 
—Marshal MacMahon— The Constitution of 1875— Monarchist 
attempts— New schemes of colonial expansion— General Bou- 



xii The French People 



langer — Victory of the republic — Acquiescence of the Church 
— The task of the Government — The danger from socialism. 

XXII. — The foreign relations of France . . . 309 
An important feature of French history — Hugh Capet and the 
crusades — Relations with England — The Hundred Years' War 
— Europe at the middle of the fifteenth century — New foreign 
policy instituted by Charles VIII — France and the Hapsburgs 
— The balance of power — The Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis — 
Religious conflicts — Henry of Navarre — The Thirty Years* 
War — Policy of Louis XIV — Friendship with England — Riche- 
lieu and Mazarin — Louis XIV supreme — His aggressive move- 
ments — The year 1688 — The Spanish Succession War — The 
Triple Alliance of 1717 — France and Russia — A question of 
alliances — The Austrian Succession War — The Seven Years' 
War — Lack of statesmen — The war of American independence 
— Vergennes — Influence of the Revolution on foreign policy — 
Mirabeau and Dumouriez — Europe in 1790 — The aff"air of 
Nootka Sound — The Family Compact — The Triple Alliance of 
1788 — Position of France in 1790— Mirabeau's speech on the 
right of peace and war — The partisans of peace — Danger of 
war — Le Comite Diplomatique — Memoir by Mirabeau — Hugh 
Elliot and Mirabeau — A peaceful settlement — The Girondist 
foreign policy — The War of 1792 — French successes — The Di- 
rectory and Napoleon — Failure of the foreign policy of the 
revolutionary and Napoleonic period — Foreign policy after 1815 
— It is forced to flow along new channels — A disastrous period 
— The Franco-Russian alliance. 

XXIII. — The France of to-day 363 

Modern France conservative — A republic for thirty years — 
Changes in the form of government between 1792 and 1870 — 
The revolutions of 1830 and 1848 — Republicans and monarch- 
ists — The Napoleonic legend — Political apathy — The people 
satisfied with a government of order — Democracy supreme — 
Religion and secularism — Religious intolerance — Progress in 
literature, natural science, and art — Need for a strong execu- 
tive — Work of the republican parliamentary system — Its peril 
— Governmental problems — Strength of the socialists — The fu- 
ture of France. 

Bibliography 379 

Index 387 



THE FRENCH PEOPLE 



INTRODUCTION 

France is a country which from Roman times has 
influenced the ideas of Christendom. Abounding in 
natural wealth, her compactness and central position have 
given her many advantages over the rest of Europe, 
Recovering rapidly from the onslaughts of the North- 
men, she led the crusades, and, having checked the 
feudal instincts of her baronage, became under Philip 
Augustus and Louis IX ihe first centralized national 
monarchy in Europe. In spite of her temporary efface- 
ment during the horrors of the Hundred Years' War 
she soon regained her lost position, and' under Louis XI 
was built up a great absolute monarchy for other nations 
to imitate. In 1494 her invasion of Italy inaugurated 
modern times, and France led the way in endeavouring 
to reconcile the movements of the Renaissance and the 
Reformation. Though she failed to establish her suprem- 
acy in Italy, and though for some forty years was the 
prey to religious and civil war, she suddenly under Louis 
XIII and XIV shook ofif her internal troubles, and, hav- 
ing suppressed the nobles, the Huguenots, and the Fron- 
deurs, dominated Europe politically and intellectually 



The French People 



for nearly a century. Her failure in the eighteenth cen- 
tury to compete with the colonial expansion of England 
relegated her for a time to a secondary position among 
the great nations. This retirement was, however, only 
momentary, for the French revolutionary wars found her 
with vigour unimpaired and the enthusiasm of her sons 
for noble ideals unabated. 

The victories of Napoleon, in spite of his eventual 
defeat and captivity, left France in possession of a Napo- 
leonic legend which is by no means a mere memory. 
And, though republican experiments have been and are 
still being tried, France remains " the centre of life, heart 
of Europe, France of Charlemagne, St. Louis, Napo- 
leon," with Napoleonic and revolutionary legends strug- 
gling for mastery. 

Her Geographical Position. — Her eastern frontier is 
partly arbitrary, partly natural. From Dunkirk a line 
drawn through the Ardennes forests along the Belgian 
and Luxemburg frontiers to a point on the Vosges 
mountains nearly opposite Strasbourg would fairly and 
accurately represent her northeastern boundary. 

Thence the line runs along the heights of the Vosges 
southward so as to include the pass of Belfort, and from 
Belfort it passes along the line of the Jura skirting Ge- 
neva and to the summit of Mont Blanc. 

It then follows the Alps till it deflects to the east so 
as to include all that was Savoy before 1859. Turning 
suddenly westward to the Pass of Mont Cenis it takes a 
southern direction along the Alps, skirts Dauphine, and 
reaches the Mediterranean about three miles east of Men- 
tone. This boundary has suffered many changes during 
French history, and under the Directory and Napoleon 



The Rivers of France 3 

France could boast that the Rhine itself was the eastern 
and northeastern limit of her territories. 

Four great rivers are to be found in France. Of 
these, the Rhone flows from north to south between the 
Alps and the Cevennes, and passes Lyons, Vienne, 
Orange, Avignon, and Aries before it falls into the Medi- 
terranean. Above Lyons the population is mainly Gal- 
lic; below it are to be found Ligurians with traces of 
Greek and Roman blood. 

The Garonne, which flows from east to west, drains 
Guienne and Gascony, and passes by Bordeaux into the 
Bay of Biscay. South of this river, in the southwestern 
corner of France, are still to be found the Basques, an 
Iberian race who are a dark people, untouched by foreign 
civilization and attached to seafaring pursuits. 

North of the Garonne the GalHc race is to be found, 
and it is especially pure between the Garonne and the 
Loire and between the Loire and Normandy. The Loire 
itself, like the Garonne, flows from the east of France to 
the western sea, passing by Nevers, Orleans, Blois, 
Tours, and Nantes. Near it the Angevin kings of Eng- 
land spent much of their time, and the whole region is 
one of the most interesting, historically speaking, in 
France. 

From the Vosges, past Troyes, Paris, and Rouen, 
flows the Seine, which empties itself at Havre into the 
English Channel. In Normandy, as in the northeast and 
east, an infusion of Teutonic blood is to be found, which 
is largely modified elsewhere by a mixture of Celtic blood. 

Bounded on the southeast and east by the Alps, the 
Jura, and the Vosges, with the Cevennes stretching from 
the Rhone to near Lyons, if we accept the long series 



4 The French People 

of heights extending from the Pyrenees to Mont St. 
Gothard, and excluding the mass of the Cevennes and 
the lower hills of the Lyonnais Charolais and Cote d'Or, 
France is mainly composed of a great plain divided into 
three parts by the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne, 
and peopled to a very large extent by Celts. 

With a temperate climate and a clever and industri- 
ous people, France has been by nature enabled to play 
an important part in the world's history. Certain char- 
acteristics in her development and in her government 
force themselves upon the notice of all students of her 
past. 

Her Wars. — The influential position always enjoyed 
by France was due in great measure to the frequent wars 
waged by her, either for conquest or defence. 

Her sons took a leading part in resistance to Islam 
and in the crusades, and spread all over Europe and the 
East the fame of the French arms and the knowledge 
of the French tongue. Her Italian wars, together with 
the long struggle with the Hapsburgs, which was waged 
by Francis I and Henry II in the sixteenth, by Richelieu 
and Louis XIV in the seventeenth, by Louis XV, the 
Committee of Public Safety, and the Directory in the 
eighteenth, and by Napoleon in the present century, 
spread the influence of French ideas far and wide. 

These wars, waged either in defence of France or 
for conquest, were often caused by circumstances con- 
nected with the geographical position of France or by 
the warlike tendencies of the races which inhabited the 
country. 

Leading Characteristics of the French Nation. — The 
history of France presents in its course many features 



The Love of Monarchy 5 

peculiar to itself and which differentiate it from that of 
other European countries. 

The steady growth of the absolute monarchy, due to 
the love of the majority of Frenchmen for a strong gov- 
ernment, to the financial maladministration extending 
over centuries, and to the gradual concentration in Paris 
of all the threads of government, can be traced clearly 
from the accession of the Capetian dynasty. The very 
checks to the increased influence of Paris and to the 
formation of a centralized monarchical system, as ex- 
emplified by the difference between the people living 
north and south of the Loire and by such institutions 
as the Parlement of Paris, impeded for a time, but could 
not stay, the regular development on the lines already 
described. In fact, such centrifugal tendencies as exem- 
plified by the Albigensian war, the adhesion of Bordeaux 
and the surrounding district to England for some centuries, 
the Huguenot attempts to gain an independent position, 
the rising in the Cevennes at the beginning and the 
Girondist movement at the end of the eighteenth cen- 
tury do but intensify the interest which attaches to the 
study of the history of a Latin nation possessed of many 
diversities of language, traditions, and aims. The Gaul 
of Julius C^sar, the West Prankish dominions of Charles 
the Great, the France of Hugh Capet, of St. Louis, and of 
Louis XIV, in spite of the irruption and settlement of 
ahen peoples, have in the main identical characteristics. 

Love of a Monarchy. — Of the above characteristics 
the most noticeable is the love of a strong government. 
The monarchy was always popular in France, while rep- 
resentative institutions never flourished. The monarchy 
was associated with triumphs abroad and with territorial 



The French People 



unity at home. Philip Augustus, St. Louis, Philip IV, 
Charles V, Louis XI, Henry IV, Louis XIV — all were 
supported by the mass of the French nation. 

In spite of periods of weakness the French monarchy 
always asserted itself successfully against its foes; it be- 
came absolute and despotic in the seventeenth century, 
and was not overthrown till 1792. 

Since the Revolution the French have professedly 
substituted the passion for equality for their veneration 
of a monarchical form of government. Napoleon's 
career was, however, popular, and a successful soldier 
who would satisfy the national love of equality and the 
universal appreciation of glory might hope again to con- 
trol the destinies of France. 

Financial Maladministration. — ^What overthrew the 
monarchy and has throughout the whole of her history 
weakened France was financial maladministration. An 
enormously rich country, France has suffered in a most 
extraordinary way from bad financial management. 

As early as the days of Philip IV the evil of financial 
maladministration had appeared, and in spite of the 
efforts of reformers like Jacques Coeur, Sully, and Col- 
bert was never removed. This serious drawback to real 
improvement in the condition of France was not due 
entirely to the despotic action of the Crown. The 
States- General of 1356 and 1357 committed grave finan- 
cial blunders, and found themselves compelled to re- 
establish the gabelle — as the unpopular tax on salt was 
called. Charles V, the greatest of the French kings before 
Louis XI, carried out many valuable reforms, but his 
financial measures are open to criticism. He compelled 
every family to buy a certain amount of salt, and, what 



Financial Mismanagement 7 

was worse, he frequently sold or granted exemptions 
from taxation to districts, corporations, and even to a 
class. His taxes were thus unequal and arbitrary, and he 
began the system of imposing customs on the transit of 
trade from one province to another. 

Undoubtedly his military and civil expenses, owing 
to the war with England, were high, and a similar condi- 
tion of things prevailed under Louis XI, while Louis 
XII's empty treasury was in great part due to the Italian 
wars of his predecessor, Charles VIII. At any rate, it 
was Louis XII who raised the sale of offices into a regu- 
lar system, thus surrendering the hold of the Crown on 
its own officials. Henry IV still further systematized 
this disastrous custom, and by instituting the paillette 
enabled the Parlement of Paris to grow into a powerful 
hereditary corporation, which henceforward showed its 
independence by becoming in the seventeenth and eigh- 
teenth centuries one of the most serious opponents of 
royalty. 

Richelieu had the power, but, unfortunately, had not 
the desire to carry out financial reforms. He openly 
proclaimed his ignorance and indifference to finance, in- 
terfering with it as little as he could. Had Richelieu 
given France an efficient financial system his country 
would have been far better able to cope with England 
in America and India during the eighteenth century. 
As it was, he never attempted to grapple with the 
unfair system of taxation, and his successor, Mazarin, 
also failed to carry out any improvements. Colbert, 
indeed, made a partially successful series of efforts to 
cleanse the Augean stable, but Louis XIV's wars and 
domestic expenditure, and the exemptions enjoyed by 



The French People 



the upper classes, reduced France soon after his great 
minister's death to a condition of semi-bankruptcy. In 
fact, it is hardly too much to say that if it had not been 
for the existence of a vast system of privilege, which, 
rendered financial reforms impossible, the Revolution 
would never have taken place. During the eighteenth 
century things worsened steadily. In spite of the efforts 
of such men as the brothers Paris and Turgot, the finan- 
cial maladministration continued, and was one of the 
principal causes of the outbreak of the French Revo- 
lution. 

That such a subtle evil should have been allowed to 
grow till it overthrew the monarchy was due in great 
riieasure to the lack of able financial administrators. It 
was also partly caused by the failure of the French to 
establish a check upon the executive, such as England 
has, in a system of parliamentary government. 

One of the most remarkable features in French history 
is the way in which the States-General never succeeded 
in establishing itself as a regular and recognised means 
of expressing the wishes of the mass of the people. 
The cleavage between classes and the isolated posi- 
tion of the provinces were the causes of this phenome- 
non, so difficult of explanation to the Teutonic mind. 
France, unlike England, never experienced the blessing 
of a Norman conquest to give her unity and ho- 
mogeneity. 

Grozuth of Paris. — And as the provinces, which were 
of diverse origin and interests, remained isolated and 
estranged from each other Paris increased steadily in 
importance till she gained her present position and 
dominated France. 



French Colonies 9 

This supremacy of Paris was finally and completely 
effected by the Revolution of 17^, which, in order to 
destroy all remains of provincial independence and to 
make France a really compact power, substituted eighty- 
three departments for the thirty-two provinces. Thus a 
united France was created, and being attached by a coali- 
tion the French were enabled to occupy the boundaries 
of ancient Gaul. 

Territorial Expansion. — Through the greater part of 
French history, certainly since the days of Francis I, the 
object of the great rulers of France was to extend the 
French borders to the Scheldt, the Rhine, and the Alps. 
Henry IV, Richelieu, Louis XIV, and Louis XV — all 
endeavoured, not entirely without success, to advance 
the French boundaries. Even to this day, in spite of 
the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, Frenchmen look for- 
ward to the time when the Scheldt and the Rhine shall 
be the border lines of France on the northeast and east 
frontiers. 

Failure to Found Colonies. — The endeavours of France 
to found a colonial system have not proved very encourag- 
ing. Successful colonial expansion and the power of 
forming self-supporting settlements across the seas seem 
to be denied to her. Yet France Had apparently admira- 
ble opportunities of anticipating England in the founda- 
tion of colonies and the conquest of dependencies in 
various parts of the world. But France was hampered, 
partly by the rooted aversion of her people to emigra- 
tion, partly by the methods used and the policy adopted 
towards her colonists, and was forced to see herself sup- 
planted in North America and in India by the less-organ- 
ized but more enterprising Anglo-Saxons. 



lo The French People 

The Position of France. — Her central position, which 
enables her to exer^se a controlling influence upon 
Spain and Italy, and which adapts her for wars of ag- 
gression, gives France at once a powerful influence in 
Europe, while her contact with the Mediterranean and 
her African possessions now brings her into connection 
with the far East. With her western shores washed by 
the Atlantic, her American interests are naturally very 
extensive, and though Louis XIV's extensive colonial 
schemes in Canada failed, France brought to the Ameri- 
cans in the war against England invaluable assistance. 

France is thus fitted by her position, by the character 
of her people, and by her history to excel in the arts of 
civilization no less than in war, both by sea and land. 
Her peasants, diligent, industrious, and conservative by 
nature, are always guided by the militant instincts of 
the upper classes and influenced by the existence of 
a powerful army. Both in the domain of thought and 
also by her arms France has in the past swayed Europe; 
it is by no means improbable that she will long continue 
to be one of the great centres of European political and 
social life. 



CHAPTER I 

THE ARRIVAL OF THE FRANKS 

From the year 121 b. c, the beginning of the Roman 
conquest, to the year 843 A. d,, the date of the break-up 
of Charles the Great's empire by the Treaty of Verdun, 
is comprised the first period in the history of France. 

During that period the country which we call France 
was occupied by Iberians, Gauls, Romans, and Teutons, 
and the French nation was gradually formed from a 
mixture of these three elements. The Gauls, who be- 
longed to the Celtic portion of the Aryan race, at the time 
of the Roman conquest, between 121 and 49 b. c, were 
divided into eighty or ninety independent tribes. Under 
the Romans Gaul included not only modern France, but 
also Switzerland, Alsace, and Belgium — in other words, 
the lands between the Alps, the Rhine, the Pyrenees, and 
the ocean. In later French history Louis XIV attempted 
to extend France to these ancient boundaries of Gaul, while 
the French Revolutionary armies in 1794 and following 
years successfully carried out the aim of the Grand Mo- 
narque, but Napoleon, fortunately for Europe, failed to 
grasp the opportunity presented to him, as late as 1814, 
for establishing the Rhine as the French boundary on 
the east. 



12 The French People 

At the period of the Roman conquest the north of 
Gaul was not far advanced in civiHzation, while the south, 
where the Gauls traded with the Greeks, was more devel- 
oped, and was accustomed to letters and to coined money. 
Massilia, or Marseilles, was practically a Greek city whose 
influence extended from Nice to Montpellier and far up 
the Rhone Valley. But the Gauls were under the influ- 
ence of the Druids; they had no organized military sys- 
tem, they had no political unity, and, like the Anglo- 
Saxons before the reign of Athelstan, they had no real 
city life. In Aquitania, in the southwest, lived the 
Iberians who inhabited Gaul before the Gauls, and whose 
descendants, the Basques, so celebrated as hardy sailors, 
still reside under the shadow of the Pyrenees and speak 
a strange language; to the east the Ligurians, whose 
tongue is extinct, dwelt on the Mediterranean Riviera; 
while on the centre and northeast the German tribes were 
ever threatening to overrun Gaul. 

Till the fall of the Roman Empire Julius Caesar and 
his Roman successors kept these fierce Teutons at bay, 
but after 476 a. d. they oC?;upied Gaul and eventually 
gave it the name of France. 

Between 121 and 58 b. c. Rome contented herself 
with occupying Gallia Narbonensis — i. e., all southeastern 
Gaul which was not influenced by Marseilles — and Nar- 
bonne became, its capital. It gradually was extended so as 
to include all the land between the Rhone, the Cevennes, 
and the Pyrenees. This district has always remained 
distinct from the rest of France, and its sons developed 
qualities not found among the stolid inhabitants of Nor- 
mandy or the keener dwellers in Brittany. Julius Caesar, 
however, conquered the whole of Gaul between 58 and 



Roman Gaul 13 

51 B. c, the fall of Alesia and the capture of Vercingetorix 
in 52 B. c. deciding the fate of the country. " Hence- 
forward," writes Mr. Warde Fowler, " that splendid 
country with its gifted population was to exercise an 
ever-increasing influence on European history; an influ- 
ence on the whole for good, and one which, in some ways 
at least, has surpassed that of every other European 
race."* Finally in 49 b. c. Julius Caesar annexed the 
Massiliot land to Gallia Narbonensis. All Gaul was now 
subject to Rome. 

Between 27 b. c. and 250 a. d. Gaul was organized 
and Romanized, principally through the efforts of 
Augustus. Narbonensis, in the south, had its own mu- 
nicipal system based on' the Roman model, while the 
rest of France was divided into three provinces — Belgica 
in the north, Lugdunensis in the centre, and Aquitania in 
the southwest, and the sixty-four tribes who inhabited the 
country were given what practically amounted to home 
rule under the great landowners. 

Lugdunum, or Lyons, was the capital of these tribes, 
a great commercial city, and the meeting-place of a coun- 
cil of representatives of each tribe, which met each 
August to maintain the state worship — the centre of the 
Roman administration. An armed force was stationed 
along the eastern frontier, which preserved Gaul from 
fear of invasion and overawed the warlike Teutonic tribes. 

Under this regime Gaul enjoyed peace for some three 
centuries, and by the end of that period the Romanization 
of the country was completed and the provincials had 
become free Roman citizens. But from about the year 

* Julius Caesar, by W. Warde Fowler, p. 23 f. 



14 The French People 

250 A. D. a long period of storm and stress succeeded 
the years of prosperous though uneventful peace. 

From the year 250 a. d. Gaul suffered from constant 
invasions of the Teutons. The Roman Empire was 
steadily decaying, its population was declining, and its 
power of resistance was lessening. Of the invading Ger- 
man hordes the Alamanni and the Franks proved the 
most dangerous, and the east of Gaul especially suffered 
from their ravages. 

From the reign and policy of Diocletian (284-305) 
Gaul experienced a certain amount of relief. He divided 
the empire into four parts, placing a ruler over each; and 
Spain, Gaul, and Britain, first under Maximian, and then 
under Constantius Clorus, Julian, and Valentinian I, were 
able for a time to hold their own against their foes. 

At last in 330 Constantine the Great set up Constan- 
tinople as a new capital of the empire, which after the 
death of Theodosius, in 395, split into the Western and 
the Eastern Empires. While the Eastern Empire sur- 
vived till the capture of Constantinople, in 1453, the 
Western Empire perished, and for a time anarchy super- 
vened. 

With the end of the period of anarchy a new epoch 
in the history of Gaul was opened, and the kingdoms of 
the Visigoths, Burgundians, and Franks took the place 
in Gaul of the rule of the Roman Empire. The Visi- 
gothic kingdom about the year 500 extended from the 
Loire and Rhone to the south of Spain, and thus included 
all southwestern Gaul, while the Burgundians, fixing their 
capital at Lugdunum (Lyons), held most of southeastern 
Gaul. 

The Franks, who arrived last, came, like the Danes 



The Accession of Clovis 15 

Into England in the ninth century, in tribes and settled 
in northern Gaul. 

Of the two great portions into which the Prankish 
nation was divided about the middle of the fifth century, 
the Ripuarians established themselves about Cologne, 
while the Salian Franks advanced beyond the Scheldt 
and the Meuse. 

These Salian Franks had developed into a nation with 
a legal system, the Salic law, and with a well-recognised 
royal power in the hands of the Merovingian family. 
Round Cambrai and Tournai (Cameracum and Torna- 
cum) were their most important settlements, but in the 
latter half of the sixth century events occurred which 
had a very important bearing on the future of their race. 

The Roman Empire still existed, and in 451 Aetius, 
" the last of the Romans," with Roman troops overthrew 
Attila the Hun at Chalons in what has been called one of 
the decisive battles of the world. In 476 the last Em- 
peror of Rome, Romulus Augustulus, was deposed, and 
in 486 Syagrius, a Gallo-Roman noble who attempted to 
hold his own against the Teutons, was overthrown near 
Soissons by Clovis, who in 481 had become king of the 
Salian Franks. 

The accession of Clovis marks the beginning of the 
supremacy of the Franks in the west, while the battle 
of Soissons decided the fate of northern Gaul. The next 
ten years were occupied by the Franks in strengthening 
their hold on all Gaul north of the Loire and in preparing 
for further conquests. 

During these years Clovis conquered the Alamanni 

beyond the Rhine and became a Christian. From 446 to 

510 he made Burgundy a tributary state, and, what was 

» 



i6 The French People 

even more important in the history of France, he over- 
threw the Visigoths at the battle of Vougle in 507, over- 
ran the country to the Garonne, and, though he was 
defeated near Aries, he continued to hold all Aquitaine 
between the Garonne and the Loire. It was not till the 
fifteenth century that this troublesome region was finally 
united to the French monarchy. Before he died he 
made himself the only Frankish king by compassing the 
death of Sigebert, the ruler of the Ripuarian Franks, and 
then by killing his son and annexing all the territory 
occupied by the Ripuarians beyond the Rhine. With 
the murder of all rivals among the Salian Franks he 
had by the time of his death removed his enemies from 
his path. Though Gregory of Tours might declare that 
" thus did God daily deliver the enemies of Clovis into 
his hand because he walked before his face with an 
upright heart," it remains apparent that Christianity had 
little effect upon the life of this savage Frank. 

It is, however, none the less true that Clovis was one 
of the founders of modern France, though important 
limitations to his so-called conquest of Gaul must be 
observed. 

Under him the Franks settled to a certain extent in 
northern Gaul, and Paris, Soissons, Orleans, and Metz 
became the seats of Frankish kingdoms. 

But Brittany was never really conquered, and in Bur- 
gundy and Aquitaine the Franks hardly settled at all. 
Even after the expulsion of the Visigoths south of the 
Pyrenees and the conquest of Burgundy, Frankish popu- 
lations never settled south of the Loire, and Aquitaine 
always tended when the kingly power was weak to re- 
cover its independence. 



The Prankish Settlement 17 

For many centuries Aquitaine and France north of 
the Loire had little in common, and in race and language 
there are still salient points of difference to be found 
among the inhabitants of northern and southern France. 

The Merovingians from Clovis onward overran, in- 
deed, southern Gaul, but their actual kingdom consisted 
of central Germany and northern Gaul. The Loire was 
practically the limit of their dominion in Gaul. 

The whole character of their settlement is in many 
ways remarkable. Unlike the conquests of the Jutes, 
Angles, and Saxons in Britain, which meant a clean 
sweep with all traditions, as well as the disappearance of the 
Roman language, Roman town life, and the Christian 
religion, the coming of the Teutons into Gaul implied 
no break with the old civilization. Their arrival and 
settlement resembled in many ways the later invasions 
of the Danes into England, or the Norman conquest. 
At first as subjects, then as allies, lastly as conquerors,, 
the Teutonic displacement of the Roman rule was a 
gradual process. Influenced and impressed by Roman 
civilization, which survived their arrival, the Teutons 
showed no disposition to destroy. The Latin tongue 
as spoken by the common people " was adopted by the 
Frank, developed into the dialects of medieval France, 
and, through them, is the parent of modern French." 
Like the language, so the towns survived, and the great 
towns of medieval and modern France can date their 
foundation to Roman times, or, like Marseilles, to a still 
earlier civilization. 

But under the stress of the barbarian invasions the 
towns were unable to stand alone as semi-independent, 
self-governing units. For safety and support they were 



1 8 The French People 

driven to seek the protection of the great landowners, 
whose estates suffered comparatively little from the Teu- 
tonic supremacy, and on which the labour system which 
existed under the Roman rule survived. This highly 
civilized country, with its flourishing towns and its de- 
veloped land system, had by the time of Constantine 
become Christian. Contact with Roman Christians had 
resulted in many of the invaders, especially the Visigoths, 
embracing the Christian religion before they entered 
Gaul. 

At any rate, before the death of Clovis practically 
all of the newcomers were Christian. France can there- 
fore claim a distinct continuity with the Roman Empire, 
the highly developed civilization of which formed part 
of, and immensely influenced the new order of things. 

During this distracted time, however, when the bar- 
barians were forcing their way into the empire, lawless 
violence seemed likely to prevail. It was thought by 
some that with the fifth century the end of the world 
was at hand, while the bishops saw in Clovis the 
" divinely appointed scourge of heresy and wickedness." 
His conversion preserved for northern France the serv- 
ices of the Church — the only institution of the Roman 
Empire which survived north of the Loire. 



CHAPTER II 

THE ALLIANCE WITH THE CHURCH 

The conversion of Clovis to the orthodox faith after 
his victory over the Alamanni in 496 is an event of 
enormous significance. He alone of the Teutonic kings 
adopted the faith of his Roman subjects, and conse- 
quently received from them, and especially from the 
clergy, that support which no Vandal or Goth or Bur- 
gundian could hope for. - The adhesion of Clovis to 
Christianity was one of the principal causes of his vic- 
tories and of the permanence of his kingdom. " When 
you go to battle," wrote Avitus, Bishop of Vienne, to 
the king, " we shall conquer " ; and strengthened by his 
alliance with the Bishops of Aries and Langres he de- 
feated the Burgundians. The Bishops of Rodez and 
Tours summoned him against the Visigoths, while the 
Bishop of Toulouse gave him every assistance, and the 
Bishop of Beam not only stirred up a rising against the 
Visigoths, but died with arms in his hands. 

The Armorican states submitted in 497, the Burgun- 
dians in 501, and the Visigoths after a fierce combat at 
Vougle in 507 were broken and dispersed. 

As head of the Catholics in Gaul, Clovis became in 
510 the sole sovereign of the Franks, and, though his 
conversion had not changed his cruel, treacherous na- 

19 



20 The French People 

ture, his alliance with the Church was continued by his 
successors to their own and their country's advantage. 

The conversion of Clovis was a severe blow to Arian- 
ism, that form of Christianity held by most of the Teu- 
tonic tribes which had settled in the west. The bishops 
of Rome were strongly opposed to Arianism, and wel- 
comed Clovis as an ally, supported all his undertakings, 
and about 500 was begun that connection between the 
popes and Franks which was to have such important 
effects in the later history of Europe. The Burgundians 
and Visigoths were Arians, and in his campaign against 
them, in which their culture disappeared with their 
Arianism, Clovis acted as the defender of the pure faith 
of Christianity. Gregory of Tours declares that all sorts 
of miraculous events, such as the appearance of a brilliant 
meteor on the steeple of Saint Hilary at Poitiers, pointed 
to Clovis as the opponent of heresy. 

Thus the Franks, in accepting conversion, found 
strong support from the bishops and from the Pope in all 
their undertakings, and fell naturally under the influence 
of Christianity. 

In the new era, when political unity had perished, 
religious unity remained, and the Christian Church was 
the most stable institution which met the eye of the 
invading Franks. " Populations," writes Guizot, " end- 
lessly different in origin, habits, speech, destiny, rush 
upon the scene; all becomes local and partial; every en- 
larged idea, every general institution, every great social 
arrangement, is lost sight of; and in this moment the 
Christian Church proclaims most loudly the unity of its 
teaching, the universality of its law. And from the 
bosom of the most frightful disorder the world has ever 



The Christian Church 21 

seen has arisen the largest and purest idea, perhaps, 
which ever drew men together — the idea of a spiritual 
society." 

It was this great society which, having already half 
converted the Roman Empire, now converted its Prank- 
ish conquerors. The bishops, always powerful in pol- 
itics, became not only the defensores of towns, but the 
advisers of the Teutonic kings. 

The Christian bishops of the fourth century had 
taken up the Roman culture of the great cities of Gaul; 
in the period of invasion they had acted with courage 
and dignity, and inspired the respect of the invaders. 
Theodoric and Alaric had recognised the high morality 
and enthusiasm which permeated Christianity; Clovis and 
Gondibald both listened to the teaching of the clergy. 
The bishops had played an important part in the vic- 
tories of Clovis; they played a still more important part 
in the succeeding centuries. 

During the wonderful transition from barbarism to 
civilization the Christian Church remained steadfast and 
active. " Elle remplira I'interregne amene par les inva- 
sions." It carried on the administration when the civil 
officers had fled, and it did much to preserve order. 

The Teutons therefore found on arriving in Gaul 
" a strange organized polity, one and united in a vast 
brotherhood, coextensive with the empire, but not of 
it, nor of its laws and institutions." 

This unexpected, undreamed-of spiritual power, this 

great society which the Franks met on crossing the 

Rhine, could not be ignored. The acceptance of the 

orthodox faith by Clovis implied then an alliance, the 

effects of which he could not foresee. As it was, the 
3 



22 The French People 

Church at once appreciated the value of this alliance 
with its savage ruler, and took the lead in reconstructing 
society, in adapting the forms and traditions of the in- 
vaders to the laws and institutions of the old system, 
in reconciling conflicting interests, and, in a word, in re- 
establishing civil order. The bishops, priests, and coun- 
cils of the Christian Church not only co-operated loyally 
and successfully with kings, princes, and emperors in 
carrying through political and social changes, but also 
developed among the new populations ethical changes of 
a corresponding importance. 

The Franks, unlike the Greeks and Latins, had to 
learn almost the first elements of civilized life, and to 
them Christianity came when they were victorious and 
triumphant. It was of the highest moment that the 
tribes while flushed with success should be tamed and 
disciplined. Fortunately the Franks did not disturb the 
towns, the boundaries of which formed the boundaries 
of Christian bishoprics. The immediate crisis in the his- 
tory of France was over with the conversion of Clovis, 
and the progress of Christianity was enormously has- 
tened by the large number of existing towns. In each 
city a congregation soon formed itself, and gradually 
each city became the seat of a bishop. 

The bishops were thus enabled by their teaching to 
affect the national character of the Franks in a very 
remarkable degree. Before long the Frank kings found 
that in the bishops and clergy they had given themselves 
not only legislators and advisers, but schoolmasters and 
ministers of discipline. Thus the Irish monk Columban 
reproved the wicked Queen Brunhildis, and was expelled 
from Austrasia. 



Its Influence 23 

But in spite of such isolated instances of opposition, 
it was early apparent that Christianity alone could cope 
with barbarism, and that the Christian Church was alone 
possessed of the influence, the ideas, the doctrines, and 
the laws out of which society could be reconstructed. 
Clovis had fought and won campaigns, but it was the 
bishops and clergy who had in reality conquered, and they 
shared with the king the results of his victories. In 511 
he presided at Orleans over a synod, the first held in 
Gaul since the coming of the Franks. Thirty-two bishops 
were present, anxious to repress Arianism with the aid of 
the secular arm. Before they separated the king and 
bishops ordained (i) that the right of sanctuary should 
be extended to the houses of bishops; (2) that the Church 
lands should be free from all charges; (3) that the bishops 
should have jurisdiction over all matters affecting the 
Church. Under the Carolings, ecclesiastics of every de- 
gree, if guilty of any crime, could only be arraigned be- 
fore a bishop. 

The alliance between the Prankish kings and the 
Church was thus firmly established, and the bishops and 
clergy bent all their energies to improving their organiza- 
tion, encouraging the building of monasteries, and fur- 
thering missionary enterprise — all these objects being as a 
rule carried out with the full co-operation of the reign- 
ing sovereigns. 

From 511 to 750 no less than eighty-three councils 
were held, the organization of the Church was improved, 
and the relations of the laity to the clergy and of the 
clergy to the bishops were definitely settled. Not only 
the clergy, but often the laity, duly observed the ordi- 
nances of the Church. Charles the Great fasted, and no 



24 The French People 

military operations took place during Lent. On occasions 
he proclaimed a general public fast, either on some im- 
portant occasion or as expiation for some fault. Nothing 
could exceed the deference of Louis the Pious, or indeed 
that of Charles the Bald, to the will of the Church. 

The observance of Sundays was insisted upon, and 
marriage was raised into the position of a Christian cere- 
mony. In this work of reform and organization the 
bishops took the most prominent part. 

In Merovingian times the authority of the bishop was 
immense; it became still more formidable under Charles 
the Great and his Caroling successors. Against the dis- 
obedient he could use excommunication, the poor he 
could awe by miracles. 

While the bishops were busy organizing the Church, 
advising kings, and directing the course of the adminis- 
tration, the piety of the multitude was stimulated and 
increased by the growth of monasteries. 

The Church had indeed become an established insti- 
tution in the country, but the ignorance was so general 
that the secular clergy unsupported would have found it 
difficult to fight their battle alone. 

In the monasteries, however, piety and learning 
secured a home, and they became strong enough to tri- 
umph over lawless violence. No institutions of that time 
can compare in sound usefulness with the monasteries 
which sprang up all over Gaul and Germany, and taught 
the people the elements of agriculture as well as the ordi- 
nary arts of civilization. In the monasteries was to be met 
with all the education and knowledge which then existed. 

In 585 Columban, an Irish monk, arrived in France 
and before his death founded the famous monasteries 



Monasteries 25 

of Luxeuil, and Saint Gall in Switzerland. From that 
time monasteries sprang up all over France, many being 
in the centres of population, such as Saint Cloud, Saint 
Denis, Saint Omer, and Saint Amand. Others, like 
Saint Calais, Saint Yrieux, Abbeville, Remiremont, and 
Maubeuge, owed their origin to the piety of some holy 
man. Convents for women were founded simulta- 
neously. At Poitiers was raised the convent of Sainte 
Croix by Radegonde, the wife of Lothair I, while the 
daughter of Lothair II built the convent of Sainte 
Enimie. Even Brunhildis gave large benefactions to 
certain houses, and the shortcomings of Charles Martel 
in this respect called down upon him the anathemas of 
the Church. 

It was quite evident that an alliance with the Church 
was necessary iox the successful union of France under 
one head, and the Merovingian kings acted as leaders of 
the Church as well as rulers of the state. Though they 
consulted the leading men from time to time and issued 
regulations, and though local synods met, there was 
little system about the government of the Frankish 
Church till Boniface, Archbishop of Mainz, began his 
work of organization. 

Under the Merovingians the Church and State were 
thus closely allied. The bishops exercised a moral power 
and a political authority. Nominated by the king, they 
were employed as ambassadors and on public business; 
they were consulted on all affairs of importance. Gun- 
tram called a council of bishops to decide upon the merits 
of his quarrel with Sigebert, and he also wished to judge 
Brunhildis by such a council. 

The relations of Church and State being so inextri- 



26 The French People 

cably connected, it was only natural that confusion 
should ensue; it was only too certain that the Church 
would suffer from its intimate connection with the state. 
Ecclesiastics sat side by side with laymen in councils, and 
with them they formed a powerful aristocracy which dur- 
ing the decline and fall of the Merovingians asserted itself 
and conquered the monarchy. From the death of Clovis, 
in 511, to the battle of Testry, in 687, the Austrasian or 
Eastern Franks, living between the Rhine and the Meuse, 
struggled with the Neustrian Franks, who occupied the 
country between the Meuse and the ocean. In the strug- 
gle between Austrasia and Neustria for predominance 
the lay and ecclesiastical aristocracy found a splendid 
opportunity for asserting their power. 

The terms of the peace concluded in 584 between 
Chilperich and Guntram of Burgundy were arranged by 
the bishops and great men; again in 587 the differences 
between these two rivals were settled at Andelot by the 
same combination of laymen and ecclesiastics, and in 613 
the fall of Brunhildis, with whom ended the greatness of 
the Merovingian house, was the result of her attempt to 
dominate over the aristocracy. 

In 614 a constitution emanating from a council of the 
bishops and the great men was published, which was a 
sort of Magna Carta. It was a defence set up against 
any despotic acts oti the part of a sovereign. While the 
nobles guarded their own interests, the Church stipulated 
for purity of elections and the preservation of her juris- 
diction. 

The Merovingian kingship was vanquished by the 
aristocracy, though Dagobert (628-638) rnade a vain 
attempt to control a force which was about to sweep 



Pepin d'H6ristal 27 

away his house. The success achieved by the Church 
by its close connection with politics led to a deteriora- 
tion in the manners and lives of the bishops. Powerful 
families held bishoprics, and in feudal wise endeavoured 
to extend their authority over immense areas. 

Leodegar, or Saint Leger, Bishop of Autun, con- 
ducted rebellions, attempted to overthrow the vindictive 
and powerful Ebroin, and finally was brutally murdered 
by the latter. This and many other similar actions on 
the part of ecclesiastics showed how necessary was the 
establishment of a powerful ruler in France. The vic- 
tory of Pepin d'Heristal of Austrasia over the Neustrians 
at Testry in 687 came therefore opportunely to deal the 
deathblow to the incapable Merovingian royalty, to check 
lawlessness in Church and State, and to infuse new life 
into the Prankish monarchy in Gaul. 

With Pepin begins the Supremacy of the CaroHngs, 
based upon their alliance with the Church. With him be- 
gins a new period in the history of the Franks. Clovis 
and the West Franks had by the aid of the Church at- 
tempted, without breaking with the past, to give to 
Gaul a permanent political existence. Under them Gaul 
remained to a great extent Roman. With Pepin, how- 
ever, the Teutonic triumphed over the Roman element. 
He and his son Charles Martel, though only mayors of 
the palace and guardians of the last rois faineants, who 
dragged on a weary existence till 751, definitely carried 
on the work of curbing the lay and reforming the ecclesi- 
astical aristocracy. 

In this way they prepared the ground for the reigns 
of Pepin le Bref and Charles the Great, the first Caro- 
lingian kings. 



28 The French People 

During the period between the battle of Testry (687) 
and the accession of Pepin le Bref — a period often 
known as that of the Mayors of the Palace — the Church 
was reorganized, missionary enterprise was encouraged, 
and the papal authority was definitely recognised. 

The bishops were at first inclined to resist Charles 
Martel; Rigobert, Bishop of Rheims, actually closed his 
gates upon him. Charles at once deposed him, and, 
ignoring the canonical regulations, gave his see to Milo, 
Bishop of Treves. His decisive victory over the great 
Saracen invasion in 732, near Poitiers, was a triumph 
not only for the Franks, but also for Western Chris- 
tendom. But though in one aspect a Christian warrior, 
Charles was not looked upon with any favour by the 
ecclesiastics; he showed no respect for the Church, but 
simply treated Gaul as a conquered country, and the 
bishops as laymen. Order he enforced, but he did little 
to restore spirituality to the Church, the condition of 
which remained a grave scandal. But already a move- 
ment from within had begun, destined to raise the tone 
of the clergy and to initiate important changes in their 
manner of life. The beginning of the eighth century 
saw a great outburst of missionary enterprise, largely due 
to English effort. 

Willebrord, supported by Pepin d'Heristal, had al- 
ready founded the bishopric of Frisia in 690, and in 723 
Charles Martel extended his protection to Winfrid or 
Boniface, as he is usually called. 

Boniface organized the Church in Germany, and took 
a leading part in establishing in Gaul the pontifical 
authority and the Roman discipline. In 664, at the 
synod of Whitby, the Church in England had decided 



Pepin le Bref and the Pope 29 

to accept the Roman authority on all religious questions; 
in 748 the ancient Church in Gaul decided, under the 
influence of Boniface, to place herself under the Roman 
system. By doing so, the Church in Gaul, like the 
Church in England, became better disciplined, better 
organized, and more spiritual. 

In 751 the last of the Merovingians was sent to a 
monastery, and Pepin le Bref was proclaimed the first 
Caroling king. The Pope Zacharias, whose position in 
Italy was menaced by the Lombards, sanctioned his seiz- 
ure of the monarchical authority, and Boniface anointed 
him with the holy oil. 

Pepin's elevation was due to a compact between him- 
self and the papacy, and the revolution had thus an eccle- 
siastical character. It came none too soon, for Gallo- 
Roman France required some fresh blood, the Church 
required drastic reforms, and the ideas of Clovis and the 
effects of his conversion appeared to be worked out. 
The victory of the Germanic over the Roman elements 
of the Prankish state was thus of great import to Gaul, 
and proved highly beneficial to both Church and State. 

Its effects were at once seen. " The Franks under 
Pepin and his successors seemed to have conquered Gaul 
a second time; it is the first invasion of the language, 
the military genius, and the manners of Germany," The 
triumph of the aristocracy over royalty was checked, a 
powerful government was established, and the papacy 
allied with the monarchy became the supreme and ulti- 
mate authority for regulating the affairs of the Church. 

In 753 Pope Stephen, hard pressed by the Lombards, 
who now occupied most of Italy, crossed the Alps to beg 
Pepin at Ponthiou near Bar-le-Duc to fulfil his promise 



30 The French People 

and defend the Rotnan see against its enemies. On 
January i, 754, Pepin swore to do so, and on July 28tli, 
at Saint Denis, the ceremony of the coronation was sol- 
emnly renewed. 

Pope Stephen himself " anointed the most pious 
Prince Pepin King of the Franks and Patrician of the 
Romans with the oil of holy anointing according to the 
custom of the ancients, and at the same time crowned 
his two sons who stood next him, in happy succession, 
namely, Charles and Carloman, with the same honour/' 

This rite of anointing was, till the act of Bofiiface, 
and then of Stephen, new to the Prankish monarchy, and 
it may have been intended as a substitute for the religious 
sanction which noble and royal families, such as the 
Merovingians, possessed as the descendants of the gods 
or great benefactors of the race. The title of patrician 
of the Romans had of late years lapsed. It formerly 
implied a relation to the sovereign, similar to that held 
by the title of mayor of the palace towards Merovin- 
gian kings. In a shadowy form it seemed to have im- 
plied the duty of defending the city of Rome against 
external attacks. 

Under the early Carolings the government of the 
State and Church went on together, and the officers of 
the Church were regarded as the officers of the state. But 
it is equally evident that under the later Merovingians 
the Prankish clergy were in a most corrupt and degraded 
condition, and that in spite of the excellent work done 
by the establishment of the Benedictine Order. 

Pepin had already begun the work of reform. He had 
first restored to the Church the property which Charles 
Martel had taken from it; he had supported Boniface, the 



Their Alliance 31 

head of the papal party, who frequently presided over 
assemblies of nobles and clergy; and he had already 
formed a close connection with Rome. 

c The Pope, whom he clearly recognised as head of 
the whole Church, had urged him to sit in judgment on 
disobedient bishops, and, if they proved stubborn, to send 
them to Rome, where their cases would be decided upon. 

It was therefore of immense importance in European 
history when the dangers to the papacy in Italy forced 
the Pope to ally with the growing Carolingian power. 
Momentous results followed this alliance. The popes, 
who could not hope for any assistance from the indifferent 
court at Constantinople against the Lombards, had helped 
to create a new royal power which would aid them 
against their enemies. The victories of Pepin over the 
Lombards were followed in 756 by the grant to the see 
of Rome of twenty-two cities stretching along the Adri- 
atic coast from the mouths of the Po and close upon 
Ancona, and inland up to the Apennines. From this 
grant arose the claim of the papacy to temporal sov- 
ereignty, the establishment of its independence of the 
Eastern emperor, and the beginning of the States of the 
Church. 

By the aid of the Prankish king Stephen II had 
become king as well as Pope, and the papacy did not 
lose the remaining portion of Pepin's gift till 1870. The 
Pope had shaken off his subjugation to the Eastern em- 
peror and had becotrie a sovereign prince. By taking 
over the exarchate- — i. e., the old Byzantine possessions 
in central Italy — Stephen stood forth as an important 
secular ruler. Till the end of his life Pepin, " the Patri- 
cius of Rome," continued to work for the papal cause. 



32 The French People 

At a great meeting of nobles and bishops held in 757 
decrees were passed regulating the lives and duties of 
the clergy and enforcing the fact of the close alliance 
between the Frankish monarchy and the Church. After 
the reduction of Aquitaine in 768, when the Gallo-Roman 
people opposed, as always, the government of the Franks, 
the churches which had been damaged were rebuilt, and 
confiscated church property was only allowed to be held 
by laymen on condition of their paying part of the income 
to the Church. 

The whole of Charles the Great's reign was one long 
series of services on behalf of the Church. His con- 
quests of the Saxons were followed by numerous conver- 
sions, his diets dealt with the reform and organization 
of the clergy, while his whole attitude towards the papacy 
implied a constant readiness to further Christianity. The 
religious sanction which the papacy in return gave to 
the position of Charles enormously strengthened his em- 
pire, and helped to secure the obedience of his widely 
scattered subjects. 

Louis II, in a letter to the Eastern emperor in 871, 
states that his title of emperor was due to his consecra- 
tion and unction by the Pope, which gave him a higher 
title than that of king. It is evident that the Christian 
power was embodied firmly in the Frankish monarchy, 
and that Charles the Great's empire had the sanction of 
the papacy. 

The conversion of Clovis and his recognition of the 
value of the help of the clergy had thus, after centuries 
of vicissitudes, and after the fall of a dynasty, been fol- 
lowed by the famous alliance between France and the 
Church which, consolidated by Charles the Great and 



Its Importance 33 

Hugh Capet, was consummated by the concordats of 
Francis I and Napoleon. 

Pepin had not only done much to aid the Church 
in Gaul to carry out its work, but had strengthened his 
own family by the alliance with Rome, an alliance which 
was of immense service to Charles the Great when he 
made France, or more accurately the country of the 
West Franks, a part of his vast empire. 



CHAPTER III 

CHARLES THE GREAT AND HIS LAWS 

With the death of Pepin and the union by Charles 
the Great, on the death of his brother Carloman, of all 
the dominions of the Franks, the modern French king- 
dom became a part of a great Prankish empire, which 
stretched from the Main to the Bay of Biscay, and from 
the mouth of the Rhine to the mouth of the Rhone. 
Charles furthered the missionary enterprises in Germany 
undertaken by his father, and he continued and developed 
his alliance with the Pope and his relations with the 
Church. In 774, having conquered the 'Lombards and 
renewed the donation of Pepin, he took the title King 
of the Franks and Lombards, and was given by the Pope 
that of Roman Patrician. He made no attempt to amal- 
gamate his lands on both sides of the Alps, and effected 
little change in the administration of Italy, which he 
ruled as King of the Lombards. Between 774 and 785 
he overran Saxony some five times, he invaded Spain, 
he annexed Bavaria. During the rest of his reign he 
conquered the Baltic Slavs, he reduced Bohemia and the 
distant and barbarous Avars to subjection, he conquered 
the Spanish march. The imagination of Europe was 
powerfully impressed by his exploits and by the magni- 
tude of his empire. His dominions extended from the 
34 



The Holy Roman Empire 35 

shores of the Baltic to the Ebro, from the German Ocean 
to the Adriatic and to the Garigliano in central Italy, 
from the Atlantic to the lower Danube, the Theiss, and 
the mountains of Moravia. 

In 800 he restored Leo III, who had been compelled 
to fly to Paderborn and seek Charles's protection, and 
on Christmas day Charles was crowned by the Pope in 
Saint Peter's basilica as emperor. With his coronation a 
new political theory is introduced into Western Christen- 
dom, the theory of the Holy Roman Empire. 

The Prankish kingship had thus been swallowed up 
for the time being in a new empire, which represented 
the conscious and intimate union of Church and State 
for their mutual advantage. 

The emperor, according to the new theory, was to 
protect the Church; in the later middle ages the popes 
reversed this intention and succeeded in mastering the 
state. But in 800, when Leo was seen on his knees 
" adoring " the emperor, men could not foresee Henry 
IV standing in the snow at Canossa. 

With Charles's coronation the reign of " pure barbaric 
force " ends, and for some centuries the strife of ideas 
competes for pre-eminence with the clash of arms. 
Europe is henceforward dominated by the conception of 
a world ruled by the emperor and the Pope, the sun and 
the moon, controlling the lesser kings, who resemble the 
constellations in the heavens. 

The reign of Charles the Great thus gave Europe the 
conception of Christendom as a great empire on the one 
hand and a. great Church on the other; it also left its 
mark in the history of French institutions. 

The administration of his immense dominion was natu- 



36 The French People 

rally a difficult problem. Like Henry II of England, 
Charles seems to have favoured the idea of an empire 
divided into a number of vassal kingdoms, and he nomi- 
nated his sons Charles, Louis, and Pepin to be kings 
respectively of Neustria, Italy, and Aquitaine. 

It was of the first importance to check the growth of 
large semi-independent provinces, which threatened the 
unity of the empire. All existing duchies were therefore 
abolished, and what dukes remained had merely high 
military posts. But with regard to the frontiers Charles 
pursued a policy similar to that of William the Con- 
queror. Margraves, like the counts palatine, were given 
districts larger in extent than a single county, with ex- 
ceptional powers, and such margraves are found guard- 
ing the marches on the frontier of Brittany, Spain, Istria, 
Pannonia, and Moravia. 

But, as in Merovingian days, the count was still re- 
garded as the pivot of the royal administration. As a 
rule the office of count was held by some member of a 
powerful family resident in the county over which he 
was placed, and whose headquarters were in one of the 
old Roman cities. For bad conduct counts were de- 
prived, but cases of deprivation were few in number, as 
Charles was ever much opposed to strong measures 
without very sufficient cause. Sometimes, though rare- 
ly, as in the case of the margraviate of Toulouse, the 
son inherited from his father the government of several 
counties. 

These counts thus governed large districts, like Eng- 
lish counties, and Charles often gave countships to Saxons, 
Aquitanians, and Lombards, as well as to Franks, whom 
he could trust. Under the counts came the centenarii, 

X 



Charles's Government 37 

who at first controlled a district similar to the Eng- 
lish hundred, and later as representatives of the counts 
{vicarii) ruled a wider area. Like the counts, the cen- 
tenarii were usually men of local influence, who in 
Charles's time did not succeed in making their posts 
hereditary. 

The duties of the counts and their officers are clearly 
laid down in one of the capitularies. They are to aid 
the king and defend the people, and are not to be 
tempted from the right road by any gift, by fear or hatred 
or friendship. Such high-principled men were hard to 
obtain in those days, and Alcuin records the fact that non 
tantos habet justitice adjutores quantos etiam suhversores. 

To supplement his own powers of supervision Charles 
called to his assistance the bishops, the missi dominici, 
and the scabini. 

Of these the bishops did a most valuable work. 
The Church, in spite of much corruption, was made by 
Charles into a centralized, organized body, and he found 
it a most useful means of consolidating his empire. The 
Church had her own code, applicable to all men; she had 
a sense of unity, she had traditions, and was willing to 
defend whatever civil rights remained. 

Throughout Gaul the interests of the clergy were the 
same. The clergy were the best educated of Charles's 
subjects, and though, by reason of their learning, wealth, 
and position, they rapidly became part of the new aris- 
tocracy, they never ceased to watch over and defend the 
interests of the poor and of the old inhabitants of Gaul. 
In Charles they found a valuable friend and defender, and 
he in return, like William the Conqueror, made them 
independent of the secular counts, and gave them a wide 



38 The French People 

jurisdiction in civil causes. With his administrative sys- 
tem the bishops were as closely connected as they were 
with that of the Merovingian sovereigns. Under Charles 
the state had more of a Christian character than it ever 
had before. 

In 779 and 789 he issued capitularies restoring and 
reorganizing the ecclesiastical system, and throughout 
his reign counts and bishops work together as the ealdor- 
men and bishops worked in the Anglo-Saxon county 
court. 

But the harmony that prevailed for the most part in 
England under the great West Saxon kings was wanting 
in the empire of Charles the Great. Though he issued 
an order forbidding the great men to disobey the bishops 
in matters pertaining to religion, it was found practically 
very difficult to settle the relations of Church and State 
on a satisfactory basis. Louis the Debonair, or Pious, 
did not facilitate a happy solution of what seems still 
an insoluble problem, by ordering the bishops to report 
to him how the counts administered justice, and the 
counts to inform him how the bishops fulfilled their re- 
ligious duties. Having their own jurisdiction the bishops 
administered the Roman law, and the counts adminis- 
tered the Frankish law as well as they could. While 
the bishop represented the imperial character of his 
master, the count represented Charles as a Frankish king. 

Thus every important town had its count and bishop, 
the one representing the Frankish, the other the Roman 
element. 

Though Charles naturally used the Church as a coun- 
terpoise to the turbulence of the great men, it is doubtful 
if this practice was beneficial to France; indeed, this part 



The Missi Dominici 39 

of his policy has been called " his greatest political error." 
Supported by the royal power, the Church after Charles's 
death became secularized, and a part of the feudal society 
which overthrew the Carolingians. 

In Saxony, where the circumstances were peculiar 
and exceptional, the bishops were given political func- 
tions. In other parts of the empire rarely if ever was a 
bishop intrusted with the duties and powers of a count. 
In any case the policy of Charles in drawing closer the 
connection of the Church and the State is open to 
criticism. 

If we except the suppression of the duchies, Charles 
had thus merely continued, developed, and adopted the 
system which had been in force when he succeeded his 
father, Pepin. 

The importance, however, which he gave to the in- 
stitution of missi dominici was worthy a brain more 
creative than that of the great emperor. The Merovin- 
gians had used missi, and Charles Martel and Pepin had 
to some extent revived the institution. But it was left 
to Charles to make the missi one of the most valuable 
and characteristic features of his administrative system. 

Over this system of local government Charles indeed 
personally presided, and by frequent progresses endeav- 
oured to keep in touch with the various portions of his 
empire. But it was by means of these missi dominici 
alone that he could hope to keep a check on injustice 
and to uphold his authority throughout his widespread 
dominions. 

The missi dominici, or imperial commissioners, or 
royal legates, were always travelling round the realm, 
like staff officers, bearing Charles's orders to distant 



40 The French People 

regions, and reporting to him upon the needs of the 
different provinces. These officials, used spasmodically 
by Pepin le Bref and Charles Martel, were chosen from 
clerics as well as from laymen. Over a certain number of 
countships one was placed, and the work of the local 
governors was regularly inspected. Often a cleric and 
a layman went forth together, visiting their districts four 
times a year, and holding courts, which all the neighbour 
counts had to attend. 

One of the principal difffculties with which the king 
and his missi had to deal was the growing feudalization 
of society. Already in later Merovingian times ' the 
growth of an all-powerful aristocracy had overthrown a 
dynasty; after Charles the Great's death the decentraliz- 
ing movement grew till it reduced France in the eleventh 
century to a mere geographical expression; even during 
his reign feudalism was gradually but surely spreading its 
roots deep. The Frankish chieftains settled in the coun- 
try paid little heed to the emperor, and desired to be 
independent and unmolested. The emperor wished to 
bring them under his direct supervision, but his success 
was only transient. Feudalism was in the air, and in a 
capitulary of Charles issued in 813 it is ordained that 
" no man shall be allowed to renounce his dependence on 
a feudal superior after he has received any benefit from 
him " except in specified cases. This is only one of 
many allusions to the growth of a feudalizing tendency 
which it was part of the business of the missi dominici to 
correct. 

But the missi had not only to correct oppressive and 
unjust judges, to hunt down robbers, to report upon the 
conduct of bishops, to check the high-handed actions of 



The Scabini 41 

the great men: they sometimes commanded armies and 
were sent on embassies. This institution of the missi 
dominici was an admirable bit of machinery for keeping 
the empire of the Franks together. 

But its success depended entirely on the strength and 
capacity of the emperor and on the honesty and ability 
of the missi. Suitable men were always difficult to find, 
for the work demanded tact, independence, and probity — 
qualities hard to meet with in those days. 

" Take care," the missi are made to say to a count, in 
one of Charles's capitularies, " that neither you nor any 
of your officers are so evil disposed as to say * Hush, 
hush! Say nothing about the matter till those missi have 
passed by, and afterward we will settle it quietly among 
ourselves.' Do not so deny or even postpone the ad- 
ministration of justice; but rather give diligence that 
justice may be done in the case before we arrive." 

The missi could not remove a count, but they could 
settle in the house of an unjust or insubordinate one and 
watch his actions till he might repent and do justice. 

To watch over and protect the poor, to shield them 
from injustice and oppression by all means in their power, 
was one of their principal duties. 

There was always a danger that the missus, like the 
sheriff in the time of Henry H of England, would him- 
self become oppressive, and after Charles's death no 
power was strong enough to keep the institution in work- 
ing order, and with the fall of the Carolingians the missi 
disappeared. 

Another check upon the counts and the centenarii 
were the scabini. These men at times acted like our 
justices of the peace, at times like modern jurors, at times 



4z The French People 

like the grand jury. Appointed by the missi, they sat as 
assessors to the count or centenarius in their courts of 
justice, and at a trial decided upon the prisoner's guilt. 

They were present at the meetings of the nation as 
well as at those of the district. Chosen for life from men 
of good character, they resembled the legales homines of 
Norman and Angevin times, and were no doubt useful 
as a check on the encroachments of the counts and on 
the power of the aristocracy. Seven was the regular 
number (though at times it was raised to twelve) that 
were present at a trial, and their decision was final. 
" After the scabini have condemned a man as a robber, 
it is not lawful for either the comes or the vicarkis to grant 
him life." 

This institution, which had much political usefulness, 
only remained an active force during the reign of the 
great emperor, and at his death was buried under the 
lavalike stream of feudalism. 

Over the whole system stood the emperor and his 
assemblies. These met twice a year, in June, July, or 
August, and in the autumn. To the earlier meeting 
came all the great men, lay and clerical, to express ap- 
proval; to the later meeting only the higher personages 
and the royal councillors, who prepared the proposals to 
be laid before the larger meeting. But these assemblies 
had Httle real power. The nation was not represented; 
the whole initiative lay with the emperor, who at the head 
of a race of warriors was able to weld together his vast 
empire. 

Still the emperor consulted the members of the 
assemblies in drawing up his capitularies, which were 
simply a multifarious collection of conclusions arrived at 



The Capitularies 43 

after aiscussion and then issued throughout the empire. 
They were in no sense codes of law, for Charles was not 
a codifier of laws, like Justinian or Napoleon, but were 
simply decrees of a most varied description which throw 
an immense light on the social questions of the age and 
the real condition of mankind at the time. 

The result of Charles's labours was satisfactory as 
long as he lived. Not for centuries was France to see 
again a king who could hold his own against the anarchic 
strength of feudalism. It was not till the reign of Philip 
Augustus that the great vassals were again compelled to 
acknowledge and obey the royal power. 

By his assemblies Charles succeeded in making his 
great men feel that they were Franks, and that they were 
ruled by a man whose statesmanship was beyond ques- 
tion, and who was their superior in war and in the art of 
government. Thus tendencies to isolation were checked, 
and the growing strength of the local powers held under 
control. Perhaps one of the reasons of his success was 
that, like Dunstan and Edgar and Canute, he allowed 
different parts of his empire to preserve their own laws, 
customs, and language. 

To convert into Franks all the various nationalities 
under his sway would have proved an impossible task, 
and Charles wisely confined himself to enforcing obedi- 
ence to the central government. Every man, according 
as he was Bavarian or Lombard, Frank or Roman, Goth 
or Alaman, layman or cleric, might claim to be judged 
secundum legem patrice suae. " So great was the diver- 
sity of laws that you would often meet with it, not only 
in countries or cities, but even in single houses. For it 
would often happen that five men would be sitting or 



44 The French People 

walking together and not one of them would have the 
same law with any other." 

Of the three great political events of Charles's reign, 
the conquest of Italy, the consolidation of the Prankish 
kingdom, and the assumption of the imperial title, each 
has in some degree affected the later history of France. 
In continuing his father's policy to the papal see Charles 
pursued a policy which later French kings frequently 
followed, not always to their advantage. In assuming 
the imperial title Charles acted under the influence of a 
noble idea, and the great institution which he gave to 
Europe was in many ways a useful and beneficent one. 
To revive the old world-wide empire and to convert it 
into a civitas Dei was worthy of a man of Charles's enter- 
prise. But though it was the " base of the political sys- 
tem of the middle ages ... it was the origin of that 
great quarrel which disturbed the West for three cen- 
turies — the quarrel of the empire and the priesthood." 
In the work of consolidating the Frankish kingdoms 
Charles's success was ephemeral. Territorial sover- 
eignty had begun to assert itself in the rise of the power 
of the great men, though Charles fought steadily against 
the inevitable course of things. His many-sided activity 
as well as the limitations of his work has been well sum- 
marized by Guizot: " The huge empire could not sur- 
vive the powerful hand that had fashioned it, but none 
the less had a great work been accomplished: the inva- 
sion of the barbarians in the West was arrested; Ger- 
many herself ceased to be the theatre of incessant fluc- 
tuations of wandering tribes; the states there, formed by 
the dismemberment of the great emperor's inheritance, 
■grew solid by degrees, and became the dike which 



The Revival of Learning 45 

stopped the human inundation that had desolated Europe 
for four centuries. Peoples and governments were more 
settled, and modern social order began to develop itself. 
This is the vast result of the reign of Charles, the domi- 
nant fact of the epoch." * 

Closely connected with Charles's restoration of the 
Church was his revival of learning. He established new 
schools, and restored old ones. Besides Alcuin, other 
learned men were appointed to posts during his reign. 
Leitradus from Noricum was made Archbishop of Lyons, 
and Theodolphus the Goth Bishop of Orleans. Eginhard, 
the chronicler of Charles's doings; Smaragdus, abbot of 
Saint Mihiel, who compiled a Latin grammar; Engelbert, 
a writer of Latin verses, who married the emperor's 
sister — are names of men who aided in spreading abroad 
knowledge. In his palace school, in which teachers and 
scholars were maintained out of the imperial treasury, 
Alcuin taught and the emperor himself was a pupil. 
Charles's enthusiasm for learning and education was per- 
haps stimulated by his visits to Italy, and from Rome he 
brought teachers of music and grammar. 

Though the results of this revival of education were 
not very striking, at all events they were permanent. 
With Alcuin's removal from York the primacy of letters 
passed to the palace school of Charles the Great, and, 
though the connection between the Church and educa- 
tion was abused during the dark period from the ninth 
to the twelfth century, the lamp of learning in France 
was never allowed to go out altogether. 

The Prankish power attained its zenith under Charles. 

* Guizot, Essais sur I'histoire de France, iii, p. 76 (ed. 1836). 



46 The French People 

Gaul was only a portion of his empire, and Aquitaine 
and Neustria merely subject provinces. France properly 
so called had no existence, Paris was merely a provincial 
town, the French language as yet had no being. Charles 
himself had realized how impossible it was for his vast 
empire to remain permanently united under one head, 
and, like the Merovingians, he arranged a division among 
his sons, A most elaborate system was devised by which 
it was settled that all the minor kings were by a sort of 
federal bond to recognise the authority of one emperor. 

In his arrangements Charles showed that he never 
entertained the idea of a kingdom like modern France 
being set up. Aquitaine was raised into something like 
a national kingdom under Louis, but northern France 
and northern Germany were, according to the great em- 
peror's plan, to be ruled over by his son Charles, who 
would thus reign on both sides of the Rhine. 

Though his empire did not last, the history of Europe 
was for some seven hundred years profoundly modified 
by the life and deeds of Charles the Great. He died on 
January 24, 814, and was buried at Aachen. 



CHAPTER IV 

HUGH CAPET AND PARIS 

In 843, at the Treaty of Verdun, the great CaroHn- 
gian empire finally broke up, and to Charles the Bald 
was assigned the whole country west of the Meuse, the 
Seine, and the Rhone. 

Charles the Great's scheme of governing Western 
Christendom by an emperor assisted by a number of 
subject kings of his kindred had broken down, and the 
history of the empire from Charles's death in 814 to the 
Treaty of Verdun in 843 is a history of continual strug- 
gles between the emperor's descendants. 

Louis the Debonair, or Pious, had succeeded Charles 
and ruled till 840. During his reign the Church in- 
creased its power and pretensions, civil wars raged, the 
Danes appeared in force, the Saxons landed in Italy. 
His three sons were unable to keep at peace with each 
other, and the partition at Verdun in 843 was the result. 
The imperial conception of Charles the Great vanished, 
and the history of the modern kingdom of France begins. 

But it was some years before Western Francia really 
developed into the modern French kingdom, and till 
the accession of Hugh Capet in 987 the descendants of 
Charles the Great continued to reign. 

These later Carolingians were, however, more Ger- 

47 



48 The French People 

man than French; they had Httle hold on Brittany, Aqiil- 
taine, or Septimania; they could not restrain the great 
feudal lords; they had rarely much power except over 
Laon, their capital, and its dependencies; and they failed 
to protect France from the ravages of the Northmen. 
It has been said with some truth that under their rule 
France " was no proper French kingdom, but a dying 
branch of the empire of Charles the Great." Since the 
death of Charles all the forces which he had held in 
check had broken loose. The dukes and counts took 
advantage of the weakness of the central power and made 
their position hereditary and practically independent. 

During the Merovingian reigns there had been at 
any rate a permanent though perhaps a vacillating prog- 
ress toward union and civilization. Of this progress the 
reign of Charles the Great was the high-water mark. 
The darkest hour in early English history was the period 
from the death of Ethelwulf to the Treaty of Wedmore 
(878); the worst period in early French history was that 
extending from the Treaty of Verdun to the middle of 
the tenth century, and of those evil years the ones be- 
tween 843 and 887 were the most disastrous. 

During this period France fell back into disunion 
and weakness, and was compelled to rely on the forces 
of feudahsm as a means of defending herself against the 
dangers of foreign invasion and internal anarchy. 

During the decline and fall of the Carolingian dynasty 
feudalism saved society from total shipwreck and stead- 
ily strengthened itself until it placed Hugh Capet on the 
throne. His accession meant more than the mere vic- 
tory of the feudal elements of society: it implied the 
victory of the French-speaking over the German-speak- 



The Northmen 49 

ing inhabitants, of Paris over Laon. Many causes may 
be adduced for the fall of the Carolings and the rise of 
the Capetians, such as the feebleness of the kings, the 
influence of the great churchmen, the growth of the 
practice of commendation, which led the smaller land- 
owners to place themselves under the nearest lord, to the 
weakening of the central government— a practice re- 
strained by William the Conqueror by the oath of Salis- 
bury. But the principal cause of the victory of feudal- 
ism and the accession of the Capetian dynasty is to be 
found on the one hand in the inability of the Carolings 
to defend France from the attacks of the Vikings, and on 
the other hand in the resistance of Paris under the Dukes 
of Paris to the invaders. 

After 843 the main problem which confronted the 
Prankish no less than the English rulers was how to deal 
firmly and successfully with the invasions of the Scandi- 
navian pirates. It was the failure of the Carolingian 
monarchs to solve this problem adequately which led to 
and justified their fall. 

The inroads of these pirates had given Charles the 
Great considerable anxiety and trouble, and his son 
Louis the Debonair had driven them away. But, taking 
advantage of the internecine quarrels among his sons, 
they soon returned, and just before the Treaty of Verdun 
they burned the port of Nantes. After this exploit their 
attacks became bolder, and, having allied with Pepin of 
Aquitaine, they sailed up the Seine in 845 and, in spite 
of " its two bridges and strongly fortified Roman sub- 
urbs on the mainland," actually sacked part of Paris. 
This success, combined with Charles the Bald's fatal 
policy of trying to buy them off, still more encouraged 



50 The French People 

the Northmen, who continued for many years to raid 
different parts of Neustria, plundering Bordeaux, burn- 
ing Tours, and in 853 attempting to seize Orleans. In 
857 they wrought frightful havoc among the churches 
of Paris; that of Saint Genevieve was burned, while 
others only escaped by paying large sums of money. 

Eventually large bodies of these pirates settled at the 
mouths of the Somme, Seine, Loire, and Garonne, and 
their ravages became so serious that in 864 Charles the 
Bald issued the edict of Pistres for improving the Prank- 
ish army and for blocking the great rivers by fortified 
bridges. It was through the bridges now built across the 
Seine that Paris held out when again besieged in 885 by a 
great host of Vikings. In 881 at Sancourt Louis III and 
the Franks, to the great joy of Western Christendom, had 
overthrown the Northmen, but Louis died shortly after- 
ward, and his brother and successor King Carloman, who 
had returned to the suicidal policy of bribing the North- 
men, in 884. 

The new king and emperor, Charles the Fat, was as 
incapable as Carloman to adopt a vigorous policy, and 
when the great siege of Paris began in November, 885, 
its defence was successfully undertaken by Odo or Eudes, 
Count of Paris, aided by Gozlin the bishop. Count Rag- 
nar, and Hugh, " first of abbots." The Northmen ap- 
parently intended to take Paris, subdue the whole sur- 
rounding country, and settle down. The future of the 
rising kingdom of France depended on the successful 
resistance of Paris. Seven hundred ships had conveyed 
some forty thousand Vikings up the Seine, and Paris was 
beset on all sides; till October, 886, i. e,, for more than 
eleven months, the defence of Paris was bravely main- 



The Siege of Paris 51 

tained, and the Northmen, unskilled in sieges, failed in 
their attacks The deeds of Odo and his valiant sup- 
porters have been fully described by an eyewitness of and 
sharer in the defence: 

" Hie consul venerabatur, Rex atque futurus, 
Urbis erat tutor, regni venturus et altor." 

During the siege Bishop Gozlin died, and Odo was 
left with the responsibility of carrying on the defence. 
Help from without became necessary, and Odo went 
forth to implore the emperor to come to the aid of Paris. 
Henry, Duke of the Eastern Franks, who had already 
made one fruitless attempt to bring relief, came with an 
army towards the end of the summer of 886, But he was 
slain by the Northmen, and Paris was again left to its 
own resources. 

At last Charles the Fat arrived with the forces of the 
empire, but instead of attacking the besiegers he bought 
them off and allowed them to pass up the Seine to Bur- 
gundy. 

Paris was saved, but while the emperor had lost all 
hold on his subjects the reputation of Count Odo was 
greatly increased. He was now by imperial grant given 
all the possessions of his father, Robert the Strong, some 
of whose domains had been held by his son Hugh, the 
abbot, who had died during the siege. 

In 888 Charles the Fat, who had been deposed, died, 
the dismemberment of the Carolingian, empire was com- 
pleted, and six states were set up — Italy, Germany, Prov- 
ence, Transjurane, Burgundy, and France. 

As France was still threatened by the Northmen who 
remained on the Seine, it was impossible to give the 



52 The French People 

throne to the Carolingian heir, Charles the Simple, Car- 
loman's youngest brother. He was only eight years old, 
and a strong and able ruler was required. The choice, 
therefore, of the Neustrian aristocracy fell naturally on 
Odo, the Count of Paris, of Blois, and of Orleans, the 
gallant defender of the city of Paris in the late siege. 
He was the son of Robert the Strong, founder of the 
Robertian line, who it is said was a Saxon brought into 
France by Charles the Great, and employed by Charles 
the Bald to defend the country between the Seine and the 
Loire, where he acquired vast possessions. He fell in 
866, fighting bravely against the Vikings at Brissarthe. 
His son Odo inherited with the countship of Paris the 
family lands in Anjou, Touraine, Champagne, and Poitou, 
and being distinguished not only for bravery, but also 
for justice, piety, and general ability, it is not surprising 
that he was chosen king. 

His election necessarily resulted in a further develop- 
ment of the power of the great fiefs in France. Odo was 
merely a primus inter pares, and at least a dozen other 
nobles looked on him as their equal. Hereditary right 
coupled with capacity alone secured willing obedience, 
and under Odo a superficial unity was only maintained 
through the necessity of making head against the attacks 
of the Northmen. Had it not been for the imminence 
of this danger the fatal weakness of owing his power to 
the Teutonic right of election alone would have been 
more obvious in his reign. 

As it was, he had no sooner driven off the Danes (who 
had under Rollo or Hrolf again besieged Paris in 889 
for three months, only retiring on money being given 
them), after inflicting on them a crushing defeat at Mont- 



Charles the Simple 53 

pensier, than he was forced to spend the rest of his days 
in contending against Charles the Simple. 

Odo died in 898, and his brother and heir wisely 
contented himself with the duchy of France — the lands 
of Paris, Orleans, Chartres, Tours, Le Mans, and Beau- 
vais, and did homage to the Caroling king, Charles the 
Simple. 

Till 929 Charles was king, and showed himself fully 
alive to the necessity of defending France from the 
Northmen. But in 911 he made the Treaty of Clair-sur- 
Epte with Hrolf, planting the Northmen permanently on 
the lower Seine. This experiment proved very success- 
ful, and by handing over Normandy Charles saved the 
rest of France from conquest, and gave it a period of 
repose from external attack. Paris was now saved from 
all danger of Scandinavian attacks, and had a neighbour 
who, though shutting her ofif from the sea, quickly 
adopted her religion, language, and manners. 

But the rivalry between the later Carolingians and 
the Robertian house assumed serious proportions after 
the Treaty of Clair-sur-Epte, for Robert, Count of Paris, 
raised a rebellion and was crowned king In 922. But the 
following year he fell in battle at Soissons, and his revolt 
was continued by other great nobles and ended in the 
murder of Charles the Simple at Peronne in 929, an event 
which Louis XI remembered at the time of his famous 
interview with Charles the Bold. 

On the death of Robert, Rudolf of Burgundy reigned 
from 923 to 936, but on his death Hugh the Great, 
Count of Paris and son of Duke Robert, wisely caused 
Louis IV (or Louis d'Outremer), son of Charles the 
Simple, to be brought over from the court of Athelstan 
5 



54 The French People 

and crowned king. Hugh was rewarded by the re- 
newal of the title " Duke of the French " borne by his 
father, Robert. This title implied a military authority 
over the various lands situated north of the Seine, and 
Hugh became the most powerful subject in the kingdom. 
His position was similar to that of the justiciar in Anglo- 
Norman days, or to that of a mayor of the palace, with 
this difference that Louis IV was by no means a roi 
faineant. 

He was a warrior, and at one time with the aid of 
Otto the Great fought against Count Hugh. Peace, 
however, was made, and when, in 954, Louis died his son 
Lothair, then only thirteen years old, was chosen king 
by Hugh's influence. Two years later Hugh died. Un- 
like his predecessors, he was a statesman who realized 
that the true ^policy of his house was to play a waiting 
game. 

None of his house did more for its future fortunes 
than did Hugh. To his sagacity in accumulating fiefs, 
in heaping up treasure, and in wisely declining the royal 
dignity in 936 on the death of Rudolf, is due the fact that 
his son Hugh Capet became the founder of the Capetian 
line. 

Like his father, Hugh Capet — so called either because 
he wore the cope of the abbot of St. Martin's at Tours, 
or because of the size of his head — was a shrewd tacti- 
cian. He had no difficulty in holding his own against 
Lothair, the Caroling king, when he attempted to shake 
himself free from the duke's influence and to make head 
against the feudal nobility. Hugh was supported by the 
Emperor Otto II and by the Church, which, represented 
by Adalberon, Archbishop of Rheims, and the famous 



Hugh Capet 55 

Gerbert, afterward Pope Sylvester II, had hitherto been 
the firm support of the CaroHngs. 

In 986 Lothair died, his son Louis V in 987, and with 
him ended the Carolingian line of kings. Unlike the 
later Merovingians, the last three Carolings were men of 
energy and resource. But their kingdom had no terri- 
torial basis, and without territory which could afford 
them men and money they were utterly unable to hold 
their own against the power of the feudal nobles. 

The time had now come for the long struggle between 
these feudal nobles and the Caroling kings, between Paris 
and Laon, to end. Things were ripe for a revolution, 
and the nobles could not have found a better candidate 
than Hugh Capet, The domain of the Duke of France 
consisted of a long strip of land extending from the 
mouth of the Somme to the Loire, with Normandy on 
one side and* Burgundy, Champagne, and Flanders on 
the other. The Seine, with Paris situated on it, crossed 
this narrow strip, cutting it well-nigh in half. Hugh 
therefore had the immense advantage of occupying a 
central position in what we may call France. Lorraine, 
Aries, and Franche-Comte held of the emperor, and were 
practically German; the Counts of Flanders, Verman- 
dois, and Champagne and the Dukes of Normandy, 
Brittany, Burgundy, and Aquitaine looked on them- 
selves as Hugh Capet's equals. But he was strong- 
est of them all, and not only was lord of the city and 
county of Paris, but was lay abbot of Saint Denis, the 
most celebrated church in France. Other important 
cities and counties also held of him, such as the cities of 
Orleans and Chartres and the counties of Blois, Perche, 
Touraine, and Maine. 



56 The French People 

Hugh Capet's position therefore fitted him for the rank 
of king, and in 987 several circumstances specially favored 
his candidature. If there was a Caroling heir it was 
Charles, Duke of Lorraine, uncle of Louis V, the last 
Caroling king. But Charles owed allegiance to the em- 
peror, and was regarded as a German. The barons 
therefore put him on one side and the most powerful of 
Hugh's peers, the Dukes of Burgundy and Normandy, 
took the lead in supporting his election. The Capetians 
were related to Burgundy, for the duke was Hugh's 
brother, and the Carolings had completely alienated the 
Normans, whose duke was Hugh's brother-in-law, by 
oppressing their duke, Richard the Fearless. With the 
support of Burgundy and Normandy and that of the 
other great nobles, such as the Duke of Aquitaine, a 
brother-in-law, and the Count of Vermandois, a connec- 
tion of Hugh's, went that of the Church. Under the 
influence of Gerbert, Hugh w^as at Noyon elected king, 
and at Rheims his election was confirmed by the Arch- 
bishop Adalbero, who crowned him King of the Franks. 
And thus " in this time failed the lineage of ' Challe- 
maine ' in France, and then by common assent was the 
kingship granted to ' Huon Chapette,' who was right 
prudent and valiant, bold and brave, so long as he lived." 

The accession of Hugh Capet completed the process 
begun at the Treaty of Verdun in 843, and it is regarded 
as the starting point of all later French history. France, 
since Charles the Great's death, had become divided 
among a number of great fiefs, and while the Carolings, 
unfortunately for themselves, had no territories, and so 
had no solid basis of feudal support, Hugh Capet had the 
advantage of being the possessor of one of the strongest 



Meaning of Hugh Capet's Election 57 

fiefs in France. His election can be regarded as the 
triumph of nationality, or of feudalism, or of the Church. 
He belonged to a family which had saved Paris from 
capture. Being lord to the Isle of France, he was essen- 
tially a Frenchman, one of the new Romance people 
which had grown up through the amalgamation of the 
conquering Franks and the conquered Romans. In 
speech and interests he, like his immediate predecessors, 
was distinctly French. 

Besides the royal domains France in 987 consisted 
of six principalities, afterward called the six lay peerages 
— Flanders, Normandy, Burgundy, Champagne, Aqui- 
taine, and Toulouse — and in these principalities the 
princes were practically independent of the kings, though 
the feudal superiority of the French crown extended over 
their states. 

Louis d'Outremer could only understand German, 
while the Capetian kings acquired the idiom of northern 
France, and Robert, the second of his race, was in the 
words of the chronicler " linguae Gallicse peritia facun- 
dissimus." The German of the Merovingians retreated 
beyond the Rhine, the rustic Latin used by the Carolin- 
gians was banished to the cloister, and in France the 
Romance tongue was generally adopted, and two dialects, 
the langiie d'oc and the langue d'oil, were formed, the one 
used in southern, the other in northern France. 

The Carolings had been more German than French; 
if there was a rebellion they fled into Germany and ap- 
pealed to the Emperor. Hugh Capet was a Neustrian 
baron, and Paris was his capital, though at that time it 
was simply the chief town of a dukedom and was little 
known. 



58 The French People 

His election implied the triumph of nationality. It 
must always be remembered in connection with Hugh 
Capet's accession that Paris and its dukedom had been 
for years merely the centre of a feudal system which 
revolved round it, and became gradually the nucleus of 
the French monarchy. 

It was not till some four hundred years had passed 
that the great feudal states were incorporated with the 
crown of France. The history of these annexations is 
the history of the aggressions of Paris. Modern France 
therefore in no way " represents ancient Gaul or Caro- 
lingian Francia." Modern France has grown in the 
same way as Prussia and Sardinia have grown, by annex- 
ing divers states and forming thereby a strong centralized 
monarchy. 

The nobles who supported Hugh Capet's ' election 
looked upon him simply as a great feudatory who held 
views similar to their own. The feudal system had in- 
deed saved Europe from a fresh supremacy of barbarism; 
Alfred and his successors in England owed their .triumph 
over the Danes to the cavalry of the Thegns, while, with 
the aid of the feudal nobles, led by the Robertian house, 
France had driven off all the Northmen with the excep- 
tion of Rollo and his followers, who had been allowed to 
settle in Normandy. In Germany, Italy, and Provence the 
great lords had been equally successful, and in the tenth 
century Europe was in the hands of a triumphant militant 
feudalism. Hugh Capet and his immediate successors 
understood the position in which they stood and its 
limitations, and Hugh showed his appreciation of it when 
he promised to take no step of importance without con- 
sulting the tenants in chief. A powerful duke, he found 



The Church and Hugh Capet 59 

himself a weak king. It was in reality the interest of the 
feudatories not to have a king at all. But a king was 
necessary to the feudal system, and when the magnates 
took the advice of Gerbert and elected Hugh Capet they 
thought he would remain like as they were; they did not 
realize that there was always a tendency among the clergy 
and people to look upon royalty as of divine origin, nor 
did they foresee that the monarchical centre would 
gradually be regarded as the " real heart of French na- 
tional life." 

But if Hugh Capet's succession was regarded with 
favour by the feudal lords the Church had every right to 
look upon it as in some respects her own especial work. 
Adalbero and Gerbert had quarrelled with the two last 
Carolingian kings and given their support to Hugh. 
The wisdom of this policy is easily appreciated when we 
remember that Hugh was a man who could preserve 
order, and who, moreover, had much Church patronage 
in his hands. The Duke of France was indeed worth con- 
ciliating, for, being abbot of Saint Denis, near Paris, and 
of Saint Martin, at Tours, he was regarded as a kind of lay 
head of the Church, and had in his gift many rich abbeys 
and benefices. But the Church had higher motives in 
supporting Hugh than merely those of self-advantage. 
In spite of her own shortcomings the Church in its best 
representatives always saw in a powerful king the only 
check upon unbridled license and anarchy. Amid the 
horrors and oftentimes chaos of feudal times the only 
chance of orderly rule lay in the monarchy. Owing to the 
growth of feudalism, every part of France was planted 
with petty tyrants whose cruel and predatory instincts 
could only be restrained by a strong king. The Carolings 



6o The French People 

could not defend the Church from feudal violence, nor 
had they lands to give to bishoprics and monasteries. 
Adalbero and Gerbert were men who fully realized the 
importance of electing such a king, and it was to them 
that Hugh owed his election. 

The Church regarded the Capetian dynasty as the 
lawful heir of the Merovingian and Carolingian mon- 
archies, and as the Church was the principal author of the 
revolution of 987, so did she continue to be the strongest 
and most loyal supporter of the Capetian line of kings. 
Hugh Capet was brought into alliance with the see of 
Rome, and became the " eldest son of the Church." 

It is therefore evident that without the support of 
the Church Hugh Capet would have failed to secure the 
crown; it is equally true that his election was at the 
time a triumph for feudalism, though it proved in the 
end fatal to the feudal system; and lastly, it cannot be 
gainsaid that, looking back, we can trace the definite be- 
ginning of French nationality, of French national life, to 
the establishment of the Capetian dynasty, which had its 
roots in the soil of France. 

At the time of Hugh Capet's accession there was no 
sign of the eventual triumph of the monarchy. He was 
simply primus inter pares, one of a number of great 
nobles. No country was more divided in feeling and 
interest than was the kingdom of the West Franks, over 
whom he nominally ruled. Each of the provincial na- 
tionalities which composed France was as strong and as 
consolidated as that of which Paris was the capital. 

There was no feeling of patriotism, no sentiment of 
nationality in France as a whole. Everywhere, as in 
England, local feeling was predominant. It was impos- 



France in 987 61 

sible, in the feudal society of which Hugh Capet was 
the leading representative, that the national ideal could 
find a place. 

The feudal system which revolved round the French 
king at the time of Hugh Capet's accession implied the 
existence of strong local states, aristocratic isolation, and 
chronic anarchy. 

Of these states Normandy owed its importance to 
the Treaty of Clair-sur-Epte. The Northmen soon be- 
came more French than the French themselves; they 
introduced into their new home a bracing influence, they 
took the lead in all the great movements of the time. Rest- 
less and energetic, the Normans conquered England and 
Sicily, they led the way in the crusades, they popularized 
in Western Europe French ideas, language, and customs. 
Brittany had only recovered from the attacks of the 
Northmen in the tenth century There the Celtic and 
Gallo-Roman influences produced under Alan Barbetorte, 
who died in 952, a state, the independent character of 
which was very marked as late as the French Revolution. 
Anjou, Champagne, Blois, Vermandois, and Flanders 
were all organized feudal states, with their own peculiar 
characteristics; while south of the Loire Toulouse, Gas- 
cony, and Poitou, with which went in the tenth century 
the old duchy of Aquitaine, were even more independ- 
ent of the central authority. 

Over this divided, anarchic, and turbulent land Hugh 
Capet was elected ruler. During his reign and those of 
his immediate successors the nobles and clergy to some 
extent enjoyed independence. But Hugh and his de- 
scendants provided for the hereditary transmission of the 
crown by associating with them during their Hves their 



62 The French People 

eldest sons as kings, and as events proved the early 
Capets were not as powerless as has been imagined. 

From the accession of Hugh Capet the process begins 
of converting the nominal feudal superiority of the crown 
into a direct sovereignty over the whole kingdom, and 
simultaneously with this process goes that of annexing 
states like Provence, Lorraine, and Savoy, which formed 
no part of the Capetian monarchy. 

Hugh and his immediate descendants began these 
processes, which later kings continued. The history of 
the Capetian dynasty is essentially a story of progress, 
of the slow development of nationality, and of the grad- 
ual weakening of the feudal influences. The early Capets 
had possessions in Picardy, Champagne, Berri; the seaport 
of Montreuil in Ponthieu, a paramount influence in Bur- 
gundy, besides their palaces in Laon, Soissons, Auxerre, 
and Sens. 

The history of their reigns emphatically forbids us 
to believe that under them royalty was a quantite negli- 
geable. 

Hugh Capet asserted with success the independence 
of France; his successor Robert (996-1031) increased 
the royal domain and the prestige of the crown. Though 
Henry I (1031-1060) was unsuccessful in most of his 
enterprises, he at least showed a courage and persever- 
ance which some of his successors imitated with advan- 
tage; and PhiHp I (1061-1108) definitely increased the 
royal domain by the absorption of the Vexin and the 
Valois, which were valuable as a protection to Paris from 
attacks from the side of Normandy or Champagne. He 
placed his brother in Vermandois, and obtained in Bourges 
a hold on the country south of the Loire. Still these 



Hugh Capet's Successors 63 

small additions of territory could not give the monarchy 
the resources and the material force required to enable 
it to fulfil its destiny. 

During most of the eleventh century France was cer- 
tainly little more than a geographical expression, and had 
little political unity. But with the twelfth century sev- 
eral movements began to exert a telling influence on the 
fortunes of France and on the future of feudalism. 

Of these movements the crusades were the most im- 
portant. 



CHAPTER V 

FRANCE AND THE EAST 

The crusades might almost be said to have created 
modern France. They began at the close of the eleventh 
century, the conquest of Jerusalem by the first crusaders 
taking place in 1099. At that time Philip I was king 
of France and feudalism was supreme. In 1291 Acre 
was lost to the Saracens and the crusades came to an 
end. By that date the French monarchy was rapidly 
vanquishing the great feudatories and annexing their ter- 
ritory. Vermandois had been absorbed. Normandy 
and Languedoc had been conquered. Flanders, Brit- 
tany, Burgundy, and Aquitaine alone of the great fiefs 
preserved their independence. The serried phalanx of 
the all-powerful barons had been once and for all broken; 
the growth of the royal power and of the territorial unity 
of France had advanced steadily and successfully to- 
gether. 

The death of Philip I, in 1108, and the accession of 
Louis I proved a fresh starting point in French history, 
and with the opening of the twelfth century the exten- 
sion of the royal power and the rise of the communes 
had a decisive effect on the fortunes of France. 

Attacked simultaneously from above and below, feu- 
dalism was forced to yield. But though the spoils went 
64 



The Crusades and French Monarchy 65 

in large measure to the monarchy, the whole nation was 
benefited by the result of the struggle. Between the 
accession of Louis VI and the death of Saint Louis or 
Louis IX the political consolidation of France was car- 
ried out, the growth of a national sentiment was fostered, 
the preponderance of French ideas, customs, and lan- 
guage throughout Western Christendom was assured, 
and France became incontestably the first power in 
Europe. This change in the condition of things in 
France, in the whole organization of her society, and in 
her position in Europe was mainly due to the crusades. 
Had it not been for the crusades the French kings would 
have had far greater difficulty in their task of elimi- 
nating feudalism from government, the communes could 
hardly have hoped for so marked an improvement in 
their fortunes, and France would have remained be- 
hind other countries in the race towards union and con- 
solidation. 

Other causes no doubt there were of the weakening 
of the feudal forces, such as the personal ability of the 
French kings, their alliance with the Church, and the 
break-up of the empire of Henry II of England. But it 
was the crusades which enabled the French monarchs to 
take advantage of these and other circumstances, to cut 
at the root of feudal ideas, and to work for the consolida- 
tion of France into a great state. They were part of 
that general " revivification of the human spirit " which 
in the twelfth century found expression in the revival of 
monasticism, in the rise of the universities, in the growth 
of the communes. 

The crusades were essentially a Frankish movement, 
and the share taken by the French makes these expe- 



66 The French People 

ditions important in their national history. The first 
crusade was almost exclusively their work; they divided 
the second (1147) with the Germans; the third (1190) with 
the English; the fourth (1202) with the Venetians, when 
they established the Latin Empire of the East. The fifth 
(12 17) and sixth (1228) are of little importance, but the 
seventh (1248) and the eighth (1270) were exclusively 
French. 

For centuries Jerusalem had been the goal of pil- 
grimages from Europe, which, though checked at times 
by the occupation of the holy city by one or other of 
the fanatical sects which flourished after the fall of the 
great caliphate, had increased in number in the eleventh 
century. The advance and conquests of the Seljukian 
Turks had again stopped the influx of Christian pilgrims 
to Palestine, but it was not till the Turkish conquest of 
Jerusalem in 1076, followed by the account of the wrongs 
of Alexius at the Council of Piacenza, that Urban II de- 
cided to urge a holy war upon Europe. Alexius had 
already had experience of the military qualities of the 
Franks, for Robert Guiscard, the Norman ruler of Sicily 
and the south of Italy, had in 1031 invaded Macedonia 
and Thessaly. It was therefore a politic step on the part 
of the Emperor to secure the aid of the Latin races in 
his struggle against the Turks. The appeal of Urban at 
the Council of Clermont in 1095, followed by the preach- 
ing of Peter the Hermit and others, stirred Western 
Christendom to its depths. 

At the time of the accession of Hugh Capet religion 
was at a low ebb in Europe. Feudalism had done its 
work in beating back barbarism and defending Europe 
from its onslaught. But though in many ways an excel- 



The First Crusade 67 

lent fighting machine, feudalism was unfit to govern or 
to direct the lives of men. In the latter half of the tenth 
century it was supreme, and its influence was fatal to all 
progress. The standard of Christian life declined; the 
clergy were becoming secular; the papacy was held in 
little respect. 

To afford men an opportunity of escaping from the 
rule of ferocity and greed, to rouse them to a sense of 
higher things, to break the bonds of feudal militarism, 
were the objects of the Cluniac revival. Its ideas 
were represented by Hildebrand, and led to what was 
called the Hildebrandine reformation. A new type of 
popes appeared, the Church became vigorous and spiri- 
tual, the Cistercians, Carthusians, and other orders 
were founded, magnificent cathedrals and churches were 
built; on all sides was seen an awakening of religious 
feeling. 

Just when the Hildebrandine revival was at its height 
came the appeal of Alexius, the Eastern Emperor, for aid 
against the Seljukian Turks. 

Europe awoke to the fact that the Turks had not 
only conquered Palestine and were endangering the holy 
places, but were threatening Constantinople. No coun- 
try showed greater enthusiasm in the first crusade than 
France. In all the four armies which proceeded to Con- 
stantinople the French were conspicuous and supplied 
most of the pilgrims. Raymond IV of Toulouse headed 
one band, composed of Provengals and Italians, while a 
large collection of Germans and men from the north of 
France set forth, such as Baldwin of Hainault, Hugh of 
Saint Pol, Godfrey of Lower Lorraine, known in history 
as Godfrey of Bouillon, and others. A third force, col- 



68 The French People 

lected mainly in Italy, followed Bohemond of Tarentum, 
a Norman prince, and a fourth, composed entirely of 
Frenchmen, was led by Hugh, Count of Vermandois, 
brother of the French king, Robert, Duke of Normandy, 
and the Counts of Chartres and Flanders. Thus many 
of the greatest French lords left France and travelled to 
Palestine. Success crowned their efforts. Jerusalem was 
taken on July 15, 1099, and in August southern Pales- 
tine was secured by a victory at Ascalon from all danger 
of an Egyptian attack. France had thus within three 
years conquered a new kingdom in the East, and Syria 
was divided into four principalities. Godfrey of Bouillon 
held the government of Jerusalem, and other French 
princes were placed over Antioch, Edessa, and Tripoli. 
After Godfrey's death, in itoo, Baldwin I (1T00-1113), 
brother of Godfrey, his nephew, Baldwin II (1113-1130), 
and his son-in-law, Fulk, Count of Anjou (1130-1143), 
each became in turn King of Jerusalem, and under them 
the Latin state reached its zenith. As in Canada in the 
seventeenth century, so in Syria the French lords repro- 
duced feudalism. 

The kingdom of Jerusalem and its dependent states 
were organized on feudal lines, and the ideal aimed at 
by the crusaders is to be found in the Assizes of Jeru- 
salem, which picture a feudal state. Military orders, such 
as the Templars and Knights of St. John, were formed, 
and the language of northern France was used generally 
in Syria. 

In 1 144 the sudden conquest of Edessa by the Atabek 
Turks warned the crusaders that their kingdom was not 
built on solid foundations. At Vezelay at Easter in 
1 146, Saint Bernard, like Peter the Hermit, roused the 



The Contest with Saladin 69 

French nation, and Louis VII went to Palestine. The 
second crusade had little result, and from that time to 
the conquest of Jerusalem by Saladin in 1157 the pros- 
perity of the Latin kingdom began to decline. Feudal- 
ism as a means of government had no stability, and a 
William the Conqueror or a Henry II was required to 
prevent the complete collapse of the work of Godfrey of 
Bouillon and his fellow-crusaders. 

The conquests of Saladin, which in a few months 
demolished the kingdom of the Franks in Syria, re- 
ducing it to a few seacoast towns and castles, led im- 
mediately to the third crusade, which, unlike the first cru- 
sade, carried out as it was by the lesser feudal princes, 
was initiated and conducted by the great kings of Eu- 
rope. 

Frederick Barbarossa and his army had perished in 
Asia Minor when Philip Augustus and Richard I started 
in 1 1 90. As usual the French nobles were largely rep- 
resented, there being present with the army Theobald V 
of Blois, Henry II, Count of Champagne, and PhiHp of 
Alsace. 

Acre was taken in 1191, and shortly afterward Philip 
Augustus returned home, with many of the French. In 
September, 1192, Richard made a truce with Saladin, and 
having given Cyprus to Guy of Lusignan he departed, 
leaving Henry of Champagne titular King of Jerusalem. 
Acre became an important centre, and the establishment 
of the Latin kingdom of Cyprus was a definite advance 
against the infidels. The Christian power in the East 
was thus strengthened, though the great and heroic 
epoch of the crusades was over. 

In 1201, when the fourth crusade was organized at 



70 The French People 

the bidding of Innocent III, and partly in response to 
the preaching of Fulk of Neuilly, none of the great kings 
of Europe (being fully occupied with their own schemes 
of aggrandizement) gave it their personal support. Its 
leaders were, like those in the first crusade, French 
nobles. Theobald III, Count of Champagne, took the 
lead, and was accompanied by Louis, Count of Blois, 
Baldwin IX, Count of Flanders, and his brothers Eustace 
and Henry, Simon de Montfort, and Geoffrey of Villar- 
douin, who- has written an account of the expedition. 
Long delays took place, and on the death of the Count 
of Champagne, Boniface of Montferrat was appointed 
general-in-chief. Falling into a trap laid for them by 
the Venetians, the crusaders allowed themselves to be 
diverted from their original object, and in 1203 took 
Constantinople, and after a short period of revolution 
conquered it a second time in April, 1204. The Latin 
Empire was at once partitioned and organized. Count 
Baldwin of Flanders was elected emperor, a feudal state 
set up, and Boniface of Montferrat made King of Thessa- 
lonica. 

Louis of Blois became Duke of Nicsea; Villardouin 
Prince of Achaia; and Odo of La Roche, Lord of 
Athens; other crusaders were given fiefs in various parts 
of the empire. Till 1261, when Michael VIII conquered 
Constantinople, the Latin Empire continued under 
French emperors, and even after its fall the Latin power 
existed in the Peloponnesus and the islands for some 
years longer. 

While French adventurers were imitating the deeds 
of the Normans in the eleventh century (though in doing 
so they were diverting much valuable energy from the 



Louis IX of France 71 

Christian East), the fortunes of the kingdom of Jerusalem 
were still able to arouse some interest in Europe. After 
Frederick II had made his treaty with the Sultan of 
Egypt in 1229 and returned, Palestine was the scene of 
revolts and wars. At length, in 1244, the Charismians 
suddenly fell upon Jerusalem and slew its inhabitants. A 
Christian force under Walter of Brienne which marched 
against them was cut to pieces near Graza, and the power 
of the French in Palestine never recovered the effects of 
this disaster. 

The Latin Christians appealed to Louis IX of France, 
and in response he led two crusades, the first in 1248, the 
second in 1270. Both failed in their objects. The first, 
of which Joinville gives an interesting account, occupied 
some four years, and resulted in the rebuilding of Jaffa, 
Sidon, and Csesarea; the second caused Louis's death, on 
August 24, 1270, near Tunis. With him ended all hope 
of holding a Latin kingdom in the East. 

The crusades had revealed to Europe the energy and 
capacities of the French people. For nearly two hun- 
dred years successive French kings had stood forth as 
the defenders of the Christian religion and French cul- 
ture in the farthest outpost held by Europeans against 
the Turks. The first crusade had succeeded in avert- 
ing the fall of the Eastern Empire for many years, and 
had thus fulfilled one of the objects of Gregory VII and 
Urban II in stirring up the expeditions to the East. The 
Seljukian Turks in the eleventh century were advancing 
rapidly, and had Constantinople fallen even in the rtftddle 
of the twelfth century the serious effect upon the social 
and political life of Europe cannot be exaggerated. 
French enterprise, though it allowed itself in the fourth 



72 The French People 

crusade to be led into wrong channels, had at any rate 
occupied Islamism for two centuries, and even after its 
retreat left in Cyprus, Rhodes, and the developed mari- 
time resources of Venice fresh hindrances to an easy 
advance westward by way of the Mediterranean. 

While the crusades proved of infinite value to Chris- 
tendom by keeping back the torrent of barbarian inva- 
sion, Western Europe, and especially France, experienced 
an immediate and general improvement in the conditions 
of social life. Enormous numbers of nobles, of whom the 
majority were French, proceeded to the crusades. 

To raise money they sold many rights to towns and 
peasants. Their absence abroad, followed in many cases 
by their deaths, gave the kings of France opportunities, 
which they seized; and gradually, as the smaller fiefs were 
swallowed up by the greater lordships, so were the 
greater lordships by the royal power. " The continued 
absence of the petty baronage in the East, and its per- 
petual decimation under the pressure of debt and travel, 
battle and disease, helped to concentrate authority in 
the hands of the royal officers." The conduct of Robert 
of Normandy and Richard I of England, who sold char- 
ters and towns, are well-known instances of the eager- 
ness of the crusaders to sell anything to raise money, 
and useful examples of the methods by which the 
towns benefited by the crusades. But no country 
gained greater political consolidation from the crusades 
than did France. 

The crusades proved fatal to the supremacy of the 
French feudal nobility, who were drawn away in large 
numbers to Palestine. As long as they remained at 
home peace and progress were impossible, but abroad 



Results of the Crusades y2> 

they used their energies to good purpose, and spread 
over the civilized world the fame of the French nation. 
Fortunately for France her kings during the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries pursued steadily their true policy, 
which was to defend their frontiers, to impose their 
authority on the nobles, and to encourage the growth 
of town life. Louis VI (1108-1137) was the first French 
king to take advantage of the crusading movement. 
Allied with the Church and well served by Suger, he 
overthrew the feudal castles on the Seine and the Oise; 
he established his predominance completely over the 
royal domain — the Isle of France — and he drove his 
chief opponent, Hugh of Le Puiset, to the Holy Land. 
Then taking advantage of the more tranquil times which 
owing to the crusades prevailed in France, he aided the 
rising communal movement by granting a large number 
of charters to towns, and at the same time he furthered 
the due administration of justice. 

His successor, Louis VII (1137-1180), only went on 
the second crusade under compulsion. In spite of end- 
less difficulties owing to the marriage of his divorced wife 
Eleanor to Henry II of England, Louis furthered the 
cause of the monarchy. Like his father, he remained 
closely allied with the Church; like his father, he built 
new towns and developed ancient ones. His successor, 
Philip Augustus (i 180-1223), is rightly considered one 
of the founders of the French monarchy, and he proved 
not only an able administrator, but one of the great con- 
solidators of the realm. 

Feeling able to take advantage of the weakness of 
his enemies, of the divisions among the barons, and of 
the rising power of the communes, Philip successfully 



74 The French People 

expelled John of England from Normandy, Maine, An- 
jou, Touraine, and Poitou, and destroyed a serious feudal 
attack on him at Bouvines in 12 14. 

Like Louis VII, he only went on a crusade with re- 
luctance, and hurried home for the purpose of organizing 
an invasion of the English possessions in France. 

Under these kings the numbers of the barons less- 
ened, and as the survivors found it necessary to stay at 
home in order to defend themselves against the aggres- 
sions of the royal power, the interest in the crusades 
diminished. 

But their concern for the preservation of their feudal 
rights came too late; the royal power which so success- 
fully asserted itself in the hands of Philip Augustus was 
equally triumphant in the reigns of Louis IX and 
Philip IV. 

The influence of religious enthusiasm, the growth of 
culture, the development of the royal authority — all tended 
to transform the feudal nobility of France from mere up- 
holders of anarchy into more orderly members of society. 
In England a somewhat similar process transformed the 
feudal baronage of the twelfth into the constitutional 
nobility of the thirteenth century. 

As the crusading ideas yielded before the absorption 
of the Western monarchs in schemes of territorial ag- 
grandizement national unity grew and was fostered in 
France by the common bonds of interest between the 
king and the towns. Feudal anarchy having disappeared, 
the towns could profit from the outburst of commerce 
which was another result of the crusades, while the peas- 
ants equally benefited from the frequent transference of 
property from the barons to the Church. 



French Influence in Europe 75 

Thus the crusades enabled the Capetian kings to 
turn the tables on the nobles, to stop private wars, and to 
escape from the bonds which were imposed on Hugh 
Capet and his immediate successors by the feudal baron- 
age. But the crusades did more, for they enabled Philip 
Augustus, Louis VII, Louis IX, and Philip IV to show 
that France, from being a divided country, had become 
the most prominent nation in Europe, the leader in war- 
like enterprises, no less than in culture, chivalry, litera- 
ture, and all the humane arts. So largely represented 
were the French in the crusades that the crusaders were 
known as Franks, and one result of the crusades was to 
spread the French language. French became " the 
speech of princes, lawyers, and merchants; yet more im- 
portant was it that it became the recognised language 
of literature." Brunetto Latino, Dante's master, wrote 
his chief work, the Tesauro, in French because " it is more 
delectable and more widely diffused," and in England in 
the thirteenth century, when the growth of nationality 
was very marked, the French tongue, art, and manners 
were commonly adopted in the court and among the 
upper classes, by the lawyers, and by the leading officials. 

In spite of the raid against Constantinople known 
as the fourth crusade, the effects upon France of the 
establishment of the short-lived kingdom of Jerusalem 
and of her efforts to aid the Byzantine Empire were 
lasting. 

French travellers, such as the Franciscan William 
Rubruquis, sent by Louis IX to the great khan, began 
to penetrate the mysterious East, and the impetus given 
to commerce in the Mediterranean proved to be more 
enduring than many of the direct and immediate effects 



76 The French People 

of the crusades. The bravery and energy shown by the 
French, the sacrifices made, the numbers of great famihes 
who spent their fortunes and gave their fives to drive 
back the Turks, gave France a strong claim to be the 
guardian of the holy places. In 1396, to beat back the 
Turks, who were again threatening Constantinople, many 
French knights joined Sigismund of Hungary in a gal- 
lant but disastrous attempt to overthrow the infidel at 
Nicopolis. And ever and anon the French in later ages 
considered the advisability of coming forward as the legal 
heirs to Palestine and Egypt. 

Such projects were dangled before Louis XIV; they 
were partly executed by Napoleon. The Crimean War 
was directly caused by a quarrel over the guardianship 
of the holy places, and at the present day France, though 
practically powerless in Egypt, still preserves her interest 
in Jerusalem and its treasures. 

The Frankish or Latin kings of Jerusalem thus bene- 
fited Europe and France in many ways, and they were 
the cause of valuable additions to the historical and poet- 
ical literature of the day. Ernoul, a French squire, con- 
tinued the history of William of Tyre; Villehardouin and 
Joinville, like Ernoul, describe events in which they 
themselves took part. Similarly the capture of Jerusa- 
lem and the subsequent struggles in Palestine inspired 
many a poet, of whom Richard the Pilgrim and William 
IX of Poitiers are perhaps the best known. The cru- 
sades were the first united effort of Christendom; they 
were wars for an idea; they were epic in their gran- 
deur. It is therefore not surprising that the gallantry 
of the French knights was often told in verses and 
songs which indicate the effect on the Western world 



The Re-sults of the Crusades ^^ 

of its contact with the East, at the bidding of religious 
enthusiasm. 

It remains to be seen how the French kings were able 
to identify the monarchical cause, which had gained so 
marvellously by the absence of many of the feudal barons 
in the Holy Land, with an orthodox crusade against the 
Albigenses, and, further, by the conquest of Toulouse to 
extend the royal dominion to the Mediterranean. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE ANNEXATION OF TOULOUSE 

The crusades were in no sense inspired by religious 
intolerance or sectarian jealousy. All that was noblest 
in mankind was concentrated in a series of efforts to re- 
store the holy places to Christian rule. The popes hav- 
ing originated the movement, supported it with all their 
might. 

The crusades enormously increased the power of 
the papacy, the influence of which upon affairs was clearly 
seen in England in the reigns of Henry H and John, in 
Germany in the reign of Frederick H, and in France in 
the events connected with the Albigensian crusade; 

That crusade, unlike those against the Turks, was 
an example of the tyranny of the popes, and of the deteri- 
oration of the crusading spirit; for it was throughout 
tainted by intolerance and jealousy, and called into being 
the Holy Inquisition. But to the French monarchy it 
proved of great value, enabling the government of Louis 
IX to absorb the lands between the Loire and the Ga- 
ronne, and to impose upon the south of France the 
advantages of law and order. The destruction of the 
independence of Toulouse following the fall of the Eng- 
lish power in France, rendered possible a strong and 
united French nation. 

78 



Toulouse 79 

The county of Toulouse had, after the death of 
Charles the Great, gradually extended its limits till at 
the beginning of the twelfth century it included all the 
lands between the Alps and the Rhone, between the 
Rhone and the Aquitanian border, and between the Pyre- 
nees and the Ebro. These lands represent what is usu- 
ally called Languedoc, where the dialect, the langue d'oc, 
was spoken and soon reached a high state of literary ex- 
cellence; while in the north of France several varieties 
of the langue d'oil were spoken until the supremacy of 
Paris forced upon France the dominant dialect of the 
lie de France, of which Paris was originally the capital. 

Subordinate to the Count of Toulouse were the fiefs 
of Narbonne, Beziers, which included Albi and Carcas- 
sonne, Montpellier, Foix, and the countships of Ouerci 
and Rhodez. 

The geographical position of Toulouse brought it 
into close connection with Spain, and marriage alliances 
increased the ties between the south of France and the 
Spanish princes. In the middle of the twelfth century 
Henry II proceeded to enforce the claims of his wife, 
Eleanor of Aquitaine, to Toulouse, but Louis VI of 
France, who had married in 1154 Constance of Castile, 
resisted the claims and assumed suzerain rights. Henry 
II, unwilling to war against his feudal superior, yielded, 
and war was averted, though it was not till the following 
century that the kings of France secured any real hold 
on Toulouse and the south of France. 

The city of Toulouse was important in Roman times, 
when it was the headquarters of a garrison which guarded 
one of the routes passing through the province of Gallia 
Narbonensis. As the capital of the county of Toulouse, 



8o The French People 

where was spoken a Romance tongue, and where the 
people early developed an advanced civilization and de- 
spised their ruder fellow-countrymen who lived north of 
the Loire, Toulouse was from 852 the seat of a line of 
hereditary and powerful counts, and as time went on its 
importance was increased. While the regions north of 
the Loire gradually became absorbed into the French 
monarchy (the battle of Bouvines, in 12 14, giving Philip 
Augustus the permanent possession of Normandy, Maine, 
Anjou, Touraine, and Poitou), the county of Toulouse, 
like Aquitaine, showed no signs of a desire for a close 
union with the French monarchy. In Toulouse com- 
merce had produced ease and luxury, and while peace 
and prosperity had long been enjoyed by the inhabitants, 
literature had reached a high state of perfection. Always 
strongly feudal and antimonarchical, the country south 
of the Loire, in which feudal violence and premature cul- 
ture stood in strange contrast, was equally lacking in 
patriotism and in vigour. Like Aquitaine and Provence, 
which were subject to the Emperor, Toulouse had be- 
come celebrated for the beautiful literature of the trouba- 
dours, who towards the end of the twelfth century were 
at the height of their fame. 

The three southern courts had about the same time 
become the chief intellectual no less than political centres 
of the country south of the Loire. " In that warm land, 
where poetry and love, art and architecture, had their 
home, freedom of opinion and speculation were natural." 

The twelfth century was the age of heresies. " The 
" Catholic faith," said Saint Bernard, " is discussed in the 
streets and market places. We have fallen upon evil 
times." But while the influence of the Church gradu- 



The Albigenses 8i 



ally succeeded In suppressing the strange doctrines and 
the heretical sects in Languedoc and Provence, the heresy 
of the Albigenses, so called because their headquarters 
were in the town of Albi, showed an unexpected vitality 
and threatened to become largely the faith of the whole 
people. The heresy was itself social and philosophical 
rather than religious. The Albigenses held the philo- 
sophical doctrine of the Manichseans, saying that there 
were two equal and coeternal deities identified respec- 
tively with the principles of good and evil, and at the 
same time they rejected the authority of the Church and 
bitterly opposed barons and clergy. " If black monks," 
wrote the poet Peire Cardinal, " may win salvation of 
God by much eating and by the keeping of women, 
white monks by fraud, templars and hospitallers by 
pride, canons by lending money in usury, then for fools I 
hold Saint Peter and Saint Andrew, who suffered for God 
such grievous torments. Kings, emperors, counts, and 
knights were wont to rule the world, but now I see clerks 
holding dominion over it by robbery, deceit, hypocrisy, 
force and exhortation." This illustration is only one of 
many of that Provencal feeling which before the end of 
the twelfth century had obtained so firm a hold upon the 
county of Toulouse and its dependencies that no efforts 
of the Church to re-establish its doctrines were successful. 
The barons seized on the property of the Church and the 
whole land was filled with anarchy. It seemed as if the 
south would begin a municipal and democratic revolution 
dangerous to the dominion of the Church. 

As early as 1 177, Raymond V, Count of Toulouse, 
had sent to the abbey of Citeaux a formal complaint 
against the heretics, and in 1181, Henry of Clairvaux, the 



82 The French People 

Cardinal Bishop of Albano, had, by the command of Pope 
Alexander III, endeavoured to convert the Albigensians. 
He had failed, and in 1184 Lucius III had instigated an 
inquisition by the bishops into the presence of heretics 
within their dioceses. But these peaceful means were 
unsuccessful; the murders of priests and expulsions of 
bishops and abbots from their sees and monasteries 
never ceased; the toleration of even the Jews, who could 
hold lands in Languedoc, continued; and the study of 
medicine and Aristotle, both of which studies were op- 
posed to Rome, was encouraged. The mere possibility 
of a southern kingdom being set up independent of Paris 
and hostile to Rome was sufficient to render action on 
the part of the Pope and King of France not only advis- 
able, but necessary. 

At length Innocent III, who was fully alive to the 
dangers which threatened the Church in Languedoc, was 
roused to action, and in 1198 two Cistercian monks, one 
of whom was Peter of Castelnau, were sent. Over them 
was placed Arnold of Amaury, the sincere but fa- 
natical abbot of Citeaux. Though one Fulk, a bigoted 
monk, replaced the lukewarm Bishop of Toulouse, the 
mission was a failure, and in 1206 was only saved from 
retirement from the county by the energy of Dominic de 
Guzman, the founder of the Dominicans, who resolved to 
devote his life to the suppression of the Albigensian 
heresy. 

The time for forcible measures had now come, and 
Rome sided with the semi-barbarous north of France 
against the civilization of the south. In January, 1208, 
Peter of Castelnau, who had excommunicated Raymond 
VI, was murdered, and Innocent III preached a crusade, 



Beginning of the Struggle 83 

which assumed the character of an international war, and 
lasted for twenty years. At the head of the forces of 
Langue d'Oil, Simon de Montfort invaded Languedoc, 
and a struggle marked by singular ferocity began. 

Raymond bowed before the storm, but his nephew, 
Raymond Roger of Beziers, made a gallant defence. 
Beziers was taken by assault and over 15,000 persons 
slaughtered. At Carcassonne Roger was captured by 
treachery, and probably poisoned. His territory was 
given to Simon de Montfort, who as a northerner was 
bitterly opposed in his efforts to reduce the south to obe- 
dience. The struggle became therefore a political one — 
the south against the north. In spite of this hostility of the 
people of Languedoc, Simon gradually defeated his foes; 
Raymond fled to Peter of Aragon, but again took arms. 

A second crusade was preached. Peter of Aragon was 
slain at the battle of Muret, the crowning victory of the 
crusades, in 12 13, and Raymond submitted, Simon de 
Montfort therefore became Count of Toulouse and Duke 
of Narbonne, and introduced northern nobles into his ter- 
ritories. Though he gave a small portion of Toulouse to 
Raymond VII, who also received the imperial marquisate 
of Provence, under his auspices the civilization of Lan- 
guedoc was stamped out with the Albigensian heresy. 

In this war Thibaut, Count of Champagne, a trou- 
vere, was compelled by his oath to' fight against Ray- 
mond, though his own words show how bitterly he dis- 
approved of the papal action: 

" Ce est des clers qui ont laisser sermons 
Pour guervoier et pour tuer les gens, 
Jamais en Dieu ne fuit tels horns creans. 
Nostra chief [Innocent III] fait tous les membres dolour." 



84 The French People 

Then he goes on to declare that 

" Papelars [the followers of the Pope] font li siecle chanceler. 
lis ont tolu joie et solas et pais, 
Sen porteront en enfer le grant fais." 

A reaction soon set in in Toulouse against the north, 
and Raymond VII, who was as orthodox as Simon, headed 
it. It was simply a struggle for the political independ- 
ence of the south, Simon was killed at Toulouse in 121 8, 
and his son Amaury, finding that he could not hold 
his own against the cgnquered populations, offered his 
domains to the King of France, to whose court he fled. 
Philip refused to accept Amaury's heritage, and died in 
1223, leaving his successor, Louis VIII, to establish the 
royal supremacy in Toulouse. The south had indeed been 
victorious, but had been so weakened by the long struggle 
that it proved quite unable to stand against the power of 
the King of France. The northern invasion, though it 
had temporarily failed, had in reality attained its object. 

In 1226 Louis VIII, in whose favour Amaury had 
abdicated his rights, recognised that the interests of the 
Pope coincided with his own, and, being pious and ad- 
venturous, continued to war against the south. 

Reunited again under the banner of the French king, 
the forces of the north invaded the lands of the south. 
Many of the lords and bishops and towns of Languedoc 
hastened to send in their submission to Louis before the 
expedition started, and had it not been for the obstinate 
conduct of the citizens of Avignon, who refused to allow 
Louis to cross the Rhone, the march would haye been 
merely a triumphal progress. As it was, Louis, having 
taken Avignon, met with no opposition till he came to 
Toulouse. 



The Treaty of Meaux 85 

Fatigued with the length of the expedition, the great 
barons began to complain, sickness broke out in the 
army, and Louis contented himself with organizing the 
administration of the country, and returned to Paris. 
For the first time a royal army under the king had ap- 
peared in Languedoc, and the expedition constitutes an 
important event in the progress towards national unity. 

Unfortunately Louis, who had thus opened his reign 
so auspiciously, died suddenly in 1226. 

.On his death Raymond VII made the Treaty of Meaux 
with the Regent Blanche of Castile, yielding to the crown 
the duchy of Narbonne and all his lands from the Rhone to 
beyond Carcassonne. He was confirmed in his posses- 
sion of the county of Toulouse, which, however, on his 
death was to fall to Alfonse, the king's brother, who was to 
marry Raymond's daughter. If they had no children the 
county was to go to the King of France. Alfonse was, 
further, to raze the walls of thirty of his strong places and 
of Toulouse itself. 

The importance of this treaty is hard to overestimate. 
The tendency towards the formation of strong monarchies 
had been felt in the south, where it seemed possible that 
Toulouse and Provence, representing as they did the 
national feeling of southern France, might combine and 
form a kingdom independent of northern France. 

The Regent Blanche had definitely removed this 
danger to France, had at last destroyed the independence 
of the south, and the royal dominion touched the Medi- 
terranean. Though the papacy set up the inquisition 
in every diocese and though Dominicans were installed 
in the new University of Toulouse, no further attempts 

were made to force on the south the customs of the 
7 



86 The French People 

north, and in Provence even troubadours were to be 
found. 

In 1241 a league was formed against Louis IX; Ray- 
mond VII revolted, while his subjects expelled the 
Dominicans, and Henry III, in 1242, opportunely 
brought an army with which to retake Poitou. The de- 
feat of the English was followed by the submission of 
Raymond, and in 1243 the Treaty of Lorris confirmed 
the Treaty of Meaux. • 

" A partie de cet epoque," writes Guillaume de Nangis, 
" les barons de France cesserent de rien entreprendre 
contre leur roi le Christ du Seigneur, voyant manifeste- 
ment que la main du Seigneur etait avec lui." The fail- 
ure of the last revolt of Raymond VII brought to an end 
the reign of feudalism in Languedoc. Raymond indeed 
attempted to contract a new marriage with Beatrice, heir- 
ess of Provence, so as to avoid leaving his domains to 
Alfonse of Poitiers. But the princess married, in 1245, 
Charles of Anjou, another brother of Louis IX and Count 
of Provence, and Languedoc was thus dominated by 
Capetian influence at the time of Raymond's death in 
1247. Toulouse at once became the possession of Al- 
fonse, and thus ended a long series of savage wars which 
had not only overthrown the independence of the people 
of the south of France, but had also destroyed a remark- 
able civilization. 

The union of northern and southern France was now 
irrevocable. The change of rulers brought no disturbance 
in Toulouse, which submitted quietly to the administrative 
alterations and new institutions introduced by Alfonse. 

In the government of Alfonse the influence of the 
wisdom and moderation of the king is constantly vis- 



Alfonse of Poitiers 87 

ible. " For the first time since the best days of the 
Roman Empire," says one historian, " was the adminis- 
tration of the south carried on in an intelHgent manner." 
Alfonse took a very active personal share in carrying out 
in his government the principles approved by Louis 
IX, and the south enjoyed law and order. 

In Provence Louis's brother, Charles of Anjou, who 
had become Count of Provence, lived from 1 245-1 265. 
Like Alfonse, he restored order, destroyed feudalism, 
checked the aspirations of the towns towards independ- 
ence, and favoured their commercial interests. The trou- 
badours retired to Spain, and northern methods of govern- 
ment succeeded in gradually welding all Provence to- 
gether. 

In 1271, on the death of Alfonse, the county of Tou- 
louse, with that of Poitiers and Auvergne, devolved on 
his nephew, Philip III; the Provengal lands had already, 
bit by bit, been incorporated with France. 

All fear of the rise of a great national state in southern 
Gaul which would have included Toulouse and Provence 
was over, and the vigorous nationality of the langue d'oil 
had conquered, though it had not convinced the south. 

During the Hundred Years' War Aquitaine continued 
in English hands, and it was not till the siege of Orleans 
in 1430 that the south began to take any important part 
in the struggle against the invaders. It was not till 
the Reformation that the south was regarded as an inte- 
gral part of France. In the French Revolution the 
south first led the way in opposing the crown, and, later, 
its independent views had to be crushed by the armies 
of the north. It always was and still remains a land 
apart, with its peculiar dialects and customs, while the 



88 The French People 

inhabitants differ widely in appearance and manners from 
their northern countrymen. 

But though the destruction of much of what was most 
characteristic in the civiHzation of the south perished, 
though Gothic tended to replace the Romanesque in such 
cities as Limoges and Toulouse, though the troubadours 
fled, and though the suppression of the Albigensian 
heresy led to the introduction of the Inquisition, it was 
necessary in the interests of France that the royal power 
in the thirteenth century should be extended to the Medi- 
terranean. 

The great feudatories in days when the monarchy was 
a mere shadow were valuable centres of local feeling, and 
proved real securities for order, and indeed for prosperity, 
if not always for peace. 

But feudalism was essentially military, and the feudal 
barons, though useful warriors, were bad rulers. When, 
towards the end of the twelfth century, some of these feu- 
dal states, like Toulouse, showed a tendency to still further 
develop the strong local feeling and to set up an author- 
ity completely independent of the central power, it was 
time for the king to intervene. Feudalism in France had 
at last found masters in such men as Louis VI, Philip 
Augustus, and Louis IX — and the age of its ascendency 
was closed. The establishment of the royal power over 
the length and breadth of France was accomplished; 
France, now a great state and nation, had under Louis IX 
assumed the leadership of Europe; it remained for Louis 
IX and Philip IV to give to France an administrative sys- 
tem adequate to the needs of the time, and to preside over 
the marvellous intellectual development of France in the 
thirteenth century. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND INTELLECTUAL PROGRESS 
OF FRANCE IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 

The French monarchy had not a few difficulties to 
contend with in the thirteenth century; it had, however, 
many sources of strength, and during the reigns of Louis 
VI and PhiHp Augustus it had made secure its founda- 
tions and consoHdated its powers. 

No longer the slave of the Church or a mere primus 
inter pares in his relations with the baronial hierarchy, the 
French king, fortunate in the support of the clergy, the 
towns, the university, and the city of Paris, stood forth as 
the real head of a strong monarchy. This revolution in 
the position of the monarchy was due partly to the policy 
of Louis VI, but mainly to that of Philip Augustus. He 
it was who destroyed feudalism as a basis of government, 
by taking measures to bring a large part of France into 
real subjection to the king and the law. The local admin- 
istration, which shortly after the accession of Hugh Capet, 
was placed under prevots, representatives of the monarchy 
in the royal domain, had been revolutionized by Philip 
Augustus by the creation of haillis and seneschals. In the 
north of France haillis were placed over the prevots, and, 
like the missi of Charles the Great, held assizes and re- 
ported to Paris upon the conduct of the prevots. In the 

89, 



90 The French People 

south the seneschals performed similar duties, but, unlike 
the haillis, who belonged to the rising official class, the 
seneschals were for the most part the great local lords. 

By these two methods of administration an important 
step was taken to concentrate all authority in the hands 
of the king, and to connect the local and central organi- 
zation. 

At the head of the whole system stood the king, 
advised by the members of his royal household. These 
ceased during the reign of Philip Augustus to hold their 
posts by hereditary right, and gave place to the king's 
personal friends. During his reign the court of the king, 
or curia regis, was gradually turning into something like 
a modern law court, composed of knights and clerics. 
From this court or council of the king sprang the official 
class, the growth of which was so encouraged by Philip 
Augustus. Under Louis IX Languedoc was added to 
the kingdom of France, and he found it necessary to still 
further develop the system which Philip Augustus had 
practically established. The regular visits of the haillis and 
seneschals to the royal exchequer were continued, and the 
connection between the local and central bodies was still 
further strengthened by Louis's institution of enqiiesteurs, 
who, like the missi dominici of CarOlingian times and the 
itinerant justices of Henry II, becatne from about 1248 a 
recognised part of the administrative systetn. 

In 1247 Louis held an inquiry into the conduct of the 
local functionaries, and heard complaints from the inhab- 
itants. At first the enquesteiirs were chosen almost ex- 
clusively from among the Dominicans and Franciscans, 
though later the members of the secular clergy and 
knights were employed. Their duty was to watch over 



Louis IX's Reforms 91 

the local administration and to repair acts of injustice 
committed by royal agents. 

In 125 1 Louis issued a great ordinance which in 
many points resembled Henry II's inquest of sheriffs. 
The baillis were forbidden to receive bribes, and were 
compelled to swear on taking office to execute justice 
fairly and to preserve the rights of the king and those 
of the people. Various other regulations as to their lives 
and conduct were laid down. 

Before Louis died the king's court had become 
divided into three bodies, each with its own duties. 
The Cour du Roi, or the Grand Council, confined itself 
mainly to administrative and political matters; the judi- 
cial business fell to an assembly known as the Parle- 
ment; the financial work was taken over by Maitres des 
Comptes. ^ 

Of these the Conseil was improved by the addition of 
trained lawyers; appeals from the inferior courts were 
taken to the Parlements; and the Gens des Comptes, who 
met in 1249 to consider financial questions, gradually be- 
came a permanent body. One of Louis's most important 
reforms was the renewal of the coinage, resulting in the 
improvement of trade, which flourished so conspicuously 
in the villeneuves and vilkfranches founded by him in 
Languedoc. 

Coming between Philip Augustus, who placed the 
royal power on secure foundations, and Philip le Bel, who 
acted as a despot, the reign of Saint Louis, who always 
showed a sense of justice and a conscientious regard for 
his subjects, was regarded as a period of peace, progress, 
and prosperity. On his death a writer declared: " Je dis 
que droit est mort, et loyaute eteinte — quand le bon roi 



92 The French People 

est mort, la creature sainte — a qui se pourront desormais 
les pauvres gens clamer — quand le bon roi est mort qui 
tant les sut aimer? " 

During Philip Ill's reign (1270-1285) the Parlement 
of Paris acquired a still more definite position. Appeals 
increased, especially from Aquitaine; the procedure of the 
Parlement was fixed in 1278, and only laymen were' al- 
lowed to be barristers. The Parlement, too, tended to 
split up into various courts, each with its own special 
functions. 

The principles adopted by Louis IX in regulating the 
administration of France were adopted by Philip IV, and 
similar results were attained. The elimination of the doc- 
trine of tenure from political life, and the increase and de- 
velopment of the royal power, were the aims of both kings. 
But Philip IV was the real founder of the absolute mon- 
archy in France, for it was he who formally established 
that administrative system which undermined the local 
institutions of feudalism. 

Owing to the increase of administrative, judicial, and 
financial work, he still further proceeded on the lines of 
differentiation laid down in the reigns of Louis IX and 
Philip III, and defined and stereotyped changes which 
had already been practically effected. In 1302 the royal 
court of the Capetian kings was divided clearly into three 
departments. First, there was the Conseil du Roi, com- 
posed of the great ofificers of the household, fifteen coun- 
cillors of state, and two or more secretaries. It was con- 
cerned with political and administrative business, and 
advised the king. Though, like the Concilium Ordi- 
narium of Henry III of England, it preserved certain 
judicial powers, mainly of an appellant character, most 



The Parlement 93 

of the judicial work was handed over to the Parlement of 
Paris, the famous law court, which had a continuous exist- 
ence till the French Revolution. Its beginning was seen 
in Louis IX's reign, but in the time of Philip IV it be- 
came permanently fixed at Paris, and itself experienced 
the process of differentiation. The Grand Chambre, often 
called the Parlement, decided all important cases of ap- 
peal, and those touching members of the sovereign 
courts, peers, and royal officers. The Chambre des En- 
quetes, prepared appeals from the lower courts for further 
consideration, and the Chambre des Requetes decided 
upon all lesser cases of first instance. 

The functions of the Parlement thus corresponded in 
great measure to those of the King's Bench and Court 
of Common Pleas, which had been evolved from the 
Curia Regis. Louis IX often presided over the Parle- 
ment; Philips III and IV more rarely. The Parlement at 
first met twice a year, at Easter and at All Saints, in the 
Palais de la Cite, known later as the Palais de Justice, but 
the legal business increased so rapidly that later in the 
century it became a permanent court. 

Unlike the law courts of England, the Parlement was 
given the duty of registering the royal edicts, and in 
later centuries the Parlement, declaring that no edict was 
in force till it had been registered, claimed the political 
right of remonstrating with the king, and of even vetoing 
his edicts. 

As the Conseil du Roi mainly dealt with political and 
the Parlement with judicial business, so upon the Cham- 
bres des Comptes devolved the financial work of the royal 
courts. Like the EngHsh Exchequer, it had jurisdiction 
in financial cases. The meeting of the Gens des Comptes 



94 The French People 

in 1269 in the Temple in Paris had shown the necessity 
for devolving the financial work of the royal court upon a 
permanent body of capable experts, who could receive 
and audit the accounts of the baillis and seneschals. The 
year 1309 is the usual date accepted for the first regular 
meeting of the Chambre des Comptes. 

The organization of the administrative machinery in 
Paris as well as in the provinces by Philip IV was an 
achievement comparable to that performed by Henry 11. 
The machinery worked well in the provinces, and though 
the relations between the Chambre des Comptes and the 
Parlement were never satisfactorily adjusted, and led to 
many conflicts, the general effect of Philip's measures 
was to give stability to the government and to lighten 
the burdens of the people. 

The same year (1302) which saw the organisation of 
the administrative, judicial, and financial machinery saw 
also the first meeting of the States-General. 

Like Simon de Montfort in England, Philip IV was 
the first French king who assembled the bourgeoisie in a 
national assembly. They may have been called in 1289, 
1290, or 1292, but there is no satisfactory evidence to 
show that representatives of the towns came together 
with the nobles and clergy before 13O2. That year was 
a critical one for Philip, He was in the midst of a bitter 
contest with Boniface VIII, and France had not experi- 
enced such a crisis in her history since the accession of 
Louis IX, 

In order to secure the national support in his quarrel 
with the Pope, Philip called the famous States-General of 
1302, Its members were divided into nobles, clergy, and 
citizens, for the peasants were unrepresented. They sat for 



The States-General 95 

one day. There was no discussion, and they unanimously 
offered the king their support. 

Beaumanois, writing just before the accession of 
Philip, said: " La seule restriction veritable est que tout 
etablissement general doit etre fait ' par tres grand 
conseil.' " 

The nobles, however, by no means looked upon 
the States-General as the restriction here alluded to. 
On the contrary, they looked upon the union of the king 
and bourgeoisie as another victory of the royal power, 
while Philip, who called the States-General together 
again in 1308, in order to get the Templars condemned, 
and in 13 14, to secure the support of the country against 
the Flemings, had no intention of founding a constitu- 
tional government. 

In England the Parliaments of 1265 and 1295 were 
forced on Henry III and Edward I respectively, and were 
the result of a union of all classes. In France the meet- 
ing of the States-General was simply due to the exigen- 
cies of the situation of 1302, and in order that Philip 
might play off the representatives of the nation against 
the Pope. The promise of the gradual establishment of 
constitutional government was never fulfilled. Though 
the nobles and their estates united in 13 14 against Philip's 
harsh measures, it was only a momentary union. 

The French, unlike the English nobility, never cast in 
their lot with the middle classes, and the system of their 
estates was not calculated to bring about a union. Sum- 
moned the States-General were at intervals during French 
history, usually, as in 1356 or 1614, when some serious 
crisis demanded strong and patriotic measures. But 
once the crisis was over the kings easily regained their 



g6 The French People 

power, and long intervals elapsed before the States-Gen- 
eral were again summoned. 

The steady encroachments upon feudalism, the 
growth of a strong monarchy and of a highly organized 
administrative system, and the development of town life 
had naturally a beneficial influence upon intellectual prog- 
ress. The tenth century, in which feudalism was su- 
preme, was distinguished by ignorance and barbarism 
and by secularity in the Church. From that time a 
steady improvement set in, which, initiated in the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries, may be said to have culminated in 
the thirteenth century. 

A striking awakening of the human spirit had taken 
place. Of its many developments the outburst of the 
crusades and the rise of the universities are the most 
prominent. During the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth 
centuries Anselm, Abelard, Bernard, Thomas Aquinas, 
and Roger Bacon illustrated this revival in speculative 
activity and scholastic theology, while in art, law, music, 
and other departments of knowledge the same steady 
advance was seen. In this revival of learning, which has 
been called the twelfth-century renaissance, the universi- 
ties played a leading part. Coincident in point of time 
with the rush of the feudal nobles to Palestine in the 
early part of the twelfth century, associations of teachers 
were busy making Paris a well-known centre for philo- 
sophical and theological study. From the time of Abe- 
lard's teaching may be dated the elevation of Paris into 
the leading intellectual centre of Europe, independent of 
the reputation of any one teacher, and based in great 
measure on the political and commercial importance of 
the city as the capital of the Capetian dynasty. The bril- 



The University of Paris 97 

liant reign of Philip Augustus, who was the founder of 
medieval Paris, saw many improvements in the city. He 
built the Louvre; he paved the streets; he founded mar- 
kets; he constructed fortifications. Recognised as the 
capital of France, Paris gained in prestige from the 
growth of the university, while the university owed its 
rapid development to the support of the royal power, 
which had its headquarters in Paris. Between 1200 and 
12 10 the university first secured written statutes and 
recognition as a legal corporation, and about the same 
time the university established its independence of the 
chancellor of Paris, who hitherto had exercised a general 
control of education. In its struggle with the chancel- 
lor the university was supported by the papacy, and 
gradually the chancellor lost most of his powers, leaving 
the masters free to govern the university without fear of 
external interference. 

Philip Augustus, who has the credit of being the 
founder of the university, exempted it from municipal 
control, and in Louis IX's reign the faculties were organ- 
ized and the teaching rights of the masters fully secured. 

The wisdom of the royal policy in supporting the uni- 
versity cannot be doubted, and the universities became 
strong upholders of the monarchic claims. To Philip 
Augustus was in some measure due the revival of Roman 
law, which gave a sanction to the royal pretensions. In 
Paris thinkers were trained who exercised a considerable 
influence upon politics in after years. In Paris were stud- 
ied theology, philosophy, medicine, and law, in addition 
to the old trivium and quadrivium, which consisted of 
grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry, and 
music. 



98 The French People 

The university soon became the centre of European 
learning. It was divided into four nations: (i) French, (2) 
German, (3) Norman, Picard or Fleming, and (4) English, 
which included Russians, Poles, and Hungarians, and these 
four nations held a university meeting once a week, 
Honorius III distinctly recognised the independent posi- 
tion of the university, and Gregory IX decreed that none 
of its members could be excommunicated except by the 
Pope. Thus protected by king and Pope, the univer- 
sity flourished. It supported the crusade against the 
Albigenses, the union of Normandy with the French 
crown, and the struggle of the English church and 
barons for Magna Carta. 

Immense were the benefits to education and public 
opinion in France from the establishment of the Univer- 
sity of Paris. In common with the other great univer- 
sities it was no mere national institution. " It was the 
home of the Latinized, cosmopolitan, clerkly culture that 
made the wandering scholar as much at home in a distant 
city of a foreign land as in the schools of his native town." 

In the thirteenth century the relations of the Univer- 
sity of Paris to the Church were frequently strained. 
There had been little danger of any criticism hostile to 
the Church in the twelfth century, for most of the stu- 
dents were orthodox, and Churchmen were in the ascen- 
dant at the university and understood its methods and 
teaching. 

But with the Latin conquest of Constantinople new 
opportunities for studying Aristotle were given to West- 
ern nations, and the question of the reconciliation of 
philosophy with theology, and of orthodoxy with specu- 
lation, stirred the learned world. As the Church became 



The Mendicant Orders 99 

more wealthy and more powerful and engaged, as in the 
Albigensian crusade, in stamping out heresy, tendencies 
towards intellectual heresies and free thought appeared in 
the Paris " schools." The danger to the supremacy of 
the papacy and to the existing order of society was seri- 
ous, and when in Paris itself views as heretical and revo- 
lutionary as those held by the Albigenses were openly 
avowed it was evident that a crisis in the history of phi- 
losophy and theology had arrived. 

From an unexpected quarter the Church found assist- 
ance. The Franciscans and Dominicans had already 
begun their labours, and by 1220 these two mendicant 
orders had been welcomed by the papacy as valuable 
allies. Though Dominic died In 1221, and Francis in 
1226, their followers carried their teaching into every 
part of Europe, and numerous other mendicant orders 
were formed. Contemplation and seclusion were es- 
chewed, and these friars plunged into the great towns 
and were found wherever men congregated most. 

Their preaching was popular, their religious poetry 
touched the hearts of the masses; they were the confes- 
sors of kings like Saint Louis and Edward I; they sup- 
ported popular rights at the time of the Provisions of 
Oxford. The friars had in France won back for the 
Church its hold of the whole world of learning, and 
had received the support of Saint Louis. In 1202 one of 
the earliest colleges connected with the university was 
founded by Robert of Sorbonne, on the left bank of the 
Seine. Robert became the confessor of Louis, who en- 
dowed the new college, which became famous as the Sor- 
bonne, and gave his patronage to the university. 

Paris during the thirteenth century attracted to itself 
l-.otO. 



loo The French People 

the learned of Europe. While France had become the 
leading country in Western Christendom and the centre 
of all the European movements, Paris remained the or- 
thodox supporter of the papacy. In other departments 
of culture besides those of theology and philosophy 
France held a high place among European countries. 
The study of civil and canon law was revived in the 
twelfth century, with results of great importance to both 
the clergy and laity. To the Church the publication of 
a text-book on canon law, known as the Decretum, 
by Gratian, a monk of Bologna, was of immense value. 
The study of canon law expanded, and the Church 
found the possession of its own law a necessity in her con- 
tests with the Empire — contests which deeply affected 
every section of the community. 

After a time the friars became bishops, cardinals, and 
even popes, but during the thirteenth century they used 
their power and position with a proper sense of respon- 
sibility. The University of Paris was unable to resist 
their energy and learning, and the mendicant schools of 
theology in Paris, with their immense intellectual activity, 
proved able to cope with the secular masters, who disliked 
their freedom from all the restraints imposed by the uni- 
versity regulations. 

After a long and severe struggle, the mendicant doc- 
tors consented, in 1255, to take an oath of obedience to 
the university statutes, and, supported by Louis IX, 
their position was established and their influence became 
paramount. They were the avowed champions of the 
papal authority and of orthodoxy, and the efifects of their 
teaching in Paris was that philosophy became orthodox, 
and produced* thinkers like Albertius Magnus, Thomas 



The Study of Law and History loi 

Aquinas, and Roger Bacon. The papacy too regained 
its supremacy over the world of thought and learning, 
and the University of Paris, now rigidly orthodox, became 
the great defender of the Church and the supporter of 
medieval theology and medieval methods of thought. 

Louis IX, like Philip Augustus, Edward I, and Alfon- 
so of Castile, was, above all things, a lawyer. He struck 
a blow at the judicial combat and private warfare; he de- 
veloped the procedure of inquest by witnesses, and he 
provided a system of appeals. Thus it was that, as has 
been shown, the Parlement of Paris developed its power 
and jurisdiction, and the study of Roman law spread in 
France. As at Paris famous schools of theology were 
set up, so at Orleans a great school of Roman law flour- 
ished. From one of these jurists came the Etablisse- 
ments de St. Louis, which contain among accounts of 
ancient customs ordinances on duels and on the proce- 
dure of the Chatelet, or Paris police court. The thir- 
teenth century was also remarkable in France for the prog- 
ress of literature and the fine arts. Of historians, Ville- 
hardouin and Joinville stand out pre-eminently. The 
former wrote his account of the conquest of Constanti- 
nople in the fourth crusade in a concise style, without 
commenting on the facts described. He makes no at- 
tempt to introduce his personal adventures or to enter 
into digressions. He goes straight to the point and 
describes feudal independence. His account stands be- 
tween the monkish chronicles and modern history, and 
from the heroic deeds portrayed can almost be called a 
poem. The author, who was marshal of Champagne, 
was killed in 12 13 by the Bulgarians, having by his writ- 
ings established himself as the forerunner of Joinville and 



I02 The French People 

Froissart. But while Joinville's Memoirs might be called 
fabliaux, Villehardouin's history should be termed a 
chanson de geste. 

The Champenois Jehan de Joinville, seneschal of 
Champagne, has left an imperishable description of 
Louis's expeditions to Egypt in the sixth crusade. " To 
read him," writes Dean Kitchin, " is like studying one of 
the fine manuscripts of the same age; each page is 
adorned with paintings, which in their quaintness and 
purity of feeling, their clearness of conception and happy 
grouping, and brilliant freshness of colour display before 
our eyes the real life of the times." He wrote a hundred 
years after Villehardouin, and may be said to have in- 
vented memoir writing. Full of picturesque details, 
Joinville's Memoirs illustrate the growth of the royal 
power, and describe all that was going on in France. 

In the twelfth century poetry abounded in France. 
In the north Arthur and Charlemagne were celebrated in 
epics; in the south the troubadours sang their lyrics. 
But the poetry of the thirteenth century suffered terribly 
from the wars against the Albigenses. The attractive 
civilization of the south was in great part destroyed and 
all that was most distinctive in the life of Languedoc per- 
ished. The days of chivalry were gone, and the trouba- 
dours were no longer heard. The Roman de la Rose, 
begun by Guillaume de Lorris about 1262 and finished 
by Jean de Meung about 1305, is the poem most worthy 
of note in the thirteenth century. In this and in many of 
the other poetic productions of the time is to be found the 
spirit of keen satire touching on the abuses in Church 
or State. 

But all kinds of subjects were treated by the poets of 



Poetry and Architecture 103 

the time, from the story of Aucassin and Nicolette to 
the chansons de geste of Jean Bodel and the sermons of 
Maurice de Sully, Bishop of Paris. History, poetry, ser- 
mons, all found a place in the French literature of the 
thirteenth century. Nor was architecture neglected, and 
in that matter Paris owes much to Philip Augustus. 
Under his care " Paris became the first modern capital of 
a centralized national state." From the school of Cluny 
had come architects, and the Gothic style made its appear- 
ance in France. A number of buildings, including the 
cathedral of Paris, grew up in the reign of Philip, and he 
wisely inclosed the city with a wall which took in the 
buildings north of the Seine, the cathedral in the island, 
and the schools on the south of the river. Under 
Louis IX the most beautiful specimen of Gothic archi- 
tecture, the Sainte Chapelle, was built, and the arts of 
sculpture, painting, and music made considerable prog- 
ress in his reign, which forms the central point of the 
most brilliant epoch in the middle ages. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR AND ITS RESULT 

No sooner had France, like England, developed the 
essentials of constitutional government in a States-Gen- 
eral, in a supreme court of justice, and the establishment of 
courts for financial business and cases of various sorts; no 
sooner had a period of prosperity apparently set in, than 
she found herself plunged into a great war which revolu- 
tionized her whole system. 

From being a country divided into a number of semi- 
independent provinces as in 987, at the accession of Hugh 
Capet, France had become at the beginning of the four- 
teenth century a strong centralized state. The old feudal 
nobility had been destroyed, the territorial unity of France 
had been secured, a highly organized administration had 
been set up. Philip IV had successfully completed the 
work of his predecesors, and the absolute monarchy with 
its highly developed administrative system was founded. 
But the accession of Philip Valois seemed to jeopardize 
the safety of the edifice which had been slowly built up, 
and France on more than one occasion threatened to sink 
beneath the disasters which fell upon her during the 
reigns of Edward III and Henry V. It was not till after 
she had undergone a period of suffering, extending rough- 
ly from 1337 to 1453, during which the monarchy under 

John and Charles VI became impotent, that the royal 
104 



The Appanages 105 

power emerged, and after infinite difficulty and patience 
again held a position similar to that which it enjoyed 
under Philip IV. 

The causes of this sudden and serious setback, so 
amazing when the development which was taking place 
in all departments in the thirteenth century is remem- 
bered, are not hard to seek. 

In the first place the French kings had created a new 
royal nobility in the place of the old feudal baronage. 
Henry I had made his brother Robert Duke of Burgundy, 
Louis VI had given to one of his sons the county of 
Dreux, and Philip Augustus had also given to one of his 
sons the counties of Boulogne, Domfront, Mortain, and 
Clermont. So far this practice had no serious results, but 
with Louis VIII a fresh development took place. By 
his will he assigned Artois to his second son, Robert; An- 
jou and Maine to his third son, Charles; Poitou and Au- 
vergne to his fourth son. Louis IX gave to his brother 
the Count of Artois the county of Toulouse, and to his 
brother Charles Provence, while to his son Robert he 
gave the county of Clermont. 

No doubt this practice of giving appanages to the near 
relations of the king was a good method of governing 
conquered territory and of introducing French ideas, lan- 
guage, and administration, but these benefits did not com- 
pensate for the dangers which resulted to the monarchy. 

The feodalite apanagee became as selfish and as un- 
manageable as the old feodalite territoriale. The new 
nobility were as anxious for independence as the feudal 
lords had been, and effects similar to those which could be 
traced to Edward Ill's family settlement policy were ex- 
perienced in France. 



io6 The French People 

The rivalry of the Burgundians and Armagnacs and 
the League of the Public Weal were, like the Wars of 
the Roses, the result of the mistaken policy of the 
French and English monarchs. 

Philip IV and his successors made a serious mistake 
in using the third estate to further their own ends, and 
in not imitating Edward I's policy and educating the 
middle classes to take a share in the government. The 
commons saw no means of satisfying aspirations which 
were natural and legitimate, and after the battle of Poi- 
tiers a coalition between them and the nobles was quite 
possible. 

The monarchy found little or no support from the 
nation during the early stage of the struggle with Edward 
III, and it was only when the lower orders realized the 
worthlessness of the nobility that, faute de mieux, they ral- 
lied round the king toward the end of the Hundred 
Years' War. 

A further cause of the difficulties which beset the 
monarchy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was 
the attempt made by the French kings to annex Aquitaine 
before they had gained full mastery over all the forces of 
disunion within France. The Hundred Years' War came 
before France was really prepared for it, and the English 
kings at once seized upon every opportunity of hampering 
their opponents at home. 

France had to fight for very existence, and the exigen- 
cies of the struggle, complicated by a rising something 
like the Commune of 1870, and by a civil war, necessitated 
the reassertion of monarchical principles and the develop- 
ment of a powerful monarchical regime. Amid the clash 
of arms the new royal feudalism was discredited, and 



Causes of the War 107 

finally overthrown by Louis XI, who reared a despotism 
on its ruins. 

As on many other occasions, France exhibited during 
this struggle a marvellous power of recovery; rarely, if 
ever, however, has her recovery been so remarkable, 
when the character and immensity of her misfortunes dur- 
ing some hundred years is remembered. 

Thus, when Philip Valois ascended the throne the 
progress of the monarchy was already checked by the for- 
mation of the new nobility apanagee and by the policy 
adopted toward the States-General. The situation was 
still further complicated by the English occupation of 
Aquitaine. On Philip's accession, the English still held 
Gascony and Guienne, with the districts of the Limousin, 
Perigord, Quercy, and Saintonge. Philip IV, by his two 
years' war with Edward I, had clearly warned the English 
that their possessions in France were held on no firm ten- 
ure. It remained for Philip Valois to inaugurate a defi- 
nite policy and to initiate a series of efforts, which, with 
slight intermissions, never ceased till the whole of the old 
duchy of Aquitaine was an essential part of the kingdom 
of France. 

Edward I had realized the impossibility of allowing 
an independent Wales to exist in the western border of 
England; Philip and his successors were equally alive to 
the necessity of expelling the English from the southwest 
portion of France. 

The task was no easy one. Bound to England by 
commercial ties, the merchants of Bordeaux were alive 
to the value of their English connection, while the popu- 
lation of Gascony and Guienne, being of different origin 
to that of northern and central France, and still impreg- 



io8 The French People 

nated with traditions of independence, trembled at the 
prospect of becoming a part of the French monarchy, and 
preferred the easy rule of their foreign and distant rulers. 
Philip could not appeal with effect to any patriotic senti- 
ment among the population of the English provinces, least 
of all to the inhabitants of Gascony. 

Nevertheless the work of unification had to be under- 
taken, and Philip at the very outset of his reign began a 
series of petty attacks on the English possessions in 
France — a policy of " pin pricks " calculated to rouse a 
monarch of a far less phlegmatic disposition than Ed- 
ward III. 

Had this matter been the only point of contention be- 
tween the two monarchs; had Edward III been able to 
concentrate all his eflforts on the defence of his provinces, 
it was likely that, supported as he was by his French- 
speaking subjects, he could have repelled Philip's efforts 
with ease. But the talented and tactful French king had 
already renewed the alliance made by Philip IV with Scot- 
land, and most successfully supported David Bruce 
against Edward Balliol, Edward Ill's candidate for the 
Scottish throne. 

To their surprise and dismay, the English Parliament 
found that it had to provide for a Scottish war, in which 
France provided the Scots the men and money. 

Almost simultaneously with the difficulties in Scot- 
land, the Count of Flanders, at the instigation of Philip, 
whose vassal he was, arrested the English merchants in 
his lands, and stopped at one blow the flourishing trade 
between England and Flanders. 

Thus attacked in Scotland, in Flanders, and in south- 
ern France by her hereditary foe, England had no other 



fitienne Marcel 109 

choice, if she wished to preserve her French possessions, 
than to accept the challenge and defend herself at all 
points. 

The Hundred Years' War, which began in 1337, and 
was not concluded till 1453, was thus due to the states- 
' manlike policy of Philip, whose descendant Charles VII 
saw the final expulsion of the English from those prov- 
inces which Henry II's wife, Eleanor of Guienne, had 
brought her husband. 

Philip, it is not to be believed, had any idea of the 
magnitude of the struggle into which he plunged his 
country. During his Hfetime he had the misfortune to 
see his enemies win Crecy and take Calais, while his suc- 
cessor, John, still more evilly treated by fortune, not only 
witnessed the overthrow of a magnificent army at Poitiers, 
but was forced to sign the Peace of Bretigny, and lived to 
see the French monarchy endangered by a democratic 
movement under Etienne Marcel. 

Like the Fronde, and the republican government es- 
tablished on the fall of Napoleon HI, the States-General, 
which met after Poitiers, at first proceeded with prudence, 
and adopted a constitutional attitude and carried out use- 
ful reforms. But just as the parliamentary Fronde was 
succeeded by the new Fronde, and as the Commune for a 
time took the place of the government of Trochu, Favre, 
and Gambetta, so Marcel found himself carried away by 
his extreme followers and hampered by the outbreak of 
the Jacquerie against the nobles. 

As it was. Marcel's attempt to give France a constitu- 
tional government is noteworthy as being, with all its 
faults, the one serious effort before 1789 to found a lim- 
ited monarchy. 



no The French People 

In the end, the excesses of the years 1356-1358 led 
to a reaction and enabled Charles V to rally round the 
monarchy all supporters of order, while the new acqui- 
sitions made by Edward III in the Treaty of Bretigny, 
facilitated the eventual conquest by France of all the Eng- 
lish lands in the south and west. 

The very failures of Philip and John had thus enor- 
mously aided Charles V's work of conscientiously carry- 
ing out the true national policy of France. The defeats of 
Crecy and Poitiers had taught the French the defects of 
their own military system, the uselessness of cavalry, as 
well as the value of dismounted men at arms; the excesses 
of the States-General, its inefficiency, and its inability to 
govern a country when the enemy were at its gates, had 
made apparent the necessity of a strong central power. 
The enormous amount, too, of fresh territory wrenched 
from France had only given Edward a vast number of 
discontented subjects who would seize the first opportu- 
nity of throwing off the English yoke and of returning to 
their allegiance to the French king. 

The national pride existing in these newly ceded prov- 
inces soon gave Charles an opportunity of taking the initi- 
ative, and, profiting by the illness of Edward III and that 
of the Prince of Wales, and by the latter's mistakes in his 
government of Aquitaine, Charles not only rapidly recov- 
ered what had been lost at Bretigny, but drove the Eng- 
lish from all their possessions, save Bordeaux, Bayonne, 
and Calais. 

In these campaigns, which only continued for some 
four years, Charles had been greatly assisted by the de- 
struction of the English fleet off Rochelle by the Span- 
iards and French, and by the failure of John of Gaunt's 



Charles V iii 

great march across France — a failure due to the Fabianlike 
policy pursued by the French, who refused to fight 
pitched battles, and allowed the hostile army to waste away 
through disease and starvation. 

As soon as the men of Guienne, and even of Gascony, 
realized that the last bolt of the English was shot, and 
that communication by sea with England was cut off, 
they felt the uselessness of fighting for a lost cause; and 
though historical and sentimental ties no less than trading 
interests kept the two great seaports of Bordeaux and 
Bayonne still faithful to the English connection, the rest 
of the country passed into the hands of the French king. 
The French may well regard Charles V as one of the 
founders of the monarchy. Till Louis XI no greater 
king governed France. Order was kept, despotism was 
restored, and Charles carried out a number of reforms 
necessitated by the long period during which France had, 
with short intermissions, been at war with England. 

The accession of the young and feeble Charles VI 
and the cessation of serious hostilities with England was 
seized upon by the populace in Paris and Rouen to assert 
popular rights. But the people had no intelligent leaders 
with a definite policy, and the great lords were powerful 
and united. 

The strength of the royal and feudal power was seen at 
the battle of Rosbecque, in 1382, when Philip van Arte- 
velde and the Flemish burghers were overthrown by a 
French army, this victory being followed by the suppres- 
sion of all popular aspirations in France and by the tem- 
porary triumph of the aristocracy. 

The supremacy of the great lords was riveted on 
France owing to the king's incapacity to rule, due to 



112 The French People 

periodical fits of madness. The rival factions of Bur- 
gundy and Orleans made government impossible and re- 
duced France to a pitiable condition of confusion, weak- 
ness, and anarchy. 

Such was France when Henry V determined, without 
any sufficient reason, to attack the distracted country. 
He had his reward, for the war which he set on foot 
proved the ruin of his own dynasty, disastrous to his coun- 
try, and led to the revival of the French monarchy from 
its temporary effacement! 

But though his dynasty suffered from the effects of 
his policy, Henry V condemned France no less than Eng- 
land to forty years of misery, during which the tide of 
war swept over most of the country north of the Loire. 

The union of France brought about by Charles V no 
longer existed, the countries south of the Loire ceased to 
show that lively regard for the French crown which they 
evinced in the period after Bretigny, and even the nobles 
would not sink their quarrels when invasion was threat- 
ened. 

The victory of Agincourt over a portion of the French 
nobility was due to the want of patriotism on the part of 
a large section of the nobles, headed by the Duke of Bur- 
gundy, while the long-continued hold of Henry VI upon 
a considerable part of the north of France was due to the 
apathy of Charles VH, the incapacity of his captains, and 
the selfishness of the feudal magnates. The Treaty of 
Troyes in 1420, which handed over to the English most 
of northern France and Paris itself, marks, perhaps, the 
lowest point touched by the French monarchy. 

At length the career of Joan of Arc turned the tide. 
The English, being defeated, lost confidence in themselves, 



The End of the War 113 

the Burgundians recognised that Charles VII represented 
the cause of French independence, and the Congress of 
Arras, where PhiHp of Burgundy renounced the EngHsh 
alHance, proved to be a momentous event in French his- 
tory and the beginning of the definite expulsion of the 
English from France. 

Henceforward the English merely fought against the 
inevitable, while the French king began steadily to re- 
cover not only his territory from the enemy, but also 
his lost power. Paris was occupied in 1436, and in 1439 
the king established a permanent military force and se- 
cured a permanent tax for its payment. Thus freed from 
all necessity of consulting the States-General and armed 
with a weapon which could be used against the feudal 
system, Charles VII found himself in a position stronger 
than that of Charles V in the years succeeding the Treaty 
of Bretigny. 

The English struggled gamely for sixteen years to 
hold the land round the ever-loyal Bordeaux, as well as 
Normandy, which the Lancastrians had endeavoured, too 
late, to completely Anglicize. But the fates were against 
them. The situation as it existed in Henry V's reign was 
entirely reversed. France now had a strong king, Eng- 
land a weak one. The French nobles were under control, 
while the English barons were reducing the shires to an an- 
archic condition through their quarrels. English foreign 
policy was in the hands of incapable men, while; the aims 
of the French government were firmly and successfully 
carried out. In 1453 the victory of France at the battle 
of Castillon brought the Hundred Years' War to a close. 

The period of the Hundred Years' War was a critical 
time for France. On two occasions — in 1360, at the 



114 The French People 

Treaty of Bretigny, and in 1420, at the Treaty of Troyes — 
nearly one half of the kingdom had been handed over to 
the English, and on the latter occasion an English prince 
had been accepted as King of France. The country dis- 
tricts suffered as much from robber bands as from the 
ravages of the English, and the early Valois kings were 
unable to unite the country against the invader, and at the 
same time to put down disorder. 

The extraordinary lack of patriotism was no doubt 
one of the principal difficulties with which successive 
kings had to cope. Robert of Artois and Geoffrey Har- 
court from private motives of revenge pressed Edward 
III to invade France; the Black Prince found the support 
of his Gascon troops most valuable in defeating his foes 
at Poitiers, while, throughout the reigns of Philip Valois 
and John, Charles the Bad was a constant thorn in the 
side of the royal power. In the reign of Charles VI and 
the early part of that of Charles VII the alliance of the 
Duke of Burgundy with England was even still more 
disastrous; and it was the University of Paris which de- 
clared Joan of Arc a witch. It is not too much to say 
that from one point of view the Hundred Years' War 
might be called by French historians the Great Civil War. 
What chance had France to achieve unity when the feeling 
of patriotism was dead in the breasts of a large portion of 
the nobles, and when much of southwestern France ad- 
hered to the English cause? 

The monarchy had found that no hope of safety lay 
with the nobles. Their military superiority perished be- 
fore the English archers and artillery in the Hundred 
Years' War, and with the loss of their military prestige 
their sense of responsibility was lowered. They ceased 



France under Charles VI 115 

to show any realization of the meaning of noblesse oblige, 
assassinations became frequent, and the peasantry suf- 
fered unspeakable hardships ftom their callousness and 
cruelty. The black death in 1348 added immensely to 
the horrors of the war. A large portion of the peasantry, 
pillaged by friend and foe, became robbers, and in 1357, 
in the Isle of France, and again in Charles VI's reign, 
in Languedoc, they rose in despair. 

The general distress equally affected the towns, which 
hitherto had been the homes of liberty. The communes, 
lately so anxious to reduce the power of the upper classes, 
became forgetful of the advantages of self-government, 
and owing to the long war bankrupt and full of discord. 

Paris, indeed, took a brave attitude under Etienne 
Marcel, but it suffered after his fall and again in 1382 for 
its democratic tendencies, while in the struggles of the 
Burgundians and Armagnacs, and during the English 
occupation of Henry V and Henry VI, it lost all its ancient 
political courage. 

The revival of France was not to come from the peas- 
ants or from the towns. Nor indeed could the Church 
offer to the distracted country any aid. The influence of 
the Church on the formation of France had been great, 
but the residence of the popes at Avignon, followed by the 
Great Schism, had not tended to check the growth of 
clerical abuses or to produce a race of ecclesiastical states- 
men. 

In 1420 the University of Paris, in common with the 
Parlement, had lost to such an extent their sense of pa- 
triotism as to recognise Henry V as king. 

During this period, when it seemed that the close of 
the middle ages would bring with it the end of the 



ii6 The French People 

French monarchy, only two institutions showed any real 
appreciation of their responsibilities or any sense of pa- 
triotism. These were the States-General and the mon- 
archy. Of these the States-General had come forward 
at two critical moments, in 1357 and 1413, and endeav- 
oured to inaugurate drastic reforms. At one time it al- 
most seemed that the States-General might, like the Eng- 
lish Parliament, become a recognised and permanent part 
of the governmental machinery. 

But it was not strong enough for the task, and the duty 
of enforcing union upon France, of destroying the influ- 
ence of the feudal lords, of inculcating a feeling of patriot- 
ism, devolved upon the monarchy under Louis XI. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE REBUILDING OF THE MONARCHY 

France had paid a Heavy penalty for the foundation, 
on the fall of the old feudal nobility, of the feodalite apa- 
nagee. The new French nobles had shown no realization 
of their responsibilities or of their duty to their country; 
they had failed to defend France against Edward III; the 
civil war between the Burgundians and Armagnacs had 
left the country an easy prey to the English, and even 
while Charles VII was busily engaged in driving out his 
foes a number of the nobles in 1440 formed, with the aid 
of the dauphin, a conspiracy against the king, called the 
Praguerie — an allusion to the recent Hussite movement. 

The Praguerie, though easily suppressed, was an ear- 
nest of what threatened France as soon as the war with 
England was over, and a warning to all lovers of order to 
rally round the king in his final suppression of the inde- 
pendence of the new royal nobility. 

Of these nobles, Charles, Duke of Orleans, possessed 
the duchies of Orleans and Valois, the county of Blois, 
and a part of the county of Soissons. Being himself of 
a pacific spirit, with literary and poetic tastes, he took no 
part in the Praguerie, though his illegitimate brother, Du- 
nois, was not so discreet. The next great family was that 
of Anjou, descended from Louis, brother of Charles V. 
9 117 



ii8 The French People 

Rene, who was then duke, held Anjou, Maine, and Pro- 
vence; he laid claim to the duchies of Lorraine and Bar, 
and he aspired to the possession of Majorca, Naples, and 
even Hungary. His daughter, Margaret, proved the evil 
genius of the house of Lancaster; his son, John of Cala- 
bria, had, indeed, greater adventures than his sister, but 
the same bad fortune. Other important houses were 
those of Alengon and Bourbon, which went back to the 
thirteenth century, the first holding the counties of Alen- 
Qon and Perche, the second that of Vendome, with Forez, 
Beaujolais, Auvergne, and the Bourbonnais. 

In Languedoc were found the houses of Foix, Arma- 
gnac, and Albret. All these were apt to be rebellious and 
inclined to keep alive the feudal spirit, which, produced by 
war, lived and flourished on war alone. The memories of 
the Albigensian crusade were perpetuated in the house of 
Foix; and the remembrance of the civil war was not for- 
gotten by the Count of Armagnac and the Sire d'Albret, 
who, living far away in Gascony, in the midst of a warlike 
population, held a position similar to that of the lords 
marchers on the Welsh frontier. 

Of the two remaining great houses, that of Brittany 
was always ready to assert its independence, while Bur- 
gundy under Charles the Bold headed a formidable insur- 
rection against Louis XI, who with immense difficulty 
succeeded in holding his own. 

The possessions of the house of Burgundy about the 
time of Louis XI's accession give an excellent idea of 
the territorial influence which had been obtained by one 
of the new royal feudal nobles, and illustrate the disastrous 
effects of the policy of founding a feodalite apanagee. The 
origin of the house of Burgundy was as recent as the 



The Burgundian House 119 

reign of John, who after the battle of Poitiers gave Bur- 
gundy to his fourth son, Philip the Bold. This fooHsh act 
of generosity on the part of John was to cost the crown 
years of trouble and anxiety, for the duchy of Burgundy 
developed with extraordinary rapidity. In 1384 Philip 
made a fortunate marriage with the widow of Louis de 
Male, and secured Flanders, Artois, and Franche-Comte. 

But it was Philip the Good, son of Philip the Bold, 
to whom Burgundy owed the greater part of its posses- 
sions. In 142 1 he bought Namur, and in 1430, on the 
death of his brother Antony, he became Duke of Brabant 
and Limburg. Before the year 1440 he was master of 
the inheritance of JacqueHne of Holland in Hainault, 
Brabant, Zealand, and Holland. The Treaty of Arras, in 
1435, gave him the Somme towns and the counties of 
Auxerre and Macon. In 1444 he succeeded to the duchy 
of Luxembourg. In 1469, by an arrangement with Sigis- 
mund of Austria, Charles the Bold, son of Philip, obtained 
Upper Alsace and the Breisgau; in 1473 he inherited Gel- 
derland and Zutphen, and the same year he occupied by 
force the duchy of Lorraine, though he did not actually 
conquer it till 1475. His list of titles, quoted by Michelet, 
are in themselves striking and suggestive: Mr. le Due 
de Bourgongne, de Lotrich, de Brabant, de Limburg, et 
de Luxemburg; Counte de Flandre, d' Artois, et de Bour- 
gongne; Palatin de Hollande, de Zelande, et de Namur; 
Margrave du Saint Empire; Sire de Friese de Salins et 
de Malines. 

Though war as a rule rallied the nobles round the 
crown, the advent of peace was always full of danger to 
the French monarchy. The nobility had been founded 
in war, and they developed by war. From the end of 



•I20 The French People 

the English wars, in 1453, to the outbreak of the Italian 
war, in 1494, all the resources of the governments of 
Charles VII, of Louis XI, and of the regency of Anne of 
Beaujeu were tried to the uttermost. During all these 
years the crown, beset with difficulties, mostly the making 
of the nobility, gradually won the day, and, supported by 
the clergy, the bourgeoisie, and the judicature, triumphed, 
and established the royal power on a firm basis. A great 
work of national, administrative, and economic reorgani- 
zation and restoration (necessitated by the civil wars 
between the Burgundians and Armagnacs followed by 
the English struggle) was accomplished, and by 1494 
France, united and strong, was ready for fresh enter- 
prises. 

In this work of restoration Charles VII bore his share. 
In 1435 he won over the Burgundians from their alliance 
with England; in 1438 he secured the support of the 
clergy by the pragmatic sanction of Bourges; and he 
then obtained from the nation extraordinary powers which 
rendered him and his successors independent of further 
grants. 

In 1439 the States-General, assembled at Orleans, 
granted the king a permanent standing army and a per- 
manent tax. This action rendered unnecessary future 
meetings of the States-General, and made the king ab- 
solute. 

The nobles and clergy, having no reason to court the 
third estate, devoted their energies to securing exemption 
from all taxation, and it became a recognised principle 
that " the clergy paid with their prayers, the nobles with 
their swords, and the people with their money." The 
third estate, deserted by the upper classes, naturally looked 



Louis XI 121 

to the king for protection, and loyally supported him 
whenever he attacked the clergy or the nobles. 

Charles VII from 1439 to 1461 only called one meet- 
ing of the States-General, for, as he himself said, " there 
is no need to assemble the three estates for raising money, 
and doing so is only an expense to the poor people, who 
have to pay the expenses of those who come." He had 
rid France of the presence of the English, he had humil- 
iated the University and Parlement of Paris, he had over- 
thrown the Praguerie, and he was able to leave his king- 
dom to his son Louis, to be still more completely welded 
into a united nation. 

The struggle between the crown and the nobles which 
was certain to follow the establishment of peace had been 
foreshadowed by the " Praguerie," and in 1465 Louis XI, 
who had succeeded in 1461, found himself confronted 
by the League of Public Weal, of which the prime mover 
was Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy. Till the lat- 
ter's death, in 1476, Louis XI was compelled to devote all 
his efforts to counteract the ability and daring of a most 
dangerous antagonist. 

The Wars of the Roses in England about the same 
time led to the fortunate suicide of the nobility, and simi- 
larly in the League of Public Weal in the designs of 
Charles the Bold were concentrated the last great effort of 
the new feudalism against the crown. In this struggle the 
king had certain advantages. In France the career of 
Joan of Arc had developed a feeling of nationality which 
had spread to the south of France. The nobility had also 
suffered severely in the civil wars and in the English war. 
At Agincourt some 8,000 had been slain, and the defeat 
had covered feudalism and the nobles with disgrace. 



122 The French People 

Charles VII had employed men of the middle class in his 
council, and with their advice he had united the conquered 
provinces to the crown and expelled the English from 
France. The crown by its success became increasingly 
popular and respected, and having obtained a permanent 
standing army and permanent taxes, was better prepared 
for the struggle than the nobles. 

In fact, without the aid of princes like the Dukes 
of Brittany and Burgundy, who were virtually inde- 
pendent sovereigns, what remained of the feudal nobles 
would have had no chance of opposing the crown suc- 
cessfully. 

As it was, the Duke of Burgundy, by a strange series 
of lucky accidents had become as powerful as many Euro- 
pean kings, and a number of circumstances united the 
duke, the nobles, and the artificial oligarchy of the princes 
of the blood. The great feudatories no less than the small- 
er vassals were alarmed at the reforming policy of Louis, 
the clergy disliked the working of the pragmatic sanc- 
tion, the University of Paris was alienated by the king's 
encouragement of the provincial universities, and the Par- 
lement of Paris was aggrieved at the foundation of a Parle- 
ment at Bordeaux. From 1464 to 1472 Charles the 
Bold supported the French princes in their struggle 
against the supremacy of the crown, and twice invaded 
France on their behalf. In the first attempt he and the 
nobles were successful. The indecisive battle of Mont- 
Ihery was followed by the Treaty of Conflans, and prob- 
ably Louis took the wisest course in making peace on 
almost any terms. The king had been caught unpre- 
pared, and his best chance was to watch for opportunities 
for separating his enemies. 



The League of Public Weal 123 

By the terms of the peace, the Duke of Berri received 
Normandy as a hereditary appanage; the Duke of Bur- 
gundy, the Somme towns, which Louis had recovered 
from PhiHp the Good, and the counties of Boulogne and 
Guines; the Duke of Brittany, the counties of Montfort 
and Etampes; the Duke of Lorraine, the royal rights over 
Toul and Verdun; the Duke of Bourbon, territorial con- 
cessions of the government of Guiennes; the Duke of Ne- 
mours, the governments of Paris and of the Isle of France. 
Others of the confederators received various rewards and 
concessions. 

The royal power had apparently received a blow so 
crushing that recovery was for many years impossible. 
Yet the absence of statesmanship, or even of ordinary pru- 
dence, on the part of the nobles saved the king, and 
restored the fortunes of the monarchy. 

The nobles merely wished for independence and for 
small isolated despotisms. Their aims contrast badly 
with those of the English barons in the thirteenth 
century. 

" The barons of England, in leading the people against 
the crown, had become an aristocracy, and had laid the 
foundations of a political organism. The French nobles 
used their victory differently. They exacted no posi- 
tive guarantee — none which might be fruitful of further 
development. The securities they sought were nega- 
tive. They made the king swear that he would never 
compel any of them to attend his court and never visit 
them without warning. All that they aimed at was inde- 
pendence, and they were careless of power which could 
only be obtained by union and common action. They 
wished to remain petty sovereigns, rather than to become 



124 The French People 

the leaders of an aristocracy, the members of a petty- 
state." * 

When once it was evident that the great nobles were 
playing for their own hands, and wished simply to secure 
strong independent principalities, their supporters fell 
away. The king, who was determined not to acquiesce 
in defeat, quickly recovered Normandy and appealed to 
the nation in the States-General of Tours in 1468 for sup- 
port in his opposition to the nobles. This meeting is a 
very important one, as indicating the general feeling with 
regard to appanages, and as illustrating the readiness of 
the middle classes to delegate all power to the king. The 
estates declared: 

(i) That " nothing under heaven, neither favour, nor 
brotherly affection, nor the obligation of any promise, nor 
pretence of gift or provision, nor fear, nor threat of war, 
nor regard to any temporal danger, ought now or ever to 
move the king to agree to the separation of that duchy 
from the crown; " 

(2) That " nothing could excuse a vassal who warred 
asrainst his suzerain." 

(3) That the treaty with the Duke of Brittany was 
wholly damnable, pernicious, fraught with evil conse- 
quences, and in no wise to be endured or tolerated.f 

Before separating the estates gave the king full leave 
in their absence to do what he pleased, or, as they put it, 
" as justice required." 

The following year, in his famous interview at Pe- 
ronne, Louis was forced to promise to give his brother 

* Martin, Hist, de France, vi, p. 571, quoted by Willert in his 
Louis XI. 

•f Willert, Reign of Louis XL p. 124, 



The Middle Kingdom 125 

Champagne and Brie, but after his return to Paris his for- 
tunes steadily improved. The Duke of Berri accepted 
Guienne instead of Champagne, and his death, in 1472, 
enabled Louis to seize Guienne. A new league was 
indeed formed, and in 1472 Charles the Bold invaded 
France, but in the interval between the Treaty of Conflans 
and 1472 Louis's position had grown stronger, and 
Charles signally failed to unite the French princes against 
the crown. 

From 1472 Louis had nothing to fear from Charles the 
Bold directly. There was no longer any danger of a 
union of French princes under the duke's leadership with- 
in France. But none the less, for four years more Louis 
was compelled to watch his great antagonist, who was 
busy forming schemes which, if successful, would have 
seriously endangered the advancement of the French 
monarchy. 

Having made a lasting truce with Louis, Charles 
entered upon the second period of his career, no longer 
directing his territorial ambition to Picardy and Cham- 
pagne, but aiming at setting up on the Rhine an inde- 
pendent and compact kingdom. He wished to consoli- 
date his dominions, to secure Lorraine, Provence, and 
Switzerland. Thus a middle kingdom, something like 
the ancient kingdom of Lotharingia, would be established, 
and Charles even hoped to raise himself to the imperial 
throne. It is not necessary to discuss the possible advan- 
tages and disadvantages of the formation of a kingdom 
stretching along the Rhine. 

Whether a kingdom " based on no community of race, 
of language, of history, of law, of trade, or of personal loy- 
alty," and with an indefensible position, could have held its 



126 The French People 

own for a long period is indeed very doubtful. During 
the few years devoted by Charles to his schemes of ag- 
grandizement in the Empire France was undoubtedly 
threatened, for his object was " not to gain a paramount 
influence within the kingdom of France, not to weaken 
the French monarchy in the character of one of its vassals, 
but to throw it into the shade, to dismember, perhaps to 
conquer it, in the character of a foreign sovereign." * 

In 1475 he invaded Lorraine, and the same year his 
ally, Edward IV, invaded France. But the star of the 
French monarchy was in the ascendant: Edward IV made 
the Treaty of Pecquigny and retired; Charles the Bold 
was slain on January 10, 1477, before Nancy. 

During these and the succeeding years Louis had 
been faithfully served by the sagacious Philip de Corn- 
mines, who in 1472 had fled from the service of Charles 
the Bold. Commines did for the language of France what 
Chaucer did for that of England. His memoirs give an ad- 
mirable account and criticism of Louis's policy. Com- 
mines is one of the first historical writers who is not con- 
tent with merely chronicling events, but dwells upon their 
causes and significance. 

Like Louis XI, he had no sympathy with democratic 
views, but his opinions show a breadth and a liberality un- 
expected in the minister of a despotic king. He realized 
what would be the end of the career of Charles the Bold, 
who, he says, was ruined by pride; he also had no illusions 
as to the evil effect on the monarchy of the action of the 
States-General at Orleans in 1439. 

During Charles the Bold's later years it was much 



* Freeman's Select Essays, Charles the Bold. 



Commines 127 

debated if Louis ought to have attacked him, and so inter- 
fered with the realization of his plans. 

" It seemed to some," wrote Commines, " that the 
king ought not to have prolonged the truce, nor to have 
suffered the duke's presumption to have waxed so great. 
. . . There were others who understood the matter bet- 
ter, and whose knowledge was greater, because they 
had been upon the spot. These advisers urged him to 
accept the truce without misgiving, and to allow the duke 
to dash himself against those German countries, whose 
might and power is such as to be well-nigh incredible; for 
they said that when the duke had taken one place or 
ended one war he would at once begin another, . . . and 
that the king could in no way avenge himself more easily 
than by leaving him to himself, and that he would even 
do well to assist him somewhat, and, above all, not to 
allow him to suspect that the truce might be broken; for 
it was certain that all his resources would be spent and 
utterly wasted against the great size and strength of Ger- 
many." * 

This Machiavellian advice, given, no doubt, by Com- 
mines, was excellently suited to the new situation which 
had been created by the ambition of Charles the Bold, and 
the advice was fully justified. 

With the fall of Charles the Bold the crisis in the 
reign was over. Louis had already reduced the great' 
feudal nobles to submission. The Duke of Alencon died 
in 1 47 1, and his son, the Count of Perche, remained a cap- 
tive till the end of the reign. The Count of Armagnac 
was killed in 1473, fighting against the king; the Count of 

* Commines, Liv. iv, chap. i. 



128 The French People 

Saint Pol was beheaded in 1475; and the Duke of Ne- 
mours and Count of La Marche and Pardiac, who owned 
vast estates, was executed the following year for planning 
a conspiracy against the king. All that remained for Louis 
was to seize upon as much of Charles's dominions as pos- 
sible and then to consolidate his power in France. Hav- 
ing annexed the Duchy of Burgundy with the counties of 
Macon, Auxerre, and Charolais, he was able, by the death 
of Rene of Anjou, to unite with France the counties of 
Maine and Provence. He had already secured Roussillon 
and Cerdagne and the duchy of Guienne, so, at his death, 
in 1483, he had not only recovered for the monarchy the 
position it had held under Philip IV, but had so thor- 
oughly and successfully carried out his policy that Charles 
VHI, like Henry VIH, was able to launch France upon 
an adventurous career, and to squander vast sums of 
money upon his foreign wars. 

" He [Louis XI] was," said Commines, " more wise, 
more liberal, and more virtuous in all things than any 
contemporary sovereign." 

Many of his plans for administrative reform remained 
uncompleted. " If God had granted him the grace," 
wrote Commines, " of living five or six years more with- 
out being too much weighed down by sickness, he would 
greatly have benefited his realm." But, with the aid of 
arbitrary taxation and a standing army, Louis had carried 
out the popular wish — the strengthening of the royal 
power. 

There was not at that or at any time before^ 1789 any 
general desire for a constitutional form of government, 
though a few, like Commines, might protest against the 
extension of the royal prerogative. 



Annexation of Brittany 129 

The nation objected to oppressive taxes, and to the 
licentious conduct of the companies of ordnance, but not 
to the increased strength of the monarchy. The unpopu- 
larity of the king was due to the weight of taxation, and 
with time men forgot that he had saved them from an- 
archy, civil war, and feudal oppression. 

Of the great feudal principalities, the only one remain- 
ing was Brittany. It was only the fear of driving the duke 
into an alliance with England that forced Louis reluc- 
tantly to make a treaty in 1472 with the duchy. Louis 
was keenly alive to the necessity of uniting Brittany to 
France, and before he died he urged the young Duke 
of Orleans, afterward Louis XII, to be faithful to the 
dauphin, and not to conclude any secret treaty with 
Brittany. 

Charles VIII had only been on the throne five 
years before an opportunity of annexing Brittany oc- 
curred. 

The duke died in 1488, and left his daughter, Anne, 
heiress to his possessions. The regent, Anne of Beaujeu, 
was quite alive to the importance of the situation, and the 
marriage of the young king and Anne of Brittany was at 
once mooted. Though Henry VII, Ferdinand of Spain, 
and Maximilian, the Emperor, intervened on her behalf, 
and though she was even betrothed to Maximilian, the 
schemes of the French court were successful; on Decem- 
ber 19, 1491, Charles VIII married Anne, and Brittany 
was thus incorporated with France. 

France had long wanted to restore the monarchy to 
its former greatness and to become territorially one; she 
obtained the realization of her desire under Charles VII, 
Louis XI, and Charles VIII. 



I30 The French People 

In times of peace, however, the nobility had no raison 
d'etre, for war was their only employment. After the 
annexation of Brittany Charles VIII, like the nobles, was 
ready for war. He therefore decided to plunge into the 
maze of Italian politics, and in 1494 he invaded Italy. 



CHAPTER X 

FRANCE AND THE ITALIAN WARS 

The year 1494 marks the beginning of modern times. 
In that year Charles VIII invaded Italy, and the drama of 
modern European politics begins. 

Henceforward the principle of the balance of power 
alone " gives unity to the political plot of modern Euro- 
pean history." In the crusades, it is true, various nation- 
alities fought side by side; but the age of the crusades 
was over, and since their close each nation had been busy 
carrying out its own development. With the exception 
of the Hundred Years' War between England and France, 
great struggles between nationalities had not begun. 
France and Germany had engaged in no great war, Spain 
had made no attempt to enter upon distant enterprises, 
Italy had her own interests to attend to. 

But with the close of the fifteenth century the work 
of preparation was over. Spain was now united under 
Ferdinand and Isabella; Maximilian the Emperor had 
not only brought together the Hapsburg dominions, but 
had by marriages and diplomacy increased the power of 
the Empire; England under Henry VII was not unwill- 
ing to leave her position of isolation; even Sweden was 
being reconstructed by Gustavus Vasa. 

No country, however, was better equipped than 

131 



132 The French People 

France for the reception of the new influences which, 
under the name of the Renaissance, were beginning to 
dominate Europe. In the royal hands was concentrated 
all the power which was in theory supposed to be shared 
by feudatories, clergy, the States-General, and the Parle- 
ment. No country in Europe could have recovered 
quicker than did France from her own civil wars* and from 
the long struggle with England; no country could rival 
her in compactness and concentration; no country could 
boast of so complete a territorial union, so well-grounded 
an administrative autocracy. Feudal provinces and dy- 
nastic appanages had disappeared, and the goal towards 
which all the great kings, from Louis VI onward, had 
been working was now attained, 

Charles VIII wished to show the superiority of France 
in Europe; he asserted rights to the kingdom of Naples; 
he crossed the Alps, and the new drama was opened. Till 
the peace of Cateau-Cambresis, in 1559, the struggle for 
Italy continued, with short intervals for rest and prepara- 
tion for new efforts. The invasion of Italy, however, and 
the Italian wars speedily developed into a contest of im- 
mense magnitude between Francis I and the Emperor 
Charles V, between France and the Austro-Spanish 
power; and the issues in this contest became, as the wars 
continued, complicated by the outbreak of the Reforma- 
tion, which hurled a fresh apple of discord into Europe. 

The Italian wars pure and simple lasted from 1494 to 
1 5 18, and included the conquest of Naples by Charles 
VIII, its loss by Louis XII, the League of Cambrai 
against Venice, and the Holy League against the French, 
followed by the expulsion of the latter from Italy and 
their reinstatement in Milan under Francis I after the 



Results of the Italian Wars 133 

battle of Marignano and the Peace of Noyon, in 1516. 
During these wars the French, as MacchiavelH truly re- 
marked, showed they had little skill in matters of state. 

In fact, these Italian wars brought little benefit to 
France. The domestic government of Louis XII was 
beneficent to the country, trade flourished, and art reached 
a high pitch of excellence. Abstention from the Italian 
wars would have made France the most powerful country 
in Europe. Unfortunately, Louis continued the bad ex- 
ample set by Charles VIII, and Francis I carried on the 
same policy, with the result that when in 15 19 the elec- 
tion of Charles V to the imperial throne united the Span- 
ish and Hapsburg claims on Italy and rendered war inevi- 
table the French treasury was well-nigh exhausted. 

The ItaHan wars, which increased the financial dis- 
order of France, form an important epoch in European 
history. The various kingdoms while struggling in Italy 
became conscious of their national identity and of their 
relation to the European commonwealth of nations. In- 
ternational law necessarily became an important study, 
and diplomacy took its modern form. Italy had already 
in the dark ages preserved for Europe the principles of 
Roman law, government, and civilization; she now gave 
to her invaders all that was characteristic of the Renais- 
sance movement — the knowledge of man, of Greek art 
and literature, the finest examples of the new style of 
architecture, of painting, and of the spirit of criticism. 
Italy was then in " the Augustan age of arts and knowl- 
edge"; in politics and refinement she had for upward of 
a century formed a world of her own. During the early 
Italian wars she monopolized the attention of Europe, and 
when, after 15 18, the centre of interest shifted north of 



134 The French People 

the Alps, she still remained divided and distracted till the 
days of Cavour. 

But though after the accession of Charles V to the 
imperial throne the main interest of European history is 
no longer in Italy, it was on Italian questions round which 
the rivalry of Francis I and Charles V hung. 

This rivalry, which extended from the accession of 
Francis I, in 15 15, to the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis, in 
1559, led to four wars in the reign of Francis, and one war 
in the reign of Henry II, the dates of which are as follows: 
(i) 1522-1526; (2) 1527-1529; (3) 1535-1538; (4) 

1542-1544; (5) 1552-1559. 

During these years the rivalry between France and 
Germany, between the Latin and the Teutonic races, first 
appeared, and became one of the main factors in European 
politics, while simultaneously the momentous issues 
which were involved in the Reformation movement were 
deeply affecting the character and course of the wars. 

In these wars Francis I and Henry II successfully, 
though at times with great difficulty, preserved the inde- 
pendence of France against the enormous strength of the 
Austro-Spanish monarchy. 

During the struggle the French kings had the advan- 
tage of wielding a highly concentrated power almost 
wholly vested in their hands and of possessing an organ- 
ized and native infantry. 

But without allies France would have been over- 
matched, and she was therefore compelled to support the 
Lutherans abroad, and even to call upon the Turks for 
assistance. For many years the policy of being Catholic 
at home and Protestant abroad was pursued by French 
kings and ministers, while the advantages of a connection. 



Metz, Toul, and Verdun 135 

if not an alliance, with Turkey were fully appreciated by 
Louis XIV, by Fleury, and even by the French Revolu- 
tionary government. 

In 1559, when the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis 
brought the long wars, waged nominally over Italy, to a 
close, France gained the three Lotharingian bishoprics, 
Metz, Toul, and Verdun, from the Empire, and Calais 
from England. She had lost Spanish Navarre, and had 
been forced to relinquish her projects in Italy. 

It is difficult to weigh the advantages and disadvan- 
tages to Europe of these long wars; it is equally difficult 
to praise or blame the action of Francis I. 

It is true that, with no sense of responsibility, Francis, 
like a knight-errant, plunged into war with Charles V, and 
throughout his reign continued to struggle vainly for 
" the bauble of a kingdom beyond the Alps." On the 
other hand, it may be said that indirectly Francis was the 
cause of the failure of Charles V to establish the uni- 
versal supremacy of the Spanish-Hapsburg monarchy in 
Europe. 

When Charles V abdicated, his projects were only half 
accomplished, and France had prevented its own dismem- 
berment and secured its own independence. 

By the opposition of France and the Austro-Spanish 
monarchy the establishment of the principle of the bal- 
ance of power was assured, and the alliance of France with 
the Turks brought the whole of Europe into closer con- 
nection. 

Thus it is evident that Europe gained immensely from 
these wars, which largely contributed to the success of 
the Reformers in Germany, and it is difficult to see how 
Protestantism could have escaped suppression at the 



o 



6 The French People 



hands of Charles V if it had not been for the intervention 
of the French and the Turks. 

Francis I and Henry II themselves cared nothing for 
Protestantism, and during their reigns, with the full ap- 
probation of Paris, the Huguenots were cruelly perse- 
cuted. 

The influence of the early Renaissance movement had 
been fully appreciated in France, and even Louise of Sa- 
voy, the mother of Francis I, agreed with her son in sym- 
pathy with " letters against scholasticism, with Erasmus 
against the monks, with the biblicists against the Sor- 
bonne." 

But this early connection of the Renaissance with the 
Reformation movement was checked by the atrocities of 
the Anabaptists, the extreme v/ing of the Reformers in 
Germany. The cultivated and educated party in France, 
which wished to introduce learning into the Church and 
to unite scholarship and knowledge to the splendour and 
artistic beauty of Catholicism, was scared by the excesses 
of some of the early Reformers, as they were later alien- 
ated by the cold, harsh worship practised in the reformed 
conventicles. 

At first Francis stood between the reforming party in 
France and the party of reaction, and endeavoured to es- 
tablish harmony between them. At the head of the re- 
forming movement in France stood the king's sister, Mar- 
garet, \vho, though in no sense a Protestant, included 
under her protection various sections of reformers, from 
the humanists and men of education anxious for reforms 
by gentle means, to the followers of Calvin and the com- 
paratively small number of zealots, who, like Somerset's 
party in Edward VI's reign, delighted in image-breaking. 



The Reformation in France 137 

But Francis was no statesman, and he and the court 
merely played with the Reformation movement, and en- 
deavoured to crush it as soon as it ran counter to the 
feelings of the Parisians and the party of reaction headed 
by Anne of Montmorency and supported by the Sor- 
bonne. 

Francis himself was far more interested in art and lit- 
erature, which he studiously patronized. A great out- 
burst of Renaissance architecture took place, of which the 
Louvre is a good example. Italian architects and artists 
flocked to France, and some of the chateaux on the Loire 
date from this period. 

In 1529 the Gargantua of Rabelais appeared, which 
alone would redeem the literature of the reign from the 
charge of insignificance if it were not supplemented by 
the verse of Marot and the political writings of Calvin. 
Francis, interested in letters, endeavoured to found a great ^ 
college of France with Erasmus at its head, in opposition 
to the dull scholasticism of the Sorbonne. But Erasmus 
would not come, while the king's want of vigour and the 
strength of the reactionary tendencies checked a project 
which if carried out might have largely benefited the study 
of language and of natural science in France. 

But though Francis I and the nation at his back had 
no wish to substitute Protestantism for Catholicism, John 
Calvin, who was born at Noyon, in Picardy, had very dif- 
ferent views. Driven from France in 1534* he published 
his great work, The Institutes, and in 1536 settled in Ge- 
neva, which became the centre for the reformers, and from 
which issued 9, system which has afifected the religion of 
half Europe. 

This teaching derived much of its strength and in- 



138 The French People 

fluence from its stern, uncompromising antagonism and 
opposition to Rome. The French Huguenots imbibed 
their opinions largely from Calvin's teaching, which stands 
in direct opposition to the views held by Francis I and his 
court. 

Loyola, Rabelais, Calvin — these three men were prob- 
ably in Paris in 1528, and their names alone are sufficient 
to explain how impossible it was to expect the Renais- 
sance to effect a modus vivendi between the various re- 
ligious parties in France. 

In persecuting the French Protestants during the lat- 
ter part of his reign Francis was acting in consonance 
with the wishes of the most powerful section of his sub- 
jects. In his weakness and in his strength Francis I typi- 
fies the French nation. France during his reign had an 
opportunity of leading the new intellectual and religious 
movements of Europe and of improving the administra- 
tion and the financial condition of the country. But, like 
their king, the subjects of Francis showed very little real 
interest in the intellectual movement, and in spite of Rabe- 
lais the age is- singularly destitute of any great literary 
achievement; the mass of the French had no sympathy 
with the desire for a reform in the Church, and they cared 
little for their own constitutional life. They supported 
willingly the upholding of the dignity and power of the 
crown; they were as eager as was Francis to secure a lead- 
ing position in Europe; they hankered after military suc- 
cesses. 

For these the nation willingly made enormous sacri- 
fices. The States-General, rarely summoned, gained no 
privileges, the bureaucratic system, so deadening to local 
life and constitutional liberty, steadily grew in impor- 



I 



Financial Disorders 139 

tance, taxes increased, the sale of offices became the cus- 
tom, the corruption of royal officers was in no wise 
checked. Financial disorders were ever liable in France 
to lead to discontent, if not to revolutionary movements, 
and the perpetual mismanagement of the finances was a 
standing danger to the well-being of the kingdom. When 
asked by Charles V how much money he took from his 
subjects, Francis I replied, " As much as I want." 

The ever-recurring misfortunes of France, whichj in 
spite of her brilliant successes in the fields of battle and 
diplomacy, alternate with periods of apparent prosperity, 
were due to the king's power of levying taxes without 
the consent of the people and to the existence of a stand- 
ing army dependent on the king alone. 

" These things," said Philip de Commines, " gave a 
wound to the kingdom which will not soon be healed." 
Other mistakes in the French system of government were 
to be found in the continual exemption of the nobility 
from taxation and in the fiscal burdens falling principally 
on the peasants, who, though no longer serfs, suffered from 
the tolls, and fees, and dues which they had to pay the 
lords, from the tithes paid to the Church, and from the 
extra burden of the taille, which in the pays d'etat was a 
tax on the value of land, in the pays d' election a tax levied 
on the presumed income from any source, and levied in a 
most arbitrary way. 

In the towns were congregated the middle classes, 
who grew rich and powerful, while the peasantry became 
more and more burdened. Nobles, middle class, peas- 
antry had nothing in common, and were practically differ- 
ent castes, between which the gulf was ever widening. 
Of these classes, the nobles and upper clergy were prac- 



I40 The French People 

tically exempt from taxation, as also were royal officials, 
municipal authorities, and students at the universities. 
The peasantry bore most of the burdens, imposed owing 
to the long and expensive wars. France was indeed a 
compact and centralized state, with the king absolute and 
uncontrolled, but if the internal condition of the country 
be examined it will be evident that without reform revolu- 
tion was inevitable. 

Instead of carefully watching over the welfare of the 
French people, Charles VIII, Louis XII, and Francis I, in 
order to gratify their desire for aggrandizement and mili- 
tary glory, were led to taking part in invasions of Italy. 

On the accession of Charles VIII the peasants made 
the following complaint to the States-General: 

" During the past thirty-four years troops have been 
ever passing through France and living on the poor 
people. When the poor man has managed by the sale of 
the coat o'n his back, after hard toil, to pay his taille, and 
hopes he may live out the year on the little he has left, then 
come fresh troops to his cottage, eating him up. In Nor- 
mandy multitudes have died of hunger. From want of 
beasts men and women have to yoke themselves to the 
carts, and others, fearing that if seen in the daytime they 
will be seized for not having paid their taille, are compelled 
to work at night. The king should have pity on his poor 
people, and relieve them from the said tallies and charges." 

The long Italian wars were not calculated to improve 
the lot of the peasantry, who were more heavily taxed 
than ever, while throughout the period from 1494 to 1559 
the French monarchy was deteriorating, and the likeli- 
hood of a serious breakdown increased as the years 
rolled on. 



Civil War Imminent 141 

This danger was intensified by the mihtary spirit which 
was now created among the smaller nobility, and which, 
when added to the permanent tendency of the greater 
barons to make their provincial governments hereditary, 
indicates some of the dangers which a weak king would 
have to face in time of peace. 

Nor could the monarchy expect much help from the 
Church. 

The concordat of Francis with the Pope had made the 
Church a part of the monarchy, and the Church had in 
consequence deteriorated. Non-residence became com- 
mon, benefices were bought and sold, and the religious 
condition of France suffered enormously. In the king's 
hands was the gift of some six hundred benefices, and thus 
the wealth and dignities of the Galilean Church were 
bound up with the royal power. Political churchmen 
henceforward flourished in French history, and till the fall 
of the monarchy the higher clergy were characterized by 
subservience to the royal will and a want of sympathy 
with the mass of the nation, which led to their overthrow 
at the Revolution. 

Even the Parlement of Paris during this age of dete- 
rioration lost its character of rectitude. Judicature be- 
came corrupt, and those judges who were not bought were 
afifected by their religious passions. 

Thus in various ways this period, though seeing the 
French monarchy apparently at the height of its power, 
contained the seeds of future difificulties. Europe was 
in 1559 divided into two hostile religious camps, for even 
in France Protestantism had gained a firm hold. Noth- 
ing had been done to strengthen constitutional life in 
France; the warlike qualities of the nobles had been en- 



142 The French People 

couraged, and civil troubles threatened to ingulf the 
weakened monarchy. 

By the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis all the political dif- 
ferences between France and Spain and between France 
and Germany, all disputes about Italy, and all questions 
connected with the balance of power were postponed in 
face of the grave and momentous religious problem, 
which carried with it questions of political liberty held to 
be subversive to all monarchical rule. 



CHAPTER XI 



THE RELIGIOUS WARS 



From 1562 to 1598 France was involved in a civil 
war, which ruined her trade, threw still further back all 
hope of the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, 
and strained severely her finances. In spite of the perse- 
cutions of Francis I and Henry II, French Protestantism, 
organized on the Calvinistic model, had grown and become 
political and aggressive. So numerous were the conver- 
sions that the principal reason why Henry II made the 
Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis was in order to deal with 
this new danger. 

At that time the French Protestants or Huguenots 
numbered about four hundred thousand, composed partly 
of the smaller nobility and gentry, but mainly of burghers 
and tradesmen. While in the Cevennes and Dauphine 
the peasants supported them, their strength lay princi- 
pally in the southwest of France, which was essentially 
Romance. " The main stronghold of the Huguenots 
may be described as a square inclosed between the Loire, 
the Saone, and Rhone on the north and east; the Medi- 
terranean, the Pyrenees, and the Bay of Biscay on the 
south and west; while Dauphine and Normandy were 
their outposts." Geneva was, however, the capital of 

143 



144 The French People 

French Huguenotism, and was practically a French 
republic. 

In the reign of Henry II Huguenotism had then 
ceased to be merely a religious movement, as it was in the 
reign of Francis I, and represented social and political dis- 
affection as much as religious opposition to the papal doc- 
trines. 

The Genevan system, to which the Huguenots ad- 
hered, was admirably suited for aggression and resistance. 
" Calvin's theology and the institutions in which they are 
embodied are certainly unlovely, and they are in no small 
degree also narrow, shallow, and hard. But they are 
throughout pervaded by an intense faith and an unflinch- 
ing consistency; and they supplied, perhaps, the only bul- 
warks able, humanly speaking, to withstand the refluent 
wave of Romanism which in Calvin's latter days came 
upon the Reformed churches of the Continent." * 

The Counter-Reformation, piloted by the Pope and 
the Jesuits and supported by Philip II and Henry II, was 
advancing with rapid strides and taking advantage of the 
divisions existing among the Protestants. The Reforma- 
tion had come to a stand in Europe, and many states were 
falling back. Nowhere was this powerful reaction so suc- 
cessfully confronted as in those parts of Europe where 
Calvinism had taken root. 

" That system gathered up into a definite organized 
shape the faith, the Church life, the private practice of 
Protestantism"; it gave forth with no uncertain tone 
decrees and a system as definite, as peremptory, and as 
imposing as that of the Romish theologians. What 



* Espin's Critical Essays, p. 230. 



Calvinism 145 

gave Calvinism a further hold on the nations was its con- 
nection with politics and political institutions. 

D'Aubigne describes its influence in the following 
passage : 

" The great movements in the way of law and liberty 
effected by the people in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries have certain relations with the Reformation of 
Calvin which it is impossible to ignore. As soon as Guy 
de Bres and many others returned from Geneva to the Low 
Countries the great contest between the rights of the 
people and the revolutionary and bloody despotism oU 
Philip II began; heroic struggles took place, and the 
creation of the United Provinces was their glorious ter- 
mination. John Knox returned to his native Scotland 
from Geneva, where he had spent several years; then 
popery, arbitrary power, and the immorality of a French 
court made way in that noble country for that enthusiasm 
for the Gospel, liberty, and holiness which has never failed 
to kindle the ardent souls of its energetic people. Num- 
berless friends and disciples of Calvin carried away with 
them every year into France the principles of civil and 
political liberty, and a fierce struggle began with popery 
and the despotism of the Valois first, and afterward of the 
Bourbons." 

But D'Aubigne was unable to speak with the same 
pride and, perhaps, pardonable exaggeration of the re- 
sults of Calvinism in France as he did with regard to the 
United Provinces and Scotland. For Calvinism was 
never more than tolerated by the majority of French- 
men, and during the religious wars it became ap- 
parent that the Huguenots had miscalculated their 
strength, and in the first war they were indeed only 



146 The French People 

rescued by the decisive action of the crown. From that 
moment it was clearly proved that Huguenotism could 
never control the constitutional and religious principles of 
the French nation. But Calvinism never acquiesced eas- 
ily in defeat, and till 1598 continued to struggle to win 
religious and political ascendency in France. 

Into this struggle Huguenotism was forced by the 
policy on the part of the Guises of " subordination of na- 
tional interests to a desire for religious unity at any price." 

The correct and natural policy of France — the policy 
adopted by Henry IV — was to oppose the Emperor and 
Philip II of Spain, to allay religious differences in France, 
and to aid her recovery from the exhaustion caused by the 
long Italian wars. But, though Duke Francis of Guise, 
the first man in France since his capture of Calais, fa- 
voured the above policy, his brother, the Cardinal of Lor- 
raine, persuaded Henry HI to make the Peace of Cateau- 
Cambresis in order to join the other Catholic powers of 
Europe in a crusade against Protestantism. 

Henceforward " religious unity at the expense of na- 
tional dismemberment " became the watchword of the 
Guises and the Catholic party in France. 

Between two parties actuated by fierce religious ani- 
mosities and antagonism the crown at the beginning of 
the religious wars was helpless. A strong king was neces- 
sary to enforce peace upon the warring religious parties, 
but, unfortunately, till the accession of Henry IV, France 
had no strong king. Throughout the wars of religion the 
crown held a most humiliating position between two 
parties, each stronger than itself. 

During the Italian and Spanish wars the smaller no- 
bility had acquired military tastes, while to the grea;ter 



Religious Divisions 147 

nobles war was their only raison d'etre. To the crown 
the advent of peace was always the signal for the outbreak 
of difficulties at home. Strong kings, like Louis XI, 
boldly faced and overcame the internal troubles which 
welled forth at the close of the English wars, but after the 
Peace of Cateau-Cambresis France found herself without 
a man of the capacity of Louis XL The result was the 
religious wars, which lasted twenty-six years and rendered 
France during that period a quantite negligeable in Europe. 

The task of managing the nobles in time of peace was 
itself sufficient to strain the resources of a strong govern- 
ment, but after 1559 the rehgious factor was introduced, 
and the position of the crown was rendered infinitely 
more difficult; for before the religious question all feel- 
ings of patriotism and loyalty seemed to disappear. The 
middle classes were divided; the great French bureau- 
cracy could not be relied upon to support the crown; the 
Huguenots gave Havre to the English; the Guises in- 
trigued with Spain. 

Face to face with the religious question, men forgot 
their own nationality, they lost all sense of the real mean- 
ing of their actions, they endangered the indepen- 
dence and very existence of France by their mutual an- 
tagonisms. 

As time went on the sturdy middle class, which, char- 
acterized by industrious habits, a scrupulous honesty, and 
an unobtrusive manner of life, has always formed the back- 
bone of the nation, saw the necessity for a strong hand to 
keep faction quiet. For while the objects of the Catholic 
party or League of Paris became after 1585 antimo- 
narchical, antinational, as well as anti-Protestant, the Hu- 
guenots, though loyal to Henry of Navarre, began to aim 



148 The French People 

at securing provincial independence and establishing an 
imperiiim in impcrio. 

The struggle between the Catholics and Huguenots, 
confused as it is in all its details, falls roughly into two 
periods: (i) 1 562-1 585 and (2) 1 585-1 598. 

During the first of these two periods the Catholics se- 
cured the principal triumphs. The Huguenots, with 
some reason, were accused of holding republican doc- 
trines, of allying with the foreigner, of opposing the legiti- 
mate succession. There is little doubt that at the Con- 
ference of Bayonne in June, 1565, the extirpation of Prot- 
estantism throughout France was considered, and the 
struggle against the Huguenots harmonized with the 
views of Philip H and of the Counter-Reformation move- 
ment. In September, 1568, a league for the extirpation 
of heresy was formed at Toulouse, and called a crusade; 
while the exultation of Pius V at the death of Conde, in 
1569, and his advice to Charles IX to tear up the very 
fibre of the roots of Protestantism show how anxious the 
advanced Catholics were for the destruction of the re- 
formed faith. 

But it was not the policy of Catherine de' Medici and 
her sons to carry out such extreme measures. Charles 
IX had no intention of acting in subservience to Spain, 
and made the Treaty of Saint Germain in 1570 with the 
Huguenots. The Catholic reactionists in France at once 
determined to arrest this tendency to conciliation, and 
were fortunate in being able to turn Catherine de' Medici's 
jealousy of Coligny's influence to good account. With 
the Guises as their leaders, and secure of the unswerving 
support of the bigoted populace of Paris — the first town in 
Europe, and the possession of which implied the suprem- 



The League 149 

acy over northern and central France — the Catholics 
struck a telling blow at their adversaries on Saint Bar- 
tholomew's Day, 1572. 

By this act the bitterness of the religious conflict in 
France and in Europe was intensified, but the religious 
policy of the French government did not become strongly 
Catholic, and continued wavering even after the accession 
of the shallow and unstable Henry III, in 1574. After 
various fluctuations of policy Henry IH made the Peace 
of Monsieur with the Huguenots, in 1576, and so en- 
raged the Catholics in Paris and elsewhere that a number 
of Catholic leagues were founded, aimed at the crown 
no less than at the Protestants. 

In 1585, however, the Guises achieved their greatest 
success in the formation of the Catholic League or the 
League of Paris. Henry of Guise, who since 1574 had 
been the leader of his house, assumed an attitude of antag- 
onism to the crown and, without actually breaking with 
the upper classes, had begun to look to the populace for 
support. 

He undoubtedly hoped to become king of France in 
the not far distant future. The country had during these 
years become entirely disorganized and all classes demor- 
alized. " Men," it was said, " were combating not for the 
faith, not for Christ, but for command." 

The capitulation of Henry HI to the League and his 
assumption of the role of a party leader at once brought 
Henry of Navarre, the great opponent of the Guises, to 
the front. 

Round him gathered the Huguenots, who could claim 
to be fighting for national independence and the principle 
of legitimacy. In this struggle Henry HI hoped to hold 



I50 The French People 

a balance between the Huguenots and the Guises. But 
after the battle of Coutras, on October 20, 1587, a revolu- 
tion took place in Paris. Barricades were raised against 
the king, who was forced to retire to Blois, where he had 
Henry of Guise murdered. 

The union between Guise and the Parisian mob had 
been of short duration; but the revolutionary movement 
against the crown was merely stimulated by the murder 
of its leader, and Paris endeavoured to ignore the mon- 
archy and to rule France by an organization which it had 
itself created. 

Paris had no intention of yielding. The movement 
there was partly religious, partly political. The suppres- 
sion of heresy was one of the objects of the League; the 
exclusion of Navarre and the expulsion of Henry Hi's 
favourites were also aimed at. 

The religious crisis had brought the movement in 
Paris to a head, but the political objects of the Parisians 
soon became paramount, and their action and general at- 
titude remind one of the conduct of the revolutionists in 
1789 and the succeeding years. 

The city was divided into five districts, and the presi- 
dents of these, with an elective council of eleven, formed 
the Sixteen. This body, by means of trade and other as- 
sociations, communicated its decisions to its supporters all 
over France. A definite attempt was thus made to es- 
tablish by means of a system of terror the supremacy 
of a central council, with affihated societies throughout 
France, and to form a despotism of the most pronounced 
type. 

The attempt is interesting, as in some respects antici- 
pating, though without its justification, the policy pur- 



Failure of the League 151 

sued by the Committee of Public Safety. But the death 
of Henry of Guise deprived the League of its only capa- 
ble leader, and the assassination of Henry HI, on July 31, 
1589, made Henry of Navarre the legitimate king of 
France. Opposition to him implied sympathy with the 
Spaniards and the revolution, France, always in favour 
of a strong king, soon decided that the monarchy and a 
revolutionary Paris were incompatible, and that patriot- 
ism was to be preferred to the Spanish alliance. 

Paris, however, bore the privations of a long and ter- 
rible siege before yielding to the inevitable triumph of 
the monarchy under Henry IV, and was so carried away 
by fanaticism as to unite closely with the Spaniards. 

Though the means adopted by the Parisians to extend 
their influence through France resemble those used at 
the time of the French Revolution, the whole attitude of 
the capital from the time of the formation of the League 
of Paris, in 1585, compares very unfavourably with that 
taken up in 1357 and 1792. On both these occasions 
France was threatened by foreign armies, and on both oc- 
casions Paris took a leading part in concerting measures 
for the defence of France. The government of the Com- 
mittee of Public Safety, with all its faults, acted, like the 
States-General under Marcel, for the nation, and was sup- 
ported by all patriotic Frenchmen in its task of defending 
France against invasion. But during the period of the 
League Paris subordinated all feelings of patriotism to 
those of fanaticism. She called foreign armies into 
France, and her unpatriotic conduct can only be compared 
to that of the new or aristocratic Fronde. 

Such conduct was bound to react on all who supported 
it. The accession of Henry IV had created a new situa- 



152 The French People 

tion, and the mistaken policy of Paris was at once re- 
vealed. 

The patriotism of even the nobles revolted against the 
Spanish alliance, and they were glad of an opportunity of 
showing their dislike of the prominent place taken by the 
third estate. Guise for his own purposes had played 
with the democracy of Paris and with the rural democ- 
racy. Had he lived it is quite possible that a social rising 
of the lower classes might have taken place, and that the 
small revolt of the peasants of Normandy against the 
nobles might have grown into another Jacquerie. 

Even if Paris had armed the peasants and given them 
a capable and determined leader, the nobility no less than 
the Huguenots would have been exterminated, and the 
Edict of Nantes would never have been required. 

As it was, the nobles, the Church, the upper bour- 
geoisie, and the Parlement of Paris, threatened by the 
Parisian revolutionists and fearing the democratic tend- 
encies of the League, united together in favour of the 
crown and the constitution, and averted till 1789 any seri- 
ous attack on the French monarchy. 

Huguenotism was also compelled to execute a similar 
volte-face. In the last days of the degenerate Valois the 
right of deposition had been preached, and the Huguenot 
Confederation had assumed an intensely democratic char- 
acter, but with the death of Henry HI the Huguenot party 
was compelled to advocate the claims of Henry of 
Navarre and to keep in the background their particularist 
tendencies. 

It only remained for Henry to accept the mass. By 
renouncing his creed he gained Paris, and with Paris, 
France. 



I 



Henry IV 153 

The League had failed, but Catholicism had won. 
Democracy was discredited, the spectre of agrarian revolt 
was laid, and the antimonarchical theory abandoned. 

The triumph of the monarchy gave a great impetus to 
patriotism, for it implied the expulsion of the foreigner 
and the restoration of the position of France in Europe. 
Constitutionally France gained nothing. Since the death 
of Etienne Marcel no notable attempt had been made to 
give France a constitutional form of government. The 
French have always preferred good administration to elab- 
orate constitutional machinery, and nothing done by the 
estates during the religious wars tended to increase the 
national regard for representative institutions. 

The States-General had been frequently summoned 
during the religious wars, but had completely failed to in- 
spire confidence in their powers or wisdom. Their help- 
lessness before Henry IV provoked no hostile criticism 
among a people which welcomed absolute rule. The 
Parlement of Paris had shown weakness during the wars 
and was discredited, and the Royal Council was incapable 
of standing against a strong king. The independence of 
the Church was indeed a possible danger to the mon- 
archy, for an independent Galilean Church implied the 
predominance of the estates, the revival of the Pragmatic 
Sanction, the aboHtion of the Concordat. The situation 
of 1682, when Louis XIV supported Gallicanism against 
the papacy and acted in the lines of Henry VIII's ecclesi- 
astical policy, seemed at one time likely to be anticipated. 

But Henry IV had no desire to see established in 
France an independent Galilean Church. He realized 
that his interests lay in friendship with the papacy. He 
recalled the Jesuits and, like Napoleon, allied with the 



154 The French People 

papacy, thus rendering himself safe from any opposition 
on the part of the national Church. 

Towards his Protestant subjects he adopted a policy of 
compromise, which secured their existence, though it 
failed to satisfy the fanaticism of their opponents. Hu- 
guenotism, rugged and unyielding, was by its nature op- 
posed to the absolutism of the crown. But the Hugue- 
not Confederation, with its democratic tendencies, never 
had a chance of success in a country so monarchical as 
France. The Edict of Nantes, which Henry hoped would 
settle the relations between the Huguenots and Catholics, 
was a treaty giving the Protestants liberty of conscience, 
eight strong towns, and certain local privileges as to lib- 
erty of worship. Huguenotism had failed to establish itself 
on even an equality with Catholicism, which remained the 
state religion. It had been driven south of the Loire; it 
never gained a real hold on the north of France; it was 
always opposed by the Parlements; its connection with 
republican doctrines and local independence alienated 
the upper classes; the deadly enmity of Paris never wa- 
vered. 

Huguenotism had several elements of weakness which 
time intensified rather than removed. The Huguenot 
Confederation, unlike the League, was organized prima- 
rily for defence, and was not adapted for winning over its 
religious opponents. There always, too, existed an op- 
position between the political and religious elements, be- 
tween the nobility and the municipal authorities, the union 
of which had constituted the strength of the Huguenot 
movement. As years rolled on the aim of the Huguenot 
towns to form an imperium in imperio and to develop re- 
publicanism in the heart of monarchical France became a 



The Monarchy Triumphant 155 

real danger and justified the strong measures taken by 
Richelieu to end their political existence. 

The Huguenots but dimly realized that their priv- 
ileges were held in " the teeth of the majority of the na- 
tion," and that but for the will of a strong king like Henry 
IV the Treaty of Nantes would never have been made. 

Louis XIV, indeed, made a great blunder in revoking 
that treaty, but at any rate he was carrying out the popu- 
lar wish when he definitely proscribed the Huguenot re- 
ligion. 

The principle of monarchy, which had been weak at 
the beginning of the war, was under Henry IV again 
strong. Other classes had weakened, but the crown had 
strengthened its position. It had outlived the struggles 
between the Catholics and the Huguenots; it was again 
the symbol of French unity against the foreigner; it alone 
could give the country peace. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE TRIUMPH OF CENTRALIZATION UNDER 
RICHELIEU AND MAZARIN 

Under Louis VI, Philip Augustus, Louis IX, and 
Philip IV the Capetian house had gradually broken down 
feudal anarchy, replacing it by a strong monarchy based 
on a uniform administration. But during the reigns of 
the early Valois kings the French monarchy, owing to 
the long war with England, was shaken to its foundations, 
and no sooner had the English been expelled from France 
than it was found that the system of giving appanages to 
members of the royal family had produced a new race of 
nobles as eager for independence as the old feudal barons. 
The efforts of Louis XI, the precursor of Richelieu, were 
successful in dissipating this formidable danger, and the 
ruin of Charles the Bold's schemes, followed soon after 
by the annexation of Brittany, again raised the royal power 
to a position of undisputed supremacy. 

But again the centralizing process was checked — first, 
by the Italian wars; secondly, by the religious troubles in 
France, during which both the Huguenots and the Catho- 
lic nobles aimed at local aristocratic government. 

Fortunately the divisions between the Protestants and 
the Catholics enabled Henry IV to check these attempts 
to annihilate the power of the crown and to effect a com- 
156 



The Policy of France 157 

promise between the two warring religions. France, 
wearied with the long period of disorder, welcomed his 
accession as securing the country against the ambition of 
the Spanish monarchy and against the anti-national and 
retrograde policy of the Catholic nobles on the one hand, 
and the advanced Huguenots on the other. 

Once seated on the throne and supported by both 
Catholics and Protestants, Henry bent all his efforts to 
enabling his minister Sully to reform the finances and to 
erect a vast confederacy of Protestant nations for the pur- 
pose of resisting the progress of the Counter-Reformation, 
which, under the leadership of the Austro-Spanish princes, 
was rapidly advancing. 

Henry's sudden death in 1610 cut short all his vast 
projects, and it was not till between 1650 and 1670 that his 
intentions were mainly carried out. Richelieu and Mazarin 
destroyed once and forever the last hope of the nobles to 
establish in the provinces governments which should be 
perpetual and hereditary, Colbert restored the finances, 
and the peace of the Pyrenees, in 1659, following on that 
of Westphalia, in 1648, completed the destruction of the 
retrograde and unprogressive schemes of the Austro- 
Spanish house. 

Owing to the exigencies of his position, Henry IV had 
been compelled to return to a modification of the appa- 
nage policy of earlier kings, and to intrust powerful nobles 
with the government of the great provinces. He had also 
systematized the sale of offices, which since the reign of 
Louis XH had been used by successive kings for the pur- 
pose of filling the treasury. By the institution of the 
paulette, on the payment of which the members of the 
central courts and the Parlement of Paris became the ab- 



158 The French People 

solute proprietors of their offices, the Parlement became 
a corporation of hereditary lawyers. 

Henry IV's death was immediately followed by a feu- 
dal reaction and a minority. Sully's fiscal reforms were 
checked, the nobles at once became supreme in the Gov- 
ernment, and all idea of opposing the Austro-Spanish re- 
actionary policy was set aside. While the great nobles re- 
joiced at the opportunity of setting up hereditary govern- 
ments in the provinces and controlling the monarchy, the 
Huguenots endeavoured to secure political powers which 
would have resulted in the creation of a federation of Prot- 
estant cities in France — an imperium in imperio — which 
must have proved a constant source of disaffection and dis- 
union in France. 

The Parlement of Paris was not behindhand in its pre- 
tensions, and the monarchy from 1610 to 1624 was sensi- 
bly weakened. With regard to foreign affairs, the policy 
of Henry IV was dropped, the vast issues which were at 
stake in Europe were disregarded, and France became a 
mere cipher among the great nations. 

From this position the patriotic efforts of Richelieu 
rescued her, and by a firm policy at home and vigorous 
action abroad checked internal disorder and restored the 
reputation of France in Europe. 

The immense value of this work has often been at- 
tacked on the ground that France, owing to his adminis- 
tration, lost all chance of setting up a constitutional gov- 
ernment, and drifted onward through despotism to revolu- 
tion. But an examination of the interval from 1610 to 
1624 — i. e., from the death of Henry IV to the final acces- 
sion of the cardinal to power — will show at once how 
groundless such charges are. During those years the 



Rise of Richelieu 159 

nobles seemed likely to convert France into a Poland, 
owing to their want of patriotism and intelligence. " This 
aristocracy," writes Henri Martin, " had no aristocratic 
spirit; their dream was to dismember, not to govern 
France; their idea was a return to feudalism." 

Their exclusiveness and ignorance of the most rudi- 
mentary principles of government were clearly brought 
out during the meeting of the States-General in 1614, 
when one of the speakers of the third estate remarked that 
the three orders were all sons of one mother — France — and 
that the nobles should regard the tiers etat as younger 
brothers, and not despise them. The nobles were furious; 
days were wasted in discussing the matter, and the inter- 
vention of the clergy was required to appease the insulted 
nobility. 

France during these years of noble influence and royal 
weakness naturally fell into a state of anarchy, and it is 
hard to see what better alternative there was than the 
strong though arbitrary government of Richelieu. 

The history of Richelieu's life is the history of France 
and of Europe. While he was successfully checking the 
revival of the Hapsburg supremacy and laying down the 
principles of French foreign policy, which were to be dog- 
gedly followed till the diplomatic revolution of 1756, he 
was at the same time erecting an administrative system 
and establishing an absolutism, both of which lasted till 
the Revolution. 

The Richelieu tradition in the foreign, the colonial, and 
the domestic policy of France was as potent a fact as was 
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic traditions of later times. 

During the whole of his great ministry, from 1624 to 
1642, the Thirty Years' War was raging. Spain and Aus- 



i6o The French People 

tria, united by family ties and religious aspirations, aimed 
at recovering for Roman Catholicism the whole of 
Europe. The Thirty Years' War was the final effort of 
the Counter-Reformation. For a time the Hapsburgs, 
aided by the genius of Wallenstein and the folly of James 
I of England, carried all before them. Germany lay help- 
less at their feet; France was threatened on her eastern 
frontier by the extension of Spanish influence from Italy 
to the Netherlands. 

In the interests of the balance of power, and indeed of 
the future of France, it was absolutely necessary that the 
triumphs of the Austro-Spanish house should*be checked. 
There was no time to be lost. Already Spain and 
the Empire were tightening their hold upon Italy, and 
by an alliance with the Grison league, which held the 
Valtelline Valley from Como to the Tyrol, were strength- 
ening their lines of communication between Germany 
and Italy. 

By 1626 Richelieu succeeded in forcing Spain to aban- 
don all claim to control the Valtelline. In 1630 he still 
further hampered the Hapsburg scheme by capturing 
Pinerolo and preventing the loss of Casale. At the same 
time, by allying with Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and 
by intriguing with the Catholic League against Wallen- 
stein, he helped to save the Protestant cause in Germany 
while he deprived the Emperor of his best general. After 
the death of the Swedish king France plunged into the 
European war, which became a duel between the houses 
of Hapsburg and Bourbon. In spite of temporary re- 
verses, Richelieu's successes from 1638 to 1642 were ex- 
traordinary. He conquered Alsace, he allied with the 
Dutch, who in 1639 almost completely annihilated the 



Richelieu's Work i6i 

Spanish fleet, he drove the Spaniards out of Piedmont, 
he aided Portugal to recover her independence, and 
he supported the Catalans. He united Artois to the 
French crown and captured Brisach. When he died 
he bequeathed to France the policy of abasing the house 
of Hapsburg on every opportunity, and as a means to 
that end he definitely organized a system of alliance with 
Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. Throughout the whole of 
Louis XIV's long reign his foreign policy was carefully 
adhered to, and though the alliance with Austria in 1756 
suspended the antagonism between the Hapsburgs and 
Bourbons for some thirty-six years, the policy of Riche- 
lieu was returned to by the Revolutionists with renewed 
vigour. 

While he had raised France to greatness and carried 
out fully and systematically the ideas of Henry IV, he had 
been equally successful in his colonial policy and in his 
administrative reforms. 

His colonial policy was marked by vigour and fore- 
sight. The first attempt was made to occupy Madagas- 
car, French settlements in the West Indies were estab- 
lished, and the restoration by the English of Quebec and 
Nova Scotia to Canada was brought about. 

Henceforward French colonial enterprise was to a 
great extent centred round the West Indies and Canada. 
Richelieu's policy was continued and developed, and it 
was not till the Seven Years' War that France was com- 
pelled to yield Canada to England and to curtail her colo- 
nial ambitions. 

In his domestic policy he had no less the interests of 
his country at heart. In dealing with the Church, the 
Huguenots, the nobles, and the official classes he was 



i62 The French People 

determined to enforce the authority and the soHdarity of 
.the state. 

A great revival of reHgion followed the close of the 
religious wars in France, which showed itself in various 
ways. Numerous associations were formed for the edu- 
cation of the clergy, many orders and organizations were 
established for carrying out the work of charitable relief, 
and secular instruction was given with success by the 
Jesuits. The names of Saint Franqois de Sales and Saint 
Vincent de Paul indicate the general character of a move- 
ment which had undoubtedly beneficial results. 

This religious revival was accompanied by a natural 
and inevitable tendency on the part of a large portion of 
the clergy towards ultramontanism. The Church wished 
to shake ofif the control of the state, to assert its own inde- 
pendence, to unite itself more closely with Rome. Such 
tendencies were forcibly checked by Richelieu. Like 
Henry VIII of England and Louis XIV, the cardinal, with 
his keen appreciation of the national interests of France, 
had no intention of allowing the papal influence in France 
to increase. Nor, on the other hand, would he permit 
Gallicanism to assert its independence of the crown. 

Richelieu's Church policy was essentially national. 
Foreign influences were reduced to a minimum, and the 
control of the state was strengthened; but his treaty with 
the Huguenots after the fall of La Rochelle roused the in- 
dignation of the Roman Catholics. Henry IV's policy of 
compromise had entailed upon Richelieu serious trouble 
with the Huguenots, who shortly after he became minis- 
ter endeavoured to enforce their claim to political inde- 
pendence. The fall of La Rochelle, however, left them 
with liberty of religious worship, but without the power 



The French Nobles 163 

of opposing municipal rights to the royal despotism. 
Mazarin continued his policy of wise moderation towards 
the Protestants, who, till his death, in 1661, were protected 
from the intolerance of their fellow-countrymen. 

The fall of La Rochelle removed a serious obstacle 
to the power of the monarchy. But the attempted revival 
of military feudalism, due to the hereditary character of 
the provincial governments, was a far greater obstacle. 
" The power of the French nobles rested," it has been 
said, " mainly upon a triple basis: (i) their strongly forti- 
fied castles, each of which required a separate siege for its 
reduction; (2) their contempt for ordinary jurisdiction, 
and their claim to settle their own disputes by what had 
once been their recognised right — private war; (3) the 
power which they exercised in the provinces through their 
positions as governors." * These nobles were practically 
free from all taxation, they monopolized all appointments 
in the army and navy, they ground down the peasants on 
their estates, forced them to pay heavy dues and tolls, and, 
what was worse, they showed during Louis XIII's reign a 
spirit of factious disloyalty. There were nineteen noble 
governors of provinces when Richelieu became first min- 
ister; at his death there were only four. In the place of 
the fifteen who had been removed he substituted intend- 
ants. They were permanent officials, usually lawyers, and 
were the agents of the government, and chosen from the 
middle classes. 

The appointment of these intendants, who resembled 
the modern prefects of departments, not only dealt a tell- 
ing blow at the political power of the nobles and at the 

* Richelieu, by R. Lodge, p. i6i. 



1 64 The French People 

spurious feudalism which they had attempted to set up, 
but proved an important step in the direction of centraH- 
zation. 

Another step in the same direction was the destruc- 
tion of the numerous feudal castles. In 1626, by one of 
the Assemblies of Notables which Richelieu at times 
called, an edict was issued that all castles not necessary for 
frontier defence should be destroyed, and that no fortifi- 
cation of private houses was to be allowed. Though 
noble plots against him and the king's government were 
frequent, Richelieu persevered in his wise course and 
overthrew the conspiracies, in which the Condes, the 
Montmorencys, the Epernons, and the Soissons took part. 
By their lack of statesmanship and patriotism, by their 
want of sympathy with the other classes in France, by the 
absence of political morality among them, the nobles had 
thoroughly deserved their fate. 

It would have been better if he had abolished their 
privileges as well as their independence. As it was, the 
nobles remained a privileged body till the Revolution, 
which to a great extent was caused by the cleavage exist- 
ing between the nobles and the middle and lower classes, — 
a cleavage which Richelieu might have closed. 

At any rate, by destroying the political power of the 
nobles and leaving them their privileges he prepared the 
way for the Revolutionists and for Napoleon. 

Equally drastic was Richelieu's policy to the repre- 
sentative institutions which still existed in the fays d'etats, 
viz., in Languedoc, Dauphine, Provence, Burgundy, Brit- 
tany, and Normandy. 

The estates were either destroyed or deprived of much 
of theirindependence, while the powers given to theintend- 



Administrative Measures 165 

ants aided the policy of the government in strengthening 
its connection with and control over all the provinces, 
whether pays d'etats or pays d' election. 

These measures obviously increased the work of the 
central government, and the Conseil du Roi or Royal 
Council was carefully reorganized, and by means of its 
division into a number of sections — Conseil des Finances; 
Conseil des Parties, for judicial work; Conseil des De- 
peches, for foreign aflfairs — was able to cope with the great 
increase of administrative and other business. 

All opposition to this centralized and administrative 
system was consistently suppressed. The nobles having 
been deprived of their political powers, the political pre- 
tensions of the Parlement of Paris remained. But in 1641 
an edict forbade the Parlement to take any cognizance of 
afifairs of state on its own initiative, and this policy of 
Richelieu was followed by Louis XIV. The States-Gen- 
eral were never summoned. 

The administrative system which Richelieu founded 
on the ruins of noble and provincial liberties continued 
till the Revolution. It has been often asserted that 
France, in the States-General, the Parlement of Paris, and 
the provincial estates possessed all the germs of a consti- 
tution of government, and that Richelieu should have en- 
couraged the growth of parliamentary institutions. 

But while in England a union of classes had as early 
as the thirteenth century opposed the crown, in France 
the nobles and third estate never attempted to form any 
league for their mutual interest. The States-General 
therefore proved a constitutional failure from its first 
meeting in 1302. The third estate was powerless against 
the nobles and clergy, and each class struggled for its own 



1 66 The French People 

interests. The meeting of the States-General in 1614 
fully exemplified the impotence and uselessness of that 
institution. 

It was too late to rouse in the nobles and higher 
clergy a desire to work with the third estate for the benefit 
of France, and Richelieu recognised the impossibility of 
utilizing the States-General in building up the mon- 
archy. Equally impossible was it to trust the Parlement 
of Paris with political powers. That self-elected body of 
lawyers now formed a close bureaucracy, impregnated with 
narrow views and class privileges. Though in the ab- 
sence of the States-General the Parlement often voiced the 
popular discontent, it had no popular sympathies; being a 
corporation of judges, it had nothing in common with the 
English Parliament, which it often aspired to imitate. 

Only in the pays d'etats were there to be found the 
real elements of constitutional life. But in the seven- 
teenth century it is more than doubtful, the noble self- 
ishness being so widespread and the cleavage between 
classes so marked, whether Richelieu under any circum- 
stances could have shaken himself free from the traditions 
of the past and developed a constitutional form of govern- 
ment. 

From her geographical position France is always spe- 
cially liable to invasion from her eastern and northeastern 
frontiers. Having no natural defences against attacks 
from the side of Flanders and Germany, a strong govern- 
ment has always been a necessity. Moreover, the whole 
course of her history encouraged the growth of monarchi- 
cal institutions. The Hundred Years' War with England, 
the long struggle with Charles V, threw into the back- 
ground constitutional aspirations and rallied all French- 



The Death of Richelieu 167 

men round the central power. The rehgious wars had a 
similar effect, and during Richelieu's ministry the Thirty 
Years' War engrossed the attention of France and ren- 
dered the triumph of the monarchy certain. 

On his death, in December, 1643, France was still at 
war with Spain and Austria, but the victory of his admin- 
istrative system was assured. He had founded the French 
Academy, he had depressed the nobles and Huguenots, he 
had freed the monarchy from all effective restraints on its 
power. In the words of Henri Martin, he had " given 
birth to the two great enemies whose struggle was to fill 
the modern world — absolutism and the press." 

The minority of Louis XIV, like the minority of Louis 
XIII, witnessed a struggle on the part of the nobles to re- 
gain their power. Richelieu, like Frederick the Great, 
had during his life concentrated all authority in his own 
hands. All the threads of the administration were con- 
trolled by him, and, with the exception of diplomacy, he 
left behind him no colleague or subordinate capable of 
taking the initiative. Like the Austrian Council, he was 
in the habit of directing the operations of the generals in 
the field from Paris. He surrounded himself with agents 
and clerks with no special capacity, but who commended 
themselves to him by their obedience and trustworthiness. 

The immediate result of his death, of the easy-going 
character of the queen regent, and of the want of firmness 
on the part of Mazarin was that the nobles and P«arle- 
ment of Paris, ignoring the necessity of concentrating all 
efforts in the struggle with Austria and Spain, endeav- 
oured to overthrow Mazarin and to abolish the office of 
First Minister. 

For some ten years France was filled with the attempts 



1 68 The French People 

of the nobles to establish themselves as feudal princes in 
their separate provinces, to sweep away the intendants, 
and, in a word, to destroy the administrative system of 
Richelieu. Their efforts, however, proved unavailing. 
Abroad the Peace of Westphalia secured Europe from the 
supremacy of the Austro-Spanish house and preserved the 
balance of power, while at home, in spite of the two in- 
surrections known as the First and Second Fronde, the 
work of Richelieu survived and the monarchy triumphed. 

In the First Fronde the Parlement of Paris had en- 
deavoured to check the wasteful administration and the 
ruinous system of taxation. Reforms were indeed neces- 
sary, especially in matters of finance. But the Parlement 
was not a body fitted to carry out such reforms. It had 
no right to take the place of the States-General; it was in 
no sense representative of the nation. Many of its mem- 
bers opposed Mazarin because he wished to deprive them 
of their hereditary right to their ofifices. 

If the official aristocracy were incapable of inaugurat- 
ing and carrying out a great scheme of reform, the feudal 
aristocracy showed itself still more impotent and factious. 

The Second Fronde, which was dominated by the no- 
bles, was simply a long struggle for governments and pen- 
sions. The movement has no tinge of constitutionalism. 

Neither the official classes, who were prominent in the 
First Fronde, nor the aristocracy, which dominated the 
Second Fronde, were capable of giving France a govern- 
ment suited to her needs. Mazarin's work was to curb 
Paris and to stamp out the remaining elements of disaffec- 
tion in the provinces. He was aided in his efforts by the 
disloyal conduct of Conde and many of the nobles, who 
allied with Spain and aided her forces to invade France. 



Mazarin's Triumph 169 

Time after time the French nobles had shown a lack of 
patriotism which ruined their prospects of following in the 
steps of the English aristocracy. Dtying the religious 
wars in France the League had allied with Philip II; dur- 
ing Louis XIII's minority it had overthrown Henry 
IV's national policy and returned to its Spanish leanings; 
and now, when France, exhausted after her long struggle 
in the Thirty Years' War, was holding her own with diffi- 
culty, the nobles joined the enemy. 

By the end of 1653 Mazarin had triumphed and the 
opposition was crushed. The Parlement of Paris was for- 
bidden to interfere in political or financial matters; Paris 
supported the king; in the southwest of France, with 
Bordeaux as its centre, disaffection was crushed. The 
promptness and resource of Mazarin were successful, and 
Richelieu's work, for a time interrupted, was carried out. 
The Treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees placed 
France in the foremost rank among the nations of Europe; 
the suppression of the Fronde rendered the absolutism of 
the monarchy secure. 

The goal to which the French monarchy had been 
steadily advancing since the accession of Hugh Capet was 
now reached, and Louis XIV could say with truth, 
" L'etat, c'est moi." 



CHAPTER XIII 

FRANCE AND A WORLD EMPIRE 

From 1660 to 171 5 France was not only the most 
prominent of the nations of Europe; she was also the most 
enterprising. Not satisfied with the acquisition of a lead- 
ing position in Western Christendom, Louis XIV and his 
ministers endeavoured to extend the influence and suprem- 
acy of France to the uttermost ends of the earth. North 
America, India, Madagascar, Africa, Siam, were all scenes 
of French activity. 

Into these ambitious schemes the nation at first en- 
tered with enthusiasm. It was weary of the incessant 
quarrels and jealousies of the nobles, it was sick to death 
of civil wars and noble factions. It therefore hailed with 
enthusiasm the assertion by Louis XIV, in 1661, of his de- 
termination to rule as well as to reign. 

All the great questions which had disturbed previous 
French kings and ministers were now settled. The no- 
blesse had for centuries been tried in the balance, and had 
been found wanting. They had failed to display the pru- 
dence, patriotism, and ability of the British aristocracy and 
had lost all influence. 

They were destined to decline still further in popu- 
lar esteem till the fatal days of the emigration, when, fly- 
170 



The French Nobles 171 

ing before the Revolution, they sealed the fate of nobility 
in France. 

Partly in consequence of the policy of the nobles, it 
was generally accepted in 1661 that France, in spite of her 
successful wars, her great wealth, the patriotism of her 
people, and the ability of her ministers, was unable to es- 
tablish a constitutiong,l government based upon popular 
representation. 

The inability of France to develop any satisfactory po- 
litical organization was due to a lack of unity and homo- 
geneity. The whole history of the French monarchy 
from Hugh Capet to Richelieu had been that of the grad- 
ual extension of the royal and the reduction of the feudal 
power. The existence of a number of isolated and es- 
tranged provinces had enabled the kings to work upon 
local jealousies and to defeat all possibility of hostile com- 
binations. No sympathy had existed between the various 
provinces. The Burgundians did not care what happened 
to the Normans, nor did the Poitevins trouble themselves 
about the fate of the men of Provence. The towns 
showed no tendency to ally with the .nobles in checking 
the assumptions of the crown, which was thus able to de- 
feat in detail any province or town which showed signs of 
independent action. 

The creation of suitable checks to royal despotism 
gradually became more and more impossible, and when 
during the minority of Louis XIII France was on the 
verge of falling into fragments owing to the absence of 
any political organization the royal power can hardly be 
blamed for taking drastic measures to make the recurrence 
of such a state of things impossible in the future. 

The nobles, superseded in the provinces by the intend- 



172 The French People 

ants and shorn of much of their mihtary power by Lou- 
vois, were attracted to Versailles, where they received pen- 
sions and lived an idle life. The Parlement of Paris was 
no longer allowed to arrogate political functions, the 
States-General had failed to make its utility recognised, 
and the nation came to expect everything from the mon- 
archy, which, under Louis XIV, became absolute and cen- 
tralized. Few kings have worked harder or more regu- 
larly than did Louis XIV. Convinced of his responsibili- 
ties as a ruler no less than of the divine character of roy- 
alty, Louis was resolved to be the head not only of the 
government, but of every department of national enter- 
prise, whether literary, ecclesiastical, commercial, or so- 
cial. From him alone was to emanate all authority, and 
he was to be the mainspring of every new development in 
French life. No sooner was Mazarin dead than he began 
to organize a bureaucratic system of government, which, 
in some respects, was a model for Europe. The Council 
of State was under the king the supreme executive and 
judicial authority, and split into various departments, of 
which the Conseil des Depeches and the Conseil des Fi- 
nances were the principal. But from the middle of Louis's 
reign these councils became obsolete, and in the contro- 
leur-general was centred all thp financial administration. 
Aided by his thirty intendants, the controleur prac- 
tically governed France. Such an administration was al- 
ways in danger of being corrupt and tyrannical, and it be- 
came so in the later years of Louis's reign. But during 
the years immediately following Mazarin's death the ad- 
ministration on the whole worked well. In Colbert and 
Louvois Louis had, undoubtedly, able, energetic ministers, 
who were able to carry out his plans and to second his 



French Literature 173 

efforts to establish French predominance in Europe, and 
to found an empire in the east and west. In the domain 
of letters the supremacy of France was at any rate un- 
questioned. The conquests of the French and the pres- 
tige of Louis's reign contributed to make " the age of 
Louis XIV " the Augustan age of French literature. 
Boileau, the prince of critics, insisted, like Pope, on cor- 
rectness of style and severity of form, and during Louis's 
reign the influence of classicism was supreme. 

" Classicism," writes Professor Elton, " means Cicero 
working on the preachers, Plautus and Terence on the 
comedians, Horace on Boileau, Virgil on Fenelon, Tacitus 
on the makers of memoirs." * All departments of litera- 
ture came into prominence, and all were influenced by the 
French king, " the embodiment of the most despotic of all 
social governments." 

The eloquence and finish so characteristic of French 
writings between 1661 and 171 5 is as apparent in French 
tragedy and comedy as it is in the works of Fenelon or in 
the sermons of the great French preachers. Of these the 
most distinguished were Bossuet, Bourdaloue, Massillon, 
and Flechier. Owing to the establishment of despotism 
in France and the stifling of political discussions French 
oratory was forced to develop on pulpit, legal, or academ- 
ical lines. Of these types of eloquence, that of pulpit ora- 
tory was most favoured by Louis XIV, and during his 
reign Bossuet produced the chief masterpieces of religious 
discourses. France for some years enjoyed internal peace, 
and. a great impulse was thus given to literary efforts, espe- 
cially when they received the full approval of the king. 

* The Augustan Age, by Oliver Elton, p. 6. 



174 The French People 

The reign therefore saw the production of sermons 
which rank among the finest existing, in point of gran- 
deur, correctness of language, and eloquence. In this, as 
in other departments of literature and art, the supremacy 
of France was unquestioned, and Louis's reign furnished 
models of the most correct types of every species of poetry 
and prose. The domination of French over the European 
world of letters was assured, and continued long after 
Louis's death. 

Over the domain of letters as over the governmental 
system the king presided. Similarly he insisted on con- 
trolling the Church and resisting the claims of the papacy 
to interfere with the Galilean clergy. The Church 
throughout the century was active in literary and educa- 
tional matters and showed considerable missionary vigour. 
The growth of Jansenism and the foundation of Port Royal 
had led to the publication of Pascal's Provincial Letters 
against the Jesuits, and it was very necessary in the inter- 
ests of France that her king should show a breadth of 
judgment and a tolerant spirit in dealing with the many- 
sided activities of the religious bodies settled in France. 

For success abroad and in India and America all dis- 
content at home should have been assuaged. The position 
was a difficult one, especially for a king like Louis, with 
strong views on Church matters. Till 1685, when he re- 
voked the Edict of Nantes, no serious step was taken 
calculated to disturb the relations of the religious dissi- 
dents to the crown or to cause a rift between the Jesuits 
and Jansenists. 

It was during this early period of his reign that all 
Louis's schemes prospered. Thus, when the French lan- 
guage, philosophy, and ideas were permeating Europe, 



i 



Colonial Schemes 175 

when French Hterature was exhibiting its marvellous pow- 
ers, when the great king's political influence in Europe was 
daily increasing, it was only to be expected that attempts 
should be made to establish French supremacy in America 
and India. 

Supreme on land, and to a great extent on sea, the 
French monarchy from 1661 to 1700 seemed irresistible. 
With the growth of its power the aims of Louis XIV de- 
veloped. Vast schemes of conquest floated across his 
brain. France, at the head of Catholic Europe, should, he 
hoped, become the mother of a great French empire and 
practically mistress of the world. 

Till 1700 the carrying out of his colonial schemes, the 
extension of the French frontier to the Scheldt and Rhine, 
and the recognition of his position as head and protector of 
the Catholic Church occupied the attention of Louis; 
after 1700 he devoted his energies to securing the Spanish 
empire for his grandson in face of the opposition of 
Europe. 

While Louis was extending the influence of France in 
the East and West and laying the foundations of an empire 
which was destined never to rise above those foundations, 
he was equally busy in maturing plans for the transference 
of the imperial dignity from the weak hands of the Haps- 
burgs to those of the Bourbons. 

He hoped to be the supreme head of Christendom, and 
already certain writers had contended that the kings of 
France as the descendants of Charles the Great had the 
right of jurisdiction over Germany. The dread of Turk- 
ish ascendency in Europe prompted many men to desire 
the establishment of a strong empire capable of protecting 
Christendom. Of such an empire Louis XIV was the 



176 The French People 

only possible head. Louis himself was willing and anx- 
ious to secure the imperial dignity. He was king of the 
most compact and perhaps the richest country in Europe, 
a country peopled by men who expected glorious deeds 
from their young sovereign. 

Louis therefore, impelled by his own convictions and 
supported by a united nation, looked forward to the time 
when he should assume that supremacy in Europe held by 
the house of Hapsburg since the fifteenth century. Hav- 
ing become Emperor, he would then be recognised as the 
head of Christendom, the defender and supporter of the 
Catholic states and Catholicism. 

While, however, he was busy forming these vast proj- 
ects he was not unmindful of the necessity of taking im- 
mediate steps to carry out his policy. It was necessary 
to keep the Emperor weak, and at the same time to 
strengthen the French northeastern frontier. Alliances 
with Sweden, Poland, and Turkey were therefore always 
kept in mind, it being obvious that friendship with these 
countries would hamper the Hapsburgs in the event of 
war between them and the French king. 

The successful execution of such a policy would reduce 
the Emperor to a position of inferiority to the great French 
monarch; it would insure the subjection of the German 
princes and the permanent superiority of the French na- 
tion. The weakness of Spain, the divisions in Germany, 
the return of the Stuarts to England at the Restoration, all 
contributed to make resistance to the French schemes use- 
less. Till 1688 Europe was in real danger of falling into 
a state of political subservience to the mighty French 
monarchy. 

If in Europe Louis's schemes were calculated to de- 



North America 177 

stroy that balance of power which Francis I, Henry IV, 
and RicheHeu had upheld, his projects in North America 
and India were fraught with consequences of serious im- 
port to the future inhabitants of the Eastern and Western 
Hemispheres. During his reign it seemed quite within 
the range of possibility that the Latin race would become 
supreme in North America and Canada, while in India the 
eflforts of Martin seemed not unlikely to result in the 
stable foundation of a French empire. The struggle for 
supremacy in North America and India between the Latin 
and Teutonic nations was just beginning, and it is un- 
doubtedly true that the French got a considerable start of 
the English. 

Had Louis been able to establish the French domina- 
tion in Europe, had he averted the opposition of his op- 
ponents and succeeded in preventing the formation of 
European coalitions against his power, the settlements in 
America and India would have expanded without serious 
hindrance, and their destruction in the eighteenth century 
would have been a matter of greater difficulty than it was. 

The attempt to establish a colonial empire seemed 
at first likely to be successful. Under Colbert France 
definitely entered into competition for the acquisition of 
the greater part of North America. In colonizing Amer- 
ica France took the lead of her rival, England. Francis I 
as early as 1523 had sent an expedition to the northern 
seaboard, and not many years later Jacques Cartier sailed 
from Saint Malo, and in September, 1535, cast anchor in the 
Saint Lawrence. After a voyage of many days he founded 
Montreal, raised a fort at Quebec, and declared the regions 
of the Saint Lawrence and its streams annexed to the crown 
of France by conquest. This attempt at a settlement, how- 



178 The French People 

ever, soon disappeared, as did a Huguenot colony planted 
in 1564 on the coast of Florida. It was not till after the 
Peace of Vervins and during the subsequent national re- 
vival that French statesmen again looked to the West, and, 
after a colony planted by De Monts had been destroyed in 
1 61 3 by an English attack from Virginia, Samuel Cham- 
plain succeeded in making effective the hitherto somewhat 
shadowy claims of France upon Acadia, as the region round 
Nova Scotia was called. To his energy is probably due the 
French possession of Canada. Over and over again he 
crossed to France to get aid; he pleaded the cause of his 
little struggling colony in the States-General of 1614; he 
defended it against the attacks of the Indian tribes. 

Richelieu undoubtedly wished to counteract the enor- 
mous transmarine possessions of Spain and to prevent any 
further extension of the hold of the Spanish king upon 
non-Christian peoples. He therefore handed the colony 
over to a trading company and supported New France in 
true despotic fashion. A central government was set up 
in Quebec, nobles were invited to accept grants of land, 
episcopacy and religious orders were established, and col- 
onists were tempted by bounties to emigrate. But no 
system of colonization so artificially fostered can flourish; 
the colonists, fettered by feudal tenures and ecclesiastical 
supervision, had little inducement to devote themselves to 
agriculture; they were weakened by attacks of the Iro- 
quois, and never numbered more than four thousand dur- 
ing the first half of the seventeenth century. 

Louis XIV and Colbert, however, made strenuous at- 
tempts to improve the severe feudal system of Richelieu 
and to remedy the lack of comprehension shown by Maz- 
arin of the vital importance of the " oceanic policy of the 



Trading Companies 179 

age." It must be allowed, however, that the Italian car- 
dinal had realized that the peopling of new lands in Amer- 
ica was valuable as a balance against Spain. The Thirty- 
Years' War was over and a fairly tranquil period had set 
in in Europe. Colbert's energy was rewarded. The Iro- 
quois were defeated and driven back, and the frontiers hav- 
ing been cleared Colbert then inaugurated a policy more 
in accordance with the industrial character of the epoch. 

The monopolizing company established by Richelieu 
was dissolved, and trade with New France was declared 
open to all Frenchmen, with a few exceptions. In 1664 
were launched the two companies of the East and West 
Indies. While all lawful measures were taken to encour- 
age free emigration, forcible means were also adopted to 
compel peasants to settle across the sea. Immense sums 
were spent in public buildings, in making roads, in con- 
structing forts, and in aiding the farmers and traders to 
achieve success in their respective callings. 

At first all went well. While France was rapidly for- 
cing her way to a position of supremacy in Europe New 
France advanced along the path of prosperity. Trade 
flourished, the population increased, and by the end of the 
century numbered at least twelve thousand persons. 

About 1674 the French West India Company broke 
down, and henceforward the North American colonies 
were governed as a province of the French kingdom, and 
in Canada was reproduced that centralized system under 
which Normandy and other French provinces were gov- 
erned. 

Like everything in which Louis XIV took an interest, 
the attempt to foster colonization in New France had a 
certain grandeur combined with a breadth of conception 



i8o The French People 

and a lavish generosity which produced for a time con- 
siderable results. Like the stately edifices which rose in 
Quebec, the foundations of the French power in Canada 
seemed fixed on strong and lasting foundations. French 
valour showed itself to advantage in the frequent contests 
with the natives, while the genius of the French race in 
assimilating inferior races had many opportunities of ex- 
hibiting itself. In this quahty, so peculiar to their nation, 
and in the exploring skill and enterprise- of which such 
men as La Salle gave evidence, the French easily surpassed 
their English rivals. Before the century closed France, 
with some show of reason, had claimed as her own the im- 
mense basin of the Mississippi — a claim which, if success- 
fully established, would have confined the English to the 
eastern coast of North America. 

In the East France made a similar bid for empire. The 
advantages to the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the English 
from their trade with India had not escaped the eye of 
Colbert, who in 1664 formed the French East India Com- 
pany to trade with the East. While the French West 
India Company was formed on the lines laid down by 
Richelieu — to conquer and convert the heathen — the East 
India Company rather resembled the English and Dutch 
companies, and was a chartered body with special priv- 
ileges and a large capital. Attempts to found French es- 
tablishments in Madagascar having ended in partial failure, 
the French established a factory at Surat, in 1668. After 
many difficulties and some disasters a French settlement 
was founded at Pondicherry, which, of the various places 
in India occupied by the French, became the most flourish- 
ing. There Francois Martin, to whose enterprise the 
French company owed the existence of this settlement, 



The French in India 



i8i 



built fortifications, established a trade, and gained the confi- 
dence of the people and neighbouring princes. In spite 
of the capture of Pondicherry by the Dutch in 1693 and 
the apparent failure of the French to settle on the Coro- 
mandel coast, the French cause in India was by no means 
lost. In 1697 the Treaty of Ryswick closed the war waged 
by France against England and Holland, and one of the 
articles stipulated for the restoration of Pondicherry to 
the French. 

In 1706 Martin died, having, of all men, done the most 
to build on solid foundations a French India. Louis 
XIV's ambitious attempts to convert the Siamese to Ro- 
man Catholicism and to control the destinies of Siam had 
indeed failed, but Martin's policy of cultivating friendly 
relations with the natives in India seemed likely to be at- 
tended with most advantageous results to France. 

In Europe the aims of the French government con- 
tinued in full harmony with those of their officials or agents 
in North America and India. Louis XIV had every in- 
tention of securing, if not the complete supremacy of the 
sea, at any rate full domination over the Mediterranean. 
One result of the carrying out of either of the famous 
Spanish partition treaties would have been to convert the 
Mediterranean into a French lake — a result which was as 
ardently desired by Louis XIV as it was later by Na- 
poleon. 

Throughout the greater portion of Louis's reign the 
attempts to establish the predominance of French ideas, 
of French culture, of the French language, and, indeed, of 
the French race in Europe and Asia and North America 
were marked by certain characteristics peculiar to the 
French monarchy in the seventeenth century. Under- 
13 



1 82 The French People 

lying all the efforts of Louis XIV to advance French in- 
fluence was zeal for the propagation of Christianity. The 
religious idea was dominant in France in the seventeenth 
century, and its influence was seen in colonial as much as 
in other matters. 

Richelieu's companies were under Church and State 
patronage, and aimed at not only the exploration of new 
lands, but also the conversion of the inhabitants. Wher- 
ever possible, the Catholic faith was established to the ex- 
clusion of other religions. Even under Mazarin the peo- 
pling of new lands in America by French Catholics in the 
interests of religion continued. Supported by the Court 
and the upper classes, who subscribed largely towards the 
propagation of the true faith, and by the Jesuits, who were 
sent to North America in large numbers by Richelieu, the 
French settlements acquired a very different complexion 
from that which distinguished those of England and Hol- 
land. 

Under Louis XIV and Colbert French colonization 
continued and developed the same features. In spite of 
the mistrust shown by the French mercantile community 
for the religious and propagandist element in the expe- 
ditions so energetically promoted by the government, min- 
isterial supervision combined with spiritual direction con- 
tinued to affect the policy of the various trading com- 
panies. In North America, Madagascar, India, and Siam 
conquest and conversion went hand in hand. 

Another feature in Louis's colonial policy, differentiat- 
ing it from that followed by England, was that the French, 
not satisfied with aiming at the extension of trade, at- 
tempted not only to convert the people, but also to con- 
quer territory. 



Louis's Failure 183 

English adventurers received no commission from 
their government to interfere with the religion or govern- 
ment of any lands with which they traded. The French 
state, however, issued a plain mandate to French compa- 
nies to extend French laws and civic rights to the people of 
any countries they might occupy. 

Thus throughout Louis's schemes for the establish- 
ment of a world-wide empire royal and ministerial super- 
vision were everywhere apparent, together with an ardent 
desire to advance the interests of the Catholic Church. 
The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes illustrates this 
policy, and is an expression of the king's sincere desire to 
banish from his realm all religious dissidents; while the 
determined, though futile, efforts of French missionaries at 
the same period to convert the Siamese illustrates the pol- 
icy followed in the distant settlements of France. 

The dream of a world-wide empire was a magnificent 
one, but from the formation of the League of Augsburg, in 
1686, and the English Revolution, in 1688, it was apparent 
that its realization was impossible. 

Nevertheless, though the Spanish Succession War re- 
duced France to exhaustion, and the Peace of Utrecht 
checked her colonial and commercial expansion, the years 
between 171 3 and 1756 witnessed a series of remarkable ef- 
forts on the part of individual Frenchmen to establish on a 
firm basis the French supremacy in India, while in North 
America a well-conceived policy was followed of cutting 
ofif the English expansion inland by means of a chain of 
forts. 

But with Louis XIV's death all hope of founding an 
empire on the lines laid down by the great king and his 
ministers in reality departed. The French nation, how- 



1 84 The French People 

ever, quick to apprehend the drift of the policy of Louis, 
has, while condemning in round terms his despotism, real- 
ized that in his aims on the Continent and over seas he rep- 
resented what was dearest to most Frenchmen. The Rev- 
olutionists and Napoleon carried out in part, or in whole, 
the objects of Louis's European policy, and it was only 
lack of ships and the superiority of the English at sea that 
prevented the continuance and development of Louis's 
transmarine policy. 

France never again had such an opportunity as she had 
in the reign of Louis XIV for not only firmly imposing 
her supremacy upon Europe, but also for establishing a 
world-wide empire. 



CHAPTER XIV 

FAILURE IN NORTH AMERICA AND INDIA 

Though all hopes of the establishment of the suprem- 
acy of France in Europe disappeared with the Treaty of 
Utrecht, the ruin of French colonization was delayed for 
some thirty or forty years. 

The rivalry of the French and English in North Amer- 
ica indeed steadily increased during the first half of the 
eighteenth century, and after the failure of Law's schemes 
the French people, like their government, took little inter- 
est in Indian affairs. But during the thirty years of peace 
which succeeded the Spanish Succession War France en- 
joyed considerable commercial prosperity. With such 
pacific ministers in office as Fleury in France, Walpole in 
England, Patiiio in Spain, and Horn in Sweden, Europe 
remained on the whole peaceful till the outbreak of the 
Polish Succession War in 1733. It was not till 1740, 
when France and England plunged into the Austrian Suc- 
cession War, that the weakness of the French government 
revealed itself, and after some fifteen years of open or la- 
tent hostility French colonization suffered an irretrievable 
blow and French prestige in Europe was sensibly lessened. 

Louis XV and his ministers showed indeed no lack of 
energy in dealing with the colonies. Re-enforcements of 
men and money were sent, though irregularly, and the 

185 



1 86 The French People 

king took great interest in the welfare of his transmarine 
possessions. 

But, as events showed, the most benevolent intentions 
were worthless unless accompanied by a wise administra- 
tion, a sagacious foreign policy, and the possession of a 
strong fleet. 

Though the French government certainly cannot be 
accused of ignorance or indifference in dealing with its In- 
dian or Canadian possessions, it remains true that the 
colonial policy of France was marred from the outset by 
fatal defects, which led to the overwhelming discomfiture 
of the carefully laid schemes of Richelieu, Colbert, and 
Louis XIV for the establishment of a colonial empire. 
The difference between the methods and ideas embodied 
in the colonial systems of England and France are in them- 
selves sufficient to account for the demolition of the edifice 
which had been so laboriously built up during more than 
a hundred years by the French monarchy. 

After the Spanish Succession War had ended with the 
loss of Newfoundland and Acadia, the English territory 
had been brought niav to the banks of the St. Lawrence. 
But these losses were not by any means fatal to the French 
hold on North America, and during the early years of 
Louis XV'sVeign Canada made distinct progress under a 
vigorous attempt to bring prosperity to New France. By 
the middle of the eighteenth century Louisburg had been 
built, Quebec was the centre of a strong garrison, and 
some fifty thousand French people had settled in Canada. 

But, though outwardly flourishing, the old evils con- 
tinued, and though France possessed in Canada and North 
America the semblance of an empire, the real elements of 
permanent power and stability were wanting. While the 



The Colonial Failure 187 

British colonists resented the interference of the home gov- 
ernment and sought for and obtained wider liberties than 
they could have hoped for in England, the French colo- 
nists were ever under a paternal administration, and found 
that the regime under which they lived was more severe 
than that experienced by their countrymen in France. 
The existence of feudal tenures was not calculated to en- 
courage the peasantry to develop the resources of the 
country; while the continuance of the influence of the 
Church, the symbol of authority, was far too great and did 
not conduce to the progress of agriculture. The colonies 
needed civil and religious liberty, the overthrow of com- 
mercial monopolies, and the lessening of the power of the 
religious orders. There was no inducement for the colo- 
nists to till the land, and the population to a great extent 
turned its attention to trading in furs, to the explora- 
tion of new territories and to opening out the far West. 
In spite of these drawbacks the French were not foes who 
could be despised. The Indians, gradually forced west- 
ward by the pushing Anglo-Saxons, allied with the 
French, who during the years preceding the Seven Years' 
War definitely adopted the scheme which had been first 
advocated in Louis XIV's reign, — of occupying the vast 
territory between the Mississippi and the Alleghany range, 
and of connecting Quebec and New Orleans by a chain of 
forts. But these plans for an extensive dominion, while 
in themselves magnificent, only bring out the more clearly 
the weakness of the French system. The English colo- 
nists, enjoying religious equality and independence, had 
formed along the seacoast free autonomous settlements, 
closely connected and gradually expanding inland. Oc- 
cupying no weak outlying posts, but satisfied with the 



1 88 The French People 

possession of lands capable of cultivation and easily de- 
fensible, the English colonial population increased in num- 
bers and steadily extended their territories. Thus at the 
beginning of the Seven Years' War " the power of feudal- 
ism and despotic government armed and organized, and 
with barbarian support, but without really lasting re- 
sources, came menacingly in contact with the power of 
freedom, of wealth and commerce, and of self-rule, ill 
regulated and peaceful, but full of energy, in the depths of 
the North American continent." 

In spite of the gallant efforts of Montcalm, the capture 
of Quebec by Wolfe's forces led to the transference to 
England of the possessions of France around the St. Law- 
rence and the Great Lakes. These lands and the coun- 
tries beyond have remained ever since in the hands of men 
of the English race. 

Like Sarsfield in Ireland, Pontiac, the Indian chief, 
made one last despairing effort to support the fortunes of 
the doomed Indian race. His struggles against the An- 
glo-Saxon colonists were unavailing, and simultaneously 
with the close of the history of the French in America 
ended the last serious struggle of the Indians against their 
inevitable fate. 

Between feudalism and despotic government on the 
one hand and freedom and progress on the other the issue 
could not long be doubtful. . 

Though England lost her control over her American 
colonies, she still divides with them the dominion of the 
North American continent, and the only traces in America 
of the extent and failure of French ambition are to be 
found in a few outlying places and in one district of 
Canada. 



Failure in India 189 

At the time that the immense colonial empire of France 
on the American continent was being destroyed the hopes 
of the French in India were similarly shattered. 

But in India conditions prevailed very different from 
those to be found in Canada. On the American continent 
there were many French colonists full of patriotism and 
attached to the cause of their own country ; in 1 ndia there 
were tradihg settlements which Dupleix wished to devel- 
op into a great empire. His ruling idea was to expel the 
English from the Coromandel coast and to establish Euro- 
pean ascendency " by a combination of martial enterprise 
and subsidiary relations with native rulers, and based part- 
ly on direct titular and territorial acquisitions from the 
Mogul or his deputies, partly on the indirect influence of 
the resources of Western civilization." 

His political conceptions were marked by startling 
originality and boldness, his energy and perseverance were 
extraordinary, his ability in politics, warfare, and com- 
mercial affairs was undoubted, and a study of his career 
leaves the impression that in Dupleix France had produced 
a great statesman. 

Before 1741, however, when Dupleix became gov- 
ernor of Pondicherry, La Bourdonnais, the governor of the 
Isle of France, had realized the necessity for a strong 
French fleet in Indian waters, and the French government 
had considered his project for destroying all the English 
factories in the East Indies. Without a fleet, however, the 
efforts of Dupleix were foredoomed to failure. His plans 
did, indeed, meet with some apparent success due to his 
remarkable diplomatic skill, courage, and pertinacity, and 
in 1 75 1 it seemed that French influence would be supreme 
in southern India. 



I90 The French People 

Two events decided the issues between the English 
and French. Of these the rise of Robert CHve was the 
first, and the second was the recall of Dupleix in 1754 by 
the French East India Company, the directors of which, 
realizing that Dupleix's policy was involving the company 
in heavy debt, did not approve of his schemes of territorial 
aggrandizement. 

With Dupleix all chance of any successful French set- 
tlements in India was thus sacrificed to the short-sighted 
policy of a trading company backed up by the government, 
which feared a rupture with England. 

It only required the defeat at Wandewash to complete 
the ruin of the French hopes in India. The English, with 
a firm hold on Bengal, and provided with a strong fleet, 
had proved able to deprive France of her last possessions 
in India and to free themselves from all serious European 
competition in the East. 

The loss of Canada and the failure in India, though 
partly the result of certain inherent defects in the French 
system of colonization, were mainly due to the want of a 
strong navy and to the entanglements of France in the 
quarrels of central Europe. 

Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV had all bent 
their energies to checking the power of the Hapsburgs, 
and, in order to achieve their purpose, alliances with 
Sweden, Poland, and Turkey had been organized. But 
after Louis XIV's death the rise of Russia called for a 
modification of the French system of alliances. Though 
Sweden, Poland, and Turkey were visibly decaying, 
French statesmen refused to alter their policy. Russia 
was forced into an alliance with Austria, and on the 
death of Charles VI and the seizure of Silesia by Frederick 



French Blunders 191 

the Great France threw herself into the Austrian Succes- 
sion War. 

No greater blunder could have been made. The 
Hapsburgs had ceased to be formidable to France, and in 
the interests of the balance of power ought to have been 
supported by Louis XV. Besides, French colonial in- 
terests demanded the full attention of the government. 

The rivalry between France and England in America 
and India had entered upon its final stage, and the only 
hope of French success lay in the creation of a strong navy 
and the withdrawal from expensive enterprises in central 
Europe. Though Napoleon might say that Fontenoy was 
worth forty years to the monarchy, it remains incontesta- 
ble that France played into the hands of England and 
Prussia during the Austrian Succession War. At its close 
she had the satisfaction of having aided in the establish- 
ment of Prussia as a first-class power, and of having weak- 
ened enormously her ability to hold her own in India and 
Canada. The elevation of Prussia, a power destined to 
seriously damage French prestige in Europe, and the 
resignation to England of the leading place in colonial and 
maritime enterprise proved a heavy price to pay for ad- 
hering to an obsolete foreign policy. 

The final disaster did not, however, come till the Seven 
Years' War, when France, by taking a considerable part 
in the struggle in Europe, threw away her last chance of 
defending Canada and her settlements in India against the 
English. If she played the game of Prussia in the Aus- 
trian Succession War, she certainly played that of Austria 
in the Seven Years' War. 

Entangled in the contest between Austria and Prussia, 
France, with a weak navy, with disorganized finances, and 



192 The French People 

with an army led by incompetent officers, was completely 
overmatched in India and Canada by the energy and skill 
of Pitt. 

In 1763, at the Peace of Paris, ended an episode in 
French history which derives its main interest from the 
ability which men like Richelieu, Colbert, La Salle, Du- 
pleix, and Montcalm showed in the development of a 
colonial policy and in the defence of the settlements of 
France across the sea. The idea of a world-wide empire 
and of transmarine conquest as conceived by Richelieu, 
Colbert, and Louis XIV was a grand one, and, as the 
French were ahead of other nations in exploring North 
America and early appreciated the value of the East 
Indian trade, there was no ostensible reason to suppose 
that the carefully laid plans for colonial development 
should not have succeeded. In breadth of view and in 
vigour of execution no exception could be taken to the 
projects or enterprises of the French government in the 
seventeenth century. 

As it turned out, it might have been better for France 
if Louis XIV had followed the advice of Leibnitz, and, 
seizing Cairo, north Africa, and Constantinople, had 
erected a French empire on the shores of the Mediter- 
ranean, and thus controlled the main avenues of Asiatic 
commerce. 

After the Peace of Utrecht England found her two 
principal rivals in the colonies and India, the French and 
the Dutch, crippled and without powerful navies. Rap- 
idly the supremacy of the sea fell into the hands of Eng- 
land, whose fleet proved supreme on many critical occa- 
sions to those of her rivals. 

India, it has truly been said, was lost to the French by 



England's Success 193 

Hawke's victory at Quiberon Bay. Though in a some- 
what feeble way Louis XV and his ministers endeavoured 
to encourage commercial enterprise, drastic measures 
such as Vauban had suggested in 1699 were necessary if 
France was to hold her own against England on the sea 
and in Canada and India. Vauban had advised the aboli- 
tion of the endowments of religious orders in North 
America, the destruction of privileged companies, and the 
systematic regulation of emigration. 

Commercial privilege, religious bigotry, and royal des- 
potism were telling their tale before the seventeenth cen- 
tury closed. It only required such wars of ambition as 
those of the Spanish Succession, the Austrian Succession, 
together with the Seven Years' War, to destroy all hopes 
of the establishment of a colonial empire. Instead of de- 
voting the energies of his country to the policy of expan- 
sion beyond sea and to the development of the navy, Louis 
XIV in his later years allowed his attention to be drawn 
away from the colonies by his vast schemes of territorial 
aggrandizement, and when Louis XV allowed himself to 
undertake expensive campaigns in Germany, while Eng- 
land was attacking the French in Canada and India only 
one result could follow. 

The French government from 1740 to 1763 under- 
took an impossible task, and its failure not only destroyed 
for one hundred and fifty years all hope of the successful 
carrying out of a colonial policy by France, but also seri- 
ously weakened the position and prestige of the monarchy 
at a time when revolutionary ideas were in the air. 



CHAPTER XV 

THE SHADOW OF THE REVOLUTION 

The Seven Years' War was a serious blow to the mili- 
tary reputation of France. Rosbach, said Napoleon, 
ruined the monarchy. At the close of the war the 
French had lost their dominion in the East and West, 
and what settlements they had in the West Indies and else- 
where were weak and scattered. Voltaire, indeed, de- 
clared that the loss of Canada was a distinct gain to France, 
and " deplored the shedding of blood to provide coffee or 
snuff for rich men in Paris or London." Montesquieu 
had taken a similar line, on the ground that emigration 
weakened the mother country by depopulating it, and 
Rousseau opposed the colonial system because it involved 
the extermination of the noble savage. Behind all these 
various criticisms lay a bitter opposition to the ecclesias- 
tical influences which had been so powerful in Canada and 
India. 

Louis XIV had especially insisted on the work of con- 
version and colonization going on simultaneously; he had 
also reproduced as far as possible a feudal system in Can- 
ada. The colonial governors undoubtedly had been ham- 
pered by the priests, and the attacks on the religious 
orders were fully justified. 
194 



Reforms Necessary 195 

The loss of their possessions in India and Canada, the 
result of a faulty system of colonization, which was unable 
to develop and become self-supporting, and of the fatal 
error in becoming entangled in the quarrels of the powers 
of central Europe, was seriously felt by the French nation, 
and Choiseul endeavoured to remedy these disasters. 

He practically recreated the navy, he held closely to 
the Spanish alliance, and his successor, Vergennes, had the 
satisfaction of contributing largely to the independence of 
the American colonies. But the effort involved in taking 
a momentary vengeance on England cost France dearly, 
and only hastened the advent of what is known as the 
French Revolution. 

The history of the French Revolution is the history 
of the transformation of feudal institutions into those of 
a modern state; it is an account of a series of events which 
destroyed the French monarchy, and endeavoured to re- 
place it by a constitutional government based on the sov- 
ereignty of the people. Though France possessed a con- 
stitution, it had long ceased to work, and the sovereign 
had been for centuries omnipotent. " All evils," wrote 
Turgot, " arise from the absence in France of a constitu- 
tion." 

Since 1614 no States-General had been summoned, 
and the personal absolutism of Louis XIV had been fol- 
lowed by the absolutism of the court under Louis XV and 
Louis XVI. In every country in Europe reforms were 
sadly needed, but no country required them with more rea- 
son than did France. In the years preceding the Revolu- 
tion the idea of the most advanced of the Continental re- 
formers was to use the absolute power for the benefit of 
mankind; not to increase men's freedom, but to constrain 



196 The French People 

them to follow the right path. The English Constitution 
was despised, and everything was hoped for from enlight- 
ened despots. 

These ideas of reform were to be carried out all over 
Europe without regard for the boundaries of states or the 
peculiarities of the sacred nationalities. 

Lessing had declared that he did not understand what 
was meant by the love of one's country, and Schiller was 
even more emphatic when he said: " I write as a citizen of 
the world; I early exchanged the narrow boundaries of 
my own country for the vast world." All over Europe 
there was a movement in favour of enlightenment, reform, 
and progress, and in Germany especially the numerous 
semi-independent princes were prepared to advance the 
well-being of their subjects. The outbreak of the French 
Revolution roused the hopes and attracted the sympa- 
thies of many Germans. But the effect of the spread 
of French revolutionary doctrines strengthened in Ger- 
many the feeling of nationality and increased the attach- 
ments of its people for their language, literature, and 
history. 

It was far otherwise in France. There the revolution- 
ary spirit produced a break Avith the past, and one of the 
main principles of the revolutionists was contempt for all 
their previous history. The Germans throughout the 
revolutionary period preserved their religious traditions, 
made no attempt to establish equality, and held firmly to 
their ancient customs. The French Revolution, on the 
contrary, was from the first stamped with an anti-Christian 
character, and always aimed at a levelling of ranks. Irre- 
ligion extended to all classes, and M. Sorel says truly 
that " the French despised their government and de- 



Louis XV 197 

tested their clergy, hated their noblesse, and rebelled 
against the laws." Such a condition of feeling demanded 
a strong ruler. Cardinal RicheHeu declared that the 
French are " capable of anything, provided that those who 
command them are capable of directing them." Unfortu- 
nately, at the time of the Revolution Louis XVI was of 
all men most incapable of dealing with a difficult situa- 
tion. The French monarchy in the past had been given 
enormous powers to enable it to defend France from for- 
eign invasion. But neither Louis XV nor Louis XVI 
realized that with the death of Louis XIV royalty had 
entered upon its decline, and that a wise policy could alone 
save France from revolution. 

Louis XIV had fully understood the importance of 
constant activity and watchfulness on the part of a ruler. 
" Nothing," he said, " is more dangerous than a king who 
geng-ally sleeps, but wakes up from time to time." Under 
capable successors his system might have avoided ship- 
wreck if it had not been for the building of Versailles. 
By it the monarchy was irretrievably ruined. At Ver- 
sailles the nobility assembled, and there were usually to be 
found as many as sixty thousand persons, who were most- 
ly courtiers, and incapable of furthering in any way the 
well-being of their country. 

Louis XV, in spite of a certain interest which he took 
in foreign politics, was the quintessence of weakness. He 
had no individuality; he remained to the end of his reign a 
mere nullity. As long as Fleury was alive there was 
always some one who could guide afifairs, but after the 
cardinal's death there was no one who, like Richelieu or 
Mazarin, was capable of taking the lead and of conceiving 
and carrying out a policy. The court during Louis's 
14 



198 The French People 

reign degenerated with its monarchy. The influence of 
the regent, Phihp of Orleans, had been bad, and no one 
was found strong enough to enforce even outward de- 
corum or to lessen the enormous expenses connected with 
the royal household. 

In the days of Turgot and Necker the pensions paid to 
courtiers alone amounted to some millions, and all at- 
tempts in Louis XVI's reign to reduce the amounts paid 
were stoutly resisted. So powerful did the Court become 
that at the time of the Seven Years' War no minister could 
hope to maintain himself unless he was a courtier, and 
Calonne found, in 1783, cm taking office that it was neces- 
sary, in order to avert the hostility of the courtiers, to lav- 
ish on them large sums. Though the majority of French- 
men had remained profoundly royalist throughout Louis 
XV's reign, the courtiers, who owed everything to the 
king, discussed revolutionary philosophy and were by no 
means loyal to the monarchical principle. 

The weakness of the monarchy extended to the whole 
governmental machine, which required many thorough 
reforms. The evils attendant on an administration pre- 
sided over by a king like Louis XV were bound to in- 
crease and develop with extraordinary rapidity, and as 
there was no chance of improvement these soon became 
intolerable. 

Under his weak and ineffective rule the control exer- 
cised by Louis XIV over the financial administration was 
no longer enforced, and the controleur-general with his 
thirty intendants managed the whole internal administra- 
tion — often in the most arbitrary manner. As the con- 
troleur found himself more and more occupied with mat- 
ters concerning trade, public works, and agriculture as 



Necker's Compte Rendu 199 

well as finance, the affairs of the provinces were practically 
under the sole control of the thirty intendants. Acts of 
tyranny by these officials could only with difficulty be pun- 
ished, for government agents were tried by a special court 
— the Conseil des Parties — and by a special code of law. 
Royal agents were free from control and armed with lettres 
de cachet, and, in the absence of a free press, were under 
no fear of any public criticism or discussion of their con- 
duct. 

Necker's Compte Rendu, issued in 1781, was the 
first attempt to give the country any information as to the 
financial position of the government; and even in 1787 the 
assembly of notables was unable to comprehend a state- 
ment of the condition of the finances, though it had been 
called together to devise some means of relieving the im- 
pending bankruptcy of France. At a time so critical in the 
history of France men of honesty and capacity were sadly 
needed, but all through the century, while the government 
was often pursuing a radically wrong foreign policy and 
becoming more and more involved in financial difficulties, 
few men gifted with any administrative talent arose. Tur- 
got stands out prominently among the nonentities who 
pass across the stage of French administration during the 
period between Louis XIV's death and the Revolution, 
and now and again such able ministers or financiers as the 
brothers Paris and Machault appear for a short period. 
For this dearth of able statesmen the bureaucratic system 
established by the Grand Monarque is principally to blame. 
The whole tendency of the French bureaucracy was to 
produce mediocrities and reduce men to one level. Like 
Frederick the Great, Louis XIV left behind him excellent 
clerks capable of managing elaborate details, but no race 



200 The French People 

of administrators able to conceive and carry out a policy 
worthy of a country like France. 

What made matters worse was that ministers were usu- 
ally chosen from the maitres des requites, who numbered 
about eighty in all, and when appointed ministers could 
only assure themselves by constant intrigues and bribery 
that their tenure of office would not be short. The influ- 
ence of Madame de Pompadour, of Madame du Barry, and 
of Marie Antoinette was very considerable, and as a rule 
most baneful to the interests of France. The Comte d'Ar- 
genson and Machault, after a short struggle with Madame 
de Pompadour, fell and were exiled. Choiseul's over- 
throw was principally due to Madame du Barry, and Ver- 
gennes, with infinite difficulty, managed to carry out his 
scheme of foreign policy in face of the open opposition 
of Marie Antoinette. During the early part of Louis 
XV's reign the loyalty of the people was certainly pro- 
found, and in 1744, when the king was ill at Metz, during 
a campaign against the Austrians and English, the national 
grief was intense, for Louis's popularity was universal. 
But from the unpopular Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle the loy- 
alty of the people began sensibly to lessen, and during the 
contest between the Parlement of Paris and the court, in 
the years 1750-56, the word revolution was heard in the 
streets of Paris. Much, however, was hoped for from the 
accession of Louis XVI, but when Turgot failed to carry 
out his reforming programme men began to realize that 
drastic changes in the whole administration were becoming 
necessary. In order to satisfy the nation, reforms, it was 
felt, would have' to be far reaching and to include the no- 
bles and clergy. There were about one hundred and forty 
thousand nobles in France, and these held one fifth of the 



Feudal Dues 201 

soil. In Louis XIV's reign the nobles ceased for the 
most part 'to live on their estates, while by the establish- 
ment of the intendants they were deprived of the duties 
which naturally fell to them in their provinces. Attracted 
to Versailles, they retained their privileges, though de- 
prived of their power. Exempted from the taille and not 
allowed to perform any duties, they still had the right of 
exacting dues and services from the people on their es- 
tates. 

The peasants thus learned to hate the nobles for enfor- 
cing dues for which they performed no duties, while the 
crown, so far from conciliating the nobility, found in it and 
in the courtiers fierce critics of all its actions. 

Among the noble class and in the salons, which were 
such a prominent feature of French society in the last 
century, philosophic discussions were common, and at- 
tacks were made on the monarchy and on the Church. 
Irreligious views became rapidly the fashion, and in 1784 
The Mariage de Figaro, by Beaumarchais, was performed 
in Paris. Though a satire on the ancien regime, it was 
acted for nearly a year, and was very popular, for in it were 
boldly expressed the views of the ordinary Frenchman, of 
the day. To his master Figaro makes the following re- 
marks : 

" Nobility, fortune, rank, office, how proud we are of 
them! What have you done to procure such blessings? 
You have taken the trouble to be born, no more! Other- 
wise, an ordinary man! Whereas I, an insignificant unit 
in the crowd, have had to employ more science and calcula- 
tion merely to gain my living than has been devoted in the 
last hundred years to the government of all the Spains." 

The fact was that, apart from the hardships inflicted 



202 The French People 

on the peasants by the burden of taxation, rendered so 
necessarily heavy owing to the exemptions enjoyed by the 
privileged classes, there was the growing dissatisfaction 
at the very existence of a class which, on the score of su- 
periority of birth, regarded all other classes as inferior. 
As the actual administration was in the hands of men be- 
longing to the upper bourgeois class, who were for the 
most part better educated than the nobles, the hatred of the 
existing inequality between the upper and middle classes 
grew into a passion, and the main object of the early Revo- 
lutionists was to secure not so much liberty as equality. 

Though humanitarian views were indeed held by many 
representatives of the nobility, though some nobles took 
an interest in agriculture and in local affairs, their desire 
for reforms was unreal and limited. The majority were 
determined to defend their privileges at all costs, and not 
suffer any diminution of their feudal dues. After Turgot's 
failure and retirement the nobles were strong enough to 
prevent any further attacks on them before 1789, and even 
set up fresh obstacles to any intrusion on their privileges. 
In England the share taken by the nobles in local affairs 
has always been considerable, and in the eighteenth cen- 
tury upon them equally with other men fell the burden of 
taxation. In France their exemption from taxation, their 
persistence in exacting small though irritating dues from 
the peasants, their inability to take the lead in local affairs, 
and the cleavage between them and the bourgeoisie ren- 
dered the nobles so unpopular that at the outbreak of the 
Revolution they had no chance of coming forward and di- 
recting the course of politics. 

But if the nobles were unpopular, the clergy were 
more so. In the seventeenth century the Church had 



The Clergy 203 

been vigorous, missionary, and national. But from the 
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes the Church in France 
began to deteriorate. It advocated persecution of the 
remaining Huguenots, it endeavoured to suppress Jansen- 
ism, it supported the bull Unigenitus. In the middle of 
the century the Archbishop of Paris advised his clergy not 
to give the last sacraments to any one who had not ad- 
hered to the bull. The Parlement of Paris led the opposi- 
tion to this policy, and was supported by the middle classes. 
The higher clergy never again in the century secured the 
support or affections of the bourgeoisie. 

Like the nobles, the Church was exempt from the 
taille and other taxes; it was very wealthy, and from its 
wealth the nation derived little or no benefit. All the 
religious work was done by the cures, who lived in the 
parishes and enjoyed only very small incomes. The upper 
clergy received and enjoyed the greater part of the money 
belonging to the Church, and did nothing in return for 
it. Patronage had fallen into the hands of the Jesuits, 
and nearly all the bishoprics in Louis XVI's reign were 
held by members of noble families, who enjoyed idle lives 
and immense revenues. Absentees abounded, and the up- 
per clergy frequented the court, as the presentation of liv- 
ings was usually managed by intrigues. 

Thus while the cleavage between the upper and lower 
clergy sensibly increased, the detestation with which the 
bishops and the upper clergy were regarded was general 
and largely justifiable. 

It is perfectly true that in other countries feudal dues 
were more oppressive than in France, the conditions of 
life more galling, and the mass of the people in far greater 
misery. It is also undeniable that French society was 



204 The French People 

never more brilliant or more intellectual than during the 
period just preceding the Revolution. And while the 
middle classes were well-to-do, the peasant was a pro- 
prietor, and France was in certain districts honeycombed 
with peasant properties. But the very disappearance of 
some abuses and the gradual dissemination of enlighten- 
ment only made the existing state of things the more intol- 
erable and the privileges of a small minority the more de- 
testable. " The very prosperity," writes M. Sorel, " of the 
early part of Louis XVI's reign hurried on the movement, 
causing men to feel more keenly such vexations as re- 
mained and to desire more ardently to rid themselves of 
them. France was the country wherein ideas of reform 
were the most widely spread, minds were most cultivated, 
men were the most alike, the government well centralized, 
the nobility most reduced to insignificance, the corporate 
bodies most subjected to control, and the nation most ho- 
mogeneous." ^ 

The governmental system of France might possibly 
have been reformed without the violence and anarchy 
which attended the Revolution. But not only had the 
events of the Seven Years' War discredited the monarchy, 
not only was the financial system in a state of chaos, and 
France, though a rich country, on the verge of national 
bankruptcy, but for years past the whole political structure 
of the monarchy, together with one of its principal sup- 
ports, the Church, had been subject to attacks at the hands 
of Voltaire, the Encyclopedists, and Rousseau. By their 
means the force of thought had been brought to bear on 
the institutions of the French government, which at the 

* Sorel, Europe after Revolution, vol. i, p. 145. 



The Philosophers 205 

outbreak of the Revolution melted away, leaving to the 
Constituent Assembly the difficult task of constructing 
an adequate constitutional system. 

Voltaire, as is well known, did not attack the mon- 
archy, but by his assaults on the Church undermined one 
of its props and left it helpless before the Revolution. As 
the French upper classes had no share in the government, 
they took, as has been shown, a lively interest in the litera- 
ture of the day, in the production of abstract theories of 
government, and in criticisms of the existing state of 
things. 

While the methods of the government remained more 
or less medieval, the culture and knowledge pervading the 
French salons were distinctly modern. Philosophy be- 
came popular, and men accustomed themselves to deal not 
with concrete facts, but with general principles. No re- 
gard was paid to the past, Montesquieu being the only dis- 
tinguished writer who had any sympathy with the former 
history of France, but attention was mainly directed to 
forming new theories on social and political questions. 
Clothed in a brilliant style, the works of Montesquieu, Vol- 
taire, Diderot, and others were widely read, and the study 
of philosophy became very popular in France. Though 
the writings of the leading literary men were marked by a 
violence and a boldness hitherto unknown in the history 
of French literature, the government regarded the views 
laid down as too theoretical to deserve repression. Vol- 
taire led the attack, which developed into two distinct 
phases, the first antireligious, and the second antisocial. 
Disbelieving in theology, Voltaire had the utmost horror 
of cruelty and injustice. He had no wish or intention to 
change or even to attack the political system of France; 



2o6 The French People 

and, though aware of its many abuses, he preferred to de- 
vote the full force of an unusually lucid style to carrying 
on an anti-Catholic crusade. In prose essays, in dramas, 
in history, and poetry he levelled the most pitiless criti- 
cisms at the weaknesses of the Church. Montesquieu, in- 
deed, had not only inaugurated a system of political criti- 
cism, but had suggested many necessary reforms in 
France; Voltaire actually started an antireligious agita- 
tion in France which has never been finally laid. The 
Church had ceased to have any real hold on the educated 
classes in France, and Voltaire, after a valuable sojourn in 
England, returned to France, having studied English phi- 
losophy and history. 

Animated by an intense admiration for the freedom 
of thought and toleration which he found in England, and 
impressed by the light weight of taxation borne by the 
English and by the absence of exemptions such as the 
upper classes in France enjoyed, he determined ecrases 
rinfdme — i. e., to destroy the ecclesiastical system existing 
in France. The cruelties inflicted on Calas and La Barre 
roused him to fury, and he wrote bitterly against the 
medieval customs which still continued to exist in the 
Catholic Church. Destructive his whole method certain- 
ly was, and though his arguments were often absurd and 
weak, it remains true that his attacks contributed greatly 
to the overthrow of the corrupt Galilean Church. His in- 
fluence was widespread, and his ideas were accepted by 
many of the aristocratic reformers both within and with- 
out France. Frederick the Great, Pombal, D'Aranda, and 
other reformers fell under the spell of his writings, and in 
France Turgot and his followers were equally affected by 
his influence. 



The Encyclopedia 207 

In his attack on the Church Voltaire was aided by the 
hostility existing throughout the century between the 
Jesuits and Jansenists, and by the violent antagonism 
which the Parlement of Paris showed against the ecclesias- 
tical system. During the regency of Orleans the Jansen- 
ists had been treated on the whole with tolerance, but even 
before the death of the regent the struggle between them 
and the Jesuits, which had first burst forth in Louis XIV's 
reign, was renewed. The Parlement of Paris, which held 
Jansenist views, adopted a very independent tone, and, till 
its suppression, in 1770, engaged at intervals in a series of 
struggles against the leading French ecclesiastics, who 
were supported by the king and court. In these struggles 
the mass of the nation, which had no adequate means of 
making its voice heard, backed up the Parlement, and that 
body from 1750 found itself regarded as the mouthpiece 
of the popular discontent at the incompetence of the gov- 
ernment as well as at the intolerance and corruption of the 
Church. The ground was indeed well prepared for the 
reception of Voltaire's scathing criticisms. 

The antireligious movement from almost the middle 
of the century was accompanied by an antisocial crusade, 
of which Diderot, D'Alembert, and other contributors to 
the Encyclopedia took a leading part. 

So convinced was the government of the dangerous 
character of the views enunciated by the Encyclopedists 
that the Encyclopedia after a short existence was sup- 
pressed. The Encyclopedia essayed to give a summary of 
all knowledge, and to bring about the reform of the na- 
tional abuses. In it labour and trade were praised, tolera- 
tion in religious matters was advocated, and the institu- 
tions of France were examined by men imbued with the 



2o8 The French People 

" positive " philosophy. There was nothing essentially 
democratic in the articles of the Encyclopedia any more 
than in the writings of Voltaire. The tendency of the 
Encyclopedia was to inculcate materialistic views in place 
of Catholic doctrines, and to urge the importance of educa- 
tion, tolerance, and freedom of thought in the growth of 
man. 

Attention to the anomalies in French society was thus 
vigorously pointed out, and the intellectual awakening of 
France was considerably furthered. 

It was, however, left to Rousseau to appeal to the 
masses, and by the enormous influence of his writings to 
divert men from the practical reforms urged by Voltaire 
and the Encyclopedists to visionary ideals. Rousseau, 
indeed, found the ground well prepared for the reception 
of his views. Born at Geneva, his Calvinistic tendencies 
are fully exemplified in the vigour and passion of his de- 
nunciations. Voltaire is said to have made sceptics, while 
Rousseau's writings inculcated fanaticism. Voltaire and 
Diderot represented the intellectual side of the literature 
which preceded and prepared the way for the Revolution; 
Rousseau exemplified the emotional side. While Vol- 
taire and Diderot would willingly have averted a revolu- 
tion by means of reforms, Rousseau made the Revolution 
a certainty. 

In his Nouvelle Heloise Rousseau idealized the lives 
of the lower middle class; he urged that more considera- 
tion should be given to the lower orders, and, extolling 
simphcity, he drew a picture^ of what country life 
should be. 

In Emile, a work on education, Rousseau declared that 
education should develop the inherent good in children, 



The Social Contract 209 

and thus he ran counter to the principles of Roman Catho- 
lic teaching. All, whether rich or poor, ought, he said, to 
be educated, and the enunciation of this democratic senti- 
ment, which has since been widely recognised, roused con- 
siderable enthusiasm in France. His Contrat Social was, 
however, his most famous and most influential work. In 
it he founds the sovereignty of the people upon an original 
compact, and advances for consideration a definite system 
of politics. The sovereignty acquired by the people was 
inalienable or indivisible, for according to Rousseau 
" man is born free," and, " in place of destroying natural 
equality, the fundamental fact, on the contrary, substitutes 
a moral and legitimate equality for so much physical in- 
equality as nature had been able to place between men; 
though they may be unequal in strength or intellect, they 
all become equal by convention and right."* With Rous- 
seau a constructive phase was entered upon, in which so- 
ciety was to be reconstructed on certain principles. " The 
end of every system of legislation," he said, " consists of 
two chief objects, liberty and equality. Liberty, because 
all individual dependence is so much strength subtracted 
from the body of the state; equality, because liberty can 
not exist without it." His attitude towards fraternity was 
equally clear. " Fraternity," according to him, is implied 
in the " citizenship " of the individual members of the 
state. Thus the well-known doctrines of liberty, equality, 
and fraternity were openly taught in the Contrat Social. 
Influenced by Rousseau, the revolutionary movement 
passed from the practical and intellectual into the emo- 
tional and sentimental stage. The nation, roused by his 
picture of the existing wrongs of society, demanded im- 
mediate reforms. The very basis of French society was 



2IO The French People 

undermined from below and attacked from above. In 
1788 national bankruptcy had to be faced. " The founda- 
tions of authority," writes Mr. Lecky, " were completely 
sapped. Concessions which at an earlier period would 
have been welcomed with enthusiasm only whetted the 
appetite for change. A great famine occurring at a time 
of great political excitement immensely strengthened the 
element of disorder. The edifice of government tottered 
and fell, and all Europe resounded with its fall." * 

It will thus be evident that after Louis XIV's death 
the French monarchy gradually lost its hold on the nation, 
and that the failure in Canada and India, together with the 
reverses suffered in Europe during the Seven Years' War, 
intensified the existing want of confidence in the executive. 

Vergennes did, indeed, by his successful intervention 
in the American war, restore to some extent the waning 
prestige of the monarchy. But the price was a heavy one, 
for the country could ill bear the eixpense connected with 
the aid given to the American colonists, and bankruptcy 
became imminent. Had it not been for the bad fiscal sys- 
tem — the heritage of ages — France might have gradually 
reformed her institutions. As it was, her finances had 
become so hopelessly involved that it is true to say that 
the immediate cause of the Revolution was the bad fiscal 
system. During these years the attacks of Voltaire on the 
Church, of Diderot and his friends on existing political 
abuses, and of Rousseau on the general condition of so- 
ciety undermined all the political and social institutions of 
France. The middle class saw in the financial necessities 
of the government an opportunity to effect a political 

* Lecky, History of England in the Eighteenth Century, v. p. 442. 



The States-General summoned 211 

transformation, to overthrow the power of the Church and 
the privileges of the nobihty, and to gain equahty. The 
unfortunate decision of the nobles to cling to the remnants 
of their feudal rights threw the whole peasant population 
on the side of the middle class, and it only required the 
summoning of the States-General to give the deathblow 
to an essentially rotten social and political system. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE REVOLUTION OF 1789 

The Revolution which broke out in France in 1789 
passed through three distinct phases. From 1789 to 
1792 important social changes were carried out which gave 
to the French people that equality for which it craved. The 
land system was revolutionized, and was freed from the re- 
mains of its feudal burdens; the land was divided. From 
1792 to 1795 republican doctrines were subordinated to a 
despotism called into existence to defend France against 
foreign attacks. From 1795 to 1799 France, under the 
Directory, enjoyed her first real experiment of republican 
government. In 1789 it is said that four fifths of the 
meadows, forests, and fish ponds and one sixth of the agri- 
cultural land were in the hands of the nobles. To put 
it in another way, half the country was held by from 
200,000 to 300,000 persons and a quarter of the land 
by corporations. In the division which took place 
after the outbreak of the Revolution the peasants gained 
enormously, the bourgeoisie received large portions of 
the Church lands, and thus a new class of proprietors was 
created, bound by interest to uphold the Revolution. 

The causes of the Revolution have already been indi- 
cated and the justification for the widespread determina- 
tion throughout France for extensive political and social 



The Meeting of the States-General 213 

reforms has been fully shown. The exorbitant privileges 
and exactions of the noblesse and upper clergy required 
immediate removal, the financial and administrative chaos 
demanded drastic treatment, and a reorganization of the 
whole system of government was obviously needed. The 
States-General, which met on May 5, 1789, proved fully 
alive to the exigencies of the situation, and the third estate 
was resolved to place the estate of the nobles and that of 
the clergy on an equality with itself as far as regarded the 
sharing of the national burdens. The cahiers or petitions 
drawn up by the local assemblies demanded ecclesiastical 
reforms, the abolition of the pecuniary and other privi- 
leges of the upper classes, the equalization of taxation, the 
sovereignty of the law, an improvement in the adminis- 
tration of justice, and, in a word, the suppression of the 
various extortions and wrongs which had been borne for 
centuries. 

The cleavage which had existed between the classes 
in France from early times, and which had been aggra- 
vated by the policy of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV, 
had produced a sense of irritation and injustice which 
could only have been removed by a frank avowal on the 
part of the privileged orders of the necessity for a thor- 
oughgoing scheme of reform, and by a sympathetic atti- 
tude towards the representatives of the third estate. But, 
instead of adopting such an attitude, the noblesse threw 
itself into opposition to the people of France, and it was 
not till the Bastille had fallen, on July 14th, that the king 
and court realized the full meaning of the movement, 
which, by their own mistakes, had passed beyond their 
control. 

The social changes demanded were as far as possible 
15 



214 The French People 

immediately carried out, a process assisted by constant 
migrations of the nobles across the frontier, and within 
three years a complete social transformation took place, 
trade guilds and clerical corporations were swept away, 
and the fiscal and administrative system was abolished. 
On August 4, 1789, feudal dues, game laws, tithes, the salt 
tax, and other oppressive burdens were removed, serfdom 
was done away with, and distinctions of birth suppressed. 
A declaration of the rights of man was issued on August 
26th, laying down certain democratic principles, such as 
the sovereignty of the people, the freedom of the press, the 
supremacy of the law, and liberty of thought. To these 
may be added the right of every citizen to assist in framing 
laws, in controlling the assessment of taxes, and in the 
spending of public money. Property henceforward was 
to be secure, taxation was to be proportional, the country 
was to be divided into eighty-three administrative depart- 
ments, and the place of the independent Church was taken 
by a number of salaried state officials instituted by the 
bishops. The enthusiasm roused by Rousseau's writings 
may account for the fact that while the Constituent As- 
sembly declared the sovereignty of the people it remained 
loyal to Louis XVI and entertained no idea of deposing 
him, while at the same time a property qualification was 
retained which invalidated the principle that each citizen 
had a voice in the formation of the laws. These and other 
anomalies, due partly to excitement, partly to want of ex- 
perience in the administration of affairs, detract little from 
the fact that the Constituent Assembly conferred lasting 
benefits on France. The remnants of feudalism were abol- 
ished, the judicial system was reorganized and improved, 
and, till 1792, it may be said that on the whole the intel- 



The Constitution of 179 1 215 

lectual revolution led by Montesquieu, Voltaire, and the 
Encyclopedists held its own. 

In England, as in France, the best intellects hoped that 
the revolutionary movement would lead to the establish- 
ment of a constitutional monarchy. Headed by such men 
as Mounier, Malouet, and Mirabeau, the followers of 
Montesquieu, who desired to base the Revolution on his- 
torical principles, aspired to set up two chambers, as in 
England, and to separate the executive, the legislative, and 
the judicial powers. 

As time went on the hopes of all moderate men were 
overthrown, and it became evident that there was no 
chance of " a philosophic resettlement of society." 

The folly of the court, the absence of any statesman at 
the head of affairs, and the death of Mirabeau not only 
justified the distrust felt of the executive, but played into 
the hands of the rationalist party, which, permeated with 
the views of Rousseau, decided to reconstruct de novo 
French society and the French government. 

Till the promulgation of the constitution of 1791, how- 
ever, the revolutionists hoped that these expectations 
would be realized, and that their principles would be uni- 
versally adopted. But it soon became evident that the 
millennium which would be brought about by the execu- 
tion of Rousseau's ideals was still as far off as ever. The 
dif^culty in carrying out the principles of Rousseau's gos- 
pel had been experienced in drawing up the constitution, 
but the Constituent Assembly, satisfied that it had solved 
the problem of translating Rousseau's principles into 
facts, separated on September 20, 1791. 

Before its dissolution it had enacted that none of its 
members should serve in the Legislative Assembly, which 



2i6 The French People 

met the following month, and that no revision of the con- 
stitution should be effected before 1800. 

The difficulties encountered by the Constituent As- 
sembly were obviously prodigious, and the only won- 
der is that more mistakes were not made. The absence 
of any foundation on which to build a party system, 
the lack of practical experience among most of the 
members, the failure to establish " liberty " in the ac- 
cepted meaning of the term, and the division of France 
into many groups rendered it impossible either to divine 
what was the " general will " or, when discovered, to 
force all Frenchmen to acquiesce in it. Nevertheless, the 
Constituent Assembly had deserved well of the nation, and 
its efforts at reorganization were worthy of more consid- 
eration than they received. That drastic reforms were 
absolutely required is undeniable, and the opinion of 
Arthur Young carries great weight. " The true judg- 
ment to be formed of the French Revolution," he says, 
" must surely be gained from an attentive consideration of 
the evils of the old government. When these are well 
understood, as well as the extent and universality of the 
oppression under which they groaned — oppression which 
bore upon them from every quarter — it will scarcely be at- 
tempted to be urged that a revolution was not absolutely 
necessary to the welfare of the kingdom." 

The years from 1792 to 1795 saw the destruction of 
the elaborate edifice reared with so much labour by the 
Constituent Assembly. The late Professor Seeley used 
to declare that there were two French revolutions — the 
one of 1789 and the Parisian revolution of 1792. In the 
early days of 1789 and 1790 the leaders in France did in- 
deed imagine that they " were assembled to retrieve every 



The National Convention of 1792 217 

fault of the past, to correct every error of the human mind, 
and to secure the happiness of future generations; doubt 
had no place in their minds, and infallibility presided per- 
petually over all their contradictory decrees." 

These revolutionists, many of them animated with 
the best intentions, were convinced that all men were natu- 
rally reasonable and good, and that on the abolition of the 
institutions of ancient France their original qualities would 
again reappear. The authors of the Parisian revolution of 
August 10, 1792, of the deposition of the king, and of the 
fall of the monarchy were under no such illusions. 

They did," indeed, date the first year of liberty from 
September 21, 1792, when the National Convention took 
the place of the discredited Legislative Assembly, but be- 
yond the fact that some of their actions may be justified by 
the invasion of France by the Prussians, history will, on 
the whole, agree with Sieyes in his somewhat exaggerated 
estimate of their characteristics. The National Conven- 
tion, he says, was a body of men " audacious without gen- 
ius, whose incomprehensible force, whose monstrous, un- 
exampled authority, was derived from their professions of 
liberty. Insensate and ferocious, they created obstacles 
while destroying the means of government, and when irri- 
tated by opposition they punished France for their own 
incapacity as rulers." 

Though it saved France from invasion and defended 
not only its integrity against Europe, but also, at first, the 
principles of the Revolution, the government was guilty of 
needless atrocities and of the deaths of many thousands of 
harmless persons of all classes of society innocent of any 
crime. Though the remarkable work done by the Com- 
mittee of Public Safety will always command the admira- 



2i8 The French People 

tion of lovers of vigorous action and of careful and success- 
ful organization, and of those who admire successes in war, 
it remains true that the ideals of the men of '89 were car- 
ried out in a way which was never anticipated at the time 
of the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. 

In 1792 and the succeeding years the dominant Jaco- 
bin party recognised the futility of the hope felt by the 
leaders of the Constituent Assembly that the French na- 
tion would unite in carrying out the revolutionary princi- 
ples had faded away. Partly owing to the mistakes of the 
Constituent Assembly, partly owing to the impossibility of 
uniting a nation round certain impossible ideals, partly 
owing to the excesses of the Jacobins themselves, the na- 
tion in 1792 and 1793 was hopelessly disunited and broken 
up into sections. Under the stress of the danger of inva- 
sion by the armies of Europe, the Jacobin leaders resolved 
to intimidate the majority and force it into obedience to, 
and acquiescence in the views of the minority. 

The methods they adopted are worthy of a short de- 
scription, especially as Jacobinism has never died in 
France. It raised its head in 1848, and again in 1870 and 
1 87 1, only succumbing after a violent series of struggles 
in the streets of Paris. 

The Jacobin rule in 1793 and 1794 will always be asso- 
ciated with the great Committee of Public Safety, which 
ruled France for upward of a year and astonished Europe 
by the successes which attended its vigorous action. In 
July, 1793, after the fall of the Girondists, this Commit- 
tee was set in motion, and twelve members were rapid- 
ly chosen. Of the men whose work in connection with 
this Committee will always live, Carnot, Jean Bon Saint- 
Andre, the two Prieurs, and Lindet devoted themselves 



The Committee of Public Safety 219 

to the superintendence of military and naval matters, while 
Herault de Sechelles conducted foreign affairs. Billaud- 
Varenne and Collot-d'Herbois established the Reign of 
Terror and Barere acted as reporter, and Robespierre, 
who, alone of the members of the Committee, had a great 
reputation in Paris as well as in the Convention, was sup- 
ported by Couthon and Saint-Just, and had no special 
duties assigned to him. 

On September 5th " Terror was decreed to be the 
order of the day." The Reign of Terror was based on 
three institutions: the Committee of General Security, the 
Deputies on Mission, and the Revolutionary Tribunal. 
To the Committee of General Security was intrusted the 
general administration of the police of Paris and of France, 
and it consequently became a valuable instrument for or- 
ganizing the system of the Terror. While the Committee 
of General Security supported and aided the Great Com- 
mittee in Paris, deputies were sent regularly and system- 
atically into the provinces. Their power was unlimited. 
These missions had been in vogue since 1792, and had be- 
come exceedingly important after the defeat of Neerwin- 
den, in March, 1793, when it was necessary to raise ad- 
ditional forces from the provinces. But after the over- 
throw of the Girondists in Paris, on June 2d, it was essen- 
tial that extraordinary measures should be adopted to 
overcome the risings in Normandy, Lyons, Bordeaux, and 
Marseilles. 

Deputies, such as Lindet and Dubois Crance, effected 
the pacification of Normandy and Lyons, and it was then 
seen how valuable obedient and terrorized departments 
would be as an adjunct to the Committee of Public Safety. 

These deputies on mission were given unlimited pow- 



220 The French People 

ers, and as long as they sent large supplies of money to 
the Committee of Public Safety in Paris they received 
the most ample support. While one section of these 
deputies was employed in internal business, another sec- 
tion was sent to the various armies in service to keep an 
eye on the generals. There, too, their authority was un- 
limited, and even a general was powerless to carry out 
measures in opposition to their wishes. 

As the basis of their elaborate system was terror, it 
will be seen what an important part was played by the 
Revolutionary Tribunal and by the military commissions 
in the armies and the provinces. Those who organized this 
tribunal and its subcommissions intended to terrorize the 
Parisians and the provincials into humble acquiescence in 
the rule of the Great Committee. This tribunal was re- 
organized in September, 1793, and divided into four sec- 
tions, all under the superintendence of Fouquier-Tinville. 
It took cognizance of all political offences, and after its 
reorganization was remarkable for the expedition of its 
procedure. The law of suspects, by which almost every 
Frenchman or Frenchwoman could be arrested and con- 
demned to death, and the law of the maximum, which com- 
pelled traders to sell articles at a fixed price, brought all 
classes within the reach of the tribunal. No part of Paris, 
or indeed of France, was safe from the action of number- 
less little Revolutionary committees, composed only of ex- 
treme Jacobins, and whose business was to fill the prisons. 
By the end of October, 1793, Paris was completely ter- 
rorized and the small Jacobin minority was triumphant. 
Politics were never mentioned, and the Parisians lived their 
ordinary life, frequented the theatres, and devoted them- 
selves to pleasure, while each week saw numbers of inno- 



The Reign of Terror 221 

cent persons massacred. Such was the character of the 
Jacobin rule from 1793 to 1794 — the domination of the 
bulk of the population by a small but well-organized 
minority. 

Strong in the belief in the truth of the fundamental 
principles which guided their actions, the extreme revo- 
lutionary faction, headed by such men as Robespierre, 
Danton, Billaud-Varenne, and Couthon, resolved to force 
its opponents to accept the Jacobin programme. " AVe 
will make a graveyard of France," said the bloodthirsty 
Carrier, " rather than fail to regenerate her according to 
our ideas." And he carried out his fell purpose in La Ven- 
dee, where a religious and patriotic population was deci- 
mated by barbarities hitherto unknown in modern times. 
The political and social reforms enacted by the Constituent 
Assembly had been received in La Vendee with approba- 
tion, but the issue of the civil constitution of the clergy, 
on July 12, 1790, roused to fury a population attached to 
its religion and its priests. No greater blunder was ever 
made by the national assembly of any country than when 
the Constituent Assembly by shortsighted policy arrayed 
against itself the great body of the clergy, numbering some 
64,000, and with them the Vendean people. 

Persecution only still further alienated the Vendeans 
from the government. Disturbances took place in 1792, 
followed by conflicts between the peasants and the repub- 
licans, and it only required an attempt, in 1793, to enforce 
conscription in La Vendee to cause the smouldering em- 
bers of discontent to burst into a flame. The war that 
ensued was marked by the* most hideous atrocities, and 
the Jacobin revealed himself in his real colours. No more 
scathing indictment of Jacobinism can be found than in 



222 The French People 

the pages of The Real French Revolutionist, by Mr. Henry 
Jephson, where the revolutionist is unmasked and his con- 
ception of liberty, equality, and fraternity subjected to a 
microscopic analysis and criticism. Some 200,000 per- 
sons, including men, women, and children, perished at the 
hands of the republican hordes, the greater portion of the 
victims being members of the lesser bourgeoisie and peas- 
ants, religious liberty was destroyed, justice perished, the 
rights of property ceased to exist, and one of the most bru- 
tal and crushing absolutisms ever experienced was forced 
not only on La Vendee, but on the whole of France. 

The war in La Vendee, however, has this special im- 
portance — that the agents of the revolutionary govern- 
ment, freed from all restraints, were able in the western 
provinces to illustrate the actual working of Jacobin prin- 
ciples in relation to the working classes, for whose benefit 
the Revolution had been brought about. The actions of 
these revolutionists in La Vendee " throw," writes Mr. 
Jephson, " as it were, Rontgen rays on the nature and 
methods and character of the French revolutionist and 
republican, piercing through outward semblances and as- 
severations, and revealing to us the actualities and inner- 
most verities; . . . and the result is the most complete 
and realistic picture of the French revolutionist in his 
genuine character and the most impressive illustration of 
French revolutionary principles in untrammelled opera- 
tion." * 

The views held and carried out by Carrier and others 
in La Vendee were equally indorsed by the leading mem- 
bers of the Committee of Public Safety. The masterful 

* The Real French Revolutionist, by H. Jephson, p. 4. 



The Directory 223 

Saint- Just was as emphatic and unhesitating in his views 
as any other member of the Mountain. " Even the indif- 
ferent are to be punished," he said; " all who are passive 
to the republic." To the Jacobins the " moral unity of 
France " meant universal submission to their doctrines, 
and whoever was opposed to them was to be proscribed. 
A narrow and cruel despotism was thus by the Reign of 
Terror imposed upon France in place of the liberty, equal- 
ity, and fraternity offered to France in 1789. The princi- 
ples of the Revolution within four years of their enuncia- 
tion were reversed, and as soon as the tension on the fron- 
tier was relaxed and the victories of 1794 had established 
the supremacy of the French arms in western Europe a 
strong reaction set in against the Reign of Terror. 

For this reaction the way had been prepared by the 
divisions am.ong the Jacobin party. No sooner had the 
Girondists been swept away than the Jacobins began to 
quarrel among themselves. Robespierre and his party 
first overthrew the Hebertists, who were the most ad- 
vanced of the Jacobins, and then turned upon the Danton- 
ists, who had shown signs of a desire to end the Terror. 
Weakened by the success of his suspicious and revengeful 
policy, Robespierre himself fell before the determined at- 
tack of his foes. The prestige of the Convention was 
destroyed, but the French people, while desirous of the 
restoration of order and good government, remained de- 
termined not to run the risk of a restoration of the ancien 
regime. The establishment of the Directory in accordance 
with the constitution of 1795 would be followed, it was 
hoped, by the realization of those expectations which the 
Reign of Terror had for a time destroyed. Such hopes 
were not destined to be realized. The incapacity of the 



2 24 The French People 

Constituents had delivered France into the hands of the 
Terrorists, and their rule had inaugurated a period of 
anarchy, which practically continued till 1799. It was, 
however, hoped in 1795 that the Directory, the result of 
the reaction after the Reign of Terror, would seize the op- 
portunity of giving France her first real experience of re- 
publican government. 

In spite of the victories of the French arms in Italy in 
1 796-1 797, the government of the Directory cannot be 
called a success for the republicans. At any rate, those 
of its members, like Carnot, who are remembered by pos- 
terity, owe their fame not to their republican virtues or to 
their devotion to the ideas of '89, but to their success as 
organizers of victory. " The annals of the Directory," says 
one writer, " would be the meanest passage in French his- 
tory if they had not been relieved by the military triumphs 
of the man who was to destroy it." And a very cursory 
acquaintance with the history of this period shows that its 
successful military conquests alone gave the government 
some slight justification for its existence. It is unques- 
tioned that the Directory stands prominently forward as 
being the worst government of modern times. The mis- 
management of the finances continued till France became 
practically bankrupt, and under its rule society was char- 
acterized by dissoluteness and corruption. Never had 
France fallen so low, and never had the country suffered 
such demoralization and anarchy, as during the years when 
it was governed by the Directorial Constitution. 

As the first real experiment of republican government 
in France, the years 1795 to 1799 have no little interest for 
students of French history. The Second Empire was al- 
ways accused of excesses impossible to find in a republic, 



The Directory 225 

and Mr. Bodley quotes the saying of M. Jules Ferry after 
the fall of Napoleon III, that " France, delivered from the 
corruption of the empire, had entered into the period of 
the austere virtues." * A very slight examination of the 
history of the Directory leads to the conviction that repub- 
lican governments are as liable to political corruption as 
any other regime. Before Napoleon III " the sole previ- 
ous experiment of republican government in France which 
lasted long enough to produce a school of morals was the 
Directory, under which every iniquity, public and private, 
was encouraged, the incarnation of the regime being Bar- 
ras, whose venality was eclipsed by his profligacy," f The 
middle class certainly cannot be congratulated on their 
first experiment in government, which ended in anarchy 
and the establishment of a despotism. Following so soon 
after the Reign of Terror, the conduct of the Directors led 
men to accept willingly, even at the price of their favourite 
political principles, the rule of Bonaparte, 

The whole character of the period is one of internal 
conflict. The reaction of Thermidor had produced the 
one really popular movement of the Revolution. But the 
Convention, determined to perpetuate their powers, had 
employed the army, and the cannon of Vendemiaire as- 
sured for five years the triumph of the Jacobin minority 
and the establishment of the Directory; for some thirty 
years Paris saw no fresh attempt at a popular rising. Dur- 
ing the years from 1795 to 1799 the government, sup- 
ported by some 30,000 troops encamped at the gates of 
Paris, held its own in spite of the ever-increasing opposi- 
tion to its maladministration. 

* France, by J. E. C. Bodley, vol. ii, p. 306. 
f Ibid., vol. ii, p. 307. 



226 The French People 

Why a government so hated and despised, the exist- 
ence of which was dishked by the mass of the nation, man- 
aged to rule France for five years has often puzzled his- 
torians. Revolutionary methods were unpopular, but the 
Directory adhered to them; legislation was paralyzed, and 
no confidence was felt in the existing laws; administration 
ceased to exist, and corruption flourished to an extent 
unheard of in monarchical France. The natural results 
followed the chaos into which the administration fell. 

Western France openly rebelled, and many provinces, 
such as Rouergue, the Vivarais, the Cevennes, Haute- 
Auvergne, and Bas-Languedoc, became practically inde- 
pendent. With the exception of Paris, police arrange- 
ments were nonexistent in the country, while in order to 
raise money the Directory did not hesitate to plunder 
churches and to seize horses, grain, and clothing of all 
sorts. In this way the armies on which the government 
relied were supplied. In December, 1796, the Directory 
itself made the following report to the Council of the Five 
Hundred : " Every part of the administration is in decay, 
the pay of the troops is in arrear, the defenders of the 
country are in rags, and their disgust causes them to de- 
sert; the military and civil hospitals are destitute of all 
medical appliances, the state creditors and contractors can 
recover but small portions of the sums due to them, 
the high roads are destroyed and communications inter- 
rupted, the public of^cials are Avithout salaries from 
one end of the republic to the other; everywhere sedi- 
tion is rife, assassination organized, and the police im- 
potent." 

Though its very existence was hateful to the mass of 
the nation, there were various elements of strength in the 



The Directory 227 

position of the Directory. The war was till 1798 remark- 
ably successful, and in war the Directory found its safety 
and strength. Paris, too, overawed and garrisoned by 
troops, was the Jacobin stronghold, and, as was usually 
the case, Paris ruled France. The middle classes, seeing 
that resistance was in vain, returned to the indififerent if 
not cowardly attitude adopted by them during the Reign 
of Terror. The peasants, who had gained in material pros- 
perity by the Revolution, were resolved to run no risk of 
the return of the ancien regime, with its taille, gabelle, and 
intendants. They, indeed, hated the Directory because it 
oppressed the Church and harassed them for men, money, 
and kind; but even such exactions, they thought, were 
more endurable than the restoration of the Bourbons. 
" No revolution will ever come from the people," was the 
conclusion of Mallet du Pan, who further described the 
French nation as " at once cruel and frivolous, servile and 
licentious, impetuous at one moment in its complaints, and 
forgetting them without motive in the next, careless in suf- 
fering as in prosperity, incapable of foresight or of reflec- 
tion, selling in the morning like savages the bed on which 
they are to lie at night; such in every age has been the 
character of the people, such are they at the present hour, 
and such they will ever remain until the end of time." 
What no doubt assisted the Directors in prolonging their 
tenure of office were the divisions existing in the ranks of 
their opponents. Opposed to them were several disorgan- 
ized factions, while throughout the country division of 
opinion was very noticeable, some men desiring the return 
of the Bourbons, and others hoping for the re-enactment of 
the constitution of 1791. 

But it was on the continuance of a successful war that 



228 The French People 

the prolongation of the government depended, though the 
war led to a decline in the population, and men were sadly 
needed for the operations of the harvest and for industrial 
pursuits. " Nous serious perdus si nous faisions la paix," 
said Sieyes, and it was quite evident that the existence of 
the Directory depended on a vigorous prosecution of 
the war. " La Revolution degenere en propagande armee, 
puis en conquete," is M. Albert Sorel's opinion: " le gou- 
vernement militaire prevant sur le civil : la Republique est 
conduite a asseoir . . . sur la puissance exterieure et a 
vivre par les armees. Finalement, les armees envahissent 
la Repubhque, et s'en emparent." " The foreign policy of 
the Directory," it has been said, " was characterized by the 
philosophic insolence, the spirit of proselytism, and the 
desire of universal revolution " which had animated the 
Girondists. Of them it was remarked that " they would 
sooner see the universe in ashes than abandon their design 
of submitting it to their doctrines." " On pent tenter, on 
pent esperer la conversion d'un scelerat, jamais celle d'un 
philosophe." Like the Girondists, the Directory aimed 
at carrying out reforms according to their own views in 
every country occupied by French troops. The rights of 
nations were to be overthrown, and the states that sub- 
mitted were to be treated as vassals of the French Repub- 
lic. The startling victories of Bonaparte in Italy led to 
peace with Austria in 1797, and the Directory, supported 
>by troops, was able to bring about the coup d'etat of Fructi- 
dor and to triumph for the last time over its opponents. 
This success, coupled with the signing of the peace of 
Campo Formio, placed the Directors at the height of their 
power. 

But their days were numbered. Bonaparte had only 



The Revolution of Brumaire 229 

supported them because he was not yet prepared to take 
their place, and the army was unaware of the character of 
the men to whose aid they had come. After Fructidor 
the illusion that France was enjoying a republican con- 
stitution was destroyed. " Constitutional government," 
says Thiers, " is a chimera at the conclusion of a revolution 
such as that of France. It is not under the shelter of legal 
authority that parties whose passions have been so violent- 
ly excited can arrange themselves and repose; a more 
vigorous power is required to restrain them, to fuse their 
still burning elements, and protect them against foreign 
violence. That power is the empire of the sword." " The 
first general," wrote Mallet du Pan, " who could raise the 
standard of revolt might carry half the country with him." 
It only required failure abroad to bring about the over- 
throw of the government. Fructidor was followed by in- 
creased disorder and anarchy at home and by partial bank- 
ruptcy; the liberty of the press was suspended; the elections 
in many of the departments were quashed in order to se- 
cure the return of the nominees of the Directors ; and the 
persecuting laws against nonjuring priests and nobles were 
re-enacted. The absence of Bonaparte in Egypt no 
doubt accounted for the loss of Italy by the French troops 
in the war of the Second Coalition. The war was mis- 
managed from Paris, and France was threatened with in- 
vasion and anarchy. At the instigation of Sieyes, Bona- 
parte, who had returned from Egypt, carried out the revo- 
lution of Brumaire, overthrew the Directory, and estab- 
lished the Consulate. Republican institutions had failed 
disastrously. In four years the Directory had brought 
France to bankruptcy, civil war, and almost barbarism. 

The nation was weary of popular institutions, and with the 
16 



230 The French People 

fall of the Directory formally renounced Jacobinism. It 
demanded a strong and intelligent government, and in 
Bonaparte it found a man in whose talents it had full con- 
fidence. The revolution of the i8th Brumaire was one of 
the most important coups d'etat which the world has ever 
seen, and France has felt its effects ever since. 



CHAPTER XVII 



THE GREAT NAPOLEON 



The Napoleonic regime differed from every other form 
of government hitherto seen in France. Napoleon's rule 
was in no sense a continuation of that of Louis XVI, nor 
of that of the Constituent Assembly. 

At one time in his career he was pleased to trace his 
descent from Charles the Great, whose empire he may have 
dreamed of reviving. He was, however, a product partly 
of the eighteenth-century reform movement, partly of 
French Jacobinism. He carried out many of the reforms 
so prized by the enlightened kings and ministers of the 
period just anterior to the French Revolution; at the same 
time his raison d'etre was to be found in the Revolution of 
1792, and he adopted the theories of the Jacobins, 

Though he employed Jacobins and perpetuated the 
spirit of Jacobinism, he used every effort to rally round 
him the old noblesse, whose hostility to Jacobinism never 
slept. His principal aim was to found a vast centralized 
system, and this object he carried out thoroughly. The 
overthrow of the Napoleonic fabric of centralization, 
which is still existing in France, would, it is believed, result 
in anarchy and disaster. In 1848 some of the republicans 
hoped that this system would be profoundly modified, and 
that local and autonomic institutions would be established. 

231 



2X2 



The French People 



But the conservative French peasant refused to consider 
the possibiHty of such changes, and threw himself into the 
arms of Napoleon III. On the return of Bonaparte from 
Egypt in 1799 it was plain to every Frenchman that a 
strong government alone could cope with the existing 
chaos within France and remedy the failure of the army in 
Italy. It was not the time to attempt to organize a consti- 
tutional regime or to carry out the ideas of 1789. A man 
was required who had not the task of Oliver Cromwell be- 
fore him, viz., the prevention of an outbreak of a social 
revolution, but who was expected to end the anarchy con- 
sequent on a revolution which had continued for ten years. 

This was the task which Napoleon, who was thirty 
years old and a general in the army, was called upon to 
perform. Instead of acting as an irresponsible head of the 
state, with no special interest in the working of the con- 
stitution, as was the hope of Sieyes, Napoleon, by his vic- 
tories and innate genius, made himself master of the 
French nation. 

His career can be studied from many points of view, 
but if simply regarded as an organizer and as a conqueror 
Napoleon's position can be easily realized and appreciated. 
His first attempts at organization were effected during 
the Consulate — that period preliminary to the empire 
which is included between the years 1799 and 1805. The 
condition of France was calculated to make the boldest 
administration despair. Mr. S. Lowes Dickinson, in his 
Revolution and Reaction in France (pages 25 and 26), has 
admirably described the situation which Bonaparte had to 
face in 1799: " Confusion, ignorance, and corruption were 
the rule in administration and finance; hospitals had de- 
generated into nurseries of disease; public buildings were 



Sieyes and the Consulate 233 

everywhere in decay; the roads were becoming impassa- 
ble, and were infested by brigands; in certain districts a 
third of the population lived by begging and stealing; the 
law of the maximum, the requisitions, the war, the inse- 
curity, the difhculties of communication, had ruined com- 
merce; elementary education was becoming extinct, and 
where it existed was little better than a farce; everything 
in every departmmt had been destroyed, and, in spite of 
innumerable positive decrees, nothing as yet had been re- 
created; every writing and record had been obliterated 
from the chart of France, and the only new inscription 
was a note of interrogation." 

In the work of reconstruction Bonaparte had, he knew, 
the whole nation at his back. The revolution of Bru- 
maire, he saw, had awakened the most lively hopes in the 
hearts of the French people. " Never probably," he said, 
" has a monarch found his people more devoted to his 
wishes, and it would be unpardonable for a clever general 
not to take advantage of such a situation to establish a 
better government on a solid foundation. . . . The peo- 
ple, with the exception of the contemptible band of anar- 
chists, are so weary and disgusted with the horrors and 
follies of the revolutionists that they are convinced that 
any change, no matter what, will bring some improve- 
ment." 

The constitution drawn up with so much trouble by 
Sieyes was a masterpiece of complicated machinery. The 
famous abbe, whose fame as a constitution-monger is un- 
equalled in modern times, had been till 1799 the political 
adviser of the Directory, though from his dislike of respon- 
sibility he had till then steadily refused to be a Director. 
Mallet du Pan's description of him is hardly too severe: 



234 The French People 

" The enemy of every power of which he is not the 
spiritual adviser, he has aboHshed the nobles because he 
was not one of them, his own order because he was not 
archbishop, the great landowners because he was not rich; 
and he will upset all the thrones because nature has not 
made him a king." It was this man who hoped that Bona- 
parte would rule in accordance with a mass of constitu- 
tional machinery absolutely bristling with checks upon 
any aspirations in the direction of absolutism. At the 
head of affairs were three consuls, one supreme, the others 
only advisers. Next came a Council of State, nominated 
by the first consul, and the business of this Council was to 
initiate laws. A Tribunate of one hundred chosen by the 
Senate was to discuss the laws, a Legislative body of three 
hundred chosen by the Senate was to accept or reject the 
laws, and a Senate of eighty nominated by the consuls for 
life had the power of vetoing any laws which affected the 
constitution. 

In such fashion was provided the machinery for pro- 
ducing legislation. The administrative arrangements 
were simpler. To the first consul was intrusted the 
power of appointing the ministers, while in each depart- 
ment a prefect, chosen by the first consul, presided over 
an elected council, and in each town a similarly chosen 
council was presided over by a mayor nominated by the 
prefect. The first consul was equally supreme in matters 
of justice. He appointed the judges for life, and the Sen- 
ate nominated the members of the Cour de Cassation, 
which sat in Paris. 

Such a constitution was not likely to remain intact for 
long. " Sieyes," said Bonaparte, " put shadows on every 
side; shadows of legislative power, shadows of judiciary 



The Consulate 235 

power, shadows of a government. It required a substance 
somewhere, and in faith I put it there." 

The constitution in the hands of the successful gen- 
eral could not escape mutilation, and two years before the 
fall of the Directory Bonaparte had indicated clearly what 
his intentions were with regard to any obstacles which 
Sieyes or any other politician might set in the way of a 
successful general. " Do you suppose," wrote Bonaparte 
to Miot in May, 1797, " that I triumph in Italy for the 
glory of the lawyers of the Directory — a Carnot or a Bar- 
ras? Do you suppose that I mean to found a republic? 
What an idea! A republic of thirty millions of people! 
With our morals, our vices! How is such a thing possi- 
ble? The nation wants a chief — a chief covered with glory 
— not theories of government, phrases, ideologcal essays 
that the French do not understand. They want some play- 
things. That will be enough. They will play with them, 
and let themselves be led, always supposing they are clev- 
erly prevented from seeing the goal toward which they 
are moving." Having chosen his ministers, Bonaparte at 
once swept away all nominal checks on his power. Sieyes 
and his supporters had no doubt intended to set up a re- 
public in Brumaire, but Bonaparte first got himself chosen 
consul for ten years, and in 1802 for life, and Sieyes found 
that by his constitution a strong monarchy had practically 
been created. 

The campaign of Marengo, in 1800, consolidated 
Bonaparte's position. After Hohenlinden peace with Aus- 
tria was assured, and the Treaty of Luneville was an im- 
mense triumph for Bonaparte, and enabled him, especially 
after the Treaty of Amiens was signed with England in 
1802, to devote himself to the work of reconstruction. 



236 The French People 

The following list of institutions created give at a glance an 
idea of the extent and character of the reforms carried out 
under the direction of the first consul: 

(i) The concordat, which restored the relations be- 
tween the Gallican Church and the Papacy. 

(2) The establishment of the University of France. 

(3) The reorganization of the judicial system. 

(4) The Code Napoleon. 

(5) A system of local government. 

(6) The foundation of the Bank of France. 

(7) The establishment of the Legion of Honour. 

(8) The settlement of a system of taxation. 

The concordat was an admirable piece of diplomacy, 
and though a blow at Jacobinism, was a valuable part of a 
general pacification. It attached the clergy to the govern- 
ment and weakened their connection with the Bourbons. 
The attacks made on the Church by the revolutionists of 
'89 were as unstatesmanlike as those made in later times 
by the third republic. Bonaparte was far too wise to 
ignore the religious sentiments of the nation, and though 
he had little sympathy with religious observances, he was 
fully alive to the influence wielded by the clergy among the 
peasantry. Joseph of Austria had well-nigh ruined the 
Hapsburg inheritance by his foolish alienation of the 
Church. Bonaparte made the clergy indeed dependent on 
the state, but by the concordat he ended the religious war 
which had continued for well-nigh ten years and had done 
more than any other single circumstance to destroy the 
work of the Revolution. 

When the Church had fallen through the attacks of 
the revolutionists the University of Paris, together with 
the twenty-one universities of France, also fell. By cer- 



The Code Napoleon 237 

tain laws passed in May, i8©6, and March, 1808, Bona- 
parte founded the modern University of France. " In the 
establishment of a teaching body," he said, " my principal 
aim is to have a means of directing political and social 
opinions." He thus looked on educational bodies as a 
means of forming political opinion and of preventing the 
spread of erroneous views. " So long," he argued, " as 
people are not taught from their childhood whether they 
are to be republicans or monarchists, Catholics or free- 
thinkers, the state will not form a nation; it will rest on 
vague and uncertain bases, and be constantly subject to 
change and disorder." He therefore formed the whole 
teaching profession into a corporation endowed by the 
state, and to the university was intrusted the control of 
all education, whether higher or secondary. By these 
means he enlisted education and the rising generation on 
his side, and provided France with a national system of 
education which lasted till our own day. 

Equally dependent on the central government was the 
whole judicial system. From 1802 he appointed the jus- 
tices of the peace and exercised a close supervision over 
the appointment of the other judges, a similar supervision 
over the lists of jurors being exercised by the prefects. 
Above all civil and criminal courts was placed the Cour de 
Cassation, and the Senate was allowed, if necessary, to in- 
terfere with the working of the system. While justice 
was reorganized Napoleon carried on the codification of 
the law which had already been begun in the early days 
of the Revolution. The Code Civil, though it crystallized 
the work of the Constituent Assembly and of the Commit- 
tee of Public Safety, is known as the Code Napoleon, and 
was promulgated in 1809. Though not the result of his 



238 The French People 

own conception, it bears upon it the impress of his own 
individual genius. Other codes were the Code de Com- 
merce, the Code Penal, and the Code d' Instruction Crimi- 
nelle, all of which were issued through his influence. 
" Thus," writes Mr. Bodley, " the whole centralized admin- 
istration of France, which in its stability has survived 
every political crisis, was the creation of Napoleon and the 
keystone of his fabric. It was he who organized the exist- 
ing administrative divisions of the departments, with the 
officials supervising them and the local assemblies attached 
to them." 

The Code Napoleon is still in force, the relations of 
Church and State are still regulated by the concordat. 
The university was founded by him, the Bank of France 
owes its origin to him, the Legion of Honour was his cre- 
ation. His work of construction and reorganization forms 
the present framework of modern France, and most of this 
work dates from the Consulate. In place of chaos order 
was established, in place of a hopelessly mismanaged and 
corrupt system of taxation was substituted a regular equi- 
table system which satisfied the peasant class. 

The price paid for this organization of the adminis- 
tration of religion, of justice, and of finance was the estab- 
lishment of a despotism which, though infinitely more 
tolerable than the despotism of either the Convention or 
the Directory, tended as time went on to press heavily on 
all classes. The liberty of the press was not established, 
religion was not allowed independent action, education was 
only encouraged in so far as it conduced to the strengthen- 
ing of the military system of France and to the support 
of the Napoleonic dynasty. Liberty in the true sense did 
not exist, but the principle of equality was favoured by 



Napoleon's Ambition 239 

Napoleon. Though the great emperor died a prisoner on 
Saint Helena, and though since his death France has seen 
the restoration of the Bourbons, the reign of Louis Phi- 
lippe, and the second empire, followed by the establish- 
ment of the existing republic, the supremacy of the state, 
imposed by Napoleon, has never seriously been threat- 
ened, and the centralized system of the first empire re- 
mains most suitable to the French temperament. 

Had Napoleon rested after the Peace of Tilsit from 
his career of conquest he might have ruled with success a 
powerful and contented nation. As a statesman, lawgiver, 
and organizer he could be compared to Caesar and Charles 
the Great; in his success in founding a despotism agree- 
able to the mass of the nation he held a position similar to 
that of Louis XIV. Unfortunately, like the Grand Mo- 
narque, he was carried away by ambition, Louis XIV 
lived to see Europe combined against him and the Peace 
of Utrecht signed; Napoleon similarly found in the War of 
Liberation his match in the united armies of Russia, Prus- 
sia, and Austria, and the two Treaties of Paris destroyed his 
magnificent projects for the aggrandizement of France. 

It would seem that with his adoption of the imperial 
title his ambition extended in proportion as his power 
grew. His victories of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland 
appear to have drawn his attention away from the work of 
government and to have concentrated his attention on ex- 
tensive conquests by sea and land. Louis XIV had 
attempted in vain to found a world-wide empire, and Na- 
poleon endeavoured to revive an idea impossible of realiza- 
tion in the nineteenth century. Supremacy in the Medi- 
terranean, which would become a French lake, the par- 
tition of the Turkish Empire in favour of France, the ruin 



240 The French People 

of English commerce, of her colonies, and of her empire in 
India, to be followed by the unquestioned domination of 
Napoleon in Europe — such were the dreams which the 
emperor endeavoured to turn into realities from the battle 
of Friedland onward. 

This second portion of his career possesses that in- 
terest which always attaches to the decline and fall of an 
institution, a country, or a man. As Napoleon proceeded 
on his career of conquest France found herself drained of 
men and wealth. The lives of his subjects were sacrificed, 
with the result that France, after being twice occupied by 
foreign armies, was again placed under the domination of 
the Bourbons. "A great nation," writes Madame de Stael, 
" would not have endured the monotonous and degrading 
weight of despotism if military glory had not continually 
roused and animated public sentiment." In place of the 
enthusiasm for liberty which the soldiers of the earlier 
revolutionary armies had felt, was substituted a love of 
glory and a keen desire to win distinction on the field of 
battle. The minds of both ofhcers and men were inflamed 
with ambition and an eagerness to obtain wealth. Their 
prospects of advancement depended on Napoleon, who 
successfully converted the republican into imperialist 
armies devoted to himself. 

He was thus able to take advantage of the mistakes 
of the Austrian generals, of the weakness and vacillation of 
Prussia, and of the consequent isolation of Russia; and 
having forced Austria and Prussia to submission and 
fought the Russians at Eylau and Friedland, he found him- 
self well advanced along the road to universal monarchy. 
It is true that at first sight the Peace of Tilsit seems to be 
a check on his successful career. Napoleon, however, had 



The Treaty of Tilsit 241 

no intention of sharing his power with Alexander or of 
modifying his ambition. He still intended to take over 
the Turkish Empire; he had placed in the newly formed 
Duchy of Warsaw a prince of the Confederation of the 
Rhine. In consenting to the Treaty of Tilsit Napoleon 
was partly actuated by the knowledge that his French sub- 
jects were weary of wars. Jena had caused no excitement 
in Paris, where the discontent at the continual warfare was 
being encouraged by secret intrigues. Having taken 
severe measures for the suppression of all discussion of his 
government in the press, or in the writings of Madame de 
Stael or of any author or authoress, Napoleon endeavoured 
to satisfy the Parisians by his presence, and by numerous 
fetes. But his determination to ruin England and to 
dominate the Continent never slept. The seizure of the 
Danish fleet in September, 1807, roused him to fury, and 
from henceforth an understanding between Napoleon and 
England was out of the question. His one chance of 
founding a dynasty and remaining on the throne lay in 
satisfying Europe that he was able to put a limit to his 
ambition and conquests. But Napoleon, bent on the de- 
struction of England, entered upon a fresh series of efforts, 
aimed principally at England — efforts which included at- 
tempts to subjugate Spain, Austria, and Russia. Europe 
being thoroughly alarmed at this threatened overthrow of 
the balance of power, and each state being fearful for its 
own independence, the ground was gradually prepared for 
the War of Liberation, in which the Napoleonic regime 
perished. Napoleon, however, in 1807 had no regard for 
these considerations. He was resolved to carry out his 
schemes without further delay, and decided to conquer 
Portugal, to close her ports to the EngHsh, and to domi- 



242 The French People 

nate the whole Spanish Peninsula, Thus the maritime 
resources of Spain and Portugal would be turned against 
England, and a great step taken in the annihilation of Eng- 
land's commercial superiority. 

Spain had been the ally of France since 1795, and Na- 
poleon imagined that by associating her with France in the 
conquest of Portugal he would strengthen the alliance 
between the two countries. Finding that the Continental 
system was opposed by the Pope, who had also refused to 
recognise Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples, French 
troops occupied Rome in April, 1808, and the papal states 
were formed into departments of France. These steps 
seriously affected the relations of Napoleon with Catholic 
Europe, and especially with Spain. It was a grave blunder 
to alienate at this crisis in the history of France the whole 
Catholic world, and from this moment Napoleon's power 
began to decline. After committing one blunder the em- 
peror proceeded to commit others, until he brought about 
the final resistance of Europe to his domination. No bet- 
ter illustrations of his insensate folly can be found than in 
his conduct in Spain. Ignoring the fact that he had alien- 
ated the Spanish nation, with whom religious fanaticism 
was strong. Napoleon proceeded to substitute for Charles 
IV and his son his brother Joseph, King of Naples. This 
insult roused the Spaniards. They refused to recognise 
Joseph as their king, and after a war of five years Napoleon 
had to confess that he had signally failed to subdue the 
Spanish Peninsula. 

This gigantic failure, due partly to the determination 
to ruin England's commerce, partly to a misapprehension 
concerning the real feelings of the Spaniards and the pecul- 
iar strength of Spain, entangled Napoleon in meshes from 



The Spanish Resistance 243 

which there was no escape and drove him into situations 
from which there was no retreat. " Trafalgar forced him," 
wrote Mr. Fyffe, " to impose his yoke upon all Europe or 
to abandon the hope of conquering Great Britain." The 
attempt to coerce Spain or Portugal began a resistance to 
the French in the Spanish Peninsula which continued till 
the emperor's overthrow, while the courage of the Span- 
iards stirred up an active opposition in Austria to the 
French domination in Germany, Napoleon apparently 
hoped that the ancient European kingdoms would prove as 
obedient as the Confederation of the Rhine or the small 
Italian states. He found, however, that he had miscalcu- 
lated the power of resistance and the patriotism existing in 
such countries as Spain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia. 
" Spain was Spain," wrote Professor Seeley, " but those 
Italian and German states were not Italy and Germany, but 
only in Italy and Germany. ... It was evident that the 
one thing needful was found, and a new idea took posses- 
sion of the mind of Europe. That idea was not democracy 
or liberty; it was nationality. It was the idea of the na- 
tion as distinguished from the state; the union by blood 
as distinguished from the union by interest." 

In July, 1808, Joseph entered Madrid. In the same 
month a French army under Dupont capitulated at Baylen, 
and the following month Junot capitulated at Cintra. 
The reaction against Napoleon had begun. For the first 
time he was confronted by a united nation; by holding 
Portugal the English had broken through the Continental 
blockade. The efifects on Europe were instantaneous: 
Austria armed; in Prussia the national movement under 
Stein and Scharnhorst progressed; even resistance to the 
French policy was threatened in Turkey. The edifice 



244 The French People 

which Napoleon had reared so carefully seemed likely to be 
overthrown and his plans for a world-wide empire de- 
stroyed. The situation could not have been more serious. 
To save the position diplomatic qualities of the highest 
order as well as decision were required. 

The meeting of Napoleon and Alexander at Erfurt 
was in many ways a masterpiece of intriguing skill, and 
though Napoleon did not secure all his objects, he at any 
rate warded ofif for a time any immediate danger of attack, 
and was given for a few months a free hand in Spain. The 
treaty drawn up at Erfurt was very different to that of Til- 
sit. Alexander being the only ruler who could force Aus- 
tria and Prussia to keep the peace, was now master of the 
situation. His vanity and his desire to seize the Danu- 
bian Principalities, and perhaps Constantinople, decided 
him to remain true to his French alliance and to continue 
his opposition to England. It required a considerable 
effort on Napoleon's part to give Russia a free hand in 
Turkey, for he had hoped to involve the Tsar in a war with 
Austria and Prussia, and thus to keep the Russians away 
from the Danube. Spain conquered, the overthrow of 
Austria would follow, and Tolstoi, the Russian ambassa- 
dor in Paris, was convinced that Napoleon intended even- 
tually to destroy the Russian Empire. For the moment, 
however, Alexander was content to enjoy the triumph 
which he had won at Erfurt, while Napoleon, having ob- 
tained that respite from attacks by Austria or Prussia which 
was so necessary for his schemes, hastened to Spain with 
the intention of ending the w^ar as quickly as possible and 
of restoring the prestige of the French arms. While in 
Spain he gave convincing proofs that as a general he was 
well-nigh invincible, but he did not remain long enough to 



Napoleon Supreme, 1810 245 

break the resistance of the Spaniards. In January, 1809, 
he left Spain and hastened to Paris in order to crush the 
intrigues of his domestic enemies and to prepare for a cam- 
paign against Austria. Stadion, who guided the adminis- 
tration at Vienna, was convinced that Napoleon should be 
attacked while busy in Spain. Austria was too poor to be 
able to continue much longer her expensive war prepara- 
tions, her EngHsh allies demanded some action on her part, 
and a strong national movement within his country made 
it difficult for the Emperor Francis to avoid hostilities. 

Though Austria was vanquished at Wagram and 
forced to make the humiliating Peace of Vienna in 1809, 
her stubborn resistance to the French armies, so graphic- 
ally described in Marbot's Memoirs, fostered the growth 
of a feeling of nationality in Germany, and encouraged the 
efforts of all patriotic Germans to compass the overthrow 
of Napoleon's power. 

The course of events iji the years 1807, 1808, and 1809 
have been somewhat fully traced because these years form, 
as it v/ere, the hinge of the history of Napoleon. In these 
years, too, his plans developed, and the objects of his policy 
were unfolded at Tilsit and Erfurt. During these years 
the first signs of the gathering together of the forces which 
ultimately overwhelmed him can be distinctly traced. The 
patriotic and never-ceasing resistance of Spain, the tena- 
cious opposition of England, the growth of a strong feel- 
ing of nationality in Prussia and Austria, the equivocal 
and suspicious attitude of Russia, were all signals of com- 
ing dangers. 

Napoleon, however, never allowed any considerations 
of these danger signals to disturb the line of policy which 
he had determined to follow. The establishment of a block 
17 



246 The French People 

of dependent states, known as the Confederation of the 
Rhine, between France on the one hand and Austria and 
Prussia on the other, seemed to secure him from any fur- 
ther difficulties in Germany, while the successes of his gen- 
erals in Spain augured well for the eventual subjugation of 
that country. He was therefore able to turn his full and 
undivided attention to the complete execution of his Con- 
tinental system and to the absolute exclusion of England's 
commerce from Europe. For this purpose he had an- 
nexed Holland and the Hanseatic towns, and proceeded 
to occupy Oldenburg. In this duel with England Na- 
poleon expected to be able to force all Europe to support 
his policy. " Choose," he said to the Swedish govern- 
ment, " between cannon shot against the English vessels 
which approach your coasts and the confiscation of their 
merchandise or an immediate war with France." 

Everything depended, in Napoleon's opinion, on carry- 
ing out this impossible policy. And the result of Russia's 
defection from the Continental system was to open the 
flood gates of a general national movement against the 
French. On December 31, 1810, Alexander issued an 
edict modifying his adhesion to the Continental system. 
Napoleon was furious, and his estimate of the importance 
of Alexander's action was by no means exaggerated. " It 
is," he truly asserted in a letter to the Tsar, " a change of 
system. All Europe so regards it; and already our alliance 
no longer exists in the opinion of England and of Europe." 
If Napoleon M^as convinced that the Continental system 
was essential for the carrying out of his schemes of empire, 
he had no other alternative but to declare war on Russia. 
" Russia's partial abandonment of the Continental sys- 
tem," wrote Professor Seeley, " was not merely a pretext, 



The Fall of Napoleon 247 

but the real ground of the war. Napoleon had no alterna- 
tive between fighting for his system and abandoning the 
only method open to him of carrying on war against Eng- 
land." 

The year 1811 was spent in preparations, 18 12 saw the 
campaign to Moscow with its disastrous failure, 1813 
marks the beginning of the War of Liberation by Russia 
and Prussia, supported by England, and joined in August 
by Austria. At bay in the centre of Europe, Napoleon's 
attempts to resist his numerous foes ended in failure, and 
his defeat at Leipzig forced him to retire to France. His 
masterly strategy in the early months of 18 14 proved un- 
availing. The allies entered Paris, the first Treaty of Paris 
was made, the emperor was sent to Elba, and Louis 
XVIII returned to occupy the throne of his fathers. The 
escape of Napoleon and the events of the Hundred Days 
necessitated a fresh campaign and the battle of Waterloo, 
before Europe could enjoy a feeling of security. The 
second Treaty of Paris and Napoleon's imprisonment at 
Saint Helena proved effectual, and closed a period of con- 
quest unequalled in the annals of modern Europe. 

To establish a stable government in France and to fix 
limits which she could not pass were the objects of the 
allied powers. " If we want a durable and safe peace," said 
Hardenberg, " as we have so often announced and de- 
clared, if France herself sincerely wants such a peace with 
her neighbours, she must give back to her neighbours the 
line of defence she has taken from them: to Germany, Al- 
sace, and the fortifications of the Netherlands, the Meuse, 
Moselle, and Saar. Not till then will France find herself in 
her true line of defence, with the Vosges and her double 
line of fortresses from the Meuse to the sea; and not till 



248 The French People 

then will France remain quiet. Let us not lose the mo- 
ment so favourable to the weal both of Europe and France 
which now offers for establishing a durable and sure 
peace." These words implied the belief that Napoleon was 
France, and that the national resentment felt against the 
emperor should be visited on the nation. Such a view was 
inaccurate; France was neither reactionary nor Jacobin. 
The mass of the French people feared the return of Jacob- 
inism, but had little responsibility for the Hundred Days. 
Nevertheless, the apathy and indifference of the French 
people were punished, when the real blame should have 
fallen on Napoleon and his supporters. 

Led astray by a false conception of the power of 
France and of the weakness of other nations, Napoleon 
was himself responsible for his overthrow; his fall was 
specially due to his obstinacy in not realizing that the exe- 
cution of his anti-English policy was impossible and in 
ignoring the magnitude of the opposition to France in 
Europe. Though the war of 1792 was a national war, 
the effects of the Revolution were essentially cosmopolitan 
and antinational. Speaking of the growth of German na- 
tional feeling. Napoleon said: " The dissatisfied souls for- 
got the benefits they had received individually in their 
resentment at their being granted by France." The 
French victories had indeed done a most useful work in^ 
breaking down feudalism in old Europe; but in abolishing 
the old-established forms of local self-government Napo- 
leon, evoked a spirit of opposition. The risings in Austria, 
Germany, and Spain were directed as much against the 
break with old-established customs as against the uni- 
formity introduced by the French. The outburst and 
growth of the feeling of nationality were distinctly opposed 



France in 1 8 15 249 

to the teaching of the French Revolution. French influ- 
ence had proved destructive to Hberty, and hence the 
Revolution gradually but surely called forth a bitter spirit 
of opposition. It was before the development of national 
feeling that Napoleon failed and fell. Indirectly he had 
given a great impulse to the idea of nationality by his con- 
quests in Germany and Italy, and so the work of the Napo- 
leonic period, apart from the emperor's restorative meas- 
ures within France, is by no means wholly destructive. 

Though the settlement of Europe in 1815 implied the 
triumph of eighteenth-century principles and of the idea 
of the balance of power, and though the Congress of Vi- 
enna ignored the new principle of nationality, France had 
in many ways benefited from the constructive work of 
Napoleon, and before many years were over the memory 
of one who was perhaps the greatest military genius in 
ancient or modern times was perpetuated by the growth 
of the Napoleonic legend. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1830 

The government of the Restoration enabled France to 
recover from her late wars. Peace brought a marvellous 
development in industry and commerce, and literature, 
freed from the tyranny of the empire, began to develop. 
At first politics continued to absorb men's attention, but 
as time went on Catholicism became the fashion, and while 
the monarchy began to look to the past for proofs of its 
rights, literature sought in the history of past times for its 
inspiration. Of this romantic revival the seeds in Europe 
had been sown during the years of the national uprising 
against Napoleon, and in France itself the ground was well 
prepared. After 1815 Chateaubriand, Lamennais, and De 
Maistre wrote without fear of governmental interference, 
and the rise of the romantic school was illustrated by the 
beginnings of Guizot, Villemain, Cousin, Thiers, and 
Mignet. A taste for historical and architectural study 
rapidly grew, and the middle ages became an object of in- 
terest. A new Hotel de Rambouillet was organized, in 
which, says Sainte-Beuve, " art was adored with closed 
doors, a new privilege was sought for in poetry, and a 
golden chivalry, a middle age of chatelaines, pages, and 
sponsors, a Christianity of chapels and hermits, was the 

theme of day dreams." Louis XVIII's government had 

250 



The Reign of Louis XVIII 251 

for a time a chance of establishing the Bourbons firmly on 
the throne, but having failed to gain the confidence of the 
country the influence of the popular party rapidly grew, 
and when Charles X ascended the throne the relations be- 
tween the liberal element in France and the ultra-royal- 
ists were very strained. Reactionary measures had been 
taken by Louis just before his death. Guizot and Royer- 
Collard were forbidden to lecture, Chateaubriand was dis- 
missed from office, the liberty of the press was checked, 
and the Jesuits became predominant in the state. 

In spite, however, of its many exaggerations, the reign 
of Louis XVIII saw an outburst of literature only equalled 
by that in Louis XIV's reign. It is possible to divide 
roughly the distinguished men of letters into two classes: 
First, there was the aristocratic party in literature, the 
watchword of which was for a time religion, and which 
included such men as Victor Hugo, Lamartine, Chateau- 
briand, Alfred de Vigny, Lamennais, fimile Deschamps, 
and others, while opposed to them were those who held 
various forms of liberal opinions. This party was inspired 
not by reHgion, but by a lofty patriotism. The Voltairean 
traditions were, as a rule, clung to, the empire was cele- 
brated, while Beranger and Casimir Delavigne were its 
principal poets, and were supported by Madame de Stael, 
Paul Louis Courier, and Benjamin Constant. 

On Charles X's accession the Villele ministry endeav- 
oured to eontinue the reactionary policy, and laws restrain- 
ing the publication of literature of all kinds and re-estab- 
lishing primogeniture were passed by the Chamber of 
Deputies, but rejected by the Peers, The new elections, 
in which men like Chateaubriand and Guizot took an ac- 
tive part, were followed by the resignation of Villele, and 



252 The French People 

Martignac became head of a ministry which for eighteen 
months inspired the hope that a constitutional government 
might grow up in France. But the dismissal of the Mar- 
tignac ministry by Charles X, followed by the issue of the 
famous Ordonnances, brought the Bourbon monarchy to 
an end. 

The Church played a large part in the history of the 
restored monarchy. Napoleon had intended " the Pope 
to be his minister of public worship, the bishops his re- 
ligious prefects, the parish priests their obedient subor- 
dinates." But during the reign of Louis XVIII and 
Charles X the Papacy entirely recovered its independence, 
and the bishops had no reason to fear the government. 
Nothing, of course, could be more favourable to the Ro- 
manist party than the royalist reaction which followed the 
fall of Napoleon, accompanied by the romantic movement 
in literature and art. The philosophy of the eighteenth 
century fell into disfavour, and war was practically de- 
clared upon toleration and liberty. Encouraged in their 
crusade by the apparent success which attended their 
efforts, the ultras attempted " to restore the old order with- 
out the liberties of the Gallican Church and with the addi- 
tion of the Jesuits." Their projects included the seizure 
of control of education from the university, and the conse- 
quent overthrowal of an important portion of Napoleon's 
edifice of centralization. The fall of Charles X was, as is 
well known, largely due to the follies of the parti pretre. 

In 1830 Charles X fled and Louis Philippe became 
king. The July revolution had none of the elements of 
the 1792 movement, or, indeed, of the revolution of 1848, 
when a powerful section endeavoured to reproduce the 
Jacobin programme. The position in Europe occupied 



The Doctrinaire Liberals 253 

by France since 1815 was in no wise endangered, and 
though risings against oppression took place in Spain, 
Belgium, and Italy, and though the movement in England 
in favour of reform was strengthened, the government of 
Louis Philippe came to an tmderstanding with England 
and quieted foreign susceptibilities by asserting a policy 
of nonintervention in Italy and Poland. The Restoration 
had been a triumph of the theory of divine right, and for a 
time the principle of the " sovereignty of the people " had 
been sensibly weakened. The liberal opposition, wisely 
recognising the limits of their powers, confined their 
efforts to insisting on a generous interpretation of the char- 
ter of Louis XVIII. At first their task seemed hopeless 
. before the reactionary influences which were especially 
prominent in the reign of Charles X. Like the early Stu- 
arts, the restored Bourbons based their absolutism on the 
alliance of the monarchy with the Church. But Charles 
X, like the English James II, entirely misunderstood the 
nature of the problem with which he had to deal, and what 
the revolution of 1688 was to the Stuarts that of 1830 was 
to the Bourbons. A new epoch in the history of modern 
France was opened, the policy of the doctrinaire liberals 
had triumphed, and while the theory of divine right dis- 
appeared, that of the sovereignty of the people was not 
fully established. 

The revolution of 1830 was a compromise; it was like 
the victory of the Reform Bill in England, a victory of 
the middle classes. The country accepted the action of 
Paris, but no enthusiasm was shown. The new govern- 
ment of Louis Philippe, like that of William III, was no 
longer regarded as of divine origin, but was merely looked 
upon as a temporary expedient. " The principle of the 



254 The French People 

revolution of July, as of the government derived from it, 
is not insurrection; it is resistance to the aggressions of 
authority. France was challenged and defied. She de- 
fended herself, and her victory is the victory of rights 
which had been unworthily outraged." These words of 
Casimir-Perier accurately describe the situation created by 
the revolution of 1830 and the accession of Louis Phi- 
lippe. The new king did not reign by inherent right, but 
by the will of the people, whose representative he was. 
Though a constitutional monarchy might be acceptable to 
the doctrinaire liberals, by the French nation it was by 
no means regarded with favour. Royalty had suffered a 
severe blow from which it never recovered, and the mon- 
archy of Louis Philippe remained a compromise which 
might or might not justify its existence. 

The revolution of 1830 was peculiarly a Paris revolu- 
tion, and the people in the country districts, fearful of a re- 
turn of revolutionary violence, indorsed the action of the 
two hundred and nineteen deputies, who had offered the 
revised charter to the Duke of Orleans. Some men found 
a comparison between the abdication of Charles X and the 
fall of James II of England, and hoped that a constitu- 
tional monarchy on English lines would be formed. But 
the French assembly split into groups under the middle- 
class monarchy of July, and all hope for the establishment 
of a government by party vanished. Nothing could ex- 
ceed the cowardice and vacillation of the majority of those 
concerned in the change of monarchs, and for five years 
riots frequently broke out, administrative anarchy pre- 
vailed in many parts of France, and it seemed at one time 
as though the country was drifting toward the condition of 
things in 1792 and 1793. 



Literature after 1830 255 

Having, however, succeeded in checking disorder with 
the aid of Casimir-Perier, Louis endeavoured in his own 
way to strengthen his throne. The circumstances of his 
accession to power forbade the adoption of a strong policy 
towards internal discontent, and in his foreign policy the 
king posed as the champion of peace. He has been called 
" an arbitrary monarch masquerading as a liberal, a con- 
servative disguised as a progressivist." In spite, however, 
of the contemptible character of the French government, 
the progress of the country continued to make enormous 
strides. Continued advances were effected in agriculture 
and manufactures, the peasants and artisans regarding the 
revolution of 1830 with indifference. Roads were made, 
bridges built, canals dug, and no effort was spared to im- 
prove the general condition of France. Population in- 
creased, the rate of wages was raised, the number of pro- 
prietors was largely added to. This continuous prosper- 
ity was aided by the excellent laws with regard to the ad- 
ministration of justice and other matters, by the founda- 
tion of large schools, and by the organization of primary 
education. Side by side with this remarkable progress 
went a splendid development in literature and art which 
was part of the renaissance begun under the Restoration, 
but which added considerably to the strength and reputa- 
tion of the July monarchy. 

In all departments of literature and art brilliant exam- 
ples of conspicuous talent were to be found. History, 
novels, and poetry were represented by such men as De 
Tocqueville, Augustin, Thierry, Thiers, Lamartine, Bal- 
zac, Chateaubriand, De Maistre, Lamennais, Victor Hugo, 
De Musset, and Alfred de Vigny, as art and music were 
by Horace Vernet, Delacroix, Meyerbeer, Rossini, and 



256 The French People 

many others. Under such writers and artists flourished 
what is known as the romantic movement. 

Every department of hterature, whether history, po- 
etry, drama, theology, or romance, were adequately repre- 
sented in the period from the Restoration to the revolution 
of 1848, and under the monarchy of July every class of so- 
ciety contributed to the literary splendour of the epoch. 
Not even in the days of privilege were so numerous, so 
varied, and so talented a band of writers produced. There 
is no doubt that many of the works of that period had a 
very considerable influence on the course of politics, and 
at the same time it must be remembered that it was during 
the years immediately following the July revolution that 
the romantic movement reached its culminating point. 

The revolution was in itself probably a disaster to 
France, for it was not followed by the gradual development 
of a constitutional monarchy, and it tended to check the 
literary and philosophic movement which was in full 
swing. Guizot and Thiers took to political life. Barante 
became an ambassador, and others hitherto interested in 
literature, natural science, and philosophy adopted political 
careers. Already, however, these men had become famous 
and inspired by the romanticists. Thierry and Guizot had 
done much for the renovation of historical studies, and 
they were followed by Thiers, De Tocqueville, Michelet, 
and Lamartine. The belief of Thierry that " history would 
stamp the nineteenth century for its own, just as philoso- 
phy had seized the eighteenth," has been fully borne out by 
the increased interest taken in the study of history. 

In 1820 Thierry, influenced by Les Martyrs of Cha- 
teaubriand and by the writings of Sir Walter Scott, wrote 
his Letters on the History of France, and in 1825 illus- 



Thiers and Guizot 257 

trated the methods of the new philosophic school of his- 
torians by his History of the Norman Conquest of Eng- 
land. In artistic fashion Thierry inquires what our an- 
cestors were, and what their characteristics. His object 
was not to find in the history of the middle ages proofs of 
the rights of the French monarchy: it was rather to ex- 
plain the growth of the middle classes and to justify their 
supremacy. In 1834 he wrote with the same object in 
view Dix Ans d'Etudes Historiques, but in 1840 his 
Recits des Temps Merovingiens, written in support of no 
fixed theory, gave the world, in place of a dull recital of 
events, a dramatic and graceful picture of primitive bar- 
barism. 

Guizot, published his Histoire du Gouvernement 
Representatif in i82i-'22 and his Essais sur I'Histoire de 
France in 1823, followed in 1827-28 by L'Histoire de la 
Revolution d'Angleterre, and in 1828-30 by his L'His- 
toire Generale de la Civilisation en France, being a course 
of lectures to which the whole literary public of Paris 
flocked. The Villele ministry had fallen, and after a sus- 
pension of nearly ten years Guizot was able to reopen 
his lecture rooms. His method is one of criticism and dis- 
sertation. Only in his English Revolution does he adopt 
the narrative form. The scientific study of history flour- 
ished in his hands, and he not only, like Thierry, inquired 
" what our ancestors were, but what made them so ; what 
gave rise to the peculiar state of society of the middle ages; 
and by what causes this state was progressively trans- 
formed into what we see around us." 

Thiers, like Thierry and Guizot, had an object in his 
writings, but he was not a philosopher, and in his History 
of the French Revolution, published between 1823 and 



258 The French People 

1828, he misrepresented the account of that movement. 
His history is untrustworthy, for he ahers the details and 
falsifies the facts. His contemporary Mignet, who also 
wrote an account of the French Revolution which is still 
read, gives an equally false view of that important period 
in French history. He omits essential facts and ignores 
some of the most salient features in the Revolution. 
" Thiers's portrait flatters the Revolution by altering the 
details; Mignet's coarser and colourless hand falsifies the 
outhne." 

There seems little doubt that the condition of politics 
when Thiers wrote led him to colour or falsify portions of 
his history. A writer to the Constitutionnel, together 
with Mignet and Armand Carrel, he founded the National, 
which prepared men's minds for the revolution of 1830. 
On Louis Philippe's accession Thiers was admitted to the 
Conseil d'Etat, and later became secretary of state for the 
finance department, while Mignet for his " enlightened 
liberalism " was made director of the archives of the for- 
eign department and received the star of the Legion of 
Honour, 

In his History of the Consulate and Empire (i840-'45) 
Thiers showed himself an enthusiastic if uncritical admirer 
of Napoleon. In all his writings eloquence and a lucid 
description of the political and financial condition of 
France are the features which strike the reader. His 
work, however, will never rank with that of Thierry, Gui- 
zot, or indeed with those of De Tocqueville or Michelet. 
The ablest member of the Philosophical School, Alexis de 
Tocqueville published between 1835 and 1839 his Democ- 
racy in America, a work of Immense interest and value. 
In it he attempts to ascertain the tendencies of democracy, 



De Tocqueville and Michelet 259 

its political effects, its influence on society, and on all the 
habits and feelings which go to make up national charac- 
ter. The progress of French society toward democracy 
had arrested his attention, and as he became convinced of 
the general irresistible tendency toward equality of condi- 
tion he was led to visit America to verify his convictions 
by observing the working of the constitution of the United 
States. 

Almost simultaneously with the investigations of De 
Tocqueville Michelet was giving to the astonished world 
of letters his spirited advocacy of the cause of democracy. 
In no sense a strict follower of the philosophic school, he 
has been called " the most unbridled of the romanticists," 
and in spite of his tendency to be so carried away by his 
enthusiasm as to give a false idea of history, his writings 
remain as an example of a brilliant style, of a fervid im- 
agination, and of a learning which few of his contempora- 
ries possessed, while his Moyen Age is the greatest of all 
his historical works, for in it he revived the spirit of the 
middle ages in a way not done even by Thierry. " To 
common perception those times are like a distant range 
of mountains, all melted together into one cloudlike bar- 
rier. To M. Michelet they are like the same range on 
a nearer approach, resolved into its separate mountain 
masses, with sloping sides overlapping one another and 
gorges opening between them." Like many of his friends, 
he hated the clergy and kings, and idolized the Revolution. 
His History of the Revolution, written between 1847 and 
1853, is marked by many defects, and is wanting in impar- 
tiality and accuracy. Like many of the historians of his 
day, he was profoundly affected by the democratic tenden- 
cies of the age; like them, his best work was done some 



26o The French People 

years before the revolution of 1848. Under the influence 
of such men as those already mentioned, the historical side 
of the romantic movement flourished, A new era in the 
study of the past was opened, the modern historical 
method was developed. 

In other paths of literature and letters the romantic 
movement was no less marked. Chateaubriand and Ma- 
dame de Stael had many followers, and the latter especially 
had immense influence on the development of a certain 
style in novel writing marked by picturesque descriptions 
and tragic surroundings. Alfred de Vigny's Military Serv- 
itude and Greatness, Lamartine's Jocelyn, Alfred de Mus- 
set's Confessions d'un Enfant du Siecle, were all written 
in 1835 and 1836, and illustrate some of the peculiar char- 
acteristics of the prose writings of the period, while Victor 
Hugo's Han d'Islande and Gautier's Jeune France display 
an excess of colour and picturesqueness not found in the 
works of such authors as George Sand and Balzac. Both 
these writers exhibit an independence of the romanticists 
which is refreshing. George Sand, the head of the ideal- 
ist school, owed much to Chateaubriand, and her early 
novels are marked by great originality; Balzac, " the apos- 
tle of realism," was writing his Human Comedy and giving 
to the world numerous examples of hisincomparable pow- 
ers. His influence on literature was destined to be im- 
mense, though he only wrote for the cultivated and intel- 
lectual classes. Till 1848 he and all the leading novelists, 
such as Alexandre Dumas, were more or less the products 
of the romantic movement, and with the historians and 
poets illustrate the extraordinary variety of the epoch. 
Poetry passed equally readily under the influence of ro- 
manticism. Victor Hugo's Odes, written in 1822, are 



Hugo and Beranger 261 

mainly classical, but in 1824 he published Les Orientales, 
and showed that he had joined the romantic school. The 
beauty of his poems was unquestioned, and in rapid suc- 
cession he wrote Les Feuilles d'Automne, Les Chants du 
Crepuscule, Les Voix Interieures, and Les Rayons et les 
Ombres. 

Like Lamartine, Beranger, and Delavigne, Victor 
Hugo was deeply interested in politics and in sympathy 
with the lower middle class, and though he erred on the 
side of a too intense reaHsm he threw open the gates of 
art, he attacked the classicists and defeated them, and be- 
came the idol of the literary and artistic youth of Paris. 

Till 1830 Lamartine, a poet " of sentiment and 
beauty," was under the influence of religious ardour and 
loyalty to the crown. His religious education, the mo- 
narchical traditions of his family, and his studies of Fene- 
lon well fitted him to write poems inspired by hatred of the 
Revolution and the empire. In direct opposition to the 
tone of his poetry Beranger wrote his peculiar lyrics. His 
watchword is La Patrie, and patriotism is the central idea 
of all his writings. While intensely artistic, Beranger 
wrote for the people, his view being that all, even the most 
humble, could be taught to appreciate the treasures of the 
imagination. Brimming over with originality, the songs 
of Beranger will always live. Like Beranger, Casimir 
Delavigne also wrote in a spirit of admiration for the 
Revolution and the empire. In 1824 he wrote two poems 
expressing the views of liberal France, and he celebrated 
the revolution of 1830 in his farnous La Parisienne. 

Romanticism, it has been said, was the liberalism of 
literature. " The greater part of the poets," writes Sainte- 
Beuve, " gave themselves up without control or restraint 
18 



262 The French People 

to all the instincts of their nature, and also to all the pre- 
tensions of their pride, and even to all the follies of their 
vanity." In spite of its faults romanticism gave to France 
a school of lyric poets unequalled in any other period of her 
history. 

Theophile Gautier, on the other hand, only cared for 
art, and disliked politics and the bourgeois element. Like 
Hugo, he did much for the French language by his care 
for form, while in beauty of imagery he will compare fa- 
vourably with any of his contemporaries. 

Criticism no less than poetry entered upon a new 
phase, and its principal exponents were Sainte-Beuve and 
Villemain. Both were affected by the ideas of the roman- 
tic school, both had considerable influence upon literature. 
Sainte-Beuve, whose brilliant criticisms are so well known, 
had produced in his Tableau de la Poesie Franqaise au 
Seizieme Siecle a work which had enormous influence 
on the romantic movement, while Villemain, who had 
studied philosophy in Germany, and who introduced the 
Hegelian system into France, influenced the men of his 
generation by his lectures, and especially by the publica- 
tion in 1826 of his Fragments Philosophiques. Other able 
prose writers were Courier, who had no sympathy with the 
empire and little with the Restoration, and Lamennais, 
who represented the views of the ultramontanes so strenu- 
ously that the Papacy disavowed his advocacy. 

Failing to secure an alliance between the papal author- 
ity and the supremacy of the people, Lamennais became 
after 1830 an avowed democrat and, with Lacordaire and 
Montalembert, one of the leading supporters of liberal 
Catholicism. His liberal contemporary Benjamin Con- 
stant opposed the idea of an absolute authority, and, influ- 



Criticism and Art 263 

enced by his experience of the evils of the ancien regime of 
the Revolution and of the empire, regarded government as 
a necessary evil and advocated the complete independence 
of the individual. Like many liberals of the day, he de- 
sired complete toleration of all religious systems, though 
he himself belonged to no religious party and was con- 
vinced that religion was a sentiment in the heart of man. 
A friend of Madame de Stael, he had, like her, been exiled 
by Napoleon. Lamennais throughout his career was al- 
ways the ardent supporter of some absolute power, but 
Constant never varied in his dislike of governmental au- 
thority. 

During the reigns of Louis XVIII, Charles X, and 
Louis Philippe France was experiencing a social and po- 
litical reconstruction, and while these eminent writers each 
in his own way aided in the recovery and development of 
the country, the period was embellished by the skill of 
various architects and artists and by the eloquence of sev- 
eral learned divines. 

The genius of the painters was exemplified by Ingres, 
Delacroix, Horace Vernet, Paul Delaroche, and oth- 
ers. While Ingres represented the classicists, Delacroix 
and his disciples fought the battle for the romantic 
school. In every department of art, letters, and natural 
science the renaissance following the Restoration found 
brilliant exponents. Lacordaire and Montalembert up- 
held Catholicism against sceptics and the union of democ- 
racy with religious theocracy. The eloquence of Lacor- 
daire, indeed, attracted vast crowds to Notre Dame, and in 
him the romantic school could claim one of the boldest 
and most impassioned preachers of the day. 

A period of such variety, which included a Beranger, a 



264 The French People 

Balzac, a Michelet, and a Vernet, could not fail to consti- 
tute an epoch in the history of European letters. Since 
the reign of Louis XIV France had enjoyed no such 
" golden season of art and letters." 

From 1830 many of the foremost names in litera- 
ture are to be found among the politicians of the July 
monarchy. Thiers, Guizot, Barante, the Due de Broglie, 
with many others, took part in affairs during the reign 
of Louis Philippe. The romantic movement suffered 
from its connection with the middle-class monarchy, 
which, having failed to establish parliamentary govern- 
ment on English lines, and having succeeded in raising 
general disaffection, which was increased by the financial 
condition of France, and by an agricultural crisis, was 
ended by the revolution of 1848. 

In all departments Louis Philippe's government had 
shown incompetence. His concessions to the threats of 
Rome were regarded as the result of weakness, and while 
not strengthening him with the clerical party, weakened 
the respect felt for him by the nation. Thiers, whose in- 
fluence and advice were fatal to Louis Philippe and France, 
hoped to secure the subservience of the Church. He as- 
sisted in dealing a serious blow at secular education, and 
approved of the occupation of Rome. 

But if the attitude of Louis Philippe and his ministers 
to the Church was a mistaken one, the faults of French 
foreign policy were no less glaring. Guizot, who had 
agreed with the subservient attitude adopted toward the 
clergy, pursued methods in his foreign policy which were 
nothing less than dishonourable. After the fall, in 1840, 
of Thiers, whose action in bringing back Napoleon's ashes 
to France revived the Napoleonic legend, and whose war- 



Guizot's Optimism 265 

like policy had alarmed the king, Guizot became practi- 
cally the guiding spirit of the government. His eloquence 
was such that he inspired a confidence for which there was 
no justification. Having secured the estabhshment of 
the July monarchy, he was, like Burke, opposed to any 
change in the Constitution, and by his obstinate conserva- 
tism insured the fall of the Orleanist dynasty. The sup- 
porter of constitutionalism and the middle classes, His posi- 
tion resembled that taken up by the Whigs in England 
after the Reform Bill. " The middle classes," he said, 
" have no taste for great enterprises. When driven to un- 
dertake them by chance, they are uneasy and embarrassed. 
Responsibility troubles them; they feel out of their ele- 
ment, and, being anxious to return to it, they drive easy 
bargains." 

To Guizot the middle classes represented the most 
important body in France, and as long as they were con- 
tented he never realized the necessity of considering the 
advisability of introducing reforms in the electoral and 
parliamentary system. In this failure to realize the neces- 
sity of reform Guizot was encouraged by Louis Philippe, 
and though in 1847 clouds gathered over the political 
horizon, though the financial situation increased the gen- 
eral disaffection, and though an ominous agitation for 
parliamentary reform threatened danger to the govern- 
ment, Guizot preserved his optimistic and uncompromis- 
ing attitude. A reform banquet was forbidden by the au- 
thorities to take place on February 22, 1848. Fighting 
took place in the streets on the 22d and 23d. On the 
24th Louis Philippe abdicated and the revolution of 1848 
was triumphant. 



CHAPTER XIX 



THE REVOLUTION OF U 



The year 1848 has been called the year of unfulfilled 
revolutions. Louis Philippe's flight was the signal for 
the revolutionary tide to set strong against many Euro- 
pean dynasties. Though the revolutions which burst out 
all over Europe came upon the world as a surprise, in 
France the fall of the monarchy had long been ex- 
pected. 

There was nothing in the reign of the bourgeois king 
to attract the French people; it was unsuited to their gen- 
ius and temper. Moreover, the monarchy of July always 
sufifered from the fact that it was a compromise. It repre- 
sented neither the divine right of kings nor the principle of 
the sovereignty of the people. In England logic in po- 
litical matters is at a discount, but the French are a logical 
people and the monarchy of July was illogical. The 
French, too, have often shown that they would willingly 
lose even domestic liberty for the sake of glory and na- 
tional greatness, and they have always appreciated the 
appearance of splendour in their system of government. 
But while Louis Philippe's home government was of a 
mean and sordid character, his foreign policy by its 
methods and want of success lowered the prestige of 

France. Consequently the throne had been long shaken, 
266 



Causes of the Revolution 267 

and Louis Philippe's own indecision in the hour of trial 
rendered his fall certain. 

Nothing was more unforeseen by the doctrinaires than 
the revolution of 1848. They were the heirs of the mem- 
bers of the Constituent Assembly, who had hoped by lib- 
eral reforms to check the tide of anarchy, and they were 
also the heirs of the Girondists. Though Louis XVIII 
was an admirer of Voltaire, the reactionary influences ran 
strongly in his reign, and Charles X became the avowed 
champion of legitimacy and of the rule of priests and no- 
bles. The revolution of 1830 seemed to the constitution- 
alists to establish a limited and parliamentary monarchy 
on a permanent basis. For eighteen years Louis Philippe 
reigned, and was advised by the most cultivated body of 
men in France. In Guizot and Thiers, in Casimir-Perier, 
Laflitte, and the Due de Broglie, the Orleanists possessed 
some of the best orators of the day — men steeped in 
constitutional philosophy and admirers of the English 
constitution, which they profoundly misunderstood. 

These doctrinaires failed to secure the support of the 
artisans, the advocates of legitimacy consistently opposed 
the citizen king, and thus the monarchy rested not on 
the broad basis of democracy, but upon the loyalty of the 
middle class, whose interests were guarded by the small 
body of theorists who formed, for the most part, the minis- 
tries of the reign. 

Though the leaders of the Orleanists were themselves 
honest, corruption was rampant, the traffic in places was 
scandalous, and with its small constituency — only about 
two hundred thousand people enjoying the franchise — 
France became like a close borough, while Louis Philippe, 
like George III, was " naivement, consciencieusement cor- 



268 The French People 

rupteur." The doctrinaires had the same confidence as 
the Girondists in the last century had in the soundness of 
their views. But parhamentary management could not 
destroy the French love of equality, and fine phrases and 
constitutional maxims did not satisfy a people which had 
lost confidence in and respect for their king. Guizot's 
honest though obstinate belief in the strength of the par- 
liamentary system may be said to have given him the 
doubtful honour of having largely contributed to the over- 
throw of Louis Philippe's throne. 

Nevertheless, though the monarchy of July had ceased 
to satisfy the French nation, and for some time past had 
been tottering to its fall, it remains true that France was by 
no means prepared for a republic. As it was, the Parisian 
mob forced on events, and a provisional government was 
formed to carry on the administration of the country. The 
members of the government at first included Lamartine, 
Ledru-Rollin, Dupont de I'Eure, Arago, Marie, Garnier- 
Pages, and Cremieux, and to these were added shortly 
afterward, at the wish of some thirty revolutionists who 
had assembled at the office of the Reforme, Louis Blanc, 
Flocon, Marrast, and an artisan named Albert. This 
mixed government thus included members of the bour- 
geoisie like Dupont and socialists like Louis Blanc, and 
was only held together by the eloquence of Lamartine. 

As the country had not declared its opinion upon the 
late events, the provisional government was not compe- 
tent to decide between a monarchy and a republic. But 
events proved too strong for the ministers, and a procla- 
mation was issued stating that " the provisional govern- 
ment wills the republic, under conditions of approval by 
the people, who will be immediately consulted," and on 



Lamartine 269 

February 26th it was declared that " in the name of the 
French people, monarchy, under every form, is abolished 
without possibility of return." 

The republic thus constituted owed its establishment 
in great measure to Lamartine's eloquence and honesty. 
He and his friends undoubtedly desired a republic, and 
were convinced that that form of government was best 
suited to the French people. The History of the Giron- 
dins, a glorification of republicanism, had an immense in- 
fluence for a short time, and Frenchmen were carried away 
by Lamartine's moving rhetoric. " I declare before God 
and before you," he had said, " that if this day is big with a 
revolution, I will not conspire for a half revolution, I will 
conspire, indeed, for none; but I will accept only a repub- 
lic." He was convinced that a provisional government 
would be unable to keep down disorder and to carry on 
the administration. " Republicans, legitimists, socialists, 
communists, and terrorists," he declared, " however op- 
posed in their ulterior objects, will fling together their vio- 
lence to overthrow the feeble barrier of a transition gov- 
ernment. If anarchy can be subdued, it is by the republic. 
If communism can be conquered, it is by the republic. 
If the revolution can be guided, it is by the republic. 
If blood can be spared, it is by the republic." Lamartine, 
carried away by his own convictions and believing himself 
to be singularly free from illusions, made two stupendous 
mistakes in his calculations. His estimate of the spread 
of republican doctrines in France was entirely wrong, and 
his belief that a republic could alone control the socialists 
and communists proved equally fallacious. 

The monarchy had made itself unpopular, but not to 
the extent imagined by Lamartine, who in the following 



2 70 The French People 

sentences expressed his own exaggerated opinion of the 
situation at the beginning of 1848: " A reign of eighteen 
years by a single man, representing a single class, has 
accumulated behind it a mass of revolutionary ideas, im- 
patience, resentment, and hatred, which it will be impossi- 
ble for any new monarchy to satisfy." Though at first the 
French people, furious at the old king allowing his throne 
to be so easily overthrown by the Parisians, forgot that 
they were monarchists at heart and accepted the republic, 
a reaction was bound to follow. And this reaction 
brought home to Lamartine his mistake in reviving the 
revolutionary legend and thinking that a republic would 
satisfy the extreme sections of Parisian society. The re- 
public of 1848, as a matter of fact, only lasted from Febru- 
ary to June. Officially, it existed four years, from 1848 to 
1852, but in reality it merely lasted four months. " The 
revolution," said Proudhon, " had come before its time." 
He realized clearly that the socialists would endeavour to 
forward their projects for a social revolution, and that 
France was not ready to receive their doctrines. He fore- 
saw that though many sections in France were dissatisfied 
with the government of Louis Philippe, the time had not 
yet arrived for uniting all Frenchmen in a steadfast desire 
to set up a republic. " Numerous criticisms of the old so- 
ciety," he said, " had been made, most of them vague, all 
of them imbued with sentimentality and mysticism, some 
more philosophic and more reasonable; but from all this 
chaos of declamatory discussion no light had been struck; 
the daily press did not occupy itself with the question; the 
immense majority of readers were indifferent to it." 

Proudhon's prophecy was fully borne out. The re- 
public was regarded by the mass of Frenchmen as a tempo- 



The National Workshops 271 

rary expedient, and not, as Lamartine and the republicans 
conceived it, as a means for bringing about the reconstitu- 
tion of society. The latter imagined that every man in 
every class would receive it with enthusiasm, and that 
every district in France would co-operate with the govern- 
ment in establishing it on a firm foundation. 

But the events between February and May undeceived 
them; Lamartine and the majority of the provisional gov- 
ernment had no sympathy with the revolutionists and so- 
cialist workingmen represented by Louis Blanc and Al- 
bert. To these men a republic meant the overthrow of 
capital, an immediate social transformation, the abolition 
of ignorance and misery, the emancipation of the pro- 
ducers. Such Utopian ideas and hopes were not shared 
by many Frenchmen outside Paris, but the extremists, 
though few in number, were united in aim, and endeav- 
oured to force upon the government their views. At first 
they were successful, and the provisional government 
agreed to set up " national workshops " for the unem- 
ployed, and empowered Louis Blanc to conduct a com- 
mission of inquiry. Supported by the trade societies, he 
set up at the Luxemburg a " Labour Parlement," where 
was discussed all problems connected with labour and 
capital. Then were stirred up the passions of the work- 
ingmen, who were assured by their president, Louis Blanc, 
that the existing social order was iniquitous, and that the 
time was coming when the labouring classes would be 
powerful and rich. Thus roused, the members of the La- 
bour Parlement, who numbered nearly forty thousand, be- 
came a strong organization, suspicious of the provincial 
government and ready to support the revolutionary party. 

This party, thus relying on the national workshops and 



2 72 The French People 

the Labour Parlement, was well aware that the mass of 
public opinion was against it. Universal suffrage had 
been established, and Lamartine and most of his col- 
leagues, anxious to lay down their authority, had fixed the 
election for April 9th. The professional agitators at once 
took alarm. In imitation of the Jacobins of the first Revo- 
lution clubs had been formed and revolutionary missions 
to the provinces organized. From the ranks of the ex- 
tremists Ledru-Rollin, the minister of the interior, had 
selected agents who replaced the prefects and subprefects 
in the departments. Counting on the political apathy of 
the majority of Frenchmen, the little group of revolution- 
ists hoped to terrorize France, and, as in 1794, to set up 
a sort of Committee of Public Safety, which, though only 
representing a very small minority, might, by means of 
organization, seize hold of the reins of power. 

Though the ignorant voters were probably as capable 
of knowing what was best for their interests as were 
Barbes, Blanqui, Louis Blanc, and Caussidiere, these 
latter determined to bring about the postponement of 
the elections. On March 17th a demonstration took 
place, and representatives of some one hundred and fifty 
thousand men who had democratic and socialistic sympa- 
thies interviewed members of the government, and de- 
manded the postponement of the elections. The minis- 
ters, though refusing to yield to dictation, eventually 
agreed to adjourn the elections to April 23d. A fresh 
attempt to coerce the government was defeated by the 
national guards, who represented, the middle class, and the 
elections were held on the day fixed. 

Louis Blanc, Blanqui, and Caussidiere had failed. 
Out of the nine hundred members of the new National As- 



The Elections of 1848 273 

sembly the reactionaries had a large majority. Lamar- 
tine and those of his colleagues who supported him were 
easily returned, while the advanced men either suffered de- 
feat at the polls or were returned with difficulty. The 
meaning of the elections was unmistakably clear. The 
country was willing to establish a republic based on 
the sovereignty of the people; it was most anxious to re- 
store order and to put an end to the general feeling of in- 
security. The voters had no love of the monarchy, but 
they feared to attempt a socialistic experiment. A repub- 
lic controlled by the party of order, by men who could be 
trusted, was what the French nation wanted, not a repub- 
lic of socialists. 

At the elections the French citizen was a free agent. 
Unlike the situation in 1814, 1815, and 1870, when France 
was either threatened with invasion or occupied by foreign 
armies, in 1848 the French people had no reason to fear 
any attack from abroad, and had their destinies in their 
own hands. In 1830 the voters were asked to recognise 
in the accession of Louis Philippe an accomplished fact: 
in 1848, however, the voters had it in their power to carry 
out what policy they preferred. It was quite evident that 
the mass of Frenchmen desired to secure the safety and 
stability of the state, the maintenance of order, the fur- 
therance of the welfare of the country, a policy of peace. 
It was seen that the principle of the " national work- 
shops," weakly assented to by Lamartine in February, was 
unacceptable to the majority of the French, and the elec- 
tions proved that the electors wished to defend, not to 
weaken, the rights of property. Recognising the reac- 
tionary character of the Assembly, Louis Blanc and the 
socialists determined on action. 



2 74 The French People 

The government was on May loth invited to form 
a " ministry of progress," which should organize co-opera- 
tive associations on certain lines approved by Blanc. The 
rejection of this proposal was immediately followed by a 
protest in which it was stated — that " the promises made 
on the barricades not having been accomplished, and the 
Assembly having refused on the loth of May to form a 
ministry of labour and progress, we workingmen, dele- 
gates at the Luxemburg, have unanimously decided not 
to take part in the fete, so called, of concord." 

On May 15th the Chamber was stormed by a mob 
headed by Albert and Barbes, who attempted to set up a 
provisional government in place of the National Assembly. 
The middle class determined to enforce order, supported 
the government, and the national guards, headed by La- 
martine, drove out the rioters. Fearful of a recurrence of 
the scenes of 1792 and 1793, the bourgeois love of order 
had given overwhelming evidence of its resolve not to 
allow Jacobin views to prevail, socialism was defeated, and 
the Assembly had won the day. It only remained to grad- 
ually suppress the national workshops, which, in a mo- 
ment of weakness, Lamartine and his colleagues had al- 
lowed to be set up. 

The workmen, who either were performing nominal 
tasks or were working one day in four and receiving half 
pay on the nonworking days, numbered in May about one 
hundred thousand. These workmen constituted a serious 
danger to the existence of order and good government. 
The Assembly decided to issue a decree on June 21st 
which put an end to the workshops. Though the experi- 
ment had been foolish, the terms offered the men were un- 
just, and on June 23d an insurrection broke out, with 



Louis Bonaparte 275 

the result that General Cavaignac, minister of war, was 
appointed dictator and given full powers. 

The insurgents fought well for four days, and the regu- 
lar troops lost nine hundred killed and two thousand 
wounded. But resistance to the soldiers was hopeless, and 
the victory of the Assembly was easily assured. The 
revolution of June, 1848, constitutes one of the turning 
points in the history of France. It was the first attempt 
since the days of the Committee of Public Safety to estab- 
lish the supremacy of Jacobin principles; it was an attempt 
to force the views of a minority upon the people of France; 
it was an endeavour to overthrow the republican regime 
and to substitute a despotism as severe as that of Robes- 
pierre and Saint- Just. The moderate republicans suffered, 
though not so severely as the extreme revolutionists. 
Though Lamartine had refused to accept the red flag, he 
was unable to secure the confidence of the mass of the 
nation. He had been one of the principal agents in bring- 
ing about the revolution, but, though he had no sympa- 
thy with the socialists, he had called up the spectre of 1792 
and 1793, which he had great difficulty in laying, and had 
inspired disorder. To avoid the danger of a reconstruc- 
tion of society, the newly enfranchised population of 
France ignored Lamartine and gave the supreme authority 
to Louis Bonaparte. Very striking is this opposition on 
the part of the mass of the French people to any attempt 
to return to Jacobinism or to endanger the stability of ex- 
isting institutions. 

In 1830 the government of Charles X, fearing a recru- 
descence of the views of 1792, had adopted measures which 
brought about a revolution and the accession of Louis 
Philippe. In 1848 France showed unmistakably her opin- 



276 The French People 

ion of the wisdom of adopting" the theories and of imbib- 
ing the " deadly poHtical poison " of Jacobinism; in 1871 
the communists were relentlessly put down. 

The course of events succeeding Cavaignac's triumph 
is well known, A commission of inquiry into the acts of 
the provisional government brought to light the chaos 
which had somewhat naturally existed for a time in the 
administration. For this state of things the republic most 
unfairly suffered much discredit. At the same time the 
Assembly decided not only to support universal suffrage 
throughout the country, but to give the nation an oppor- 
tunity of electing the head of the state. On December 
10, 1848, Louis Napoleon was elected to the presidency of 
the French RepubHc by 5,434,216 out of 7,327,345 votes. 

Such an election following within twelve months the 
establishment of the republic is of importance, as showing 
unmistakably what were the real views of the French 
people. For the first time since the revolution of 1789 
France had an opportunity of declaring her wishes. In 
1848 she had to choose between a socialist experiment 
based on Jacobin views, a republic built up on communal 
and departmental institutions, and the peace and prosper- 
ity which it was believed was certain to follow from the 
election of Napoleon Bonaparte to the presidency. 

The middle class alone might have preferred not to 
run the risk of the establishment of an empire, but the 
peasants were fully resolved to sacrifice everything for the 
restoration of order. Their hatred of feudalism and their 
dread of the return of the ancien regime had prevented any 
rising on their part against the Directory; in 1848 they 
were so dominated by the love of order, they were so per- 
meated with conservatism, that they willingly, with their 



The Second Empire 277 

eyes open and of their own free will, elected Bonaparte. 
The new president was careful to declare that he repre- 
sented the principles of the revolution of 1789. Be- 
tween Jacobinism and the party of reaction stood the 
greater portion of the French nation, which was always 
alive to the necessity of political and social stability. 
Without the consent of the majority of the French people 
the Hundred Days and the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 
had been brought about. The popular voice had now as- 
serted itself in favour of a powerful executive. In 1852 it 
willingly accepted the second empire, and thus, as De 
Tocqueville foresaw, universal suffrage was immediately 
followed by the establishment of an arbitrary monarchical 
government. 



19 



CHAPTER XX 

THE NAPOLEONIC LEGEND AND THE SECOND EMPIRE 

At the close of 185 1 a coup d'etat placed Louis Napo- 
leon in possession of the government and a plebiscite con- 
ferred the presidency on him for ten years. On December 
2, 1852, a second plebiscite having testified to a strong 
feeling throughout France in favour of the rule of one 
man, the president was proclaimed emperor as Napo- 
leon III. 

These plebiscites fully justified that conception of his 
position which Napoleon had early formed. The Res- 
toration merely represented the triumph of the nobles; 
the monarchy of July, that of the middle classes; the re- 
public of 1848, an attempt to return to the doctrines of 
1793. He aimed at representing the nation as a whole. 
Universal suffrage had resulted in the government being 
conferred on Louis Napoleon, who therewith regarded 
himself as justified in establishing his own authority and in 
transforming the government into a constitutional mon- 
archy. 

His success in attaining to the supreme power was due 

to many causes, chief among which must be placed the 

remarkable growth of the Napoleonic legend, attributing 

to the first emperor a policy which he probably never con- 

278 



Napoleon Ill's Success 279 

sidered, and assigning to him intentions by which he was 
never actuated. 

It was forgotten that the Restoration had come as an 
immense rehef to a people exhausted after a period of 
war following a revolution and lasting some twenty-three 
years. It was also forgotten that the great outburst in 
literature, art, and natural science known as the Romantic 
Revival was due to the fall of Napoleon, and the close of 
an epoch which had brought France defeat, foreign in- 
vasion, and loss of territory. Till the Memorial of Saint 
Helena was sent forth by Las Casas Frenchmen who had 
not served in the army looked back with aversion to the 
military despotism of the empire. But the imprisonment 
of the emperor on Saint Helena and the account of his 
captivity roused the sympathy of the French nation, and 
the Napoleonic legend was born. 

By bringing to France the emperor's ashes Louis Phi- 
lippe accentuated the growing admiration for and sympa- 
thy with the regime of the great emperor, and the regard 
for his memory increased. The revival of the legend was 
encouraged by such writers as Beranger and Thiers. The 
ballads of the former became immensely popular; " the 
little corporal with his gray military coat " became a well- 
known saying; while the histories of Thiers, unintention- 
ally, no doubt, caused the name of Napoleon I to become 
so endeared to the masses that the first use the peasants 
made of the grant of universal suffrage was to elect Louis 
Napoleon dictator. For the establishment of the second 
empire Thiers was as responsible as any one man. 

Thiers was essentially a representative of modern 
France, and no one was a greater admirer of the revolu- 
tion of 1789 and of the traditional foreign poHcy of France 



28o The French People 

as pursued by the Convention and the Directory. He be- 
Heved that France was and should remain the first country 
in Europe, and was convinced that her colonial and other 
failures were due to the absence of statesmen. Provided 
she could find statesmen like Chatham or Frederick the 
Great, he believed France would regain the position she 
held in the world before the Seven Years' War. To him 
Henry IV and Napoleon as First Consul embodied those 
qualities which he regarded as essential for recovering for 
France her lost prestige. He saw that the revolution of 
1789 constituted a distinct breach with the past, and he 
recognised that the Napoleonic institutions had outlived 
the storms of the War of Liberation, the Restoration, and 
the revolution of 1830. He therefore was deeply anxious 
that these institutions should not be disturbed and that 
France should follow her ancient principles of foreign pol- 
icy. In his History of the Consulate and the Empire he 
did much to develop an idolatry for a man who had 
aroused among the French people a passion for military 
glory and who had subordinated all institutions to the wel- 
fare of the army. Till 1830 the admiration of Napoleon 
did not assert itself, but the writings of Thiers revived the 
passion for a man " who had shed the blood of his coun- 
trymen like water, who had extinguished their liberties, 
who had dwarfed their literature, and made France an in- 
tellectual desert." 

Louis Napoleon had himself taken advantage of the 
growing feeling among the peasants In favour of a Napo- 
leonic regime, and had in 1840 published his Idees Napo- 
leoniennes, in which he asserted that had Napoleon I lived 
he would have gradually modified his centralized despot- 
ism and returned to the ideas of the revolution of 1789. 



The Memory of Napoleon I 281 

This view that Napoleon's centralized system was only a 
temporary expedient necessitated by the anarchy and 
chaos brought about by the Directory readily found fa- 
vour with Frenchmen, and especially with the peasant 
class. This class had gained by the revolution of 1789, 
and, being in full possession of its lands, dreaded any dis- 
turbance, and was willing to sacrifice political liberty for 
the sake of freedom from anxiety with regard to the ten- 
ure of its property. Napoleon I had owed his success in 
great measure to the fact that he understood the needs of 
the nation. 

As the reconstructor of France he lived in the minds of 
the peasants; he gave them the administrative system 
suited to their temperament, and they repaid him by for- 
getting his despotism, his taxes, and his overweening am- 
bition, and looked back on the days of his rule with envy. 
Of the Napoleonic reorganization Mr. Bodley says: "It 
is not perfect — no human work is; but admirably suited 
to the French temperament is the organization which, cre- 
ated in less than a decade amid the alarms of war, Jias not 
only performed its functions for three generations, but 
stands erect as the framework to keep French society 
together amid the fever of insurrection or the more hn- 
gering disorder of parliamentary anarchy, just as though 
it owed its stability to the growth of ages." *• 

The tradition of Napoleon's achievements had in 1848 
quite obliterated the memory of the bloodshed caused by 
his wars, while the legend of the splendour of the empire 
stood in striking contrast to the middle-class monarchy of 
Louis Philippe and its materialist ambitions. 

* France, by J. S. E. Bodley, vol. i, p. 109. 



282 The French People 

In 1848 and the following years, however, the peas- 
antry had no desire for martial glory; they simply desired 
to be protected against socialism, and they resented the 
action of the monarchist majority in the National As- 
sembly in repudiating on May 31, 1850, the principle of 
universal suffrage, Louis Napoleon owed his position as 
president to the votes of the people, and the monarchist 
majority had also been elected under the same system. 
The monarchists having resolved to do away with the 
work of the revolutionary democrats and to overthrow the 
president, had disfranchised three million electors, and 
by so doing had ruined all their prospects. 

Amid conflicting interests and factions the president 
was able to appeal with ejffect to the memory of the great 
Napoleon. The removal of the general sense of insecurity 
and the firm establishment of a government which would 
check faction and put down disorder with a firm hand was 
demanded by the mass of the nation. In a speech on Oc- 
tober 2, 1852, Louis Napoleon clearly described the situa- 
tion and defined his aims. 

In it he shows that he fully appreciated the fact that 
he owed his position to the divisions among his op- 
ponents and to the general expectation that, like his 
uncle, Napoleon I, he would save society from anarchy and 
chaos. 

The people, he declared, " know that in 1852 society 
was rushing to its ruin, because every party was consoling 
itself beforehand for the universal shipwreck by the hope 
of planting its flag on any dehris that might float to the 
surface. ... To forward the welfare of the country it is 
not necessary to apply new systems, but to give, above all, 
confidence in the present, security for the future. . . . 



Napoleon IIFs Character 283 

That is how France seems to wish to return to the 
empire. ... In a spirit of mistrust certain people say, 
The empire is war. I say, The empire is peace! " * 

In these words, Louis Napoleon endeavoured with suc- 
cess to impress upon France the view already alluded to, 
that the great emperor only used despotism as a tempo- 
rary expedient, and intended, as soon as his political sys- 
tem was established, to form a constitutional government, 
in which liberty should be fully enjoyed by the press and 
by all Frenchmen, and further, that he, the president, in- 
tended to develop this policy, to preserve peace, and to 
favour industrial progress. 

The character of Napoleon III is one of the most com- 
plex in modern French history. Kindness, generosity, 
gratitude, were all found in him; he was aware of the needs 
of the world and of the national aspirations of France. He 
had long been a private citizen, and he alone of French 
politicians had a practical knowledge of foreign countries. 
Much that he did was beneficial to Europe and to France. 
His wish for the overthrow of the Austrians in Italy, his 
liberal commercial ideas, his opposition to the Jesuits, all 
were parts of a policy to be expected from a man who had 
seen much of the world. At the same time it is undoubted 
that he was a dreamer and idealist, with much of the fatalist 
in his composition. He did not shrink from bloodshed in 
1852, and his enemies assert that he never realized the dif- 
ference between right and wrong. He showed infinite pa- 
tience and perseverance in carrying out his ideas, and 
throughout his reign he endeavoured to shape the course 
of history and to direct the course of the European powers. 

* Quoted by S. Lowes Dickinson in Revolution and Reaction in 
France, p. 226. 



284 The French People 

He had nothing of the political genius of Mirabeau, he had 
not the determination of Napoleon I. 

It has been said that there was in him '' a strange 
mixture of imperialistic traditions, and the recollections 
of a carbonari of scientific pursuits and English experi- 
ences, newspaper culture, and an antipathy, half plebeian, 
half aristocratic, to the prosiness of the bourgeois spirit 
which he found incorporated in the July monarchy." 

The nation, which had seized the reins of power in 
June, 1848, had placed him at the head of affairs in De- 
cember, 1 85 1, and a year later supported his adoption of 
the imperial title. In his dislike of the bourgeoisie and the 
Orleanists he represented the views of the greater part of 
the nation, and, like it, he was weary of the volume of elo- 
quence which was poured forth in the French Chambers. 
Thus supported by the French people, he formed the 
theory of a democratic dictatorship which would give to 
the nation the reforms which it desired, and he determined 
to establish a government based on equality and one which 
would lessen the power in the assembly of the plutocratic 
bourgeoisie. 

It was therefore as a democratic chief, appointed to 
suppress all attempts to revive Jacobinism on the one 
hand, and on the other to check the projects of doctri- 
naires and to substitute authority for so-called liberty, that 
Louis Napoleon entered upon his duties as emperor. Be- 
fore his overthrow at the battle of Sedan he had slowly 
and gradually effected changes in the constitution all in 
the direction of parliamentary government, and thus had 
carried out what he always conceived to be the policy of 
Napoleon I. 

The fear and hatred of anarchy and the dread of any 



Fear of Socialism 285 

return to the ancien regime were thus the strongest forces 
which built up the empire. The name of Bonaparte was a 
guarantee that there should be no return to the ancien 
regime, and that all anarchy should cease. " All the mem- 
ories," says Baron Pierre de Courbetin, " in France and 
Europe of the great epic of the first empire were sud- 
denly revived and illuminated by the appearance of Napo- 
leon's nephew in the arena of politics." The socialists of 
1848 had threatened the security of property, and had 
roused universal apprehension among all French pro- 
prietors, large and small. These had united in a common 
aim and determination to save their property from present 
and prospective attacks. This union of the propertied 
classes, which included the peasants as well as the gentry, 
came as a staggering blow to the endeavour of the revo- 
lutionists to enforce their will on France. When their 
next attempt was made, in 1871, they ostensibly gave up 
their policy of forcing their will upon the peasants, and 
adopted the cry of the emancipation of the large towns 
from the influence of the country districts. 

Another source of strength to Napoleon's empire was 
the well-merited unpopularity of the Assembly. Since 
1830 the doctrinaire liberals had habitually indulged in 
lengthy debates, and, though no doubt many wise words 
were uttered, the only result was the fall of the monarchy 
of Louis Philippe. With the revolution of 1848 the par- 
liamentary regime fell into great discredit, and though Na- 
poleon, as president, was opposed in the Assembly by men 
who were perhaps the most cultivated in France, he had 
no difficulty in taking advantage of the unpopularity of 
the Assembly and founding a system of " enlightened des- 
potism," 



286 The French People 

A third source of strength of his empire was the sup- 
port of the Church. The CathoHc vote was all-important 
for Napoleon III, and the clergy saw in his accession to 
power an opportunity of securing a firmer hold upon edu- 
cation, a reform of the marriage laws, and facilities for op- 
posing the growth of scepticism. No sooner was he in- 
stalled as emperor than he justified the adhesion of the 
clergy to his throne by aiding Pius IX to re-establish him- 
self in Rome and to recover from the effects of the late 
revolution. The Pope restored, the Catholics were defi- 
nitely won over to his cause, and Napoleon was able till the 
outbreak of the Crimean War to give his country that peace 
which was the surest foundation of his unstable dynasty. 
Though by the part taken by the French in the Russian 
war Napoleon gained the friendship of England and was 
able to pose as the champion of European interests, the 
second decade of his reign was destined to see the power 
of France shaken by the policy adopted toward the Italian 
struggle for unification, and overthrown by the late ap- 
preciation of the determination of Germany, led by Prus- 
sia, to achieve national unity. 

In a practical way he endeavoured throughout his 
reign to carry out many of the schemes of the revolution- 
ists of 1789, but he had no sympathy with the views of the 
Jacobins of 1793, or with those of their successors, the so- 
cialists. 

Unfortunately for his reputation, the changes in the 
machinery of government and most of his social and 
economic reforms came in the latter part of his reign, and 
by no means compensated for the repressive measures 
which characterized the early years of his government. 
His forcible seizure of the " reins of office," only effected 



The Empire before i860 287 

at the cost of many lives and accompanied by imprison- 
ment and transportation, had led naturally to the growth 
of a fierce and bitter opposition. 

The shadow of the coup d'etat darkened the whole of 
his reign, and hampered his projects for the general well- 
being of his subjects and forced him into a line of policy 
from which he found it difficult to deviate. Till 1868 the 
freedom of the press was restricted, though it is not easy 
to sympathize with the journalists of the second empire, 
when one sees the way in which liberty of the press is 
interpreted at the present day. Till i860 the Legislature 
was allowed little independence, and in 1858 Orsini's at- 
temjpt to murder Napoleon led to the renewal of the pol- 
icy of proscription. Circumstances had thus prevented 
the emperor before i860 from posing as the true inter- 
preter of the wishes of the great Napoleon, and the law of 
1858, coupled with " the systematic manipulation of the 
elections," gave some justification for the views of the 
opposition that he was " nothing but an adventurer sus- 
taining by coercion tempered with hypocrisy the position 
he had won by crime." * 

Till i860 the position of the emperor was on the whole 
a strong one. The people were still grateful for their 
rescue from the hands of the socialists, and the events of 
the Crimean War shed a lustre over the acts of the gov- 
ernment. But with the year i860 the power of Napoleon 
began steadily to decrease, till in 1870 the edifice of im- 
perialism which he had so carefully reared was honey- 
combed in all directions. The Italian War of 1859 proved 
the first blow to the Napoleonic system. The emperor 

* Revolution and Reaction in Modern France, by S. L. Dickinson, 
p. 236. 



288 The French People 

had made magnificent promises to Victor Emmanuel, and 
had in May, 1859, engaged to emancipate Italy as far as 
the Adriatic. But the victories of Magenta and Solferino 
in June were suddenly followed by the return of Napoleon 
to Paris and by the Treaty of Villafranca, in November, 
between Austria and France. 

The promises made to the Italians remained unfulfilled, 
the Adriatic was not reached, and Venetia remained in the 
hands of Francis Joseph, The invasions of Sicily, Naples, 
and the Roman Campagna by the Italians, and the French 
claim to Savoy and Nice in i860 destroyed all the pres- 
tige enjoyed by Napoleon in Europe. He was known to 
be secretly encouraging the Italians, and the great powers 
realized that in France there existed a force dangerous to 
the peace of Europe. His advocacy of Italian unity had 
involved him in difBculties with the Papacy, and in order to 
extricate himself he advised Pius IX to yield the Ro- 
magna. The French Catholics no less than the Italian 
supporters of the Pope were furious, and Napoleon found 
that one result of his Italian policy was the alienation of a 
large and influential portion of his French subjects. 

The attacks of the French CathoHcs on the govern- 
ment produced repressive measures, and the liberal mal- 
contents hastened to enrol the Church in the campaign 
against the emperor, which continued till Sedan. 

Napoleon had the misfortune, too, about the same time, 
to irritate the industrial interests in France by his com- 
mercial treaty with England, which, concluded in January, 
i860, recalled the one made by Vergennes in 1786. This 
treaty imposed on the nation free-trade doctrines in place 
of the protectionist policy which had been adhered to al- 
most uninterruptedly since the days of Colbert. Attacked 



The Empire after i860 289 

by the economic revolution, the cotton spinners in the 
northern departments showed no desire to support an 
autocracy which had threatened their interests. Thus Na- 
poleon in i860 had estranged one half of the nation 
through the contest about the temporal power of the 
Papacy, and at the same time by inflicting sufferings on a 
considerable section of his subjects by his semi-adoption of 
free-trade views had stirred up another cause of discontent. 

Criticisms of the enlightened despotism under which 
France was ruled were written in a violent tone, and Na- 
poleon, finding the nation unappreciative of his liberal 
commercial policy, issued, on November 24, i860, with 
the advice of Morny, a decree granting to the legislative 
body the right of public discussion and the right to move 
an address in answer to the speech from the throne. 

Publicity of debate, a more effective control of the 
budget, and the right to discuss freely the policy of the 
emperor were rights the importance of which cannot be 
overestimated. These concessions restored what had been 
abolished in 1851, they implied a confidence in the nation, 
and the policy which dictated them has been described as 
a " coup d'etat born of the solitary meditations of the em- 
peror." Thus by his Italian enterprise, his commercial 
policy, and his publication of the decree of November 24th 
Napoleon had begun to justify the saying that he was " a 
man of programmes, postures, and reforms." 

During the ten years from i860 to 1870 Napoleon 
had time and opportunity to gradually develop a consti- 
tutional monarchy. But he lacked the capacity of putting 
his plans into execution, and played into the hands of his 
opponents. 

The opposition, in spite of all his efforts, steadily grew. 



290 The French People 

and after the Italian War was joined by the Church, furi- 
ous at the independence of Italy and opposed to the mod- 
ern conception of toleration and free thought. " The first 
Napoleon," it is said, " had created the Ultramontane 
Church; and it was his successor who had to meet its open 
declaration of war." 

To these various lay and clerical elements, moved by 
different impulses and aiming at different objects, but 
united in common hostility to the emperor, the accession 
of the socialists was a doubtful gain. 

From 1868 the socialists, like the early Jacobins, be- 
gan to spread their propaganda throughout France. The 
" International " was to the socialists what the Jacobin 
Club was to the revolutionists of 1793 — a centre to which 
societies might be affiliated and from which the party of 
revolutionary socialism might issue its orders and organ- 
ize its adherents. The artisans, disappointed at the failure 
of their efforts in 1848, and with no confidence in the em- 
pire, were easily conquered by the socialists, and resolved 
on the first opportunity to complete the work in which 
they were interrupted by the decision of the electors, in 
May, 1848, to suppress Jacobinism. The elections of 1863 
had showed that, though the country districts were still 
loyal to the emperor, the towns were discontented, and 
in 1864 Thiers had clearly indicated in a speech the rea- 
sons of their discontent. Universal suffrage, he pointed 
out, was, owing to governmental threats and bribery, in- 
operative, and he showed how the press was gagged and 
the people at the mercy of the police. The cure for these 
evils, in his opinion, was the establishment of ministerial 
responsibility. 

The emperor's principal minister was now Rouher, who 



Weakness of the Empire 291 

since Morny's death was all-powerful and styled the vice- 
emperor. He was not a statesman, though clever and elo- 
quent. He spoke of the doctrine of ministerial responsi- 
bility as " a superannuated constitutional fiction," and 
never succeeded in gaining the confidence of the country. 
In 1864 the struggle between the emperor and his Ultra- 
montane subjects was renewed, owing to the refusal of 
the government to allow the priests to read from the pul- 
pits the syllabus of Pius IX, in which was denounced " all 
doctrines based upon national sovereignty, universal suf- 
frage, and liberty of commerce." 

While thus opposed by the liberals, the Catholic 
clergy, and the workingmen the Austro-Prussian War 
took place, and the opposition declared that Sadowa was a 
humiliation for the French nation. The close of the Con- 
tinental struggle to the advantage of Prussia was coinci- 
dent with the tragedy in Mexico and the attack by Gari- 
baldi on the pontifical states. 

As the prestige of the empire declined under these suc- 
cessive shocks the elections of 1869 were held, and re- 
vealed the fact that the Government stood on the edge of 
a precipice. The emperor himself recognised the neces- 
sity of bowing to public opinion and dismissing his minis- 
try. On December 27, 1869, he wrote his celebrated let- 
ter to Emile Ollivier, in which he invited him to form a 
ministry composed of men " fully representative of the 
majority in the Chamber." Napoleon thus indicated his 
determination to rule as a constitutional monarch, and his 
desire to allay the uneasiness of the country and the an- 
archy which had spread from the Chamber to the streets 
of.Paris. 

His tenure of unlimited power, enjoyed for some eigh- 



292 The French People 

teen years, was now over, but his resolution to act consti- 
tutionally came too late. " Experience teaches us," says 
De Toccjueville, " that the most dangerous moment for a 
bad government is that in which it begins to reform." 

On May 6, 1870, the people were asked to approve of 
the liberal reforms which the emperor had introduced into 
the constitution, and in the plebiscite that was taken it 
appeared that a large majority had confidence in the em- 
peror. Encouraged by this victory, Napoleon seems to 
have been persuaded that military successes would restore 
his authority. The choice lay between war and revolu- 
tion. 

The imminence of a quarrel with Germany had been 
for some years recognised; the train had been long laid, and 
only a spark was required to set it alight. The question 
of the Hohenzollern candidature to the throne of Spain 
was no sooner raised than an explosion became inevitable. 
The immediate cause of the fall of the second empire was 
therefore not due to the growth of a liberal party, nor to 
the opposition of the Church, nor to the new development 
of Jacobin principles. 

In domestic matters the emperor had endeavoured, in 
accordance with his convictions, to do all in his power to 
ameliorate the condition of the lower orders, and in 1870 
France found itself with a liberal ministry. But in his 
foreign policy he had thrown aside all his promises of 
peace; he had made no attempt to vindicate his assertion 
that Napoleon I intended to give France a period of tran- 
quility; he had, on the contrary, involved the country in 
many wars. The part taken by France in the Crimean 
War may or may not be justified, but the motives which 
led the emperor to interfere in Italy against Austria are 



Fall of Napoleon III 293 

open to criticism, and the expedition to Mexico is inde- 
fensible. In fact, his reign, so far from being one of peace, 
was one of war, from which France gained Httle. More- 
over, the whole course of French foreign policy from the 
close of the Italian War to the opening of the Franco- 
Prussian War was one tissue of blunders. 

Napoleon III had failed to carry out his solemn prom- 
ises of peace, and his wars contrasted badly with those of 
his uncle. His failure abroad only increased the bitter- 
ness of the opposition, while the inefiQcient military prepa- 
rations at home under incapable administrators and dis- 
honest subordinates led by sure steps to the catastrophe at 
Sedan, which, like Leipzig, proved fatal to the Napoleonic 
dynasty. 

Though unfortunate in the circumstances connected 
with the coup d'etat, the second empire owed its origin to 
the disunion existing among the monarchists, the repub- 
licans, and the democrats. This disunion was certain to 
lead to anarchy, and the nation was justified in giving it- 
self a dictator. Its choice of Louis Napoleon was due to 
the extraordinary development of the Napoleonic legend, 
the strength of which lay in the undoubted fact that Na- 
poleon I had reconstructed French society on a perma- 
nent basis and had saved France from a complete return 
to chaos and barbarism. 

Security of property and the preservation of order has 
been, and is, the watchword of the mass of the French 
people. The memory of Jacobin excesses in 1793-94 
and of Jacobin attempts to seize power in 1848 was fresh 
in the minds of the law-abiding and industrious majority 
of the French people. 

Bearing this in mind, the rise of Napoleon III seems 



294 The French People 

not only natural, but, under the circumstances, inevitable. 
The disappearance of the Napoleonic legend beneath the 
ruins of the political and social fabric of the second empire 
proved, however, to be only temporary, and the recrudes- 
cence of that legend remains a curious testimony to the 
love of order so deeply imprinted on the minds of the 
French peasants. 



CHAPTER XXI 

THE COMMUNE AND AFTER 

Though Sedan proved fatal to the empire already- 
weakened from within, there is nothing to show that the 
country as a whole desired a return to republican govern- 
ment. Symptoms no doubt there were of discontent with 
the emperor's home and foreign policy, but the oppo- 
sition was confined to certain sections. The war, how- 
ever, precipitated matters and left the country without a 
government. Had the monarchical parties united on 
some definite policy France might now be under a mon- 
archy, but the inability of the royalists to decide upon a 
candidate was necessarily followed by the establishment 
of a republic. 

The immediate efifect of the defeat of Sedan was to 
stir up the Paris mob to overthrow the Assembly. This 
done, a republic was proclaimed, and a government of 
national defence was formed, with General Trochu as its 
president. 

The principal work of the government of September 
4th was to organize resistance to the Prussians and to de- 
fend Paris, which from September 16, 1870, to January 
28, 1871, was besieged by the enemy. In most countries 
at such a crisis in their history the external danger would 

have produced union. But the contrary happened in 

295 



296 The French People 

Paris. Instead of showing a patriotic opposition to the 
foe, the Parisian sociaHsts did all in their power to ham- 
per the government. Insurrections were organized with 
the object of overthrowing the men at the head of affairs, 
and in October and January it was only by the assistance 
of the troops that the social democrats were defeated and 
dispersed. 

In 1792-93, when France was threatened by foreign 
invasion, united action was followed by the retreat of the 
enemy; in 1870 and 1871, however, the descendants of 
the men who had defended France against Brunswick 
busied themselves, not in resisting the Prussians, but in 
plotting against the Government of National Defence. 

On January 28, 1 871, an armistice was concluded, elec- 
tions were held all over France, and on February 12th the 
new Assembly met at Bordeaux, under the presidency of 
Grevy. In the elections the nation showed its horror of 
anarchy and returned a majority of reactionists who were 
favourable to peace but hostile to Paris and democratic 
socialism. As in 1848, universal suffrage had resulted 
in the election of men opposed to revolutionary schemics. 
For, though Paris returned some thirty socialists, revolu- 
tion no less than republicanism was unpopular in the coun- 
try, and the Orleanists and Legitimists had for a time 
considerable support. Thiers was placed at the head of 
the new government, which included Jules Favre, Simon, 
and Dufaure, and peace was signed with Germany. On 
March loth the Assembly was dissolved, and it was 
agreed that it should meet again on March 20th, at 
Versailles. In the meantime important events took place 
in Paris, where the party of the social democrats had been 
gaining strength. 



The Action of Paris 297 

The teaching of Marx, formulated in his Manifesto of 
the Communist League in 1847, had permeated the ranks 
of the French artisans, who, disappointed at their defeat in 
1848, still hoped to carry out a communistic revolution. 
In 1864 an International Association had been formed 
which adopted socialistic views, and endeavoured to bring 
under one organization the labourers of different countries. 
In France the International became in the latter days 
of the empire the centre of revolutionary socialism, and 
of this movement Paris became the centre. It opposed 
the emperor consistently and bitterly, and when the war 
of 1870 broke out and the French army suffered defeat 
the communists in Paris prepared to take advantage of 
the situation to further their own ends. In 1356, during 
a similar crisis, Etienne Marcel, at the head of the Pari- 
sians, had endeavoured to head a movement at first patri- 
otic, but which degenerated later into an attempt of Paris 
to lead France. During the religious wars in France in 
the sixteenth century Paris had taken advantage of the 
position of affairs and developed democratic tendencies 
and a power of organization which the Jacobins of 1794 
might have envied, and a few years later she cast aside all 
thought of patriotism, and, in order to keep Henry IV 
from the throne, allied closely with Spain. Such turbu- 
lent and unpatriotic conduct was by no means an excep- 
tion in the history of Paris, for during the Fronde, when 
the foe was again at her gates, she showed no care for the 
national interests. Louis XIV punished her by building 
Versailles, but his successors only found that Paris was 
as apt as ever to become unmanageable, and during the 
Revolution she again came to the front. At that crisis in 
her history patriotism and care for French interests were 



298 The French People 

made the justification for the September massacres and 
the innumerable crimes which followed. Always unruly, 
Paris has since the Revolution guided in the main the 
destinies of France. But there is a limit beyond which 
she has not been able to go, and the events of 1848 and 
1871 made it clear what that limit was. 

Democracy may apparently be supreme in France, but 
to the provinces democracy has one, to the Parisians an- 
other meaning. And it was this distinction between the 
provincial and Parisian view which was clearly brought 
out in 1 87 1. The extreme democrats had learned from the 
events of 1848 that the provinces were opposed to the 
adoption of their principles, and their failure in 1848 had 
forced them to modify their political plans and to recog- 
nise the difficulty of imposing the will of a small minority 
upon the majority of Frenchmen. They therefore gave up 
the idea held in 1848, and so successfully carried out in 
1793, of organizing all France by deputies on mission and 
a network of affiliated clubs under a central body in Paris. 
Instead, they fell back on the plan of emancipating the 
great towns from the influence of the country and making 
them autonomous, and by this policy trusted to the po- 
litical activity in the towns and the apathy in the provinces 
to enforce their will on France. 

Such an idea, if held during the French Revolution, 
would have been regarded as rank treason, but in 1871 the 
descendants of the Jacobins had to face the unpleasant 
fact that universal suffrage had placed a serious obstacle in 
the way of the realization of their plans. Therefore, when 
on March 18, 1871, a revolution took place in Paris it was 
directed as much against the Napoleonic system of cen- 
tralization as against the government. Paris, it was as- 



Paris and France 299 

serted, so far from governing France, was, like the other 
great towns, controlled by the country. She no doubt 
makes the revolutions, but, it was argued, the country at 
once perverts them, as in 1848. 

The position taken by the communists represented 
a complete volte-face from that taken tip by the first Jaco- 
bins. During the period of the French Revolution the 
Committee of Public Safety, aided by the Jacobin Club, 
had adopted Louis XIV's system of centralization, and by 
very elaborate methods had controlled France until the 
misgovernment of the Directory brought Napoleon to the 
head of affairs. In 1871 they became " the apostles of 
local autonomy " and at the same time made special claims 
for Paris in the manifesto of the commune published on 
April 19th, " Paris," it stated, " reserves to herself to 
operate, according to her own ideas, those administrative 
and economic reforms that are demanded by her popula- 
tion; to create institutions suitable to develop and propa- 
gate instruction, production, exchange, and credit; and to 
* universalize ' authority and property according to the 
necessities of the moment, the wishes of those who are in- 
terested, and the data furnished by experience." 

Had such a scheme been carried out France would 
again have fallen under the control of the Parisian demo- 
crats, who never seem to have understood the real condi- 
tion of the provinces. Nothing, however, was more sus- 
pected and dreaded than the Jacobin policy, even though 
it professed, as in 1792 and the following years, to bring 
to the people liberty. Beneath the kid glove of Jacobin- 
ical liberty was concealed the iron hand of Parisian domina- 
tion and a central despotism. Hence it came about that 
the " retrograde " provinces never harboured for a mo- 



300 The French People 

ment the thought of accepting the " progressive " offers 
of Paris, Lyons, Bordeaux, and other " advanced " cities. 
But before the National Assembly could establish its au- 
thority the commune in Paris had to be suppressed, and for 
the moment Paris was determined to establish her auton- 
omy and to hold the city against all comers. The removal 
of the Assembly from Bordeaux to Versailles and the at- 
tempt of the government to enforce the payment of rent 
and other obligations had aggravated the situation, but 
though negotiations were opened with the communists in 
the hopes that a modus vivendi might be arrived at, it soon 
became evident that compromise was impossible. 

The leaders of the insurrectionary movement endeav- 
oured to organize a government of their own, elected a 
Municipal Council on March 28th, and in May appointed 
a Committee of Public Safety. This policy brought into 
strong relief the conflicting tendencies existing among the 
communists. A minority was opposed to the formation 
of a Committee of Public Safety on the ground that it im- 
plied a dictatorship, while the majority, anxious to return 
to the traditions of 1793 and 1794, supported the establish- 
ment of the committee with the hope that it would make 
Paris mistress of France and would inaugurate the tri- 
umph of the revolutionary party. Other signs of dissen- 
sion soon appeared, and such men as Cluseret, Jourde, 
"l^elescluze, and Grousset, while attempting to govern en- 
ergetically, had no confidence in each other, and only 
agreed in advocating a policy of incendiarism and murder 
when attacked by the Versailles troops. No special com- 
petence was shown by the leaders in the difficult task of 
governing Paris. " In less than a fortnight," is the evi- 
dence of Grousset himself, " conflicts of every kind had 



Fall of the Commune 301 

arisen," while it was asserted after a week's trial that the 
Committee of Public Safety was " an obstacle instead of a 
stimulus." 

The commune during the short period of its existence 
did indeed attempt to carry out a part of its socialistic 
programme, but failure attended all its efforts. The 
war with the Versailles government had begun on April 
2d, and on May 21st the Versaillese entered Paris. After 
eight days of sanguinary street fighting Paris was with 
difficulty won. During the struggle the communists 
murdered in cold blood the archbishop and more than 
sixty other persons, and fired the Tuileries, the Palais 
Royal, and other buildings, including several churches and 
theatres. It is said that the government had to deal with 
eleven thousand prisoners, and the struggle ended with 
executions, transportations, and imprisonments. 

Though the commune was svippressed, Paris had suf- 
fered terribly, and the antagonism between the country 
and the great towns was increased. It was impossible, at 
a time when the organization of the army had not been 
carried out, when the finances had not been placed on a 
sound basis, when the German army of occupation was still 
within the French borders, for the country to discuss the 
proposals of the Paris commune, A minority had, as in 
1793 and 1848, endeavoured to impose its will on the na- 
tion and to insist on far-reaching changes, which, how- 
ever feasible or desirable, were not practicable in 1871. 
On their merits some of the ideas of the socialists de- 
serve attention, but the incompetence shown by their lead- 
ers in the work of government did not augur well for the 
success of their projects, which were overthrown when the 
Versaillese occupied Paris. 



302 The French People 

As in 1848, so again in 1871, the country population 
had united with the bourgeoisie of the towns and declared 
against the incoherent, unpractical, and undisciplined 
forces of socialism. Universal suffrage having again 
saved the state from total shipwreck, it became necessary 
to establish the republic on a stable basis and to give 
France a government which should preserve order, restore 
the finances, and reorganize the army. 

The principles of the commune were, in the words of 
M. Seignobos, " the exact reverse of the [centralized] 
system hitherto demanded by the French revolutionary 
party, following the tradition of the Convention." The 
suppression of the commune was followed by the estab- 
lishment of the third republic, with Thiers as president. 
But the latter days of this ambitious though patriotic 
statesman were full of disappointment to him and his fol- 
lowers. On May 24, 1873, he resigned, and Marshal Mac- 
Mahon was proclaimed President of the French Republic. 
An era of " reactionary incompetence " was opened, and 
till 1875 intrigues abounded and almost culminated in a 
restoration. In 1875, however, "there was estabUshed 
the political constitution which France had vainly striven 
to give herself since 1789. There are now in France cer- 
tain political principles which no party contests any longer 
— the sovereignty of the nation exercised by the Chamber, 
universal suffrage, liberty of the press, the jury, the right 
of public meeting. Under this constitution was preserved 
the social organization created by the Revolution and the 
administrative machinery created by Napoleon." 

As in 1848, so in 1871, the French people had refused 
to be led away by the revolutionary propaganda. In 
1852 they had set up the second empire as a barrier against 



The Constitution of 1875 303 

anarchy, in 1875 a constitution was given France, and it 
was hoped that peace and prosperity were assured under 
this constitution. Thiers had been overthrown because it 
was thought by the conservative party that the time had 
come to restore Hmited monarchy to France. The fall of 
Thiers had, however, failed in its object. The monarchy 
was not restored, and with the promulgation of the con- 
stitution of 1875 the repubHcans had gained a great vic- 
tory. It was not, however, till about 1879 that the in- 
trigues for a monarchical restoration ceased. Till then 
the monarchists were encouraged by the friction between 
the two chambers to hope that public opinion would de- 
clare itself on their side. 

It was believed, and with some show of reason, that the 
repubhc owed its establishment not to any attachment felt 
by the nation for democratic institutions, but merely to 
the impossibility in 1871 of fixing upon any other form of 
government. At the same time the religious character of 
the majority of Frenchmen in the provinces was well 
known, and the monarchists looked, and not in vain, to the 
Roman Church for support in the campaign which they 
carried on against the liberals. France was thus forced 
into two distinct camps, for, as the monarchists organized 
their forces, so the liberals were compelled to call the ex- 
treme democrats to their aid and to take up an attitude of 
hostility to the Church. 

The struggle between the advocates of progress and 
those of reaction went on fiercely. Dufaure, a moderate 
man of republican views, failed to retain power for more 
than a few months, and his successor, Jules Simon, was 
suddenly dismissed from office on May 16, 1877, by the 
president of the republic. Marshal MacMahon. 



304 The French People 

A crisis of supreme importance had occurred, and a 
determined effort was made to vindicate the monarchic 
principle. MacMahon dissolved the Chamber and ap- 
pealed to the country, urging the danger of republican 
doctrines. Though the monarchist party was strong, and 
had in the Comte de Paris a candidate for the throne, the 
majority of Frenchmen showed no desire to restore the 
throne. After an uneasy period MacMahon recognised 
that the country was republican and did not indorse his 
forcible policy. He therefore resigned in 1879, and was 
succeeded by Jules Grevy, and the republic gradually set- 
tled down under his presidency. 

But the effects of the late conflict continued to be 
seen in the vigorous attacks made on religion and religious 
instruction, in the revival of socialism, and in the attempts 
of the extreme left to revise the constitution. Apart 
from these developments the decision in 1879 in favour 
of a republican form of government enabled the country to 
turn away from politics and to devote itself to industrial, 
commercial, and colonial undertakings. Railways were 
made, canals constructed, harbours improved, and public 
works of all kinds entered upon, Europe was entering 
upon a period of colonial expansion, and France embraced 
the opportunity of finding fresh outlets for her trade. 
In North and West Africa French arms and French explor- 
ers were successful in extending the claims and posses- 
sions of France, while an attempt was made to carry out 
the projects of Colbert and Louis XIV in Madagascar. 

In the East an expedition was undertaken to Tonquin, 
though it is doubtful whether such distant enterprises have 
proved in any sense profitable to France or agreeable to 
her people. This " forward " policy, though synchroniz- 



General Boulanger 305 

ing with a marvellous economical recovery, proved very 
expensive, for immense sums were laid out in building 
schools and in reorganizing and rearming the military 
forces. In 1884 France realized that she had not only to 
cope with religious dissensions, but had also to face seri- 
ous financial difficulties. The hostility of the clergy to 
the republic was clearly seen in the events succeeding the 
1 6th of May, 1877, and Gambetta and Jules Ferry had 
adopted measures of religious oppression. From 1880 to 
1885 a very bitter feeling existed, which hindered the firm 
establishment of the republic and left behind a feeling of 
distrust. 

During this period of expansion and development the 
country had seen the rise and fall of many ministries with 
supreme indifference. Wearied with this succession of 
ministries which lived by compromise, Gambetta attempted 
to form a strong party independent of the extremists of 
both sides. His failure and death, in 1882, left parties in 
great confusion, which was increased by the blunders 
made by Freycinet in his Egyptian policy and by a general 
feeling of uneasiness and discontent at the state of affairs 
in the French colonies. Added to these causes of discon- 
tent was a certain amount of dissatisfaction at the anti- 
clerical policy of Ferry, which showed itself in the elections 
of 1885, when an increased number of conservatives were 
returned. It was at this time that General Boulanger took 
advantage of the dissatisfaction at the political and eco- 
nomical situation and at the hostility of Germany, Austria, 
and Italy. " The Boulangist movement," says Mr. Bod- 
ley, " revealed that Csesarism was ever latent in the French 
nature," and many people expected a coup d'etat and the 
establishment of a dictatorship. The fate of President 



3o6 The French People 

Grevy, in 1887, followed by the election of Carnot to the 
presidency, had no effect in tranquillizing the agitation, 
and it was not till 1889 that Boulangerism perished with 
the flight of Boulanger. Amid the general satisfaction at 
the return of material prosperity it was recognised that the 
republic was built on stable foundations. 

This victory of the republic had important results for 
France. The Tsar entered upon friendly negotiations 
with the French nation, which at the same time found that 
its relations with the Pope were able to be placed on a 
more satisfactory footing. Though a religious people, 
the French had consistently opposed at the polls the cler- 
ical cause so long as it was identified with the reactionary 
monarchists. The death of the Comte de Chambord and 
the conviction that the republic could be treated with in- 
duced the Pope, Leo XIII, to inaugurate a new policy. In 
his encyclical of February 16, 1892, the French Catholics 
were advised to accept the republic. 

Though this attempt to restore peace between the gov- 
ernment of France and the Church has not as yet had any 
marked effects, it is to be hoped that as time goes on the 
religious animosities, the product of the revolutions of the 
present century, may gradually be assuaged. At any rate, 
the clergy do not constitute a serious danger to the repub- 
lic, which has found during the last four years in socialism 
a bitter opponent of parhamentary institutions. 

The assassination of President Carnot, in 1894, fol- 
lowed by the resignation of Casimir-Perier, six months 
later, stirred France to its depths, and gave ample evidence 
of the existence of anarchist plots, of the unbridled license 
of the press, and of the paralysis of parliamentary govern- 
ment. The present President, M. Emile Loubet, has a 



The Danger from Socialism z^j 

difficult task before him in his endeavours to secure minis- 
terial stability, to improve the financial system, to check in- 
tolerance, and to provide safeguards against the growth 
of anarchy itself, the product of the development of social- 
ist doctrines among the working classes. 

There is no doubt that socialism has gained ground 
in France during the last twenty years. The communists 
of 1 87 1 were indeed overthrown, but in 1876 the labour 
movement again recommenced its public work in a con- 
gress held in Paris to consider co-operation. Fearful of 
the triumph of the monarchists, the liberals showed every 
desire to conciliate the workingmen, regarding them as 
useful allies in case of any reaction, and before long was 
published the Egalite, a journal openly advocating social- 
istic principles. In 1878, at the Lyons Congress, the doc- 
trine of collectivism appeared, and was fiercely attacked 
by Gambetta, and the Egalite was suppressed. The fol- 
lowing year the Marseilles Congress definitely passed a 
resolution affirming the desirability of nationalizing prop- 
erty and the instruments of production. Though declara- 
tions have been passed in opposition to co-operation and 
anarchy, the socialist movement is now joined by both 
co-operatives and anarchists. 

As soon as an amnesty was granted to the ex-com- 
munists the socialist propaganda was resumed, and under 
the leadership of men like Marx and Guesde it was re- 
solved to press for such reforms as the abolition of stand- 
ing armies, an eight hours' bill, and liberty of public meet- 
ings. In the industrial centres socialism developed rapid- 
ly, and as the ruling powers in France were discredited by 
the Panama and other scandals, the ranks of the socialists 
were re-enforced by the discontented. The elections of 



3o8 The French People 

1893 and 1896 revealed the strength of the socialist organi- 
zation, and it has become evident that in socialism the 
government of France has an opponent whose strength is 
unknown. It may be that rural France will again suc- 
ceed in holding its own against both the forces of reaction 
and the new danger from socialism, and insure the steady- 
development of representative institutions; but in any case 
universal suffrage has before it a period of trial. 



CHAPTER XXII 

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF FRANCE 

/. To the Revolution of i/8p 

The foreign policy of France has filled a large place 
in her history. Of all European nations, France has been 
the most willing to sacrifice constitutional progress for 
military glory. The Celtic blood which flows in the veins 
of such a large proportion of the nation is no doubt partly 
answerable for the spirit of adventure which has so fre- 
quently dominated French policy, but the geographical 
position of France, with its vulnerable frontier on the 
northeast, has at certain crises in her history rendered 
necessary the subordination of political development to 
military exigencies, and, indeed, to the necessity of safe- 
guarding the welfare of the kingdom. Throughout her 
history France has essayed to be at once a sea as well as a 
military power; like England, she has aimed at securing 
vast colonial possessions and at establishing her influence 
in the Eastern no less than in the Western Hemisphere. 

Such a policy was, however, not defined till the six- 
teenth century, for in the preceding ages the French were 
busy in consolidating their kingdom and in aiding their 
kings to repress the nobles and to expel the English from 

their land. 

21 309 



3IO The French People 

The accession of Hugh Capet marks the beginning of 
the period in which the French made their first efforts at 
foreign poHcy. In the crusades the adventurous French 
spirit was displayed to the world, already surprised by the 
successes of the Normans in England and Sicily. But 
the crusades were essentially cosmopolitan, and did not 
specially call out a national feeling in any of the countries 
which took a leading part in the struggle for the Holy 
Land. The crusades tended to bring men together 
and to make them realize that Europe was one great 
society. 

The growth of hostility between France and England 
had, however, a contrary effect. It eventually called out 
feelings of patriotism and nationality in both countries, and 
led to the consolidation of France into a powerful and well- 
compacted nation. During the medieval period three dis- 
tinct crises defined the relations of France with England: 
the Norman conquest, the reign of Henry II, and the reign 
of Edward HI. The Norman conquest startled Europe, 
and from that event England was brought into close rela- 
tions with the Continent, and especially with France. 
Henceforward till Henry H's reign the quarrels of Nor- 
mans and Frenchmen were unceasing, and revealed the 
jealousy which the success of the Normans in conquering 
England had aroused. But it was to the complications 
caused by Henry H's position in France that we can defi- 
nitely trace the origin of the national hostility between 
France and England. Though the crusades had aided the 
crown in beginning its policy of absorbing the estates of 
the great feudatories, Henry H's position in France as lord 
of a large portion of the country hindered the growth of 
centralization, and it became evident that the union of 



The Hundred Years' War 311 

France was impossible so long as England held any pos- 
sessions in the French kingdom. French foreign policy 
thus resolved itself into hostility to England and alliance 
with England's foes. The success of Philip Augustus in 
uniting to the monarchy Normandy, Anjou, Maine, Tou- 
raine, and Poitou stimulated further efforts in the direc- 
tion of unity, and Louis IX was equally successful in 
preventing Henry III regaining Poitou. With Philip 
IV a fresh step forward was taken, and, not content 
with expelling the English from France north of the 
Loire, the French kings henceforward aimed at amal- 
gamating thg English possessions between the Loire and 
the Pyrenees with the rest of France. To facihtate a task 
rendered especially difficult owing to the preference felt 
by the inhabitants of Bordeaux and the surrounding coun- 
try for the English rule, Phihp IV allied with Scotland. 
Till the beginning of the reign of Queen Elizabeth the 
connection between France and Scotland formed a factor 
in European politics which had always to be reckoned 
with. France had gained a trustworthy and useful ally, 
and England had for centuries on her borders a foe always 
ready to take advantage of her difficulties. 

This line of policy laid down by Philip IV was followed 
and developed by PhiHp VI when the next great crisis in 
the relations between France and England — the Hundred 
Years' War — brought the two nations into open hostility. 
In spite of the defeats of the French at Crecy and Poitiers, 
and of the Scots at Neville's Cross, the French kings never 
wavered from their true policy. Compelled to -make the 
Treaty of Bretigny, John left to his son Charles V the duty 
of tearing it up and of watching for an opportunity of driv- 
ing the English out of France. Philip VI had rightly 



312 The French People 

resolved on expelling the foreigners from Guienne and 
Gascony, and had brought upon his country the Hundred 
Years' War. His policy was fully justified when his grand- 
son, Charles V, succeeded in taking from the English all 
their possessions in France, save Calais, Bordeaux, and 
Bayonne. 

Unfortunately, the weakness of Charles VI and the 
strength of Henry V enabled the latter for a time to estab- 
lish a temporary hold on France. But he was building 
upon sand, and no sooner did a weak executive govern 
England than France, stimulated by a growing national 
feeling, drove out the invader, and in 1453 England only 
held Calais. The Hundred Years' War, in spite of its 
early failures and the discredit thrown upon chivalry, had 
proved successful, and the policy of Philip IV and his de- 
scendants was fully justified. So long as England held a 
considerable portion of the country, so long was it impos- 
sible for France either to rest within her borders or to take 
her part in Continental politics. 

The situation in Europe in the middle of the fifteenth 
century was assuming a threatening aspect, and in view of 
(i) the growing weakness of Italy, divided as it was into 
numerous small states, and of (2) the rapid consolidation 
of monarchies, it was very necessary in the interests of the 
balance of power that France should be well compacted, 
united, and able to bear her share in the solution of the new 
problems which were about to be laid before the world. 
Free from the incubus of the English occupation, Louis 
XI rapidly concentrated his efiforts upon the reduction 
of the remaining semi-independent members of the 
noblesse apanagee. The danger from Charles the Bold 
being removed, France was consolidated, and her recovery 



France and the Hapsburgs 313 

from her own civil wars and from tlie English invasions 
made rapid progress. 

On his accession Charles VIII found himself able to 
lay aside the hereditary hostility of France to England 
and to embark upon a new line of foreign policy, which 
continued till 1688, and in some respects till 1756. This 
new foreign policy, with its many ramifications and stu- 
pendous results, he inaugurated by his invasion of Italy 
in 1494, with which invasion the middle ages end and 
modern times begin. His invasion of Italy was repeated 
by Louis XII and Francis I, and the French did not finally 
give up all hopes of gaining part of Italy till the Treaty of 
Cateau-Cambresis. As soon as Charles of Spain became 
the Emperor Charles V France found that her struggle for 
Italy had forced upon her the necessity of opposing by all 
means in her power the threatened estabHshment in Europe 
of the supremacy of the Austro-Spanish house. Till 1700, 
when Charles II of Spain died, the interests of the Haps- 
burgs of Spain and Austria were mainly identical, and the 
foreign policy of the French kings was, with but few ex- 
ceptions, anti-Hapsburg. Till 1688 the friendship between 
France and England was rarely broken, and all efforts 
were concentrated on attempts to break down the Haps- 
burg power. For this stupendous task it was necessary 
for French kings and statesmen to bring into play quali- 
ties and resources entirely dift'erent from those used in 
the conflicts between France and England. Diplomacy 
was called into being, political marriages came into vogue, 
and a system of alliances was evolved, which continued not 
only into the eighteenth century, but which was utilized 
by Napoleon I, and formed the basis of his policy in cen- 
tral Europe. 



314 The French People 

In this struggle between France and the Hapsburgs, so 
valuable in the interests of the balance of power, the enter- 
prise and resources of France came as a revelation to 
Europe. Her sons, indeed, had taken a leading part in 
the crusades; the Normans had conquered England and 
founded a flourishing kingdom in Apulia and Sicily, which, 
under William the Good, a contemporary of the English 
Henry H, had enjoyed great prosperity; French nobles 
had fought against the Turks in Hungary and in Scotland 
against the English; but it was not till the sixteenth cen- 
tury, when Francis I and Henry II essayed to check the 
endeavours of Charles V to establish his supremacy over 
Germany and Italy, to enforce religious uniformity, and 
practically to dominate Europe, that the European powers 
realized the defensive strength of France and the political 
skill no less than the military qualities of the French nation. 

In this struggle France laid Europe under a debt of 
gratitude, and the results of the contest were far-reaching 
in Western Christendom and in France itself. Advan- 
tage was taken of the accession of the ambitious Turkish 
emperor Solyman the Magnificent to concert combined 
attacks on Charles V from the East as well as from the 
West, alliances were made with the north Protestant 
princes, and a " system " was founded the effects of 
which can be traced through all French history. Catho- 
lic at home and Protestant abroad, France succeeded 
in gaining Metz, Toul, and Verdun from Charles V, 
and though the Hapsburgs were by no means seriously 
weakened, the French monarchy during the sixteenth cen- 
tury preserved the balance of power and gave full evidence 
of its value as a member of the European political system. 
Under several strong kings France was able to make oppo- 



The Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis 315 

sition to the Hapsburgs in Austria and Spain the leading 
feature of her foreign policy. Till 1756 it was the settled 
aim of Henry IV, Richelieu, Louis XIV, and Louis XV 
to reduce the power or, if possible, to break the power of 
the Austrian house; while till 1700, when Louis XIV's 
grandson became King of Spain, it was equally important 
in the eyes of the French rulers to crush the Spanish 
Hapsburgs. 

The Peace of Cateau-Cambresis, in 1558, allowed 
breathing time for the combatants, who had been in a 
state of war for nearly forty years, and their religious con- 
flicts compelled the French to concentrate all their atten- 
tion on internal matters and only spasmodically to inter- 
fere in the warfare consequent on the rise of the Dutch 
republic. While Philip II was annexing Portugal and was 
busily engaged in the congenial task of endeavouring to 
crush Protestantism and political liberty in Holland, the 
Catholics and Huguenots were tearing each other to 
pieces. It was not till the accession of Henry IV that 
France was able to pick up the threads of her foreign policy 
which she had laid down in 1558. 

During the interval much had happened. The Count- 
er-Reformation had advanced with steady steps, and cen- 
tral and northern Germany seemed likely to be restored 
to the papal authority. The Jesuits were full of hope, 
and their successes justified the belief that Protestantism 
was on the wane. England and Holland, however, were 
brilliant exceptions to the general failure to resist the tide 
of papal aggression. England had by the defeat of the 
Spanish Armada dealt a serious blow to the reputation of 
the Spanish monarchy, and a new epoch in history was 
opened, which was to prove disastrous to the commercial 



3i6 The French People 

monopoly of Spain in South America and the Indies. The 
resistance of Holland to Philip II had inaugurated a new 
era in the history of political liberty and freedom of 
thought, and had vindicated the right of a downtrodden 
nation to rise against oppression and intolerance. 

Though Philip II had failed against England and 
Holland, he had conquered Portugal, and his colonial pos- 
sessions were immense; allied with Austria and supported 
by the papacy, the combined power of the Hapsburgs in 
Vienna and Madrid constituted a standing menace to Prot- 
estantism and the balance of power. The independence 
of Holland could easily be overthrown by armies co-oper- 
ating by land and sea. Spanish troops could march 
through north Italy, and by way of the Rhine to the 
Netherlands; the German Protestants were divided into 
the camps of Calvinists and Lutherans, and incapable of 
offering a united resistance; Poland was strongly Catholic. 
It only required Austria to produce a capable ruler, fanat- 
ical in religious matters, cool and collected when dealing 
with politics, in order to set Europe ablaze from the Baltic 
to the Adriatic. 

Henry IV, one of the greatest kings of France, 
fully realized the danger to the balance of power and to 
France which the condition of affairs in central Europe 
implied. It was quite evident that no modus vivendi could 
be arranged between the Protestants and the advancing 
tide of Catholicism, and that the chances of a European 
war increased daily. It was equally evident that if the 
combatants were left to fight it out the triumph of the 
Hapsburgs was assured, and with that triumph Europe, 
as in the time of Charles V, would be again threatened 
with a Hapsburg supremacy. 



Henry of Navarre 317 

Henry IV's policy was obvious, and in vigorous 
and characteristic fashion he set to work to carry it out. 
The predominance of the Hapsburgs in Europe had al- 
ready been checked by France, and the efforts and projects 
of Charles V had come to naught. The same danger in a 
different form and under different conditions had again 
appeared, and France prepared to insist upon the preserva- 
tion of the balance of power and the continuance to the 
north German princes of the enjoyment of their political 
independence and their religious liberties. United with 
England, Henry IV had already entered upon his new 
undertaking, and the true foreign policy of France was 
being effectively carried out, when his sudden death re- 
lieved the Hapsburgs of a dangerous opponent and de- 
stroyed French influence in Europe for about fifteen years. 
The retirement of a prominent nation from active participa- 
tion in European politics would be in ordinary times a very 
serious matter, but coming, as it did, during the first thirty 
years of the seventeenth century, which formed a period of 
exceptional anxiety, it had a very disastrous effect on the 
course of events. A great war was hanging over Europe, 
the forces of disorder and anarchy were on the verge of 
being let loose. Europe could ill spare the determined 
will, the cool head, and the tolerant mind of Henry IV, 
backed by all the resources of France. His death was an 
unspeakable disaster for Europe. France lost the oppor- 
tunity of guiding Western Christendom at this crisis, and 
of imposing barriers to the advancing power of the Haps- 
burg and the Jesuit, 

Freed from all anxiety with regard to France, Europe 
plunged into the Thirt}^ Years' War very much after the 
fashion of a rudderless ship in a gale of wind. Ferdinand 



3i8 The French People 

of Styria, who, as Emperor Ferdinand II, controlled the 
destinies of Austria during the early part of the war, did, 
indeed, know his own mind, and at one time seemed 
likely, with the aid of Wallenstein, to extend Austrian 
predominance all over Germany, and to make the Baltic 
" an Austrian lake." But he had called out spirits which 
he could not lay, and after the landing of Gustavus Adol- 
phus in Pomerania, Germany, though saved from Aus- 
trian tyranny, began to experience such anarchy as had not 
been witnessed by civilized Europe since the days succeed- 
ing the fall of the Roman Empire. 

France, meanwhile, having recovered from the evil 
effects of the minority of Louis XIII, began again to take 
an interest in the politics of Europe and to return to the 
policy of Francis I, Henry II, and Henry IV, only to find 
that a situation had been created which, but for the death 
of Henry IV, might have been prevented. Under the 
able hands of Richelieu, however, France adapted herself 
to the position in Europe. Gustavus Adolphus had 
by his victories decided the religious question, and 
henceforward there was no fear of the permanent su- 
premacy of the Jesuits in north Germany. But the politi- 
cal question was still unsolved, and the possibility of the 
establishment of the predominance of the Hapsburgs was 
itself sufficient to call for energetic action on the part of 
France. To check the possibility of such predominance 
was the work of Richelieu. He definitely attempted to 
organize alliances with Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, so as 
to hamper the Austrians on their flanks; he made treaties 
with Italian princes, so as to bring about the expulsion of 
Germans from Italy; he aided Portugal to establish her 
independence; he intrigued in Germany against the em- 



The Thirty Years' War 319 

peror; he made great efforts to secure the friendship and 
support of the Dutch. In every part of Europe the Haps- 
burgs were confronted by the activity of Richelieu. His 
poHcy was continued by Mazarin, and while the Peace of 
Westphalia attests the triumph of French foreign policy 
over the Austrians and the establishment of religious free- 
dom and political independence in the small German states, 
the Peace of the Pyrenees marks the definite fall of Spain 
from the high place which she had occupied in Europe 
since the days of Ferdinand and Isabella. By the time of 
the death of Mazarin France had accomplished in great 
part the policy which she had entered upon in the days of 
the rivalry between Francis I and Charles V. Her own 
frontiers had been safeguarded and extended, her heredi- 
tary foes of the house of Hapsburg had been weakened, 
the German states had been taught to look to her for pro- 
tection, Sweden was her close ally, Poland and Turkey 
were not unwilling to cultivate her friendship ; in a word, 
France in 1661 occupied a remarkably strong position at 
home and abroad. 

Under Louis XIV's personal rule the policy of oppo- 
sition to the house of Hapsburg was continued with vig- 
our, though sundry variations from that policy were made, 
and certain new developments were entered upon. Not 
content with making, first, the absorption of the Spanish 
monarchy and, later, the complete subjugation of the Ger- 
manic powers the object of his foreign policy, Louis also 
entered upon a competition with England and Holland in 
America and the far East, and endeavoured by strenuous 
efforts to further the expansion of the French colonies in 
America and of the French settlements in India. Till 
1688 Louis's endeavoars were, on the whole, crowned 



320 The French People 

with success. Austria, involved in a Turkish war, was not 
the equal of France, whose frontier had advanced and been 
strengthened by the seizure of Strasbourg and other places. 
Coincident with successes in Europe the colonial posses- 
sions in North America flourished, and there was hope that 
in India French influence would prove superior to that of 
England and Holland. 

Unfortunately Louis failed, while carrying out his pol- 
icy, to realize the limitations to his power, the strength of 
the Protestant sentiment in Germany, or the violence done 
to the patriotism of the empire by his reunions, and espe- 
cially by his seizure of Strasbourg. The clearly defined 
policy of Henry IV and Richelieu had been discarded for 
one far more ambitious, and perhaps more magnificent, but 
one which proved absolutely unattainable. 

In part this policy no doubt attuned itself admirably 
to the national wishes. It had always been a tradition that 
the Rhine was the true French boundary, and all efforts to 
reach it met with the approbation of the French people. 
But it was a policy which required delicate handling, and 
such rude methods as the capture of Strasbourg in time of 
peace and the filching of territories from the empire by 
means of the Chambers of Reunion were only calculated 
to arouse the suspicions of Europe. 

The year 1688 was in many ways a fateful one for 
the French nation. Since the days of Francis I and Wol- 
sey England and France had remained for the most part 
at peace. With the expulsion of the English from France 
by Charles VII no ostensible ground for hatred and mu- 
tual hostility existed. Wolsey had recognised the futility 
of continuing an ancient feud for which no suf^cient 
grounds existed, and. his policy was continued by Eliza- 



Friendship with England 321 

beth, who made the French alliance the basis of her foreign 
policy. Both countries were interested in checking the 
growth of the Hapsburg power, whether for political or 
religious reasons; both were anxious to see the independ- 
ence of the Dutch secured; both had friendly relations with 
the north German princes. In the sixteenth and the early 
part of the seventeenth centuries there was no immediate 
ground for expecting that the colonial interests of France 
and England would clash. In electing to ally with France 
and not with Spain Cromwell not only continued the Eliza- 
bethan tradition, but he showed a realization of the fact 
that at that time England's trade had more to fear from 
Spanish than French competition. 

Friendship between France and England during the 
later Cromwellian period was as advantageous for France 
as it was for England. It enabled Mazarin to come victo- 
riously out of the war with Spain and by means of Louis 
XIV's marriage with the Spanish Infanta to prepare for 
the eventual ascendency of the French king in the Penin- 
sula, and for the gradual absorption by France of outlying 
territories belonging to Spain. Cromwell's death left 
France the dominant military power on the Continent, for 
the later Stuarts abdicated the influential position won in 
Europe by the great Protector and confined their efforts 
to the active development of England's maritime and 
colonial interests. 

Mazarin had therefore continued with success the 
hereditary policy of France toward the Hapsburgs, though, 
like Richelieu, he had to act frequently on the defensive, 
and he had again renewed with England those friendly re- 
lations which the events of the civil war in England and 
the unstable policy of the English court had for a time 



322 The French People 

weakened. Louis XIV on his accession to power at once 
hastened to take advantage of Mazarin's successful diplo- 
macy. English friendship, or, at any rate, English neutral- 
ity, was absolutely necessary for the satisfactory execution 
of the many schemes which were maturing in Louis's 
mind, and for his aggressive wars. Apart from the sudden 
outburst of national antipathy to France when the famous 
Triple Alliance of 1668 was signed by England, Holland, 
and Prussia, the policy of the EngUsh court remained 
steadily favourable to Louis's designs throughout the reign 
of Charles II and James II. The value of such a policy to 
France cannot be overestimated. Freed from all fear of 
any serious intervention on the side of England, Louis was 
able to enter upon the execution of his aggressive designs. 

Though the efforts of Richelieu and Mazarin had suc- 
ceeded in destroying the ascendency of the house of Haps- 
burg in Europe and in hastening that decline of Spain 
which since Philip II's death was becoming more and 
more apparent, Louis resolved to acquire, with the death 
of Charles II of Spain, the whole Spanish monarchy for his 
family, and in the meantime to annex its outlying terri- 
tories. " After 1665," wrote the late Sir John Seeley, " the 
Spanish monarchy is a passive prey, supported only by the 
policy of the sea powers, and experiencing no revival until 
it passes into the hands of the house of Bourbon." 

Till 1678, however, no general dread of French as- 
cendency in Europe was aroused. England and Holland 
were far from becoming allies, and the German princes 
were, for the most part, the paid servants of the Grand 
Monarque. As long as there was no universal sentiment 
in Germany against the French pretensions, it was impos- 
sible for the emperor to resist the advance of the monarchy 



Louis XIV Supreme 323 

of Louis XIV, and he was forced to accept for a time a 
position humiliating to the wearer of the imperial crown. 
Till the Peace of Nimeguen the spirit which animated 
the policy of Richelieu and Mazarin can be to some extent 
traced in Louis's foreign policy. While England re- 
mained, if not an ally, at any rate a passive spectator of 
Continental politics, the diplomacy which Richelieu and 
Mazarin had so ably put into force was continued, and 
with admirable results. Spain was isolated in the war of 
Devolution, and lost territory; Holland was isolated in the 
beginning of the Dutch war of 1672, and only just escaped 
annihilation; and though Europe showed uneasiness, and 
the imperial troops and the Brandenburgers took up arms, 
the Peace of Nimeguen gave Louis Franche-Comte, with 
the occupation of Lorraine, and left the French monarchy 
at the height of its power. 

So far Louis had mainly concerned himself with the 
Spanish branch of the house of Hapsburg, but after Nime- 
guen he seems to have seriously considered the advisabil- 
ity of preparing the ground for his candidature for the im- 
perial crown. The idea of making Louis emperor had 
floated through the brain of Mazarin; it had already been 
considered by Louis himself; and as after 1678 the Span- 
ish succession question remained in abeyance, it was but 
natural that a man of the temperament and ambition of 
the French king should throw aside all questions of pru- 
dence and enter upon an adventurous course of policy. 

The years from 1678 to 1688 form the turning point 
in Louis's career, if not in the history of France. From 
the days of Francis I France had pursued a foreign policy 
which was marked, on the whole, by sagacity and deter- 
mination. She had acted as the opponent of the attempts 



324 The French People 

of the Hapsbiirgs to form an empire based on militarism' 
and intolerance. All supporters of progress and liberty 
had gathered round her, and she had become the head of an 
imposing system of alliances. Representing great tmiver- 
sal interests, France under Henry IV, Richelieu, and Maz- 
arin never menaced the liberties of Europe or encroached 
upon the neighbouring states. From 1661 to 1678 
France occupied a position far stronger than she had held 
at any previous time. With her army reorganized by Lou- 
vois and commanded by Turenne and Conde, her finances 
restored, her manufactures encouraged, her navy im- 
proved, and her colonies developed by Colbert, France 
under the wise direction of a Richelieu would have proved 
irresistible. 

After 1678, however, Louis abandoned the statesman- 
like traditions which the cardinal had followed, and em- 
barked on a policy which for audacity remained unsur- 
passed till the Revolutionary period. This policy was 
nothing less than to advance the French frontier toward 
Germany, even though that entailed the complete aliena- 
tion of those princes of the empire who had been attached 
to France since the sixteenth century. Hitherto the 
French policy carried out so successfully at the Peace of 
Westphalia had emphasized the differences between the 
princes of the empire and the emperor. To their advocacy 
of the interests of Germany as opposed to those of the 
house of Austria France owed much of her success. Louis 
now deliberately threw all his German supporters, Protes- 
tant and Catholic alike, on the side of the emperor, and at 
the same time still further incensed the Calvinist and 
Lutheran states in the empire by his intolerant conduct 
toward the Huguenots. By the seizure of Strasbourg and 



n 



The Year 1688 325 

the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes Louis practically re- 
nounced the position of protector of the Protestant states 
in Germany and retired from the position of champion of 
Germanic liberties against the emperor. It only required 
the deposition of James 11 and the accession of WilHam 
III to complete the isolation of France in Europe. 

The year 1688 is the end of a brilHant and successful 
period in the foreign policy of France, the period of Fran- 
cis I, Henry IV, Richelieu, Mazarin, and Colbert. It 
marks the beginning of a period full of disasters in Europe 
and the colonies, ending with the disastrous Peace of Paris 
in 1763 and the Revolution. From 1688 is opened the 
commercial and colonial duel with England, which ended 
in the discomfiture of France and the foundation of the 
British Empire. Though France held her own against 
Austria, she only did so by returning in the eighteenth cen- 
tury to the system — then out of date — of utilizing the jeal- 
ousy felt by certain German princes towards the emperor. 
But this tardy recognition of the blunders resulting from 
the overweening ambition of Louis XIV did not compen- 
sate for the loss of the North American colonies and for 
the defeat of the French schemes in India. 

The interests of Protestantism all over the world, the 
commercial interests of England and Holland, the national 
interests of Germany, were all opposed to Louis, who, till 
within two years of his death, struggled bravely but in vain 
against his enemies. He did, indeed, win one notable suc- 
cess when he placed his grandson, Philip, on the Spanish 
throne, and thus gave France till the Revolution a valu- 
able ally. But he lived to see the English established in a 
portion of Canada and at Gibraltar, and the Austrian power 
in possession of the Spanish Netherlands, Milan, and Na- 



326 The French People 

pies. The accession of Philip V of Spain, the tearing up of 
the Partition Treaties, and the seizure of the Barrier for- 
tresses had roused the fears of William III. France and 
Spain united would, it was feared, place Louis XIV in com- 
mand of the greatest commercial and colonial system in 
the world. Spain under French influence would revive, 
and the commercial interests of England and Holland 
would be endangered, if not ruined. William's fears were 
justified. With the accession of Philip the decline of Spain 
was arrested; French energy invigorated her whole sys- 
tem, and till the death of Charles III Spain experienced a 
continuous and most unexpected recovery. The Spanish 
Succession War was essentially a commercial war, fought 
to prevent the Mediterranean from becoming a French 
lake. At the end of the struggle England definitely as- 
sumed the character of a great commercial state, while 
France had been so weakened by the war that she ceased 
for many years to be a danger to Europe. Protestantism 
was safe, the influence of the Counter-Reformation was 
ended. France had entered in 1688 upon a new period in 
her foreign policy, and her rivalry with England continued 
till 181 5. The Hundred Years' War had been fought to 
secure the expulsion of the English and the consolidation 
of France; the second Hundred Years' War was waged for 
supremacy on the sea and in the colonies; and the wars 
from 1689 to 1697 ^"d from 1702 to 171 3 marked the be- 
ginning of the long struggle. 

On the death of Louis XIV an opportunity of recon- 
sidering her system of alliances was presented to France. 
The policy of opposition to Austria was out of date. 
Charles VI alone was not a serious danger to the integrity 
of France; Sweden, Poland, and Turkey were no longer 



The Triple Alliance of 17 17 327 

powerful allies. France is a country that has never will- 
ingly continued for any long period without allies. In 
the Hundred Years' War the Scottish alliance proved of 
real value, and during the years of rivalry between Francis 
I and Charles V the ties of friendship between France and 
the north German Protestant princes and her close rela- 
tions with Turkey constituted important additions to the 
difficulties of the Hapsburgs. Similarly during the period 
of the religious wars France found in England an ally, 
while throughout Richelieu's administration foreign alli- 
ances with Sweden, Holland, the princes in Germany, 
and Italy formed an important part of his policy. During 
the early portion of Louis XIV's personal rule his strength 
lay in the number of his allies, and it was between 1661 
and 1688 that the system of alliances with Sweden, Poland, 
and Turkey as a means of weakening the house of Aus- 
tria was definitely formulated. Though Louis's mistakes 
alienated his German supporters and weakened his con- 
nection with Sweden, he entered the Spanish Succession 
War in close alliance with the electors of Bavaria and 
Cologne. France has seldom been isolated, and on the 
rare occasions when she has found herself in a position of 
isolation she has never rested till she has gathered round 
her a number of trustworthy allies. 

When Orleans found himself in office as regent Spain 
was alienated, Turkey was at war with Austria, Sweden was 
with difficulty holding her own against a coalition, France 
herself was exhausted and practically isolated in Europe. 
In this precarious position, when the designs of Philip V, if 
successfully carried out, would have overthrown the re- 
gency, France was forced to look around for allies. The 
immediate danger came from Spain, where Alberoni was 



328 The French People 

endeavouring to further the wishes of Phihp and his queen, 
EHzabeth of Farnese, without detriment to the true in- 
terests of Spain. The only power which, in the condition 
of Europe, was able to offer the government of the re- 
gency the means of establishing itself on a permanent basis 
was England, and that power had been the principal enemy 
of France during the late Spanish Succession War. The 
interests of England and France still clashed in the colo- 
nies and on the sea, and the two countries were about to 
enter upon a fierce rivalry in India. 

But the necessity for self-preservation weighed more 
with Orleans than national considerations. The dynastic 
interests of his house were at stake, and, moreover, France 
was at that time in no condition to undertake fresh enter- 
prises against England. In order, therefore, to protect 
his interests against the Spanish Bourbons and to prevent 
a good understanding being arrived at between Alberoni 
and the English king, he opened, through Dubois, negotia- 
tions with George I which led to the famous Triple Alli- 
ance of 1 71 7. A new system, based on the friendship and 
interests of the houses of Orleans and Hanover, was thus 
formed, which lasted till 1742. Its continuance, after it 
had served its immediate purpose, was no doubt due to the 
peaceful proclivities of Fleury and Walpole, both of whom 
abhorred war and staved off as long as possible the inevi- 
table collision between France and England. The years 
between 171 7 and 1742 thus constitute a parenthesis in 
the second Hundred Years' War, and for the time the com- 
mercial and colonial rivalry of the two countries was sub- 
ordinated to other considerations — only to break out all 
the fiercer in the War of the Austrian Succession and the 
Seven Years' War. 



France and Russia 329 

Possessed of the English alliance, which gave her 
that immunity from attack which was so needful after the 
exhausting War of the Spanish Succession, France had no 
question of foreign policy to deal with of vital importance. 
Still the regent was compelled to consider the value of 
the traditional friendship of France with Sweden, Poland, 
and Turkey — a friendship bequeathed to him by Louis 
XIV. Some decision with regard to the attitude to be 
adopted toward this system of a*fliances was rendered neces- 
sary, owing to the sudden rise of the great Muscovite 
power. 

The appearance of Russia as a European state consti- 
tuted nothing less than a revolution, and it became neces- 
sary for Europe to recognise the real meaning of the intro- 
duction of a new factor into the existing political system. 
To none of the great powers was the rise of Russia of such 
vast importance as to France. 

The policy which the French government had hitherto 
followed in order to check any danger from Austrian pre- 
ponderance had consisted of alliances with Sweden, Po- 
land, and Turkey, all of which powers were to be numbered 
among the declining nations of Europe in the eighteenth 
century. The question before France was simply whether 
it would not be wise for her to substitute a Russian for the 
existing alliances in the north and east of Europe. To 
the regent Orleans and Cardinal Fleury the question was 
for the first time submitted. Momentous issues hung 
upon the decision of the French government, which was 
naturally averse to entering upon a new and adventurous 
policy without very sufficient reason. Some modern 
French writers have not hesitated to criticise severely the 
refusal of Orleans to form a close offensive and defensive 



330 The French People 

alliance with Russia, and have declared that a union be- 
tween the two countries would have been most beneficial 
to French interests. It is true that France found little to 
reward her in her Swedish, Polish, and Turkish connec- 
tions, but when the Russian alliance was proposed to 
Orleans the treaty with England had just been made, and 
the friendship between the French and English courts 
might have been weakened, if not destroyed, by a treaty 
with Russia, with which country England was not on very 
friendly relations. Furthermore, it was impossible to tell 
if Peter the Great's empire would be a permanent political 
structure. It had risen suddenly; it might equally sud- 
denly decline. There was therefore much to be said for 
the conservative policy pursued in the north and- east of 
Europe by Orleans and Dubois, under whose guidance 
France was beginning to recover from the effects of Louis 
XIV's foreign policy. It would, however, have been bet- 
ter for France if the regency of Orleans had inaugurated 
a complete break with traditions of foreign policy which 
were obsolete; as events proved, a Russian alliance could 
not have resulted in disasters equalling in magnitude those 
which accompanied her policy from 1740 to 1763. 

That period included the War of the Austrian Succes- 
sion (i 740-1 748) and the Seven Years' War (i 756-1 763), 
at the close of which France found that she had not only 
raised up a dangerous foe in Prussia, but had lost Canada 
to England and all chance of founding an empire in 
India. These twenty-three years stand out in French his- 
tory as being replete with errors from which France has 
never recovered. Mistake after mistake was made and 
never rectified. Till 1740 the reputation of France stood 
high, immense possibilities were before her; it was con- 



The Austrian Succession War 331 

ceivable that the Latin and not the Teutonic race might be 
supreme in North America and India; it was by no means 
decided that England was to gain an unquestioned su- 
premacy of the sea. But between 1740 and 1763 France 
threw all her chances away, and after 1763, in spite of the 
efforts of Choiseul and Vergennes, she gradually drifted, 
overwhelmed with debt, into the jaws of the Revolution. 

In 1740 it was evident that as Spain (with which 
power she had again formed, in 1733, a close alliance) was 
involved in a commercial war with England France would 
also be drawn into hostilities. In the event of such a con- 
tingency it behoved Fleury to refit the fleet, which was in 
no condition for war, and to prepare to carry on with vig- 
our the conflict with England in the colonies and on the 
sea. For such a struggle France would be compelled to 
strain every effort, to concentrate her whole attention on 
the war, an^ to make serious sacrifices of men and money. 

Instead of carrying out such a scheme which the crisis 
imperatively demanded, the French government entered 
not only upon a conflict with England, but also, simultane- 
ously, upon the Austrian Succession War. 

It is difficult to stigmatize adequately the folly of such 
a proceeding. The revival of the anti-Austrian policy of 
Francis I, Henry IV, Richelieu, and Louis XIV was a 
blunder of the worst description. The Hapsburgs no 
longer threatened the balance of power, and certainly after 
the Polish Succession War (1733-1735), when France had 
gained Lorraine, Austria had rapidly declined in strength. 
For the sake of the preservation of the balance of power 
France ought to have supported Maria Theresa instead of 
aiding in the attempt to partition her territories. When 
the war was concluded at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle the 



332 The French People 

French people realized that the one result of all their 
efforts was that Prussia, an ungrateful ally, had secured 
Silesia, and that the French position in Canada and India 
was threatened. 

In the Seven Years' War mistakes of equal magnitude 
were made. The Treaty of Westminster, concluded be- 
tween England and Prussia in January, 1756, was no 
doubt expected, but it did not justify France in consenting 
(in May of the same year) to the Treaty of Versailles, by 
the terms of which she was bound to carry on war with 
Great Britain until it suited Austria to make peace with 
Prussia, or in making with Austria the arrangements of 
1757 and 1758, by which she promised her armed co- 
operation in Europe. 

France thus entered upon her final struggle with Eng- 
land for the supremacy in North America, in India, and on 
the sea, fatally hampered by her agreements with Austria. 
Till the Revolution she remained allied with Spain and 
Austria. Though she successfully aided the Americans 
to secure their independence, and so far avenged herself on 
England for her losses in the Seven Years' War, her im- 
portance in Europe was sadly diminished; and she was 
forced to stand by and see Poland partitioned without 
being able to effectively interfere to check the perpetration 
of a vast national crime. Her foreign policy since 1740 
had been singularly devoid of perspicacity and foresight. 
No statesman of wide views appeared who was able to 
guide France at the most critical period of her later history. 
The succession of family compacts with Spain was an in- 
adequate makeweight against the loss of her colonies and 
the decline of her prestige in Europe. If the Revolution 
was necessary in order to set right the defects of her inter- 



War of American Independence 333 

nal organization, it was no less necessary in the interests of 
her foreign relations. 

Ever since Louis XIV's death France had been singu- 
larly deficient in statesmen of ability. With the excep- 
tion of Dubois and Vergennes, she could boast of no 
name equal to Pitt, or Carteret, or even to Stanhope. 
Vergennes, indeed, made prodigious and, to some extent, 
successful efforts. He recognised that the overwhelming 
disasters of the Seven Years' War were due to the mistake 
of the French government in attempting to conduct great 
campaigns in central Europe while waging war with Great 
Britain on the sea and in the colonies. Therefore, when 
engaged in aiding the Americans, he carefully abstained 
from playing any part in European politics, and devoted 
all the available resources of France to checkmating the 
English in America. 

The signal success which attended his policy for a time 
blinded his contemporaries to the difficulties in which, 
through the active part taken in the American struggle, the 
French nation became involved. The financial position of 
France, owing to the immense sums paid to the Ameri- 
cans, became hopeless, while the American movement ex- 
cited a zeal for natural law and natural liberty. The 
French officers and soldiers who fought for the colonists 
were obviously affected by the considerations which had 
led the Americans to take up arms. The arguments 
used by the colonists to justify their resistance to Eng- 
land told with tenfold force, against the despotism of 
Louis XVI. In France self-government and representa- 
tion had been unknown for centuries, and on their return 
to their homes the French officers, like Lafayette, natu- 
rally felt compelled to fight for liberty, to resist the view 



334 The French People 

that power emanated from the king and not from the 
people, and to regard the past history of France as a warn- 
ing and not as an example. But as Lord Acton, in his 
Lectures on the French Revolution, has with great felicity 
pointed out, the ideas which France adopted from America 
belonged almost exclusively to the war period (when the 
colonists were in the throes of their struggle for liberty 
or death), and not to the constitutional period which fol- 
lowed the war. 

Vergennes's foreign policy in all respects was bril- 
liant. The English defeat in America was followed by the 
establishment of French influence in Holland, and on his 
death, in February, 1787, France seemed to be recovering 
the position which she had lost in 1763. But though allied 
to Austria, Spain, and Holland, France at the death of 
Vergennes was in reality powerless. Joseph H of Austria 
disliked his connection with France, and was anxious to be 
freed from it. The Spanish alliance was of little real 
value, and in 1788 the French influence in Holland was 
easily overthrown by England and Prussia. At the time 
of the French Revolution France had no capable states- 
men and no valuable allies. She was practically isolated 
in Europe. 

//. Afte7' the Revolution of lySp 

As was only to be expected, the outbreak of the 
French Revolution had some very curious efifects upon 
the foreign policy of France. The well-meaning, but ut- 
terly inexperienced men who abounded in the Constituent 
Assembly propounded views entirely at variance with 
those held in the chancelleries of Europe. Henceforward, 
they declared, wars were to cease, as being opposed to rea- 



The AfFair of Nootka Sound 335 

son, justice, and liberty. Wars for the balance of power 
would be in the future impossible, for France would induce 
all nations to adopt her principles, and thus the recognition 
of the principle of the rights of man would lead to universal 
peace. 

In such a condition of things diplomacy would find 
its work simple, for alliances based on dynastic considera- 
tions would no longer exist, and nations would confine 
their efforts to uniting all peoples in a resolve to preserve 
peace. The majority of the Constituent Assembly were 
so affected by the belief in their pacific professions and 
so convinced in their permanent value that, on May 22, 
1790, they passed a resolution that the French nation re- 
nounces all warlike enterprises with the object of making 
conquests, and will not employ its arms against the liberty 
of any nation. 

But while these pacific protestations were being made 
France was on the verge of a war with Great Britain over 
the affair of Nootka Sound — a matter which directly af- 
fected Spain, but France only in so far as she had not as 
yet repudiated the Family Compact. 

During the greater part of 1790 the chances of peace 
and war were evenly divided, and the discussions on the 
subject bring out clearly the immense difficulty which the 
French nation experienced in attempting to break away 
from ancient traditions, and to substitute for a system of 
alliances a scheme of no wars and no entangling engage- 
ments. It also becomes evident that in 1789 and 1790 
Mirabeau alone of Frenchmen understood foreign poli- 
tics, and that without his advice France would probably 
have been plunged into a long and disastrous war. As his 
career and that of Dumouriez illustrate the utter impossi- 



336 The French People 

bility for a great nation like France to suddenly ignore its 
past history, and at the bidding of a number of well-mean- 
ing philosophers to inaugurate a period of peace in Eu- 
rope, it may be profitable to follow rather closely the views 
of these two men, so dissimilar in character, on foreign 
policy. 

Mirabeau's claim to the title of statesman depends upon 
the view taken of the value of his influence over the foreign 
policy of France. In no department was his superiority 
over his contemporaries so clearly seen as in that of foreign 
affairs. In no department had he so free a hand, in no 
department was his personality so strongly asserted, in no 
department were his own views so consistently and suc- 
cessfully carried out. And no more striking proof can be 
found of the remarkable influence wielded by Mirabeau in 
shaping and directing the foreign policy of France at a 
critical period than in the confusion which, upon his death, 
immediately ensued in the foreign ofBce. 

On questions of internal policy Mirabeau had, as we 
know, little opportunity of initiating and carrying out a 
policy. His letters and speeches, indeed, give us a fairly 
clear idea of the principles which would have characterized 
a government of which he was a member. Unfortunately, 
he was never in a position to carry out his ideas and to 
give France a popular and stable constitution. 

With regard to foreign affairs, however, Mirabeau's 
position was entirely different. Though each member of 
the Assembly might think himself fully qualified to discuss 
every question bearing on the making of the constitution, 
as yet the complete ignorance of the mass of Frenchmen 
on foreign questions rendered the deputies more inclined 
to follow Mirabeau in matters affecting the relations of 



Mirabeau 337 

France with Europe. The vacillating and in many ways 
incompetent Montmorin, too, was easily persuaded, as 
soon as he had a hint of Mirabeau's connection with the 
court, to leave the direction of foreign politics in the hands 
of a man who already, before the meeting of the States- 
General, had given him ample proof of an acquaintance 
with the politics of central Europe unsurpassed by any 
of his contemporaries. 

From the appointment of the Diplomatic Committee, 
at the end of July, 1790, to his death, in April, 1791, the 
management of foreign affairs was practically in the hands 
of Mirabeau, who, through his complete ascendency over 
Montmorin, became in effect " a constitutional foreign 
minister." By inspiring Montmorin's despatches and ex- 
planations before the Assembly Mirabeau was able to 
defend Montmorin's policy. Thus, by Mirabeau's means, 
a harmony was established between the ministers and the 
Assembly, which, had it existed in other departments, 
would have rendered the work of the government far 
easier, and would have checked the constant and baneful 
interference of the Assembly with the executive. 

Of living Frenchmen no one was so well qualified to 
guide France in 1790. Mirabeau had not only studied the 
constitutions of Switzerland and of Prussia, of England 
and of America; he had himself resided in England and 
Prussia, in Holland and Switzerland. And of his many 
writings which bear evidence of his intimate acquaintance 
with the most pressing questions of the day, none illus- 
trates so clearly his profound views on European politics 
as does the Secret History of the Court of Berlin. Ver- 
gennes had himself recognised Mirabeau's capacity by 
sending him, in June, 1786, on a secret mission to the court 



33^ The French People 

of Berlin, but it was not till 1790 that his experience could 
be placed at the service of France. 

In dealing with foreign matters, Mirabeau found him- 
self involved in questions of unusual difficulty. The year 
1790 had opened in the midst of revolution and wars, 
which seemed to betoken serious changes in the European 
state system. A revolution had, early in 1789, been suc- 
cessfully carried out by Gustavus III in the interests of the 
monarchy; later on in the year the revolution in the Aus- 
trian Netherlands against the reforms of Joseph II had 
broken out; and on January 10, 1790, an Act of Union of 
the Belgian United Provinces had been drawn up and the 
dominion of the emperor shaken off. 

Poland, fired by the example of France, had deter- 
mined to carry out reforms, and in May, 1790, a new con- 
stitution, intended to establish an orderly government ca- 
pable of defending her independence against the intrigues 
and attacks of Russia, was accepted by the Diet. In the 
north of Europe, Russia and Sweden were carrying on a 
naval war, and, till peace was made at Werela, in August, 
1790, it was always possible that Gustavus III might ap- 
peal successfully to France for succour. In the east, Rus- 
sia and Austria were leagued together for the dismember- 
ment of Turkey, and this conflict seemed most likely to 
lead to a general European conflagration. The Triple Al- 
liance of 1788, between England, Prussia, and Holland, 
had, as far as Pitt was concerned, been formed mainly for 
defensive and pacific purposes. That statesman hoped, by 
gradually including in the system Turkey, Sweden, and 
perhaps the emperor, to place a solid barrier against the 
ambition of both Russia and France, and to secure a last- 
ing peace. 



Europe in 1790 339 

But though England was dismterestedly anxious for 
peace, Pitt's pacific views were not shared by Frederick 
William or by his minister, Hertzberg, who burned to take 
advantage of the distracted condition of the Hapsburg em- 
pire and to enlarge the boundaries of Prussia by the addi- 
tion of Danzig and Thorn. Hence Prussian aid had been 
given to Gustavus III in his struggle against Catherine, 
and treaties had been made with Turkey at the end of Jan- 
uary, 1790, and with Poland in March, both obviously 
aimed at Russia and Austria. The death, on February 20, 
1790, of Joseph II, a sovereign who had " failed in every- 
thing he undertook," and the accession of Leopold II, 
whose clear-sighted, determined, and pacific policy was in 
full harmony with that of the English cabinet, were des- 
tined to prevent the extension of the Turkish war into a 
great and general European conflict. But, owing to the 
warlike attitude of Prussia, the prospect for several months 
remained menacing, and it was not till the end of July that 
the preliminaries of peace between Austria and Turkey 
were drawn up and the difficulties between Austria and 
Prussia definitely adjusted by the Congress of Reichen- 
bach. Into this highly charged political atmosphere the 
afifair of Nootka Sound fell like a bomb in the early spring 
of 1790 and threatened to bring upon Western Europe a 
war, in which England, Prussia, and Holland would con- 
tend against the allied Bourbon powers of France and 
Spain. Thus during the first half of 1790 two more 
European wars were in immediate prospect, in addition to 
(i) the wars in the north and Turkey and (2) the civil war 
in the Netherlands. 

It was in connection with the difficult Nootka Sound 
question that Mirabeau'g ability to deal with foreign poli- 



340 The French People 

tics and his success in preventing the illusions of the As- 
sembly from affecting the course of diplomacy were clearly 
demonstrated. The event which constituted the " affair " 
of Nootka Sound had taken place as early as April, 1789. 
A trading settlement had been made by some English mer- 
chants at Nootka Sound, on Vancouver Island, near the 
coast of California. The Spaniards in Mexico viewed 
with jealousy this settlement in a district to which they had 
no just rights either by discovery or occupation, and 
asserted a claim to all the western coast of America be- 
tween Cape Horn and the sixtieth degree of latitude. 

They therefore sent two Spanish ships of war to 
Nootka Sound. An English vessel — the Iphigenia — was 
seized, her officers and crew put in irons, and the vessel 
was only restored and allowed to sail away to the Sand- 
wich Islands after her cargo had been plundered. The set- 
tlement was destroyed, the British flag was hauled down, 
and the Spanish flag hoisted in its place. Somewhat later 
three other smaller English vessels were seized and de- 
tained. The news of these outrages reached England in 
February, 1790, and there seemed little doubt that the ac- 
tion of the Spaniards would lead to formidable complica- 
tions. In answer to English complaints Spain equipped 
a large fleet. Pitt at once made extensive preparations for 
war. A land force was raised, the fleet was placed in readi- 
ness, and plans were drawn up for attacking the Spanish 
possessions in the West Indies and South America. On 
the 5th of May a message from the king announcing the 
prospect of war was presented to both houses of Parlia- 
ment. Fitzherbert, " a man of parts and of infinite zeal and 
industry," was in June sent to Madrid to insist on full repa- 
ration being made to the parties injured before the abstract 



The Family Compact 341 

question of the right of the Spaniards to the western coast 
of America was discussed. Holland and Prussia were ap- 
plied to for assistance, and both declared themselves ready- 
to fulfil the engagements of the Triple Alliance of 1788. 
Spain, on the other hand, looked to Russia and France. 
Early in 1789 the idea of a quadruple alliance between 
France, Spain, Russia, and Austria in answer to the Triple 
Alliance had been seriously entertained. Though that was 
perhaps no longer feasible, Russia was still on bad terms 
with England, and to Russia Spain at once appealed. 

But it was to France that Spain most confidently 
looked for aid against England. Ever since the secret alli- 
ance of 1733 the interests of France and Spain had been 
united against the trading supremacy of England. And by 
the Family Compact of 1761 the two powers had been still 
more closely drawn together. They were by their alliance 
bound to aid each other in all enterprises. Spain had 
come to the assistance of France at the end of the Seven 
Years' War; she had joined her in helping the Americans 
to secure their independence. It seemed then, at first 
sight, unlikely that the French nation would refuse to aid 
a well-tried ally in her extremity, especially when the foe 
was England, the common enemy of both nations. A war 
between England and Spain, in which France fought on 
the side of Spain, would in 1790 have changed the whole 
course of the Revolution and deeply affected the current of 
European history. And that such a war was on the verge 
of breaking out a very cursory acquaintance with the his- 
tory of France is sufificient to show. In fact, it was not till 
October that it was finally certain that France would not 
support Spain in a war against England. 

But France in 1790 occupied in Europe a far different 



342 The French People 

position to that which she held during the ministry of Ver- 
gennes. Under that statesman she had largely con- 
tributed to the success of the American colonists in their 
struggle for independence, she had checked the designs of 
Joseph II on the Scheldt, she had persuaded Turkey to 
recognise the occupation of the Crimea by Russia. Her 
influence, while considerable at Constantinople and at 
Stockholm, was paramount at The Hague. The balance of 
power, as Mirabeau said, was in her hands. The death of 
Vergennes, early in 1 787, marks the fall of France from her 
influential position in Europe. War was indeed within an 
ace of breaking out between France and England in the 
autumn of 1787, and to many Frenchmen of that day war 
seemed the best means of escape from the bankruptcy 
which threatened France. 

But Montmorin was not of the same stufif as Vergennes, 
and from his refusal in the autumn of 1787 to fight for 
the supremacy of France at The Hague must be dated the 
beginning of the complete efifacement of France in Europe. 

The Triple Alliance of 1788, the immediate result of the 
retirement of France, gave the law to Europe for some 
years, and in face of this formidable combination France, 
occupied with her own internal troubles which culminated 
in the revolution of 1789, remained a cipher in Europe. 
For a moment it had seemed as though a quadruple alli- 
ance between France, Russia, the emperor, and Spain 
would early in 1789 be formed. But nothing came of 
this project, so dear to Catherine II, and France re- 
mained apparently unconscious of the perplexing ques- 
tions which engrossed the attention of the European 
world. The possibility of the complete separation of the 
Belgian provinces from the empire had through the 



Position of France in 1790 343 

greater part of 1789 called for the serious attention of the 
members of the Triple Alliance, on the ground that they 
might fall into the hands of France. The Belgians had 
early in 1790 invited the French government to recognise 
their independence. To a great extent inspired by the 
example of France, they had carried out successfully a 
revolution; a considerable party in the revolted provinces 
held the same views and adopted the same language as the 
French republicans, and were anxious to bring about the 
annexation of their country by France. It seemed likely 
that the insurgents, if England and Prussia refused to sup- 
port them, would throw themselves into the arms of 
France, where they would be welcomed by Lafayette and 
his party. But France had neither money nor serviceable 
troops, and the Assembly did wisely in supporting Louis 
XVI on two separate occasions in his determination not 
to receive any overtures from the revolted provinces. 

The victory of the clerical party and the consequent 
proscription of the democrats in the spring of 1790 de- 
stroyed all chance of the Belgian Revolution receiving any 
sympathy from the National Assembly. To judge from 
Viennese opinion, it seemed unlikely that even the Nootka 
Sound afifair would divert France from her own Revolution 
and induce her to carry out her engagements with her 
allies. Though nominally bound to Austria by the treaty 
of 1756, it had long been apparent to the imperial court 
that nothing could be hoped for from the French alliance. 

In Vienna men only spoke of France in a tone of irony. 
Mercy, the Austrian ambassador, declared in the autumn 
of 1789 that the influence of France in Europe was de- 
stroyed. Leopold, six weeks after his accession, had not 
thought it worth while to notify the fact ofKcially to the 



344 The French People 

French government, and in April, when anxious to secure 
the good offices of some powerful nation in mediating be- 
tween himself and Prussia, he applied not to his ally, 
France, but to England. It was evident to Montmorin 
that the treaty of 1756 was at an end; the powerlessness 
of France was advertised to the world. 

In spite, however, of the temporary efifacement of 
France, politicians of experience firmly expected that she 
would support Spain in the disputes of that power with 
England. All through the winter of lySg-go the possi- 
bility of a foreign war which would have the effect of di- 
verting popular passions, had been discussed in Paris. 
Lafayette, whose hatred for England amounted almost to 
a craze, seized upon the news of the likelihood of a rup- 
ture between England and Spain, and formed a party 
whose policy was to support the ministry in a war against 
England. The commercial treaty of 1786 between Eng- 
land and France was unpopular, and it would have been 
easy for Montmorin, who was himself not averse to war, 
to have taken advantage of the ill will borne to England by 
France and embarked the country on a popular struggle. 
The Jacobins, however, headed by Barnave, the Lameths, 
and Duport, who opposed Lafayette on every point, were 
at one with Robespierre in the opinion that a war would 
strengthen the crown, endanger the results of the Revolu- 
tion, and ought therefore to be avoided. 

On the 14th of May Montmorin wrote to the presi- 
dent of the Assembly, describing the English preparations 
against Spain, declared that as a precaution the French 
government were fitting out fourteen ships, and asked for 
subsidies to pay for this new expense. It was hoped that 
England's warlike attitude would unite all parties in the 



The Right of Peace and War 345 

Assembly in firmly supporting the king against their hated 
rival. But it was at once evident that the deputies were 
by no means prepared to act in a united manner. Amid 
great excitement Alexandre Lameth proposed that the As- 
sembly should at once decide the question whether to the 
king or nation belonged the right of peace and war. The 
folly of wasting time in a discussion of an abstract principle 
when war might break out any day was immediately 
pointed out by Mirabeau, who, in a telling speech, per- 
suaded the Assembly on May 15th to agree to Mont- 
morin's proposal, and to thank the king for the measures 
which he had taken to maintain peace. Having provided 
for the exigencies of the moment, the Assembly then en- 
tered upon a debate, which lasted several days, upon the 
constitutional question. 

Mirabeau's views at this time on the true policy of 
France at this critical moment may be gleaned from a 
speech — never delivered — which he had himself in part 
written. In this speech, printed in the appendix to Vol- 
ume VII of the Memoirs of Mirabeau, we find an eloquent 
eulogy of the policy of the Family Compact. France is the 
natural and necessary ally of Spain, and Spain is equally the 
only ally on whom France can at the moment count. 
" For Turkey is engaged in a serious struggle with Russia; 
Poland, anarchic as usual and in danger of partition, can 
only look to Prussia, if haply that power will aid her 
against Russian and Austrian designs; Austria is, indeed, 
nominally allied to France, but the ambition of Leopold 
will not allow him to forego his plans in the East; Sweden 
is the friend of England, and that power, with Prussia and 
Holland, form the Triple Alliance which has left France 
isolated in Europe. Spain alone can aid her to withstand 



346 The French People 

England on the seas. Honour and interest alike com- 
mand the French nation to keep to her engagements with 
Spain. Friendship with England is impossible, and the 
late commercial treaty ought at once to be repudiated. 
England only cares for the extension of her commerce; 
enmity between her and France must necessarily be eter- 
nal." Mirabeau then examines the causes of the disputes, 
and finds that the English pretensions to Nootka Sound are 
flimsy. " In interfering with the Spanish claims estab- 
lished as far back as the reign of Charles II the English 
have broken the Treaty of Utrecht. In reality the English 
desire to force Spain to make a commercial treaty with 
them. Moreover, the upper classes in England would 
gladly see England involved in war with Spain. The revo- 
lution of 1789 only separates the English still further from 
the French nation; for liberty is hostility to monopoly. 
The king of England and the peers fear for their privileges, 
and hope by means of a successful war to divert the at- 
tention of the advocates of reform. What, then, should 
be the true policy of France? She can observe neutrality, 
she can simply carry oiit the terms of treaties and give 
Spain the assistance stipulated, or she can throw herself 
heart and soul into the struggle and repudiate the hated 
commercial treaty with England. The French nation 
cannot abandon their old ally to the tender mercies of 
England without bringing about the ruin of their com- 
merce, their colonies, and endangering their own inde- 
pendence and their constitutions. A firm attitude may 
avert the struggle. The National Assembly should there- 
fore bring forward a decree begging the king to make a 
very considerable increase to the fleet, to offer the media-" 
tion of France in the quarrel between England and Spain, 



Mirabeau's Speech 347 

and, lastly, if England should persist in her hostile attitude, 
to declare that the first shot fired against Spain will be con- 
sidered as fired against France." 

But the Assembly by no means shared these warlike 
views, which Mirabeau himself found reason before long to 
modify. In the famous discussion which was aroused by 
the Nootka Sound question the Jacobins, following the 
lead of Barnave and Robespierre, not only claimed that 
the right of declaring peace and war should lie with the 
Assembly, but declared in favour of a formal renunciation 
of all projects of conquest and of all wars other than those 
purely defensive. Mirabeau's speech on May 20th and 
his famous answer to Barnave on May 226. are well 
known. He had no difficulty in showing that the right of 
declaring peace and war must necessarily belong to the 
king, as head of the executive; he had still less dif^culty in 
proving to all reasonable men the folly of the Utopian ideas 
of those who thought all Europe would speedily follow the 
example of France, and unite with her in decreeing the 
abolition of war. But the Assembly, carried away by mere 
phrases, by baseless ideals, and by mere Utopian dreams, 
was not in a condition to appreciate Mirabeau's statesman- 
like argument. 

An immense mob congregated in the streets, and the 
Assembly itself was crowded with the populace stirred up 
by the extreme radicals. Cazales, who had ventured to 
declare that, for his part, Russians, Germans, and English 
were nothing to him, that he only cared for his own coun- 
trymen, and that the blood of one of his fellow-citizens was 
dearer to him than the blood of all the people of the world, 
•was cried down for daring to assert such narrow patriotic 
sentiments. In the streets a new pamphlet entitled The 



348 The French People 

Great Treason of the Count Mirabeau " was hawked about. 
But Mirabeau's eloquent refutation, on the 22d; of Bar- 
nave's arguments of the day before was for the moment 
irresistible, and he succeeded in carrying the essential part 
of his proposition, namely, that " questions of peace and 
war were to be settled in the Assembly after an express 
proposition of the king and under his sanction." He 
could not, however, prevent the Assembly from formally 
declaring that the French nation renounces all wars of con- 
quest, and will never employ its forces against the liberty 
of any people. 

Though these decrees were by the king of Prussia in- 
terpreted to mean that France would not carry on any 
aggressive war against England, more sagacious observers 
were by no means of the same opinion. On June 24th 
Pitt wrote to his mother that " our foreign business re- 
mains still in suspense, and I hardly know what to conjec- 
ture of the possibility of peace or war." 

The party of peace at any price had by no means won a 
complete victory. Montmorin's subsidies had been voted, 
and the Spanish ambassador loudly called for the fulfil- 
ment of the terms of the Family Compact, and in a private 
audience made a direct appeal to Louis XVI. Mirabeau 
himself appears to have abandoned the extreme position 
taken up in his unpublished speech, and in his note to the 
court of June 23d shows the king the right attitude to 
take up in his conference with the Spanish ambassador. 
The Family Compact, according to Mirabeau, must be dis- 
solved, for as drawn up it is a mere dynastic treaty, hence 
impossible to be accepted by the Assembly. In its place 
he advises an ordinary treaty which shall have regard to the 
commercial interests of France, and further recommends 



Danger of War 349 

that an envoy shall be at once despatched to Spain to carry- 
out his suggestion. Moreover, he said, it would be unwise 
to present to the Assembly any treaty for ratification till 
July 14th, the anniversary of the capture of the Bastile, 
was over. The Societe de 1789 had, too, published the 
articles of the Family Compact, and it was obvious that 
Mirabeau was right in thinking its acceptance by the As- 
sembly impossible. 

The month of July passed amid rumours of wars and 
much uncertainty. Though the French ambassador in 
London, M. de la Luzerne, might write that, in conse- 
quence of the decree of May 226., the opinion in London 
was that no French minister dare make warlike prepara- 
tions, and that England could without fear assert her su- 
premacy over the two worlds, and though Alexandre La- 
meth might look forward to the immediate tranquility of 
Europe, no statesman could reasonably expect that the 
French people had suddenly lost all their national charac- 
teristics. It only required a rumour at the end of July 
that Austrian troops were marching through French terri- 
tory to Belgium to throw the Assembly into a panic. Re- 
ports of hostile preparations by Spain and England, of a 
threatening league between Prussia and Austria, and of 
the formation of an Emigre army to restore the old regime 
were sufficient to overthrow in a moment all the peaceful 
protestations of the Assembly. 

The excitable, nervous character of the deputies stood 
revealed to Europe, and on July 28th the king was peti- 
tioned to arm the citizens and to provide for the defence 
of the state, and the leave already granted to the Austrians 
to pass through French territory was withdrawn. On 
July 29th it was decided that a committee of six should be 



350 The French People 

appointed to examine all existing treaties between France 
and foreign powers, and to report to the Assembly upon 
all questions of foreign affairs. On August ist the follow- 
ing members of the committee known as Le Comite Diplo- 
matique were appointed: Mirabeau, Freteau, Masson, 
D'Andre, Barnave, Duchatelet. The next day Montmorin 
sent to the Assembly a letter of the Spanish ambassador, 
Ferrare Nuiiez, dated June i6th, in which " the speedy and 
exact performance " of the Family Compact is demanded, 
France is invited to give an explicit answer, and to take her 
measures openly, " so as to avoid the least occasion of 
distrust." Otherwise Spain would " look for other friends 
and allies among all the powers of Europe." Instead oi. at 
once deciding, as was the general expectation, in favour of 
carrying out the Family Compact, the Assembly referred 
the whole matter to the Diplomatic Committee. There 
Mirabeau was all-powerful, and had been elected reporter 
(or chairman). On August 25th Mirabeau communi- 
cated to the Assembly the opinion of the committee. In 
his address he stated that it would be well if France could 
remain at peace until her finances had been placed on a 
sound footing, her army reorganised, harmony restored 
generally in the country, and the constitution completed. 
" Soon," he said, " these results will be secured; soon also 
Europe, freed, like France, from the chains of despotism, • 
will embark upon a free and generous policy." He then 
proceeded to explain that the committee recommended the 
adhesion of France to all existing treaties until they are 
revised or modified, that thirty ships should be commis- 
sioned, and that the engagements to Spain should be car- 
ried out, that for the Family Compact should be sub- 
stituted a national compact. On the 25th the Assembly 



Memoir by Mirabeau 351 

went beyond this report, and decreed " that they would 
abide by the defensive and commercial engagements which 
the government had contracted with Spain," and further, 
" that the king be desired to order into commission forty- 
five ships of the line, with a proportionable number of 
frigates and small vessels." • 

At this time, though Montmorin was pacific in his tone, 
our representative in Paris, Lord Gower, declared that, 
though the king and ministry desired peace, there was no 
doubt that a very large body of men in France were in- 
clined to war. Opponents of the commercial treaty with 
England naturally hoped that war would free them from the 
term-s of the treaty; the aristocratic party had everything to 
gain from war; many, like Lafayette, regarded England 
with hatred or with jealousy; and it was also suggested that 
Spanish gold had won over many members of the National 
Assembly. There is no doubt that war was on the point of 
breaking out between England and France in the autumn 
of 1790. Mirabeau has left in a memoir drawn up at 
this time a remarkable sketch of his views on the situa- 
tion. In it he depicts in a masterly manner the fall of 
France after the death of Vergennes; he describes her posi- 
tion at the moment, and discusses the true policy of 
France in the event of Spain's refusal to make a national 
alliance. France, in that case, though isolated, should 
show energy and activity. Her diplomatists should make 
all Europe see the importance of not allowing France to 
be overwhelmed by her foes. If, however, Spain accepts 
the proposals of the National Assembly, war is certain to 
break out, and the condition of Europe forbids the hope of 
any ally other than Spain. He then points out that war 
will only aggravate the evils from which France is suffer- 



352 The French People 

ing, and that unless France succeeds in securing the assist- 
ance of Austria and Sweden, unless she is well served by 
her ambassadors in all the European courts, unless she can 
count on divisions breaking out among her enemies, war 
will bring to France disaster abroad and anarchy at home. 
It was a serious moment for France, and, indeed, for 
Europe. Lord Gower most explicitly declared to Mont- 
morin early in September that the support of France to 
any claims advanced by Spain would lead to war with Eng- 
land. In obedience to the decree of the National Assem- 
bly, the king had begun to arm sixteen ships of the line. 
Through the greater .part of September Lord Gower's lan- 
guage was uniformly firm, and on September 17th he 
writes that he thinks this language has made some impres- 
sion on the popular mind. The exact means by which war 
was averted is still a mystery. Mirabeau, as chairman of 
the Diplomatic Committee, and as confidential adviser of 
the court, was the most influential person in France. 
Mirabeau had declared himself in favour of war. If peace 
was to be preserved, and Pitt was always in favour of peace, 
some influence must be brought to bear upon Mirabeau. 
Lord Gower could not hold any public communication 
with him, for Mirabeau held no official position. Pitt 
therefore resolved to send Hugh Elliot, just returned from 
his successful embassy at Copenhagen, on an unofiflcial 
mission to Paris. Elliot had been at school with Mirabeau, 
and had always been on friendly relations with him. In 
Lord Stanhope's Life of Pitt a letter written by Pitt early 
in October to Elliot is printed, in which the English minis- 
ter says: " I imagine, indeed, from your account that we 
can hardly hope in case war should take place with Spain 
and should last for any time that France will not ultimately 



Hugh Elliot and Mirabeau 353 

take part in it. But I think there seems to be a reasonable 
prospect that the person with whom you communicate 
may be brought to make such representations to the Span- 
ish court, even if a rupture should have taken place, as may 
lead to a speedy restoration of peace. ... At least it may 
be fairly expected that no immediate decision will be taken 
in France to give actual succours to Spain on the com- 
mencement of hostilities, and this point alone will be of 
great consequence, as it will give us considerable advan- 
tages in our first operations." 

It is evident from this letter that the Diplomatic Com- 
mittee was still inclined to maintain the Family Compact. 
Suddenly, however, Mirabeau changed his mind. From 
that moment peace was certain, as Spain would not go to 
war unless she was supported by France. 

There is no doubt whatever that to Elliot's influence 
was due Mirabeau's change of mind. But we know noth- 
ing of the arguments used by Elliot, and this obscure pas- 
sage of diplomatic history has never been cleared up. All 
we know is that Elliot's mission was entirely successful. 
Years after a brother diplomatist, writing to Elliot about a 
negotiation then pending, says: " If you could have been 
sent to conduct it as successfully as you did your mission 
to Mirabeau," etc. On October 22d Lord Gower wrote 
that " the popular party has signified to me, through Mr. 
Elliot, their earnest desire to use their influence with the 
court of Madrid in order to bring it to accede to the just 
demands of his majesty, and if supported by us, I am in- 
duced to believe, they will readily prefer an English alli- 
ance to a Spanish compact." This complete change of 
front was still more strikingly exemplified in Mirabeau's 
note for the court on October 28th, in which he advises 



354 The French People 

peace as absolutely necessary in the interests of the mon- 
archy, and declares that the English preparations were 
made with regard to the war between Russia and Sweden, 
that Spain cannot fight without France, that there is 
no party of any consequence in France which desires war, 
and that the whole tendency of European politics is in fa- 
vour of peace. 

All danger of war between France and England was 
now removed, and Florida Blanca, who at the end of July 
had appeared to be bent on war, found that the prospects of 
the promised French alliance were very doubtful. This 
defection of her ally, combined with the appearance of a 
formidable English fleet, produced a powerful effect in 
Spain. Somewhat suddenly, on October 28th, a conven- 
tion was signed between Florida Blanca and Fitzherbert, 
followed shortly afterward by the Treaty of Escurial, in 
which Spain surrendered every point. Pitt had won a great 
triumph. He had destroyed the Family Compact; he had 
won a considerable victory over Spain; he had preserved 
peace; France remained isolated. 

The peaceful settlement of this difificult question was 
naturally very disappointing to the aristocratical party. 
It was, moreover, the opinion of Gouverneur Morris 
that a foreign war would alone save the French nation 
from the impending anarchy. But would a foreign war 
have done more than plunge France rapidly into the chaos 
towards which she was tending? Her army was dis- 
organized, and time was required for its entire recon- 
stitution. Peace was necessary to complete the work 
of the Assembly; peace was necessary till France had 
given herself a working government, for, as Mirabeau 
said, France was then practically without a government. 



The Girondist Foreign Policy 355 

It is probably true, as Von Sybel asserts, that the out- 
break of hostilities at that period would not have run 
counter to the interests of the Jacobins, but would have 
played into their hands by bringing about the fall of a 
king and ministers whose weakness and indecision would 
have rendered them incapable of carrying on a successful 
war. The history of 1790 conclusively proves that the 
adoption of revolutionary principles had not in any way 
changed the readiness of the French nation to engage in 
war if its interests were threatened or an ally attacked. It 
soon became no less evident that the love of aggression 
and aggrandizement was by no means dead, and even the 
deputies perceived before the dissolution of their As- 
sembly, in September, 1791, that a nation situated as 
France was could not ignore its traditions and interests. 
In November, 1790, Avignon had been declared united 
to the French crown, and the French had thus rapidly de- 
viated from the path of self-abnegation marked out in the 
previous May. 

When once it was realized that French interests de- 
manded annexations, and that foreign powers were not 
likely to accept willingly and immediately the principles 
of the Revolution, a new period in the foreign policy of 
France was begun. The Girondists demanded a propa- 
gandist campaign in case any power attacked or threatened 
French independence. " Let us tell Europe," said Isnard, 
at the close of 1791, " that the French people, if once they 
draw the sword, will throw aside the scabbard; and if the 
cabinets of Europe bring about a war between the kings 
and the peoples, we will unite all peoples in a struggle to 
the death against the kings." In 1792 the Girondists car- 
ried out their views and involved France in a war which 



356 The French People 

lasted, with short mtervals, till 1815, At the outset the 
ministry, guided by Dumouriez, the Girondist minister of 
foreign affairs, showed no originality in its conception of 
what should be the true foreign policy of France. 

It had required all the efforts of Mirabeau and Lafay- 
ette to prevent the outbreak of war over the affair of Noot- 
ka Sound, and it was then evident that a strong party ex- 
isted which was anxious, in spite of the abstract principles 
asserted by the Constituents, to fulfil the terms of the Fam- 
ily Compact with Spain. In 1792 Dumouriez and the Gi- 
rondists boldly returned to the foreign policy of Henry IV, 
Richelieu, and Louis XIV. War was to be waged against 
Austria, and the principal theatre of the war was to be 
the Austrian Netherlands, which, when conquered, was to 
be declared an independent republic. By such a policy 
Dumouriez hoped to avert any hostile action on the part 
of Great Britain, which would resent the annexation of the 
Austrian Netherlands to France. In order to isolate Aus- 
tria Dumouriez proposed to secure the neutrality of Prus- 
sia, the states of the Empire, Sweden, and Denmark, and 
to gain the alliance of Bavaria. 

From 1756 to 1792 the alliance between France and 
Austria, the result of the diplomatic revolution of 1756, 
had held good. In 1792 France reverted to her ancient 
policy of hostility to the Hapsburgs. On this occasion, 
however, Europe did not second the efforts of France, as 
it had done in the Austrian Succession War, and Dumou- 
riez found himself unable to repeat the role of Belleisle. 
Though a party existed at Berlin favourable to the revolu- 
tionary principles, Prussia refused to desert its coalition 
with Austria; and Bavaria and the other German states, 
though hostile to both Austria and Prussia, did not form 



The War of 1792 357 

themselves into a third state under the control of France. 
Furthermore, as after Valmy the French aggressions in- 
creased and the Austrian Netherlands were occupied, the 
Scheldt declared open, and Holland threatened, England 
adopted a hostile attitude; and in February, 1793, Dumou- 
riez found that instead of France fighting Austria alone, 
she was opposed by all the powers of Western Christen- 
dom. Though Dumouriez' knowledge of European poli- 
tics was accurate, and though his opinions were justified 
by later events, he failed to appreciate the effect upon 
Europe of that French enthusiasm for their revolutionary 
principles which showed itself in an active propaganda, in 
annexations of territory, and in a generally aggressive pol- 
icy, illustrated by the occupation of the Austrian Nether- 
lands and by the decrees of November 19 and December 
15, 1792, which incited the inhabitants of Europe to rise 
against their rulers. The principles adopted in 1789 had 
been entirely thrown aside and a war of aggrandizement 
entered upon. 

After the French armies had been defeated at Neerwin- 
den and Dumouriez had fled, Danton endeavoured for the 
remainder of 1793 to return to the spirit of the declarations 
of 1789. He demolished the propagandist views of the 
Girondists and the decrees of November 19th and Decem- 
ber 15th by declaring that such principles would compel 
the French to support a revolution in China, and on April 
13' 1793' the Convention declared that the French people 
would not interfere in the afifairs of other nations. The 
war then resolved itself into a defensive war, and a struggle 
for existence fully justified by the existence of a European 
coalition which aimed at the restoration of the Bourbons. 

With the establishment of the Committee of Public 
24 



358 The French People 

Safety and the successful defence of France in the second 
half of 1793 the foreign policy of the French republicans 
passed into a new phase, more advanced than, but in 
many respects resembling, the policy advocated by Du- 
mouriez. War against Austria was to be combined with 
very elaborate negotiations with all the other European 
powers, whether in the first or second rank, in order to 
break up the coalition. So successful were the efforts of 
the Committee of Public Safety that in 1794 French suc- 
cesses drove back the allies at all points, and led to the 
breaking up of the coalition in 1793. The treaties of 
Basle constituted a diplomatic triumph for the French, 
who, having detached Spain, Prussia, Holland, Tuscany, 
Norway, and Sweden from the ranks of their foes, were 
able to concentrate their efforts upon England, Austria, 
and Sardinia. By the treaties of Basle revolutionary 
France had again entered into the European system, and 
had at the same time shown that it was determined to 
advance the French boundary to its natural frontiers, and 
so to realize the dreams of Louis XIV. Richelieu had 
declared that the frontier of ancient Gaul ought to be that 
of France, and Danton had emphasized this opinion by 
declaring that the limits of France were marked by nature, 
and were the ocean, the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine. 
Having broken up the concert of Europe, the task be- 
fore the French was simplified. During the period of the 
Directory (1795-99) can be traced ideas dating from the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and attempts to adapt 
them to the new condition of affairs. Rewbell, like Du- 
mouriez, belonged to that school of diplomatists who re- 
garded Austria with undying enmity, and looked upon 
Prussia as the natural ally of France. Others of his col- 



The Directory and Napoleon 359 

leagues, supported by such astute politicians as Talleyrand 
and Sieyes, opposed the idea of giving Prussia a strong 
position in north Germany. They were equally ready to 
negotiate with Austria or with Prussia, so long as they 
were able to remove both powers from the French frontier 
by means of the interposition of a number of small states 
dependent on France. This plan of setting up a quantity 
of little republics had been entertained by Belleisle in the 
Austrian Succession War, and those of the directors who 
advocated this policy proposed to push Prussia behind the 
Elbe, or, at any rate, behind the Weser, and to compensate 
her for losses on the west by acquisitions farther east. 

Though Rewbell carried out his views and the cam- 
paign against Austria was not extended to hostilities 
against Prussia, Napoleon on becoming emperor at once 
realized that the policy urged by Sieyes and Talleyrand 
was the true policy of France. In some ways his Ger- 
man policy was a return to the ancient policy of the 
French nation; in others it embodied new and striking 
developments which for a time placed central Europe 
under the heel of a foreign despotism. Though unable 
to check the growth of the feeling of nationality in Prus- 
sia, or to prevent that kingdom from becoming the lead- 
ing German state, Napoleon did succeed in prolonging the 
existence of such states as Bavaria and Saxony. But not 
content with a purely Continental policy, he endeavoured 
to avenge on England the losses and defeats which France 
had suffered at her hands since 1688. 

In 181 5 the foreign policy of the revolutionary and 
Napoleonic period had ended in disastrous failure. The 
Prussians, Russians, and Austrians had invaded France 
and taken Paris; the English had destroyed the Conti- 



360 The French People 

nental system and swept the seas, and as early as 1810 
had taken all the French colonies. 

It was only the quarrels of the allies and the diplomacy 
of Talleyrand that secured for France the respect due 
to a great though defeated nation. 

///. After 1815 

The year 181 5 brought to an end the second Hundred 
Years' War, and England and France have as yet never 
been again in armed conflict. They had struggled for 
supremacy in Canada, in India, and on the sea, and Eng- 
land had won. The old hostility of France to Austria had, 
too, lost its meaning and disappeared from among the 
active forces which moved the passions of Europe. It was 
impossible for French invasions of Germany to be in the 
future either profitable or successful. The rise of Prussia 
was a fact the exact import of which was not fully under- 
stood, and with its unostentatious but continuous develop- 
ment Prussia was in no sense a menace to its neighbour. 

The foreign policy, therefore, of France was forced to 
flow along new channels and to find opportunities for its 
exercise now in supporting the Spanish throne against the 
liberal tendencies of a large number of Spaniards, now in 
joining England to secure for the Greeks a measure of in- 
dependence. 

Louis Philippe, after aiding the Belgians to shake ofif 
the Dutch yoke, busied himself with successes in Algiers 
and adventures in Egypt. His ministers, however, were 
by no means successful foreign politicians, and neither 
Thiers nor Guizot raised the reputation of the French 
Foreign Office. In fact the disgrace to Louis Philippe's 
policy brought about by the Spanish marriages was one of 



The Franco-Russian Alliance 361 

the causes of his overthrow. Though France was to a 
great extent isolated during the Restoration period, from 
1830 to 1848 the successive French governments had culti- 
vated friendship with England; in Napoleon's IIFs reign 
French and English soldiers fought together in the 
Crimea. 

With the intervention of France in the Italian War 
of Independence French foreign policy entered upon a 
most disastrous period. Without clearness or consistency 
the emperor plunged from one blunder into another, and 
the reputation of France suffered enormously in Europe. 
The Mexican expedition, the Luxembourg affair, and 
the Prussian War ended in failure and disaster, and with 
the establishment of the third republic France again found 
herself isolated in Europe. Since 1815 forces then latent 
had developed surprising strength, and not only had Italy 
become a powerful kingdom, but Prussia had wrested the 
supremacy in Germany from Austria, and in 1871 the king 
of Prussia was crowned emperor of Germany. 

After some years of uncomfortable isolation (following 
the Franco-Prussian War), during which Prussia, Austria, 
and Italy formed the famous Triple Alliance, France has 
drawn close to Russia, and the intimate connection be- 
tween a republic and a despotism is still puzzling Europe. 
First advocated during the regency of Orleans, between 
171 5 and 1723, and then realized for three uneasy years 
by Napoleon I, it has been the privilege not of a king or 
emperor of France, but of a republican government, to 
carry into effect Peter the Great's scheme of a close alliance 
between France and Russia. 

No country has prepared more surprises for Europe 
than France, no country has dreaded isolation more than 



362 The French People 

France, and no country has so rapidly recovered from 
defeats. The French have always been ready to suspend 
their internal development for the sake of military glory, 
and consequently the domestic history of France has been 
deeply affected by her foreign policy. It remains to be 
seen whether the Latin races are able to hold their own 
against the increasing vigour and enterprise which is the 
characteristic feature of the purely Teutonic peoples. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

THE FRANCE OF TO-DAY 

Modern France is the product of the Revolution and 
of the French Empire, and modern France is nothing if 
not conservative. " La Republique sera conservatrice ou 
elle ne sera pas," were the words of Thiers, and they are 
fully borne out by the history of the third republic. The 
prosperity of France and the maintenance of internal 
order are to-day as much prized by the peasant and the 
ordinary tradesman as they were in the evil days of the Di- 
rectory or in the early months of 1848. Patriotic, mod- 
erate, and upright, the mass of the French people during 
the last hundred and ten years have lived through a 
period very " remarkable for its changes, its grandeur, its 
misery, for sanguine hope and terrible disillusions." 

From the dictatorship of Thiers to the present day — 
a period of nearly thirty years — France has existed under a 
republic. Between 1792 and 1870 the form of govern- 
ment has been, with the fall of the existing regime, 
changed nine times. In 1792 the monarchy fell, in 1794 
Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety were 
swept away, in 1799 the Directory perished amid univer- 
sal rejoicing. With the advent of the nineteenth century 
further rapid changes supervened. In 18 14 the first em- 
pire came to an end, and in 181 5 Louis XVIII had to fly, 

363 



364 The French People 

to return after the battle of Waterloo. In 1830 the Bour- 
bon monarchy was finally overthrown, to the great detri- 
ment of French political life, which was just beginning to 
develop naturally, and which, under the guidance of wise 
statesmen, might have risen to something approaching 
that seen in England. The French people took little part 
in that revolution; they disliked the compromise which 
the liberal opposition offered them, and when Louis Phi- 
lippe fell in 1848, the magnitude of the mistake made in 
1830 was realized by the shortsighted doctrinaire liberals. 

The dismissal of Polignac in 1830 would probably 
have saved the situation, and the party of Thiers and Gui- 
zot might have forced Charles X to act as a constitutional 
ruler. As it was, France since 1830 has shown no polit- 
ical stability, the Legitimist monarchy is dead, and at 
times it seems as if some military adventurer might, in the 
event of a national crisis, destroy the republic and set up a 
third empire. In 1848 the second republic was estab- 
lished, but gave way in 1852 to the second empire, which 
in its turn was succeeded by the third republic, in 1870. 

One result of these rapid changes is that France at 
times resembles a water-logged ship. She has no perma- 
nent dynasty, no permanent aristocracy, no traditions ex- 
cept those connected with Napoleon I and his empire, 
no permanent institutions beyond those set up by the 
great emperor. She has cut herself off from her brilliant 
history connected with the Capetian, Valois, and Bourbon 
dynasties, and since the fall of Napoleon I has not been 
able to justify in the eyes of Europe the wisdom of her 
action in breaking off completely with the glorious tradi- 
tions of her past. 

At the present time there is a large party in France 



The Napoleonic Legend 365 

who regard a republic as the only possible government for 
a country which cut itself adrift from the traditions of its 
ancient monarchy in 1792. The assertion that "the re- 
public since September 22, 1792, had not ceased for a 
single moment to live its latent life as a government in 
reserve for the salvation of the country " represents the 
views of the extreme republicans. This view harmonizes 
with that held by De Tocqueville, who considers the 
first period of the revolution ended with the triumph of 
the middle class in 1830, and agrees with the position al- 
ways adopted by journalists representing the opinions of 
members of the extreme left. 

On the other hand, there always is in France a strong 
undercurrent of opinion hostile to the republic, and in 
sympathy with a monarchical regime. The existence of 
such an opinion has been illustrated of late years by the 
revival of the Napoleonic legend and by the cessation of 
the feeling of hostility to and distrust of the second empire 
which the events of 1870 and 1871 engendered. From 
1870 to 1890 the Napoleonic legend attracted little notice 
and less enthusiasm. The events connected with the fall 
of the second empire were vividly remembered, and the 
subsequent death of the prince imperial discouraged the 
Bonapartist supporters. From 1890, however, the tide in 
favour of Csesarism has ttu'ned and the memory of the first 
Napoleon has become a real force in French politics. 

In spite of the attacks of Lanfrey on Napoleon I, the 
conclusions arrived at by Taine, though hostile to the 
great emperor, have undoubtedly damaged the memory 
of the Revolution, while the flood of literature bearing on 
the career of Napoleon testifies to the enormous interest 
taken in the history of his life and reign. The Panama 



366 The French People 

scandal and several other such incidents have, on the one 
hand, brought home to Frenchmen the truth that a repub- 
lic is by no means free from corruption and venality, while 
on the other there remains the ever-important fact that 
modern France is the work of Napoleon I. Mr. Bodley's 
words on this point are very striking: 

" Under the restoration of the legitimate kings, under 
the revolutionary monarchy of the Orleans branch, under 
the plebiscitary empire, and under the parliamentary re- 
public the Napoleonic construction forms the unchanging 
basis of the administration and life of the country, whatever 
forms of legislation and executive powers the constitution 
of the moment has set up. . . . Moreover, nothing sur- 
vives of the Revolution but what was established by Napo- 
leon." * 

Though at intervals the French nation can be roused 
to declare in unmistakable fashion its preference for one 
or other of the many forms of government presented to 
it, it remains true that one of the strangest features of 
French society is the general indifference of the mass of 
the people to politics even at critical periods in the history 
of France. The bulk of the population of France is not 
and never has been revolutionary; the main objects of the 
people are tranquility, order, and peace. As a rule the 
majority has allowed itself to be dominated by a small 
active minority, which by its energy, and not infrequently 
ferocity, has terrorized the ordinary Frenchman into obedi- 
ence to its wishes. 

In the autumn of 1791 when the extremist Petion 
was elected mayor of Paris comparatively few of the elect- 

* Modern France, by J. E. C. Bodley, vol. i, p. 120 



Political Apathy 367 

ors took the trouble to go to the polls, though only a 
small number of the Parisians desired the election of a 
violent revolutionist. The fall of Robespierre was cer- 
tainly brought about by the consensus and with the aid of 
a majority of the Parisians, who for the time threw off theijif 
habitual carelessness and adopted a less submissive atti- 
tude. The grapeshot of Vendemiaire, however, was a 
sufficient excuse for inaction during the unpopular gov- 
ernment of the Directory, and it was only the ambition of 
Sieyes and the determination of Bonaparte that freed 
France from a yoke detested by all classes. Similarly the 
exciting Hundred Days were not brought about by the 
general wish of the nation, and the revolutions of 1830 
and 1848 in no sense represented a widespread desire 
for change. It is probably nearer the mark to say that all 
the above upheavals were organized and carried out 
against the will of the French nation. 

In 1848 after the establishment of universal suffrage a 
clear issue was placed before the people in France, and the 
answer was unmistakable. The nation was sound at 
bottom and refused to have any dealings with the social- 
ists. It had not taken any share in the overthrow of 
Louis Philippe, but with regard to the future it spoke in 
no hesitating tone. Peace and order were required; politi- 
cal rights were of secondary importance. To this deci- 
sion of an independent public opinion Louis Bonaparte 
owed his imperial throne. 

The occasions, indeed, when the French nation has 
risen in its might are very rare. For some eighty years 
France has been the victim of attacks and plots on the 
part either of the reactionaries or the Jacobins. History 
shows that as a rule the violent party in France carries the 



368 The French People 

day and wields all the power. Its influence is due to the 
absence in ordinary times of public opinion or of public 
spirit, and to the ease with which the French population 
is intimidated by violent partisans. To this peculiar 
characteristic of the French people the Jacobins owed 
much of their success in 1792 and the following years. 
While the deputies on mission intimidated the provinces, 
a determined knot of revolutionists carried on the Reign 
of Terror in Paris and guillotined thousands of persons 
belonging mainly to the middle and lower classes without 
experiencing any resistance on the part of their victims. 
The cowardice of the bourgeoisie in Paris during the year 
of the Terror is one of the least edifying, though perhaps 
one of the most extraordinary features in the history of 
the Jacobin supremacy. 

France since 1789, and especially since 1871, has fre- 
quently been ruled by ministries in which she has no in- 
terest or confidence. Public opinion in France is usu- 
ally manufactured, and rarely expresses the real views of 
the people. Party and personal influences dictate the tone 
of the articles in the journals, which consequently have 
little value and are seldom read by the majority of French- 
men. 

The nation is apparently satisfied with a government 
which guarantees the continuance of order; otherwise it 
is indifferent to the rise and fall of the various minis- 
tries which, with bewildering rapidity, have appeared 
and have suddenly been overthrown. This indifferentism 
which so largely pervades the electorate shows itself in 
various ways. The composition of the Chambers is 
marked by an " abstention des capacites," and conse- 
quently the Legislature and Executive are not composed 



Democracy Supreme 369 

of the men who represent the best qualities of Frenchmen. 
The more refined a man's nature is the less he cares to 
subject himself to the attacks of a scurrilous press. 
Owing, too, to the popular indifferentism, the crassest po- 
litical ignorance prevails in the provinces. Few take any 
interest in politics or even read the newspapers, and so a 
situation is created full of danger to the stability of the 
state. " There is no public opinion in France," writes Mr. 
Bodley, " as we understand it in England, or, at all events, 
no means of expressing it. The spirit of the press of the 
whole country, excepting in matters of local interest, is 
regulated by the journalists of Paris, who interpret merely 
the sentiments, sometimes conflicting, sometimes unani- 
mous, of the boulevards, and the newspaper is not used 
by the public for airing its grievances by means of letters 
to the editors." * 

It is at any rate as certain as any prophecy with regard 
to France can be, that there is no sentiment of loyalty to 
any royal race existing among the French people. The 
traditions of greatness in times past under the Bourbons 
are dead. The overthrow of Charles X and Louis Phi- 
lippe completely destroyed the idea of monarchy " as the 
symbol of national power," while the collapse of the sec- 
ond empire dealt a blow at the tradition of the first empire 
and the memory of the administrative genius of the great 
Napoleon. 

Democracy is an accepted fact and universal suffrage 
has become a necessity in France. Though the concep- 
tion of equality by a Frenchman falls very short of the 
doctrine as professed in the early days of the great Revolu- 

* France, by J. E. C. Bodley, vol. i, p. 131. 



370 The French People 

tion, it remains true that any limitation of the suffrage 
would shock the national sentiment of equality. Frater- 
nity has long ceased to have any meaning. The French 
Revolution was essentially cosmopolitan, and the " broth- 
erhood of nations " was loudly proclaimed in 1789. But 
Europe in the War of Liberation would have none of this 
doctrine, while the French in erecting statues to Danton 
and Marat have not shown any desire to destroy the mem- 
ory of internecine struggles between Frenchmen and 
Frenchmen. And though personal liberty is by no means 
sacred and freedom of opinion only exists at the pleasure 
of the state authorities, the French profess to believe that 
the famous legend of the Revolution — Liberty, Equality, 
and Fraternity — has still some of its ancient force. Noth- 
ing has perhaps done more to emphasize and intensify the 
theoretical and practical aspects of liberty in France than 
the incessant struggle between religion and secularism. 
In this strife Jacobinism has been allowed to dictate the 
policy of successive governments, though in other re- 
spects the country never hesitates to repudiate the teach- 
ings and claims of the Jacobins. The narrow bigotry 
shown on all possible occasions by the state officials, the 
deference paid by even the president of the republic to 
anticlericalism, is all the more astounding when it is re- 
membered that France is a Catholic country, and the vast 
majority of the people staunch adherents of the Roman 
Catholic Church. In 1793 and 1794 the whole country, 
dreading foreign invasion, submitted in all things to a 
well-organized system of terror wielded by a compara- 
tively small number of determined men; at the present 
day, though the fear of the outbreak of Jacobinism is as 
strong as ever, France in the matter of religious policy 



Religious Intolerance 371 

allows herself to be terrorized by a violent and loud- 
voiced antireligious minority, whose fundamental doctrine 
is absolute intolerance of all opinions opposed to its 
own. The history of the modern development of the 
opinions and methods which were adopted by Robespierre 
and his party is in some ways interesting, though its study 
shakes one's belief in the advantage to be gained from a 
republican form of government. 

In 1873 the monopoly of the University of France was 
broken down and the right of free teaching allowed to all 
classes; in 1874 M, Challemel-Lacour led the attacks on 
Christianity and declared it was necessary to secularize the 
country. In 1879 and 1880, owing to the influence of 
Gambetta and Jules Ferry, a secularist policy was carried 
out and attempts were even made to prohibit all the em- 
blems of religion. 

Saint-Just himself could not have desired a more faith- 
ful execution of his projects for educating the nation to 
adopt his creed, and Jules Ferry proved a worthy follower 
of the tyrannical and intolerant Jacobins. Since 1892 the 
papacy has changed its attitude — the bishops and clergy 
are advised to accept the republic. This wise policy has 
not led to any increase of tolerance toward the Jews. 
Want of toleration remains a constant menace to internal 
peace and order, and atheism among the ranks of the so- 
cialists is still rampant. It may be that the day is not far 
distant when the nation will rise in defence of its religious 
sentiments and convictions, and insist on the establishment 
of a system of toleration. 

At present there are no positive signs that religious 
liberty is likely to be secured in France, and the situation 
has not materially altered for the better since 1883, when 



372 The French People 

Jules Simon wrote on the state of France. " The Catholic 
religion," he says, " is threatened with a reconstruction 
of the organization and discipline of the Church by the 
Parliament; the candidates for Holy Orders are threatened 
with compulsory military service, absolutely incompatible 
with their clerical education; it is proposed to suppress 
the revenue granted by the State to the Church, .... to 
take from the Church the buildings devoted to pubHc wor- 
ship, etc., etc. And we are told that religion is not 
threatened, that these dangers are the invention of cleri- 
cals, and that the government will not consent to fresh 
aggressions." * 

The same writer also points out that, with reference to 
reHgious liberty, " it is curious and painful to witness in 
1880 the same exaggerations and the same excesses as 
in 1793." 

At the present day, though the papacy has recognised 
the republic and forced the monarchists either to with- 
draw from political life or to become republicans, the ex- 
tremists still persevere in their antireligious policy, and it 
will evidently take many years before a real modus vivendi 
can be arranged between the secularists and the Catholics. 

It is to be hoped that the course of the national life of 
France will not be seriously disturbed by the lack of re- 
sponsibility shown by its journalists, by religious intoler- 
ance, or by political rancour. The progress of literature, 
natural science, and art in France has been of European 
importance, and no body of men in France have done 
more to promote the advancement of history and natural 
science, and for the improvement of instruction than the 

* Dieu, Patrie, Liberty, par Jules Simon, p. 293. 



Need for a Strong Executive 373 

professors of the Ecole des Chartes. By their efforts 
learning in France has progressed, and through their valu- 
able researches modern France has gained enormously in 
the respect of Europe. 

It is peculiarly difficult to forecast the future of the 
political development of France. Some writers hold that 
representative institutions are unsuited to the French 
people, and that a pariiamentary system cannot long con- 
tinue to flourish side by side with the centralized system 
of administration created by Napoleon I. Others, who 
regard French history as a slow, though continuous de- 
velopment of the principles of the revolution of 1789, 
are of opinion that gradually the representative system 
will become as popular as autocracy was in the past, and 
that the abuses connected with the French Assembly will 
disappear. 

There is no doubt that statesmanship is needed in 
France, and it is the absence of it which has caused so 
many of the political changes of the last twenty-eight 
years. The relations of the Legislature and Executive 
are often far from being what an ideal constitution would 
demand, and the scurrility of the press passes all bounds 
of decency and decorum. But it is hoped by the friends 
of the republic that before long the people of France will 
insist on possessing high-class journals, edited by men 
with a sense of responsibility, and there is little doubt that 
if there were a steady demand for creditable political litera- 
ture the supply would be forthcoming. The pity of it is 
that at present the newspapers are not read by a large pro- 
portion of the people, who devote all their attention to the 
" trivial round, the common task," and pay no heed to 
matters of national import. 
25 



374 The French People 

The republican parliamentary system, it is pointed out, 
has done much valuable work since 1871. The reorgani- 
zation of the army and navy, the reconstruction of the 
national defences, the expansion of French colonial inter- 
ests, and the re-establishment of friendly relations with the 
papacy, together with the Russian alhance, must all be 
placed to the credit of the republican government. 

In spite of the comparative success of the republican 
regime there are many thoughtful persons who foresee the 
overthrow of the parliamentary representative system 
and the substitution of a dictator whose power will be 
based on manhood suffrage. It is said, first, that the 
French nation prefer to be governed, and do not like to 
govern themselves; and in the next place, that the republic 
is unable to preserve oyder, and that it has signally failed to 
represent the best qualities of Frenchmen. Consequently 
the nation has no regard for the parliamentary system, 
which, owing to the prevalence of corruption and the 
number of small groups which exist in the Chamber, is 
often signally ineffective. The past history of France 
would seem to prove the first of these contentions, viz., 
that the French like to be governed, and are always ready 
to throw themselves into the hands of a hero who is will- 
ing to lead them, to keep order, and to give them peace so 
far as it is compatible with the national love of glory. 
It was thus that the nation at various times willingly 
accepted the despotism of Louis XI, Henry IV, and Louis 
XIV, and found an acceptable refuge from the anarchy of 
the government of the Directory, and from the menacing 
attitude of the 1848 socialists in the establishment of the 
first and second empires respectively. 

Owing, however, to the complete and irreparable break 



Problems in France 375 

with tradition after the revolution of 1789, it is not neces- 
sary or advisable to seek for examples of the French love 
of an autocracy beyond the foundation of the first empire. 
Representative Constitutions have hitherto not proved 
brilliantly successful among Latin or Celtic nations, and 
there seems little room for doubt that a ruler who could 
fire the enthusiasm of the people might under certain cir- 
cumstances succeed in placing himself at the head of the 
state. The question how far circumstances favourable 
to the success of a new Napoleon exist at the present day 
in France, is difificult to answer. Mr. Bodley, in his re- 
markable work, so often alluded to in these pages, has no 
hesitation in declaring that France is suffering from po- 
litical maladies which can be cured by a dictator only. 
The corruption of Parliament, the violence of the press, 
the refusal of the most capable Frenchmen to take part in 
public life, force upon him the conviction that " an em- 
peror as the chief of a republic, far from being an anomaly, 
might under favourable circumstances solve the unrav- 
elled problem of the century." 

Such a conclusion of the many honest attempts to give 
France a sound constitutional government would be a 
bitter disappointment to all who believe in the ultimate 
triumph of representative institutions. And the peculiar 
difficulties with which France has had to contend would 
justify, even under the present unsatisfactory conditions of 
public life in France, a prolongation of " the experiment 
of governing France by ministers supported by a popular 
Assembly and elected by manhood suffrage." * In other 
countries, such as England, the aristocracy has taken the 

* Edinburgh Review, April, 1898, p. 543. 



376 The French People 

lead in local government and in securing reforms. In 
France it has been otherwise. The French nobles were de- 
prived of all share of local government. When the Revolu- 
tion came they fled, and no men could be found capable of 
taking the place of the central authority. The abdication 
by a large and perhaps the most intelligent class in France 
of all its duties is an event unprecedented in European 
history, and the importance of which cannot be over- 
estimated. Since 1789 France, deprived of the services 
of a large proportion of her most capable sons, has been in 
the position of a bird deprived of the use of one wing. 
She was compelled to accept Napoleon's centralized sys- 
tem of administration, which in its turn has hampered the 
development of local autonomy — a plant of very slow 
growth. 

Thus France has never had a fair chance of gradually 
replacing the officialism and centralization of her adminis- 
trative system by local institutions. It is by developing 
a local spirit such as exists in England that France will 
find the best means for improving the radical defects of 
her government and for remedying the evils of her 
free press. Unfortunately, it is only too possible that 
events may force on France a solution of " the unravelled 
problem " which will tend to throw still farther back the 
evolution of a local popular spirit. 

The socialists are now stronger in France than at any 
previous period in her history. In 1848 and in 1871 they 
failed in the face of the openly declared opposition of the 
mass of the French nation. Since 1871 the quarrels be- 
tween political parties, the attitude taken by the Church, 
financial scandals, mistakes in foreign policy, and, above 
all, the weakness of the executive have enabled the 



The Future of France m 

socialists to develop to an amazing extent. Even if 
opposed by the army, they remain a standing menace 
to the internal peace of France. Allowing that the 
country is sufficiently united or determined to resist the 
endeavour to hoist the red flag, two antagonistic systems, 
in the words of M. Seignobos, still face each other, " un 
regime public democratique, un regime administrative 
hierarchique." Each has plenty of advocates, each has an 
equal chance of success. But before the supremacy of 
either system can be assured the French republic must 
pass through an anxious if not a dangerous period. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



It is impossible to enumerate all the works dealing with the history 
of France. In Monod's Bibliographic de I'Histoire de France will be 
found a large and admirable selection of the most important books deal- 
ing with the various phases of the political, religious, and social history 
of the French people. In the following list I have endeavoured to bring 
together a few of the best-known original authorities as well as the most 
valuable of the secondary authorities. For a list of memoirs I must 
again refer the reader to Monod's Bibliography. Valuable information 
about books on French history and culture will also be found in Lec- 
tures on Modern History, by H. Morse Stephens, in Annals of Politics 
and Culture, by G. P. Gooch, and in the bibliographical notes at the 
end of each of the chapters in the Histoire generale of Lavisse and 
Rambaud. 

GENERAL HISTORY 

Gibbon. Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. (New edition by 

Professor Bury.) 
Ranke, J. V. Weltgeschichte. 

Lavisse et Rambaud. Histoire generale de IV"^ siecle i nos jours. 
Periods of European History, 476-1901. (Edited by A. Hassall.) 



FRENCH HISTORY 

general 

MiCHELET. Histoire de France. 

Lavisse et Rambaud. (As above.) 

Martin. Histoire de France. 

GuizoT. Histoire de la civilisation en France. 

379 



380 The French People 

Rambaud. Histoire de la civilisation frangaise. 

Gasquet. Precis des institutions politiques et sociales de I'ancienne 

France. 
Cheruel. Dictionnaire historique des institutions de la France. 
KiTCHlN. History of France. 



SPECIAL 

/. The Merovingian, Carlovingian, and Early Capetian Periods 

Oman. The Dark Ages, 476-918. 

Gregory of Tours. Historia Francorum. 

Jahn. Geschichte der Burgundionen. 

Thierry. Recits des temps Merovingians. 

FUSTEL DE COULANGES. Histoire des institutions politiques en I'an- 
cienne France and La monarchie franque. 

VlOLLET. Histoire des institutions politiques de la France. 

JUNGHANS. Histoire critique des regnes de Childeric et de Chlodo- 
vech. 

LOENING. Geschichte des deutschen Kirchenrechts. 

BORDIER ET Charton. Histoire de France. 

Davis. Charlemagne. 

Lot. Les derniers Carolingiens, Lothaire, Louis V, Charles de Lorraine. 

Luchaire. Histoire des institutions monarchiques de la France sous 
les premiers Capetiens, and Manuel des institutions frangaises. 

//. The Great Capetian Kings 

Luchaire. Introduction du Louis VI le Gros ; Institutions mo- 
narchiques ; Etudes sur les actes de Louis VII ; and Les communes 
frangaises a I'epoque des Capetiens direct. 

Walker. On the Increase of Royal Power in France under Philip 
Augustus. 

HUTTON. Philip Augustus. 

NORGATE. England under the Angevin Kings. 

Petit-Dutaillis. Regne de Louis VIII. 

Wallon. Histoire de Saint-Louis. 

JOINVILLE. Vie de Saint-Louis. 

BOUTARIC. Saint-Louis et Alfonse de Poitiers. 

Beugnot. Essai sur les constitutions de Saint-Louis. 



Bibliography 381 



///. The Later Capets 

Langlois. Le regne de Philippe le Hardi. 
BOUTARIC. La France sous Philippe, le Bel. 
FOURNIER. Le royaume d'Arles. 

IV. The Early Valois Kings 

Perrens. Etienne Marcel. 

S. Luce. Histoire de la Jacquerie. 

Benoist. La politique de Charles V. 

BOUTARIC. Institutions militaires de la France. 

Beaucourt. Histoire de Charles VIL 

P. Clement. Jacques Coeur et Charles VIL 

Vallet de Viriville. Histoire de Charles VII et son epoque, 

Desj ARDINS. Louis XI, sa politique exterieure, ses rapports avec I'ltalie. 

Philippe de Commines. Memoires. 

Barante. Histoire des Dues de Bourgogne. 

Kirk. History of Charles the Bold. 

V. The Italian Wars and the Renaissance 

De Cherrier. Histoire de Charles VIII. 
Philippe de Commines. Memoires. 
Delaborde. L'Expedition de Charles VIII en Italic. 
De Maulde-la-Claviere. Histoire de Louis XIL 

VI. The Wars of Religion 

Davila. Histoire des guerres civiles en France. 

Armstrong. French Wars of Religion. 

Ranke. Franzosische Geschichte. 

Lacretelle. Histoire de France pendant les guerres de religion. 

Forneron. Les Dues de Guise. 

D'AUMALE. Histoire des Princes de Conde pendant les XVP et XVIP 

si^cles. 
De Croze. Les Guises, les Valois, et Philippe II. 
Waddington. La France et les protestants allemands sous Charles 

IX, et Henry III. (In Revue historique, March, 1890.) 
Robiquet. Histoire de la Ligue sous le regne de Henry III. 



382 The French People 

De Meaux. Les luttes religieuses en France au XVP siecle. 
Hanotaux. lEtudes sur le XVP, et le XVIP siecles. 
Atkinson. L'Hopital. 
Marcks. Gaspard de Coligny. 



VII. The Early Bourbons 

Armstrong. French Wars of Religion. 

WiLLERT. Henry IV. 

Baird. The Huguenots and Henry of Navarre. 

Philippson. Heinrich IV und Philip III. 

Weill. Les theories sur le pouvoir royal en France pendant les 

guerres de religion. 
Anquez. Histoire des assemblees politiques des reformes. 
Fagniez. L'industrie en France sous Henry IV. (Revue historique, 

1883.) 
Desclozeaux. Etudes critiques sur les ceconomies royales de Sully. 
Zeller. Le minorite de Louis XIII. 
D'Avenel. Richelieu et la monarchie absolue. 
Hanotaux. Histoire du Cardinal de Richelieu. 
Mignet. Rivalite de Frangois I et de Charles-Quint. 
Armstrong. Charles V. 

De Crue. La Cour de France et la societe au XVP siecle. 
Ranke. Franzosische Geschichte. 
Pattison. Renaissance in France. 
Robinson. Margaret of Navarre. 
BourCIEZ. La Cour de Henry II. ^ 
Christie. Etienne Dolet. 
Tilley. The French Renaissance. 
Ranke. The History of the Popes. 
CoiGNET. La reforme frangaise avant les guerres civiles. 
ESPIN. Essay on Calvin. 

Mignet. Etablissement de la reforme religieuse a Geneve. 
Lodge. Richelieu. 

Fagniez. Le pere Joseph et Richelieu. 
Wakeman. The Ascendency of France. 
Chemel. Histoire de la France pendant la minorite de Louis XIV, 

and Histoire de la France sous le ministere de Mazarin. 
De Retz. Memoires. 
Madame de Molteville. Memoires. 



Bibliography ^Ss 

Perkins. France under Richelieu and Mazarin. 

C. D'AUMALE. Histoire des Princes de Conde pendant le XVP et 

XVIP sidcles. 
Pascal. Provincial Letters. 
COSNAC. Mazarin et Colbert. 



VI/I. The Age of Louis XIV 

The Memoirs of Louis XIV. 

Philippson. Das Zeitalter Ludwigs des Vierzehnten. 

MiGNET. Negociations relatives i la succession d'Espagne sous Louis 

XIV. 
ROUSSET. Histoire de Louvois. 
Voltaire. Le si^cle de Louis XIV. 

Hassall. Louis XIV and the Zenith of the French Monarchy. 
Legrelle. Louis XIV et Strasbourg. 
Clement. Histoire de Colbert et son administration. 
Michaud. Louis XIV et Innocent XL 
Geffroy. Madame de Maintenon. 
St. Cyres. Fenelon. 

Parkman. Pioneers of France in the New World. ' 

Reynold. Louis XIV et Guillaume III. 
Courcy. La coalition de 1701 centre la France. 
Baudrillart. Philippe V d'Espagne et la cour de France. 

IX. The Reign of Louis XV 

Baudrillart. Philippe V d'Espagne et la cour de France. 

WiESENER. La Regence. 

AUBERTIN. L'Esprit public au XVIII""" siecle. 

ROCQUAIN. L'Esprit revolutionnaire avant la revolution. 

JOBEZ. France sous Louis XV. 

Thiers. Histoire de John Law. 

Voltaire. Precis de regne de Louis XV. 

Pajol. Les guerres sous Louis XV. 

Lacretelle. Histoire de France pendant le XVIII"" siecle. 

De Tocqueville. L'Ancien regime et la revolution (translated). 

De Broglie. Frederic II et Louis XV ; Maurice de Saxe et d'Argen- 

son ; La paix d'Aix-la-Chapelle ; Le secret du roi ; and L'AUiance 

autrichienne. 



384 The French People 

Waddington. Louis XV et le renversement dcs Alliances ; La 

guerre de sept ans ; and Les debuts. 
Parkman. Montcalm and Wolfe. 
Geffroy. Gustave III et la cour de France. 
Malleson. Dupleix. 
Bright. Maria Theresa and Joseph II. 
Flammeront. Maupeou et les parlements. 



X. France before the Revolution 

Droz. Histoire de Louis XVI. 

Chereot. La chute de I'ancien regime. 

Taine. L'Ancien regime. 

FONCIN. Ministere de Turgot. 

Say. Turgot. 

Lecky. History of England in the Eighteenth Century. 

De Broc. La France sous I'ancien regime. 

Young, Arthur. Travels in France. 

XI. The French Revolution 

Von Sybel. The French Revolution. 

Morse Stephens. History of the French Revolution. 

AuLARD. Revolution frangaise. 

Sorel. Europe et la revolution frangaise. 

Champion. Les cahiers de 1789. 

Jervis. The Galilean Church and the Revolution. 

Carlyle. The French Revolution. 

Taine. La Revolution. 

Mignet. Histoire de la revolution frangaise. 

LOMENIE. Les Mirabeau. 

Meyieres. Vie de Mirabeau. 

Stern. Das Leben Mirabeau. 

Willert. Mirabeau. 

Stourm. Les finances de I'ancien regime, et de la revolution. 

SciOUT. Histoire de la constitution civile du clerge. 

Browning. The Flight to Varennes. 

AULARD. Les orateurs de I'Assemblee Constituante, and Les ora- 

teurs de la Legislative et de la Convention. 
Schmidt. Tableau de la revolution frangaise. 



Bibliography 385 

Mortimer-Ternaux. Histoire de la terreur. 

Eire. La legende des Girondins. 

Gros. Le comite de salut public. 

Mahan. Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and the 

Empire. 
Thiers. Histoire de la revolution frangaise. 
TUNGS. Bonaparte et son temps. 
LUNFREY. Histoire de Napoleon. 



XII. The Consulate 

Thiers. Histoire du consulat et de I'empire. 

Sargent. The Campaign of Marengo. 

Thibaudeau. Memoires sur le consulat, and Le consulat et I'empire. 

FOURNIER. Napoleon L 

Welschinger. The Due d'Enghien. 

XIII. Europe under Napoleon I 

Lanfrey, Thiers, Thibaudeau, Fournier, as before. 

Taine. Napoleon. 

Vandal. Alexandre I et Napoleon. 

Ram baud. La domination frangaise au AUemagne. 

Seeley. Life of Stein. 

Shand. The War in the Peninsula. 

Napier. History of the Peninsular War. 

Segur. Histoire de Napoleon et de la grande armee pendant I'annee 

1812. 
HousSAYE. i8i4andi8i5. 
Flanan. Histoire du Congr^s de Vienne. 
Sorel. Les traites de 1815. 
Ropes. The Campaign of Waterloo. 
Chesney. Waterloo Lectures. 
Viel-Castel. La restauration. 



XIV. France after iSij 

Debidour. Histoire diplomatique de I'Europe contemporaine. 
Seignobqs. Histoire politique de I'Europe contemporaine. 
Viel-Castel. Histoire de la restauration. 



386 The French People 

Daudet. Louis XVIII et le due Decazes. 

HiLLEBRAND. Geschichte Frankreichs. 

Lamartine. Histoire de la revolution de 1848. 

Ollivier. L'Empire liberal. 

Blanchard, Jerrold. Life of Napoleon III. 

SOREL. Histoire diplomatique de la guerre Franco-Allemande. 

Taxile Delord. Histoire illustre du second empire. 

BODLEY. France. 

Daudet. Histoire diplomatique de I'Alliance Franco-Russe. 

Leroy-Beaulieu. La France, la Russie, et I'Europe. 

Rambaud. La France coloniale. 



INDEX 



Abelard, 96. 

Absolutism, 167, 195. 

Academy, the, 167. 

Acadia, 178, 186. 

Adalberon, Archbishop of Rheims, 54. 

Aetius overthrows Attila, 15. 

Africa, the French in, 170, 304. 

Agincourt, battle of, 112, 121. 

Aix-la-Chapelle, peace of, 331. 

Alan Barbetorte, 61. 

Alberoni, Spanish Minister, 327, 328. 

Albert, member of the Provisional 
Government of 1848, 268, 271, 274. 

Albertius Magnus, 100. 

Albigenses, the, 81. 

Albigensian crusades, the, 78, 83. 

Albret, house of, 118. 

Alcuin, 45. 

Alen9on, house of, 118. 

Alesia, fall of, 13. 

Alexander of Russia, and Napoleon 
at Erfurt, 244. 

Alexander III, Pope, 82. 

Alexius, Emperor of the East, 66. 

Alfonse of Poitiers, 85, 86. 

Algiers, the French in, 360. 

Alleghany range, the, 187. 

Alliances with other states, 135, 160, 
161, 176, igo, 195, 242, 244, 311, 
318, 319, 321, 326, 334, 356; pres- 
ent alliance with Russia, 361. 

Alsace, 160. 

Amaury, son of Simon de Montfort, 
84. 



American Independence, the War of, 

France in, 333, 334. 
Amiens, Treaty of, 235. 
Anabaptists, the, 136. 
Anarchist plots, 306. 
Aiaarchy, the fear of, 284. 
Anjou, house of, 117, 118. 
Anne of Beaujeu, regency of, 120. 
Anne of Brittany married to Charles 

VIII, 129. 
Appanages, the, 105. 
Aquitaine, 16, 17, 87, 106, 107. 
Aquitania, 13. 
Arago, member of the Provisional 

Government of 1848, 268. 
Architecture in the reigns of Philip 

Augustus and Louis IX, 103. 
Armagnac, house of, 118. 
Armistice of 1871, 296. 
Armorican states, submission of, to 

Clovis, 19. 
Arnold of Amaury, abbot of Citeaux, 

82. 
Arras, congress of, 113. 
Art, 255, 263, 264. 
Arthurian epics, 102. 
Artois united to the French crown, 

161. 
Assemblies, the, of Charles the Great, 

42 ; of Notables, 164. 
Assembly, a new (1871), meets at Bor- 
deaux, 296. 
Assembly, the, of 1830, divisions of, 

254- 

387 



388 



The French People 



Assembly, the, of 1S71, at Versailles, 

296. 
Atrocities of the Revolution, 217. 
Aucassin and Nicolette, story of, 103. 
Augustus, and the Romanization of 

Gaul, 13. 
Austrasia, struggle of, with Neustria, 

26. 
Austrian Succession, the, War of, 185, 

191, 193, 328, 330. 
Austro-Prussian War, the, 291. 

Bacon, Roger, 96, loi. 

Baillis, 89, 90. 

Balance of power, 131, 135, 160, 177, 
241, 249, 312, 314. 

Baldwin I, Baldwin II, Kings of Je- 
rusalem, 68. 

Baldwin IX, Count of Flanders, 70. 

Balzac, 255, 260, 264. 

Bank of France, 236, 238. 

Barante, 256, 264. 

Barbes, 272, 274. 

Barere, 219. 

Barnave, 344, 347. 

Barry, Madame de, 200. 

Basques, the, 3, 12. 

Bastille, fall of the, 213. 

Baylen, capitulation of Dupont at, 243, 

Bayonne, Conference of, 1565, 148. 

Beaumarchais (The Mariage de Fi- 
garo), 201. 

Belgian provinces, the, revolution of, 

342, 343- 
Belgica, 13. 
Beranger, 251, 261. 
Blanche of Castile, 85. 
Blockade, the Continental, broken, 

243- 
Bodel, Jean, the chansons de geste 

of, 103. 
Bohemond of Tarentum, crusader, 68. 



Bonaparte, Joseph, King of Naples, 

241. 
Bonaparte, 228, 229, 231-249, 259, 

2S5. (See also Napoleon I.) 
Boniface (or Winfrid), Archbishop of 

Mainz, 21, 25, 29 ; anoints Pepin 

le bref, 29, 30. 
Boniface of Montferrat, crusader and 

King of Thessalonica, 70. 
Bossuet, 173. 
Boulanger, General, 305. 
Bourbon, House of, 11 8, 160. 
Bourbons, the, 227, 239, 251-253. 
Bourdaloue, 173. 
Bourgeoisie, the, 94, 120, 212, 225, 

302. 
Bouvines, battle of, 1214, 80. 
Break, a, with the past, 196. 
Bretigny, Peace of, 109, no, 311. 
Brissarthe, battle of, 52. 
Brittany, 16 ; annexation of, 129, 

156- 
Broglie, the Due de, 264, 267. 
Brumaire, i8th. Revolution of, 229, 

230, 233, 235. 
Brunetto, Latino, 75. 
Brunhildis, 22, 25, 26. 
Bureaucracy, 138, 199. 
Burgundians, the, 14, 171 ; defeated 

by Clovis, 19 ; and Armagnacs, 

wars of, 106, 117, 120. 
Burgundy, 15, 16 ; made a tributary 

state, 15 ; the house of, 118 ; power 

of the Duke of, 122. 

Ceesar, Julius, 12. 

Cahiers, 213. n 

Calais, 109. 

Calonne, 198. 

Calvin, 136-138, 

Calvinism, 144. 

Cambrai, League of, 132. 



Index 



389 



Campo Formio, Peace of, 228. 
Canada, 161, 178, 180, 186, 188, 190- 

194 ; lost, 330, 360. 
Carloman, 50. 
Carnot, 218, 224. 
Carnot, Sadi, President, 306. 
Carolings, Carolingians, 24, 27, 47, 49, 

55- 
Carrier, 221, 222. 
Cartier, Jacques, 177. 
Casale, 160. 

Casimir-Perier, 254, 255, 262. 
Casimir-Perier, President, 306. 
Castillon, battle of, 113. 
Cateau Cambresis, Peace of, 132, 135, 

313. 315- 

Catherine de' Medici, 148. 

Catholics, 156. 

Caussidiere, 272. 

Cavaignac, General, 275, 276. 

Cazalis, 347. 

Celtic blood, 3, 309. 

Centenarii, the, 36, 41. 

Centralization, progress of, 147, 164, 

231, 239, 299. 
Challemel Lecour, M., leads attack 

on Christianity, 371. 
Chalons, battle of, 15. 
Chambord, Comte de, 306. 
Chambre des Requetes, 93 ; des En- 

quetes, 93 ; des Comptes, 93, 94. 
Champlain, Samuel, 178. 
Charlemagne, epics of, 102. 
Charles V, 6 ; vigorous reign of, iii, 

311, 312. 
Charles V (Emperor), 134, 135, 312- 

314, 317, 319. 
Charles VI, 104, 1 11, 312. 
Charles VII, 7, 112, 121, 131. 
Charles VIII, 7, 131, 132, 313. 
Charles IX, 148. 

Charles X, 251-254, 263, 267, 275. 
26 



Charles, Duke of Orleans, 117. 

Charles Martel, 25, 27, 28. 

Charles of Anjou, Count of Provence, 
87. 

Charles the Bald, 47, 49. 

Charles the Bold, 118, iig, 121, 122, 
125, 126, 156, 312. 

Charles the Fat, 50, 51. 

Charles the Great (Charlemagne), 23, 
24, 34-46, 49 ; reigns of his de- 
scendants, 47-55. 

Charles the Simple, 52-54. 

Chartres, Count of (crusader), 68. 

Chateaubriand, 250, 251, 255, 260. 

Chilperich, 26. 

Choiseul,_20Q| 331. 

Christianity, 18 ; zeal for the propa- 
gation of, 182. 

Church, the, 19-33, 59. 60, 115, 161, 
162, 174, 187, 203, 214, 252, 264, 
286, 288, 290, 306 ; alliance of the 
monarchy with, 19-33 ; and Charles 
Martel, 128. 

Cintra, Junot's capitulation at, 243. 

Citeaux, abbey of, 81. 

Clair-sur-Epte, Treaty of, 53, 61. 

Classicism, 173. 

Clergy, the, 37, 90, 120, 200, 202, 
203, 213, 286, 305, 306. 

Clermont, Council of, 66. 

Clive, Robert, 190. 

Clovis, 15, 19, 20, 26, 27. 

Cluny, school of, 103. 

Cluseret, 300. 

Code, de Commerce, 238 ; d'lnstruc- 
tion Criminelle, 238; Napoleon, 
237 ; Penal, 238. 

Colbert, 6, 157, 172, 177-179, 182, 
192, 288, 324. 

Coligny, 148. 

Collectivism, 307. 

Collot d'Herbois, 219. 



;90 



The French People 



Colonial enterprises, 9, 161, 170-193, 

304. 305, 309. 319- 
Columban, 24. 
Comite Diplomatique, Le, report of, 

by Mirabeau on the Family Com- 
pact, 350, 
Commines, Philip de, 126, 127. 
Committee of General Security, 219. 
Committee of Public Safety, 217- 

220, 222, 275, 299, 357, 358 ; (of 

1848), 272 ; (of 1871), 300, 301. 
Commune, the, 299-302. 
Communes, the, rise of, 64, 73. 
Communists, 297, 299, 301, 307. 
Comptes, Maitres des, 91 ; Gens des, 

91 ; Chambres des, 93, 94. 
Comte d'Argenson, the, exiled, 200. 
Comte de Paris, the, a candidate for 

the throne in 1877, 303, 
Concordat, the, of Francis I, 33, 141 ; 

of Napoleon, 33, 236. 
Conde, 148, 164, 168, 324. 
Confederation of the Rhine, 241, 243, 

246. 
Conflans, Treaty of, 122. 
Conseil des Depeches, 165, 172 ; des 

Finances, 165, 172 ; des Parties, 

165, 199 ; du Roi, 93. 
Constance of Castile, 79. 
Constant, Benjamin, 251, 262. 
Constantinople, capture of, by the 

Crusaders, 70. 
Constituent Assembly, the, 205, 214, 

216, 218, 221, 224, 334, 335. 
Constitution, the, of 614, 26 ; of 

1791, 215, 227; of 1795, 223; of 

the Abbe Sieyes, 233-235 ; of 1875, 

302. 
Consulate, the, 229, 232, 238. 
Continental system. Napoleon's, 241, 

242, 246. 
Contrat Social, Rousseau's, 209. 



Controleur-general, the, 172, 198. 
Convention, the, 223, 238, 280. 
Convents, 25. 

Coromandel coast, the, 181, 189. 
Council, the, of State, 172 ; of the Five 

Hundred, report of the Directory 

to, 226. 
Counter-Reformation, the, 144, 157, 

160, 315, 326. 
Counts, 36, 37. 
Coup d'etat, the, of 1851, 278, 287, 

293- 
Cour de Cassation, 234, 237. 
Cour du Roi (Grand Council), 91. 
Courier, Paul Louis, 251. 
Court, the king's, 91. 
Cousin, 250. 
Couthon, 219, 
Coutras, battle of, 150. 
Crance, Dubois, 219. 
Crecy, battle of, 109. 
Cremieux, 268. 

Crimean War, the, 76, 286, 287, 292. 
Cromwell, 321. 
Crown, the, increasing popularity of, 

122 ; independence of, 162. 
Crusades, the, 64-78, 310, 314 ; results 

of, 71-77. 

Dagobert, 26. 
D'Alembert, 207. 
Danton, 357, 358. 
Dantonists, 223. 
Declaration of Rights, 214. 
Decretum, the, 100. 
Delacroix, 255, 263. 
Delaroche, Paul, 263. 
Delavigne, Casimir, 251, 261, 
Delescluze, 300. 

De Maistre, 250 (Le Maistre), 255. 
Democracy, 297, 298 ; an accepted 
fact, 369. 



Index 



391 



Democratic dictatorship, 284. 
Demonstration of March 17, 1848, 

272. 
De Monts, 178. 
De Musset, 255, 260. 
Departments, 214. 
Deputies of the Mission, 219. 
Deschamps, Emile, 251. 
Despotism, Napoleonic, 238. 
De Stael, Madame, 240, 251, 260. 
De Tocqueville, 255, 258, 259, 277 ; 

his Democracy in America, 258. 
De Vigny, Alfred, 251, 255, 260. 
Diderot, 205, 207, 210. 
Diocletian, 14. 
Diplomacy, its modern form, 133 ; 

employed by French kings and 

statesmen, 313. 
Directory, the, 212, 223-230, 235, 238, 

276, 280, 281, 299, 358. 
Disasters, beginning of a period of, in 

1688, 325. 
Divine right (of kings), 253. 
Dominicans, the, 99. 
Druids, the, 12. 
Dubois, 330, 333. 
Dufaure, 2g6. 
Dumas, Alexandre, 260. 
Dumouriez, 335, 356, 357. 
Dupleix, 189, T90, 192. 
Dupont de I'Eure, 268. 
Duport (the Jacobin), 344. 

East India Company (French), 179, 

180, 190. 
Ebroin, 27. 

Ecole des Chartes, 373. 
Edward III (of England), 104, 106, 

no. 
Edward IV (of England) invades 

France, 126. 
Eginhard, 45, 



Egypt, the French in, 360. 

Eleanor of Aquitaine, or Guienne, 79, 

109. 
Elizabeth of England, 320, 321. 
Elliot, Hugh, and Mirabeau, 352, 353. 
Emigration, the, 170. 
Emile (Rousseau's), 208. 
Empire of Charlemagne, 34-46. 
Empire, the first, 231-249, 283, 285, 

286. 
Empire, the second, 279-294 ; col- 
lapse of, 369. 
Empire, world-wide, dream of, 184. 
Encyclical, the, of February 10, 1892, 

306. 
Encyclopedia, the, 207, 208. 
Encyclopedists, the, 204, 215. 
Engelbert, 45. 
England, hostility between France and, 

310, 311 ; friendship with, 313, 220; 

commercial treaties with, 288, 344. 
Enquesteurs, 90. 
Epernons, the, 164. 
Equality, 202, 212, 213, 259, 268, 369, 

370. 
Erfurt, Treaty of, 244, 245. 
Ernoul, a historical writer, 76. 
Escurial, Treaty of, 354. 
Etablissements de St. Louis, loi. 
Europe in 1790, 338, 339. 
Eustace of Flanders, crusader, 70. 
Executive, a strong, French fondness 

for, 374. 
Eylau, battle of, 240. 

Family Compact, the, 341, 348-350, 

353- 
Favre, Jules, 296. 

Ferdinand II of Styria, emperor, 318. 
Ferry, Jules, 225, 305, 371. 
Feudalism, 40, 48, 58, 88, 96, 156, 163, 

194 ; influence of, on religion, 67 ; 



392 



The French People 



in the kingdom of Jerusalem, 68 ; 

in Canada, 194; broken down by 

French victories, 248. 
Feudal castles, destruction of, by 

Richelieu, 164. 
Feudal nobility, 72, 74, 104. 
Feudatories, absorption of, 64. 
Financial mismanagement, 139, 210, 

224. 
Flanders, Count of, crusader, 68 ; 

arrests English merchants, 108. 
Flechier, 173. 

Fleury, 135, 185, 197, 328, 329, 331. 
Flocon, member of the provisional 

government of 1848, 268. 
Florida, Huguenot colony in, 178. 
Foix, house of, 118. 
Foreign policy, 309-362. 
Form of Government, changes of the, 

363. 364- 

Fouquier-Tinville, 220. 

France, influence of, upon Christen- 
dom, I ; in 987, 51 ; political con- 
solidation carried out during the 
crusades, 65 ; royal dominion ex- 
tended to the Mediterranean, 85 ; 
at the beginning of the fourteenth 
century, 104 ; unity of, 129 ; a lead- 
ing power, 75, 138, 314, 319, 324 ; 
position of, in 1790, 341-343 ; the 
France of to-day, 363 ; fnture po- 
litical development, 373 et seq. 

Franciscans, the, 99. 

Francis I, 133, 134, 136, 137, 139, 
141, 143, 144, 177, 313, 314, 318, 

327, 331- 
Fran9ois, Saint, de Sales, 162. 
Franco-Prussian War, the, 361. 
Franks, the, 14 ; Ripuarian, 15 ; Sa- 

lian, 15, r6. 
Frederick the Great, 190. 
Freedom of the press, 287. 



Free Trade doctrines, 288. 

French supremacy sought by Nape- 
leon, 239. 

Freycinet, 305. 

Friedland, battle of, 239, 240. 

Frondes, the, 168. 

Fructidor, coup d'etat of, 228, 229. 

Fulk, Count of Anjou, King of Jeru- 
salem, 68. 

Fulk, missionary to the Albigenses, 
83. 

Gallia Narbonensis, 12. 

Galilean Church, the, 153, 206, 252. 

Gallic race, the, 3. 

Gambetta, 305, 371. 

Garibaldi, 291. 

Gamier-Pages, 268. 

Gascony, held by the English, 107. 

Gaul, 12, 13. 

Gauls, the, 11, 12. 

Gautier, Theophile, 260, 262, 

Gerbert (Pope Sylvester II), 55. 

German and French, 57. 

Germany, claims on, 175. 

Girondists, the, 218, 219, 223, 228, 

268 ; foreign policy of, 355, 356. 
Glory, military love of, 240, 266, 309, 

362. 
Godfrey of Bouillon, 67 ; King of 

Jerusalem, 68. 
Gower, Lord, 3,52, 353. 
Gozlin, Bishop, 50, 51. 
Grand Chambre, the, 93. 
Gregory IX, Pope, decree of, 98. 
Grevy, Jules, 296, 304, 306. 
Grousset, 300. 
Guesde, 307. 

Guienne, held by the English, 107. 
Guiscard, Robert, 66. 
Guise, Duke Francis of, 146 ; Henry 

of, 149, 151. 



Index 



393 



Guizot, 250, 251, 256, 257, 267, 360. 
Gun tram, 25, 26. 
Gustavus Adolphus, 318. 
Guy of Lusignan, 69. 

Hapsburg, house of, 159, 176, 317, 

322, 323. 
Hapsburgs, the, 160, 191, 327, 331, 

356 ; struggle between France and, 

314, 315, 319. 

Hardenberg, 247, 

Hebertists, the, 223. 

Henry II, 90, 310, 314, 318. 

Henry II. Count of Champagne, titu- 
lar King of Jerusalem, 69. 

Henry II of England claims Tou- 
louse, 79. 

Henry III, 149-152. 

Henry IV (of Navarre). 7, 9, 151, 
152, 156-158, 161, 162, 177, 280, 

315, 316, 324, 325 ; effect of the 
death of, 317. 

Henry V of England attacks France, 
112, 312. 

Henry of Clairvaux, 8r. 

Henry of Flanders, 70. 

Herault de Sechelles, 219. 

Heresy, the Albigensian, 81. 

Hildebrand ; the Hildebrandine, Ref- 
ormation, 67. 

History of the Girondists (Lamar- 
tine's), 269. 

Hohenlinden, battle of, 235. 

Hohenzollern, the candidature, 292. 

Honorius III, Pope, 98. 

Horn, Swedish Minister, 185. 

Hugh Capet, 47-63, 171, 310. 

Hugh, Count of Vermandois, 68, 

Hugh of Le Puiset, 73. 

Hugh of St. Pol, 67. 

Hugh the abbot, 50, 51. 

Hugh the Great, 53, 54. 



Huguenots, the, 136, 143-155, 161, 

162, 315. 
Hundred Days, the, 247, 248, 277, 

367. 
Hundred Years' War, the, 166, 311, 
312, 326, 327 ; the second, 326, 328, 
360. 

Iberians, 11. 

Idees Napoleoniennes, 280. 

India, 170, 174, 177, 180, 189-193, 

195. 320, 331, 332, 360. 
Indians, the, 187, 188. 
Innocent III, Pope, 70, 82. 
Insurrection of June 23, 1848, 274, 

275- 

Intellectual awakening in the twelfth 
century (twelfth - century renais- 
sance), 96. 

Intendants, 163, 168, 198, 199. 

International Association, the, 290, 
297. 

International law, the study of, 133. 

Intrigues (from 1873 till 1875), 302, 

303- 
Irreligion, 201. 
Isnard, 355. 
Italian wars, the, of Charles VIII, 

131-135, 142, 156, 313 ; of Napoleon 

III, 287, 288. 

Jacobinism, 218, 230, 231, 248, 274- 

276, 286, 370. 
Jacobins, the, 219-231, 252, 272, 290, 

293, 297, 299, 347, 355, 367, 368. 
James I (of England), 160. 
Jansenism, 174, 207. 
Jansenists, the, 174. 
Jerusalem, the goal of pilgrimages, 

66 ; Kingdom of, 68 ; Assizes of, 

68. 
Jesuits, the, 174, 182, 207, 252, 315. 



394 



The French People 



Joan of Arc, II2, I2I. 

John, 104, 109. 

John of Gaunt, no, in. 

Joinville, Jehan de, 76 ; his memoirs, 

loi, 102. 
Jourde, 300. 
Judicial system. Napoleon's, 237. 

La Bourdonnais, i8g. 

Labour movement, the, 307. 

Labour Parlement, the, 271, 272. 

Lacordaire, 262, 263. 

Lafayette, 344. 

Laffitte, 267. 

Lamartine, 251, 255, 256, 260, 261, 

268, 269, 271-275. 
Lamennais, 250, 251, 255, 262, 263. 
Lameth, Alexandre, 345. 
Lameths, the, 344. 
Lanfrey, 365. 
Language, French, diffusion of, through 

the crusades, 75. 
Langue d'oc, the, 57, 79. 
Langue d'oil, 57, 79, 87. 
La Rochelle, 162, 163. 
La Salle, 192. 
Las Casas, account of Napoleon at St. 

Helena, 279. 
La Vendee, war in, 221, 222. 
Law, civil and canon, study of, lOO, 

lOI. 

Law's schemes, failure of, 185. 
League, the Holy, 132. 
League, the, of Paris, 147, 149, 150, I53- 
League, the, of Public Weal, 121. 
League, the, of Toulouse, 148. 
Learning, revival of, under Charles 

the Great, 45. 
Ledru-Rollin, 268, 272. 
Legion of Honour, the, 236, 238. 
Legislative Assembly, the, 215-217. 
Legitimists, 296. 



Leipzig, Napoleon's defeat at, 247. 

Leodegar, or Saint Leger, Bishop of 
Autun, 27. 

Leopold, Emperor, 343. 

Leo XIII, Pope, 306. 

Letters, supremacy in, in the reign of 
Louis XIV, 173, 174. 

Lettres de cachet, 199. 

Liberation, War of, 239, 247. 

Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, 
legend of the Revolution, 370. 

Ligurians, the, 3, 12. 

Lindet, 218. 

Literature and art after the Restora- 
tion and during the July monarchy, 
250-263. 

Lorraine, 331. 

Lorris, Guillaume de, 102. 

Lorris, Treaty of, 86. 

Lothair I, 25. 

Lothair II, 25. 

Lothair (the Caroling), 54, 55. 

Loubet, M. Emile, President, 306. 

Louis Blanc, 268, 271, 272, 274. 

Louisburg, 186. 

Louis the Debonair, 38, 49. 

Louis IV (d'Outremer), 53, 57. 

Louis V, last of the Carolingian kings, 

55- 
Louis VI, 65, 73, 79, 89, 124, 126, 

128, 156. 
Louis VII, 73, 75. 
Louis VIII, 84, 85. 
Louis IX (Saint Louis), 71, 86, 89-93, 

97, 100, loi, 156. 
Louis XI, 6, 7, 121, 156, 312. 
Louis XII, 7, 157, 313. 
Louis XIII, 133, 167, 171, 318. 
Louis XIV, 7, 9, 161, 167-184, 186, 

187, 190, 192, 194, 195, 197. 199. 

201, 207, 239, 297, 315, 319, 320, 

322, 324, 326, 327, 331. 



Index 



395 



Louis XV, 9, i86, 191, 193, 195, 197, 

198, 200, 315. 
Louis XVI, 195, 197, 198, 200, 214, 

231, 333> 343- 

Louis XVIII, 247, 250, 251, 253, 263, 
267. 

Louis, Count of Blois, 70. 

Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, 275, 276, 
278, 280, 282-284. (See also Na- 
poleon III.) 

Louis Philippe, 252-266, 268, 270, 
281, 285, 360, 367. 

Louvois, 172, 324. 

Louvre, the, built by Philip Augustus, 

97. 
Loyola, 138. 
Lucius III, Pope, 82. 
Luneville, treaty of, 235. 
Luxembourg affair, the, 361. 
Lyons (Lugdunum), 13, 14; Lugdu- 

nensis, 13. 

Machault, 199, 200. 

MacMahon, Marshal, 302-304. 

Madagascar, 161, 180, 182, 304. 

Magenta, battle of, 288. 

Maitres des requetes, 200. 

Mallet du Pan, 227, 233. 

Malouet, 215. 

Marcel, Etienne, democratic leader, 

109, 115, 153, 297. 
Marengo, campaign of, 235. 
Margaret, sister of Francis I, 126. 
Maria Thereso, 331. 
Marie, 268. 

Marie Antoinette, 200. 
Marignano, battle of, 133. 
Marot, 137. 
Marrast, 268. 

Marseilles Congress, the, 307. 
Marseilles (or Massilia), 12. 
Martignac, 252. 



Martin, Fran9ois, 177, 180, 181. 
Marx, Carl, 297, 307. 
Massillon, 173. 

Maximum, the law of the, 220. 
Mazarin, Cardinal, 163, 167, 168, 172, 
178, 182, 190, 197, 213, 319, 321, 

323, 324- 
Meaux, Treaty of, 85. 
Mendicant orders, the, 99, 100. 
Merovingians, kingdom of the, 17 ; 

fall of, 27, 29. 
Meung, Jean de, 102. 
Mexico, war with, 291 (the Mexican 

expedition), 361. 
Meyerbeer, 255. 
Michelet, 256, 258, 259. 
Middle classes, the, 95, 139, 147, 202, 

204, 210, 211, 227, 265, 267, 274, 

276, 278, 284, 365, 368. 
Migrations (of nobles), 214. 
Miguet, 250, 258. 
Milo, Bishop of Treves, 28. 
Ministerial responsibility, proposed by 

Thiers, 290. 
" Ministry of progress," 274. 
Mirabeau, 215, 335, 336-338, 345" 

348, 350, 351- 
Missi dominici, 37, 39. 
Mississippi, the, 180, 187. 
Mistakes, 330. 

Monarchists, 282 ; and Liberals, 303. 
Monarchy, 5, 89, 116, 153, 155, 193, 

197, 198, 210, 266, 267, 269, 270 ; 

the Legitimist, 364. 
Monarchy, Constitutional, 254, 278, 

289. 
Monarchy, the, of July (1830), 266, 

268, 278, 369. 
Monasteries, the, 24, 25 ; learning and 

security in, 24. 
Monsieur, Peace of, 149. 
Montalembert, 262, 263. 



39^ 



The French People 



Montcalm, i88, 192. 
Montesquieu, 194, 205, 206, 215. 
Montlhery, battle of, 122. 
Montnaorencys, the, 164. 
Montmorin, 342, 344, 351. 
Montpensier, defeat of the Danes at, 

52. 
Montreal, founded, 177. 
Morny, 289, 291. 
Moscow, campaign to, 247. 
Mounier, 215. 
Mountain, the, 223. 
Muret, battle of, 83 
Music, 255. 

Nantes, Edict of, 154 ;' its revocation, 

174, 183. 
Napoleon Bonaparte, Napoleon I, 

231-249, 278-281, 284, 299, 313 ; 

interest in, 365. (See also Bona- 
parte.) 
Napoleon III, 225, 232, 278-294. (See 

also Louis Napoleon Bonaparte). 
Napoleonic legend, the, 2, 249, 264, 

279, 293, 294, 365. 
National Assembly of 1848, 272, 274, 

285. 
National Convention, the, of 1792, 

217, 219, 223, 225, 238. 
National defence, government of the, 

of i87o,.295, 296. 
National guards, 272. 
Nationality, 58, 60, 62, 65, 114, 117, 

119-121, 124, 162, 248, 310; in 

Europe, 243 ; in Germany, 245. 
National, the, 258. 
National unity, 9, 58, 65, 86, 108, 147, 

164, 312 ; promoted by the crusades, 

74. 
National workshops, 271, 273, 274. 
Necker, 198, 199. 
Neerwinden, battle of, 219, 357. 



Neustria, 26. 

Neville's Cross, battle of, 311. 

Newfoundland, 186. 

New France, 178, 179, 186. 

Nimeguen, Peace of, 323. 

Nobility, the nobles, noblesse, 58, 70, 
119-123, 141, 152, 157-159. 163- 
165, 167, 170, 171, 200-202, 212- 
214, 231. 

Nootka Sound, the affair of, 335-356. 

North America,, 170, 174, 177, 185, 
320, 331, 332. 

Northmen, the, 48-51, 61 ; the Nor- 
mans, 61. 

Nouvelle Heloise, Rousseau's, 208. 

Nova Scotia, 161, 178. 

Noyon, Peace of, 133. 

Odo of La Roche, Lord of Athens, 70. 

Odo or Eudes, Count of Paris, 50-53. 

Ollivier, Emile, 291. 

Oratory, 173. 

Ordonnances, the, 252. 

Orleanist dynasty, the, 265. 

Orleanists, the, 267, 284, 296. 

Orleans, regent, 327-329. 

Orleans, school of, Roman law at, 

lOi ; siege of, 87 ; synod of, 23. 
Orleans, the Duke of, 254. 
Orsini, 287. 
Otto II, emperor, 54. 

Papacy, the present attitude of the, 
toward France, 372. 

Paris, 8, 9, 94, 96, 97, 113, 151 ; Uni- 
versity of, 97 ; the treaties of, 239, 
247. 

Paris, the brothers, ministers, igg. 

Parlement de Paris, the, 7, 91-93, 121, 
141, 153, 158, 165-167, 172, 200, 
207, 269. 

Parliamentary government, 284. 



Ind 



ex 



397 



Parliamentary representative system, 

374- 
Partition Treaties, the, 326. 
Pascal's provincial letters, 174. 
Patino, Spanish minister, 185. 
Paulette, the, 7. 
Pays d'election, 165. 
Pays d'etats, 164-166. 
Peace of Paris, 192. 
Peace, party of, 347, 348. 
Peasants, the, 140, 201, 204, 211, 276, 

281, 285, 294. 
Pecquigny, Treaty of, 126. 
People, the indifference of, to politics, 

366-369. 
People, the, sovereignty of, 253. 
Pepin d'Heristal, 27, 28. 
Pepin le Bref, 27-31 ; donation of, 31, 

35- 
Peter of Castelnau, 82. 
Peter the Hermit, 66. 
Petion, elected Mayor of Paris, 366. 
Philip I, 62, 64. 
Philip II (Augustus), 43, 69, 73, 84, 

88-91, 97, loi, 103, 105, 156, 311. 
Philip III, 87, 92, 93. 
Philip IV (le Bel), 6, 75, 91-94, 104, 

106, 108, 311, 312. 
Philip V of Spain, 325, 326. 
Philip VI (Valois), 104, 107-110, 

311- 
Philip the Bold, 119. 
Philip the Good, 119. 
Philip of Alsace (crusader), 69. 
Philip of Orleans, regent, 198. 
Philip van Artevelde, iii. 
Philosophic discussion, 201. 
Philosophy, the study of, 205. 
Pinerolo, capture of, 160. 
Pistres, edict of, 50. 
Pitt. ';t8, 340, 352. 
Pius IX, 286, 288. 



Plebiscites, 278, 292. 

Poetry in the twelfth and thirteenth 

centuries, 102. 
Poitevins, 171. 
Poitiers, battle of, 28 ; second battle 

(Hundred Years' War), no, 311. 
Polish Succession, War of the, 185, 

331- 
Pombal, 206. 

Pompadour, Madame de, 200. 
Pondicherry, 180, 181, 189. 
Pontiac, 188. 
Port Royal, 174. 
Praguerie, the, 117, 121. 
Predominance, French, 173, 181. 
Prev6ts, 8g. 
Prieurs, the two, 218. 
Principles, political, uncontested, 202. 
Progress during the reign of Louis 

Philippe, 255 ; in literature, science, 

and art, 372, 373. 
Prosperity, 304, 
Protectionist policy, the, 288. 
Protestantism, 135-138, 143, 316, 325, 

326. 
Proudhon, 270. 
Provence, 171. 
Provisional government of 1848, the, 

268, 271. 
Prussia, 191, 360 ; the Prussian War, 

361. 
Public discussion, right of, 289. 
Pyrenees, the. Treaty of, 169 ; Peace 

of, 319. 

Quebec, 161, 177, 178, 186, 188. 
Quiberon Bay, battle of, 193. 

Rabelais, 137, 138. 

Radegonde, 25. 

Ragnar, Count, 50. 

Rambouillet, Hotel de, a new, 250. 



398 



The French People 



Raymond IV, Count of Toulouse, 

crusader, 67. 
Raymond V complains against the 

Albigenses, 81. 
Raymond VI, 82. 
Raymond VII, 83, 85 ; submits to 

Louis IX, 86. 
Raymond Roger of Beziers overcome 

by Simon de Montfort, 83. 
Reactionaries, the, 367. 
Reformation, the, 134, 137. 
Reform banquet forbidden (in 1848), 

265. 
Reforms by Louis IX, 90, 91 ; by the 

Constituent Assembly, 214. 
Religious policy, modern, 370, 371 ; 

described by Jules Simon, 372 ; 

problems, 142, 143, 147 ; troubles, 

156 ; revival, 162. 
Renaissance, the, 136, 137. 
Republic, the, 365 ; of 1848, 270-277 ; 

the third, 302, 303, 361, 363. 
Restoration, the, 250, 252, 253, 255, 

278-280. 
Revolution, the, 195, 212-230, 334; 

of 1789, 277, 281 ; of 1792, 252 ; of 

1830 (July), 252-254, 280 ; of 1848 

(February), 252, 265, 267 ; (June), 

275 ; of March 18, 1871, 298. 
Revolutionary Tribunal, the, 219, 220. 
Rewbell, 358, 359. 
Richard I of England, 69, 72. 
Richard the Pilgrim, poet, 76. 
Richelieu, 7, 9, 156-167, 177-179, 

182, 186, 190, 192, 197, 213, 315, 

318-320, 324, 331, 358. 
Rigobert, Bishop of Rheims, 28. 
Ripuarian Franks, 16. 
Risings, anti-revolution, in the prov- 
inces, 219, 226. 
Rivalry, French and English, in North 

America, 185, 191. 



Robert, Count of Paris, 53. 

Robert, Duke of Normandy, crusader, 

68. 
Robert of Sorbonne, 99. 
Robert (successor of Hugh Capet), 62. 
Robert the Strong, 51, 52, 
Robespierre, 219, 221, 223, 275, 344, 

347, 367. 371- 
RoUo, 52. 

Roman de la Rose, the, 102. 
Roman civilization, the continuity of, 

17, iS. 
Roman conquest, the, 11. 
Romantic revival, the, 250, 256, 260- 

262, 279. 
Rome, occupation of, by Napoleon, 

242. 
Romulus Augustulus, 15. 
Rosbach, 194. 
Rossini, 255. 
Rouher, 290. 

Rousseau, 194, 204, 208, 210. 
Royal power, grow^th and extension 

of, 74, 75, 88-90, 104, 134, 169, 171. 
Royer-Collard, 251. 
Rubruquis, William, sent by Louis 

IX to the great khan, 75. 
Rudolf of Burgundy, 53. 
Russia, rise of, 190 ; a new factor in 

the European political system, 329. 
Ryswick, Treaty of, 181. 

Sadowa, 291. 

Saint-Andre Jean Bon, 218. 
Saint Bartholomew, massacre of, 149. 
Saint Bernard, 68. 
Sainte-Beuve, 250, 261, 262. 
Sainte Chapelle, the building of, 103. 
Saint Germain, Treaty of, 148. 
Saint Helena, Napoleon's imprison- 
ment at, 247. 
Saint-Just, 219, 223, 275, 371. 



Index 



399 



Saint Lawrence River, the, 177. 

Salic law, the, 15. 

Sand, George, 260. 

Savoy and Nice, 2S8. 

Scabini, the, 37, 41. 

Scotland, alliance of Philip IV with, 

108. 
Sea, the, supremacy on, 332. 
Second Coalition, War of the, 229. 
Sedan, battle of, 284, 293, 295. 
Seneschals, 89, 90. 
Seven Years' War, the, 161, 187, 188, 

191, 193, 194, 198, 204, 328, 330, 

332. 
Siam, 170. 
Sieyes, Abbe, 217, 228, 229, 232-234, 

359- 
Sigebert, murder of, 16, 25. 
Sigismund of Hungary, 76. 
Silesia, seizure of, by Frederick the 

Great, 190. 
Simon de Montfort» 70, 83, 84. 
Simon, Jules, 296, 303. 
Smaragdus, 45. 
Socialism, 306, 307. 
Socialists, the, 271-273, 285, 286, 290, 

296, 301, 307, 308, 376, 377. 
Society just before the Revolution, 

203, 204. 
Soissons, battle of, 15 ; house of, 164. 
Solferino, battle of, 288. 
Solyman the Magnificent, 314. 
Sorbonne, the, foundation of, 99. 
Spain, resistance of, to Napoleon, 242. 
Spanish Armada, defeat of, 315. 
Spanish Succession, War of the, 183, 

185, 186, 193, 326, 329. 
States-General, the, 8, 94, 95, 107, 

no, 113, 116, 120, 121, 124, 138, 

140, 153, 159, 165, 166, 178, 195, 

213 ; declaration of, at Tours in 

1468, 124. 



Statesmanship, need for, 373, 

Stephen, Pope, 29-31. 

Strong government, love for a, 5. 

Sully, 6, 157. 

Sully, Maurice de. Bishop of Paris, 

103. 
Supremacy, French, in Europe, 176, 

177, 184. 
Surat, 180. 
Surprises, 367. 
Suspects, the law of, 220. 
Syagrius overthrown at Soissons by 

Clovis, 15. 
Sylvester II, Pope (Gerbert), 55. 

Taine, 365. 

Talleyrand, policy of, 359 ; diplomacy 

of, 360. 
Terror, reign of, 219, 223-225, 368. 
Testry, battle of, in 687, 26-28. 
Teutonic blood, 3. 
Teutons, 11, 12, 14, 17 ; the Alaman- 

ni, 14 ; the Franks, 14. 
Theobald III, Count of Champagne, 

crusader, 70. 
Theobald V of Blois, crusader, 69. 
Theodolphus, the Goth, Bishop of 

Orleans, 45. 
Thermidor, reaction of, 225. 
Thibaut, Count of Champagne (atrou- 

vere), 83. 
Thierry, Augustin, 255-257. 
Thiers, 229, 250, 256-258, 264, 267, 

279, 280, 290, 302, 303, 360. 
Third Estate, the, 120, 159, 165, 166, 

213. 
Thirty Years' War, the, 159, 317. 
Thomas Aquinas, 100, loi. 
Tilsit, Peace of, 239, 240, 244. 
Tonquin, expedition to, 304. 
Toulouse, the county and city of, 79, 

80. 



400 



The French People 



Towns and country, 285, 298, 301. 

Towns, growth of power of, 73. 

Triple Alliance, the, of 1668, 322 ; of 
1717, 328 ; of 1788, 342 ; of Prus- 
sia, Austria, and Italy after the 
Franco-Prussian War, 361. 

Trochu, General, 295. 

Troubadours, the, 80. 

Troyes, Treaty of, 112. 

Turenne, 324. 

Turgot, 8, 198, 199, 202, 206. 

Turks, the Seljukian, 66. 

Ultramontane Church, 290 ; subjects, 

291. 
Universal suffrage, 272, 276, 278, 282, 

290, 296, 298, 308, 367, 369. 
University of France, 236, 237, 371. 
University of Paris, 96-98, 100, loi, 

115, 122. 
Urban II, Pope, decides to urge a 

holy war, 66. 
Utrecht, Treaty (or Peace) of, 185, 

192. 

Valois kings, the early, 156. 

Valtelline Valley, the, control of, 160. 

Vauban, 193. 

Vendemiaire, 225, 367. 

Vercingetorix, 13. 

Verdun, Treaty of (893), li, 47- 

Vergennes, 195, 200, 210, 288, 331,333. 
334 ; death of, 344. 

Vernet, Horace, 255, 263. 

Versailles, 172, 197, 201 ; the Assem- 
bly at, 300 ; Treaty of, 332. 



Victor Emmanuel, 288. 

Victor Hugo, 251, 255, 260, 261. 

Vienna, Peace of, 245. 

Villafranca, Treaty of, 288. 

Villehardouin, Geoffrey of, 70, 76; his 
history, loi. 

Villele, the, ministry, 251. 

Villemain, 250, 262. 

Visigoths, the, kingdom of, 14 ; sub- 
mission of, to Clovis, 19. 

Voltaire, 194, 204-208, 210, 215, 251. 

Vougle, battle of (a. d. 507), 16, 19. 

Wagram, Austria vanquished at, 245. 

Wallenstein, 160, 318. 

Walpole, 185, 328. 

Walter of Brienne, crusader, defeated 

near Gaza, 71. 
Wandewash, defeat of the French at, 

190. 
War of Liberation, the, 280. 
War, the, of 1792, 356, 357. 
Waterloo, battle of, 247. 
West India Company, the French, 

179. 
West Indies, the, 161, 179, 194. 
Westminster, Treaty of, 332. 
Westphalia, Treaty or Peace of, 157, 

168, 169. 
Willebrord, bishop of Frisia (690), 

28. 
William IX of Poitiers, poet, 76. 
Wolfe, capture of Quebec by, 188. 
Wolsey, 320. 

Zacharias, Pope, 29. 



THE END 



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